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Preface
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Columbia University
It is a great pleasure for me to write this preface for Roy Prosterman’s
landmark book on land tenure reform. – Roy and his colleagues at the
Rural Development Institute have been tilling this soil for four dec-
ades – long before the issue became fashionable.1 They have blended
first-rate scholarship with advocacy: an early, and often lonely, voice
recognizing the importance that access to land and security of land
tenure has in uplifting the lives of the poor in agrarian economies.
They have not only detailed these effects but also identified the me-
chanisms through which these benefits are realized. In most develop-
ing countries, most people depend for their livelihood on agriculture.
Land is thus an essential part of the means of production, but those at
the bottom typically have no land. Giving even small plots of land can
make enormous differences to their lives and the lives of their fa-
milies. Prosterman and his colleagues not only talk about the impor-
tance of land, they provide hard evidence.
But Roy and his colleagues are not Panglossian idealists. Their hard-
headed research will be a challenge for many a warm-hearted reformer:
land reform is not easy. They carefully document the successes and the
failures, paying close attention to the differences in circumstances of
the different countries. Their conclusions are at the same time sober-
ing and heartening. The numerous failures are often cited by critics of
land reform. Prosterman and his colleagues conclude that govern-
ments should purchase land, without compulsion, paying market
prices; and given the tight budget constraints facing many developing
countries, this limits the scope. At the same time, they argue that
micro-plots can have very high productivity and make a great deal of
difference. That means the government may not have to purchase huge
amounts of land to make a big difference to large numbers of the poor
in these countries.
I have long been an advocate of land reform, and in the following
paragraphs, I want to explain why, provide some suggestions of how
governments can lower the costs of market-based land reform, and
show what can be done to increase the prospects of successful land re-
form. Finally, Prosterman and his colleagues argue for the importance
of enhanced security of tenure. There are good reasons for this. But in
many countries, there is resistance. I want to explain at least part of
the cause of that resistance, making some suggestions of how we can
square this circle.
The rationale for land reform
One of my earliest papers was on land tenancy.2 I attempted to explain
the widespread practice of sharecropping. To most economists, this in-
stitution seemed strange – for sharecropping greatly attenuates incen-
tives. There are widespread complaints in developed countries about
tax rates that approach 50%, yet most workers in developing countries
have to turn over to their landlord 50% – in some cases 2/3 – of their
crop. I explained sharecropping in terms of balancing out concerns
over risk (landlords are better able to bear risks) and incentives (work-
ers need some incentives to motivate them, in a context where it is
costly for landlords to monitor workers). If workers were risk neutral
(and had access to capital), workers would rent land and would have
good incentives. If monitoring were costless, landlords would hire
workers and pay them a fixed wage, absorbing the risks of fluctuations
of output and price. Sharecropping represents a compromise. But
while it may be a good compromise, incentives are nonetheless attenu-
ated: workers do in general work less than they would if they owned
their own land. Redistributing land to workers should, in this theory,
result not only in more equity, but in greater output and efficiency.
These economic theories, based on the New Paradigm of Informa-
tion Economics,3 represented a marked break from conventional neo-
classical economics, which argued that one could separate issues of dis-
tribution from efficiency. The divergence between the distribution of
the ownership of land and the ownership of “labor” creates what are
called agency problems, which can have a large economic toll.
Perhaps this accounts for why many of the most successful develop-
ment stories began with land reform: Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and China.
In the case of other successes, like America, land was in ample supply.
Jefferson thought that the backbone of America was the small farmer
who owned his own plot of land.4
The first problem encountered in land to the tiller programs is that,
in most countries, the land has to be taken away from others. Those
from whom the land is being taken away don’t like it. This gives rise to
political problems, and without wholesale revolution (as in China),
these cannot be easily ignored. The standard mantra is that expropria-
tion of land undermines security of property rights, which are viewed
as sacrosanct. The violation of property rights itself has strong, adverse
incentive effects.
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But this argument against land expropriation is not always totally per-
suasive. Property rights are always circumscribed. Someone who buys
stolen property will lose that property if the rightful owner makes a
claim, even if the new “owner” paid good money for it. But questions
may be raised about the legitimacy of many land claims. In South
American countries, land was taken from the indigenous inhabitants.
Do they not have some legitimacy in reclaiming the land that was
theirs? So too in other countries where land is given away by colonial
masters. In many countries, there is a rethinking of the rights to land of
the aboriginal or indigenous inhabitants. In recent years, similar ques-
tions of legitimacy are being raised about property rights acquired in
the process of transition from communism to a market economy: many
of the old party bosses seemed to have simply grabbed state assets.
Nonetheless, there are many who, while recognizing these problems
with the legitimacy of land rights, believe that upsetting security of
property rights raises more problems that it resolves. That is perhaps
part of the reason that this book (and the World Bank) have in recent
years emphasized market-based land reform.
Market-based land reform, in which government purchases land at
market prices, faces a problem of finance. Poor countries are poor;
money spent to purchase land is money that could be spent on educa-
tion, rural roads, health, or other development projects. Where, in the
list of alternative ways of spending money to promote growth and alle-
viate poverty, should market-based land reform lie?
In principle, limitations of revenue with which to purchase land
should not be as great a problem as it seems to have been. For if the
land redistribution increases efficiency (consistent with the fact that
productivity on small plots can be high), then the government can lend
the money to the poor to buy the land. Large efficiency gains will ac-
crue to the new owners; if the purchase price from the old landowners
is based on the older, lower productivity, old landowners are just as
well off as they would otherwise have been. But the new formerly-land-
less are far better off. Everyone is a winner, and none of this costs gov-
ernment anything. The government is just an intermediary, facilitating
the efficient reallocation of land.
One problem with this “solution” is that poor tillers lack access to
capital and technology; without those, their plots will not be productive.
Thus, an essential aspect of a successful land reform must be the provision of
complementary inputs.
The IMF and its (distorted) accounting practices imposed a second
problem. If the government borrows to buy the land from the landlord,
and then lends on to the small farmer, its sole role is as an intermedi-
ary. It has both an asset (the mortgage) and a liability (the debt). But
IMF accounting only recognizes the liability, not the asset, and the
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IMF puts developing countries under enormous pressure not to in-
crease their indebtedness. Given the IMF’s continued focus on incen-
tives and the enervating effects of taxation, they should be enthusiastic
about land reforms that reduce the scope for sharecropping. But their
opposition may reflect not so much the economics of land reform but
the views of landholding elites, which have resisted such reforms.
Given budget limitations – and the need to finance complementary
inputs – it is important for government to reduce the price that it has
to pay for the land it acquires. There are three ways that it can do so.
First, it can impose a tax on unproductive land. (This can be assessed
either in terms of employment or value-added on the land. The latter
may be particularly effective if the country imposes a value-added or in-
come tax, because the result of the attempt to avoid the “underutilized
land” tax will be increased value-added tax revenue.) This will encou-
rage those who are not using their land to sell it – or alternatively pro-
vide the government with more money with which to buy the land
from those who are willing to sell it. Second, it can impose a progres-
sive land tax, a tax that increases with the size of landholdings (though
there are often problems in implementation, as large landholdings are
put into the names of different family members). Third, it can impose
a general land tax with a small-holder exemption, allowing landowners
to declare the value of their land, with the proviso that the government
would have the right to purchase the land at, say, 10% more than the
declared price. Again, this proposal has the advantage that if land-
owners declare a high price – which would forestall purchase – there
will be increased tax revenues with which to purchase land from those
who have declared a low price. This proposal can be accompanied by a
tax on land improvements (e.g., structures), with large penalties for
those who do not declare such improvements. In the past, it might
have been difficult to implement such a tax in countries with large
landholdings, but with satellite imaging, governments can now get an
accurate assessment. These measures may be used in combination to
lower the costs of acquisition and to generate revenues to facilitate land
acquisition in order to provide the complementary inputs necessary for
successful land reform.5
Security of land tenure
Economists have long argued for the importance of secure property
rights; without such security, there will not be the investments required
to increase productivity. Secure and transferable property rights facili-
tate the creation of credit markets, opening up access to the finance re-
quired to purchase better seeds, fertilizer, and other improvements.
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That is the theory. In practice, there are two problems. The first is
that even with secure collateral, credit markets typically do not work
well in developing countries, partly because land markets are not suffi-
ciently developed for land to be a good source of collateral, and partly
because in some countries, courts may be reluctant to enforce debt
contracts (forcing a poor farmer to turn over his land to a rich bank).
The second is that when land markets are working and courts are
willing to enforce debt contracts, a new set of problems arise: given the
high volatility of output and prices, and given the other vicissitudes fac-
ing the lives of the poor (an illness in the family forcing them to bor-
row to buy medicines) and the absence of insurance, there is a high
risk of the poor who borrow on the basis of land as collateral becoming
landless. Ironically, secure and transferable property rights can lead to
more landless peasants.
We began our discussion pointing out the high social and economic
costs of landlessness. But in many developing countries, if individuals
can borrow using their land as collateral, there is a significant risk that
they will borrow so much that there is a serious probability that they
will lose their land. In such societies, individuals face all sorts of large
risks – and have little means of insuring themselves against these
risks. There is, of course, variability in agricultural output and prices.
Matters have become worse: some of the miracle seeds are more sensi-
tive to weather variability. In India, international seed companies have
lobbied for weakening of germination standards. The more productive
hybrids and genetically modified varieties require the farmer to buy
seeds every year.
There is often little public availability of health services. The ad-
vances of modern medicine then present a two-edged sword: if a parent
gets sick, the child feels a natural obligation to buy the miracle medi-
cines that may prolong their life or alleviate their pain. The parent’s life
may be prolonged, but the child may become landless. Individuals bor-
row, moreover, for weddings, funerals, and other social obligations.
When two or more of these “risks” occur at once – a parent gets sick
and the weather turns bad – the individual is especially likely to lose
his land. (In India, matters often turn worse: there has been a rash of
suicides, in the thousands, as many think death is the only way of es-
caping the burden of debt.)
Just as land reform without complementary inputs may be counter-
productive, resulting in lower productivity, secure property rights with-
out protective insurance may increase landlessness.6 By contrast, re-
cent research has called into question the virtues of full security of land
rights. For instance, China’s increase in agrarian productivity occurred
well before there was any security of property rights; and even today,
there are leaseholds, not freeholds. In countries with limited land turn-
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over, land markets will be thin, and land will still not serve as a good
source of collateral. Moreover, as we have noted, courts may be reluc-
tant to enforce credit contracts when it entails dispossessing local inha-
bitants, and especially so if the inability to repay is a result of, say, bad
weather or a family tragedy. The approaches of the Grameen Bank,
BRAC, and other micro-credit schemes, which are not based on collat-
eral but on the creation of social capital, seem far more promising in
extending access to credit.7
Concerns about the creation of new landless peasants as a result of
transferable land rights has led some governments to devise still other
ways of facilitating credit, e.g., some fraction of the output can be used
as collateral. Thus, over the long run, in the absence of good insurance
markets (and there are never good insurance markets in developing
countries), partial or limited security of property rights (that is, for in-
stance, limitations in the transferability of ownership) may be prefer-
able to fully secure and transferable property rights. This serves as a re-
minder: in the world of second best, simplistic solutions, based on
market fundamentalism, may not serve a country’s interest as well as
more nuanced “compromises.”
Concluding remarks
As we have noted, land reform has been part of the early economic
strategies of several of the most successful developing countries. There
is a compelling case – made in this book and elsewhere – that provid-
ing more land to the tiller would reduce poverty and increase growth.
Yet in some places land ownership is becoming more concentrated, as
the ruling elites use their political power to garner for themselves one
of the country’s most important natural resources. Cambodia stands
out as an example. And while the international community often talks
about the concentration of income and wealth, they seldom discuss the
inequality of land ownership – and land may be much more unequally
distributed than either income or wealth. A Gini coefficient of income
inequality in excess of 0.4 is a sign of a highly unequal society – yet
Paraguay’s Gini coefficient for land inequality is, according to some
sources, in excess of 0.9!
In a world in which we are constantly confronted with equity and ef-
ficiency trade-offs, land reform is one of those rare instances of a policy
which simultaneously promotes both. Yet the issue has for too long
been neglected – perhaps because the elites in many of the developing
countries have done well by the status quo. It is a shame that the inter-
national institutions have not pushed this agenda more. This book puts
the issue back onto the agenda, and Roy Prosterman should be congra-
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tulated, not only for his tireless energy as an advocate, but also for his
deep work, presented here, providing nuanced arguments and detailed
evidence.
Notes
1 See, e.g., H. de Soto, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (Basic Books 2000).
2 J.E. Stiglitz, Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, 41(2) REVIEW OF ECONOMIC
STUDIES 219-255 (1974).
3 See J.E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, abbreviated
version of Nobel lecture, 92(3) AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 460-502 (2002).
4 I think, however, that there may be more to it than just a matter of incentives, but
these are deeper questions which will have to be left to another occasion.
5 There are further advantages of shifting the burden of taxation to land: long ago,
Henry George argued for the use of a land tax. See PROGRESS AND POVERTY (Cosimo
2005) (originally published in 1879). For more recent discussions of land taxes, see
Karla Hoff, Land Taxes, Output Taxes, and Sharecropping: Was Henry George Right?, in
K. Hoff, A. Braverman & J.E. Stiglitz, eds., THE ECONOMICS OF RURAL ORGANIZATION:
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (Oxford University Press 1993).
6 See, e.g., A. Braverman & J.E. Stigltiz, Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity and the
Dynamics of Inequality, in P. Bardhan, ed., THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF AGRARIAN INSTI-
TUTIONS 185-201 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989).
7 See, e.g., A. Haldar & J.E. Stiglitz, The Dialectics of Law and Development: Analyzing
Formality and Informality, paper prepared for the Initiative for Policy Dialogue’s Chi-
na Task Force (2008).
PREFACE 15

1 Poverty, law and land tenure reform
Tim Hanstad, Roy L. Prosterman and Robert Mitchell
I. Background
Global poverty is not just another problem. It is the most important
problem facing the world today. Despite the substantial economic and
social improvements made over the past several decades, the most
recent estimates (as calculated for 2005) are that 1.4 billion humans re-
main in extreme poverty, using the latest research and based on those
living on less than US$1.25 a day. This is up from previous estimates
of less than 1 billion people living in extreme poverty. According to
these new estimates, a total of 2.6 billion people were surviving on less
than US$2 per day.1 These poverty estimates were also made before
the recent sharp increases in food and energy prices.
Poverty is devastating wherever it exists. It robs people of life and
hope. It is the chief cause of world hunger – as of 2006, the FAO esti-
mated that 854 million people around the world lived in near-constant
hunger and malnourishment, an estimate again made before the very
large increases in basic food prices since that time.2 And hunger kills,
not usually through starvation, but through chronic malnutrition,
which is the most important contributing factor in child mortality.3
Globally, poverty remains largely a rural phenomenon. Of the 1.4 bil-
lion people in our world living on less than US$1.25 a day, about three-
quarters reside in rural areas.4 Especially in rural areas, and particu-
larly for poor families, land plays a dominant economic, social and po-
litical role. For these hundreds of millions of poor people, land is a
main vehicle for gaining social status and a political voice within their
communities, for providing nutrition and income for their families, for
establishing some measure of economic independence, for investing,
and for accumulating wealth and transferring it between generations.
The manner by which land rights are held, land conflicts are ad-
dressed, and land use is regulated affects:
– the ability of families to produce for their subsistence and generate
marketable surpluses;
– the social and economic status of families, including their group
identity;
– incentives for families to exert their own efforts to improve and in-
vest in the land, and to sustain the natural resource base;
– opportunities for families to access financial services;
– the ability of families to build and improve housing;
– opportunities for families to access government programs and parti-
cipate in the political process; and
– the capacity of families to build reserves to protect their assets dur-
ing periods of economic, climatic, health-related or other stress.
In sum, for the vast majority of people in developing countries, the nat-
ure of their rights to land largely defines their access to opportunity,
income, housing, economic and nutritional security, political power,
and social status within their community.5
Worldwide, in a macro-scale comparison, systems in which small
owner-operated farms dominate tend to achieve the highest yields per
hectare.6 A more specific set of illustrations of productivity compari-
sons from post-tenure-reform settings is given in Box 1.1.
Box 1.1. Land rights and farm productivity
Various aspects of these linkages are discussed in specific country
settings throughout the book. For example:
– Chinese farmers, beneficiaries of an initial reform that turned ten-
ant farmers into individual owners in the years immediately after
the Communists came to power (and before the disastrous collec-
tivization), increased grain production by 70% and farm incomes
by 85% in the seven years from 1949 to 1956 (Chapter 7).
– Taiwanese farmers, beneficiaries of a parallel reform in 1953 that
provided ownership to tenants, increased grain production by 60%
and farm income by 150% in the following 10 years (Chapter 2).
– South Vietnamese tenant farmers living in villages that implemen-
ted similar reforms during 1970-1973 increased rice production
by 30% in that time period, in the midst of a war (Chapter 2).
– In the Mexican state of Laguna, in the wake of the Mexican land
reform, small, individually cultivated ejidal farms created by the
land reform had a total factor productivity – calculated exclusive
of the farmer’s labor – that was 50% greater than for the collec-
tively farmed ejidos and 33% greater than for the pre-existing
large farms (Chapter 3).
– When the Chinese collective farms were later broken up, the re-
sulting individual farms initially increased grain production by
8.6% per year during 1980-1984, roughly 10 times the average
rate of increase prevailing under collectivitization (Chapter 7).
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Household access to land and secure rights to land have impacts be-
yond the level of individuals and families. Research has documented
a positive relationship between equitably distributed land and both
economic growth7 and poverty alleviation at the country level. A study
by two leading World Bank economists of 66 countries over the peri-
od 1960-2000 found that countries with a more broad-based distribu-
tion of land were characterized by higher levels of economic growth.8
Another study on the relationship between land access and poverty in
21 developing countries found that land concentration and a corre-
sponding lack of land access explained 69% of the variation in pov-
erty levels.9
While broader agricultural growth does lead to rural poverty allevia-
tion at the country level, it is not nearly as effective as broadening land
access. Analysis of the same 21 countries shows that a decrease in land
concentration by one-third leads to a one-half reduction of the poverty
level within 12 to 14 years. By contrast, agricultural growth of 3% per
year without a reduction in land concentration would take 60 years to
produce the same level of poverty reduction.10
Broad-based land distributions are also associated with greater social
peace and cohesion. History provides many examples where high rates
of landlessness, an inequitable distribution of land, or other land rights
deprivations have led to large-scale conflicts with devastating conse-
quences.11 In the 20th century, this included, for example, the great
civil conflicts in Mexico, Russia, Spain, China and Vietnam.12
For these reasons, many policy makers, development practitioners
and researchers have recognized – though with significant fluctuations
in the attention paid to the land issue over time – that providing impo-
verished rural people with access and secure rights to land is central to
reducing poverty, empowering poor people and communities, and pro-
moting both broader economic growth and social harmony.
This book explores the intersection of poverty, land and law in an ef-
fort to advance our understanding and insight as to how governments
might provide the poor with access and secure rights to land. Much of
what appears in individual chapters is informed by and documents the
experience of a group of lawyers who have had significant experience
in working with governments, international development agencies and
civil society groups to provide poor people with access and secure
rights to land. The approach to this work has been characterized by
several important shared values and biases, including a pro-poor bias,
a bias for approaches likely to have a large-scale impact, and a belief
that the law, in this as in many other aspects of international develop-
ment, has an important role to play. Over the past four decades, the
combined experience of the authors spans more than 40 countries and
totals more than 150 person-years. The authors, including the three
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who act as overall editors of this volume, have accumulated this experi-
ence through their joint and collaborative work at the Seattle-based Ru-
ral Development Institute, which is affiliated with the University of
Washington School of Law.
Improving and securing the relationship of poor families to land
persists as a crucial issue in much of the world. This is the central
question of “pro-poor land tenure reform’’ and the defining topic of
this book. We use the term “land tenure reform” rather than “land
reform” because the latter has often been understood to refer only to
redistributing rights to land. We define “pro-poor land tenure reform”
broadly to include reforms that increase the ability of the rural poor
and other socially marginalized groups to gain or protect access and
secure rights to land (see Box 1.2). We stress that not all land tenure
reforms are pro-poor (Zimbabwe’s disastrous “land reform” is a re-
cent and obvious example), but we sometimes use the terms inter-
changeably.
We write this book as lawyers with multi-disciplinary perspectives
who are collaboratively engaged in international development work.
This work has included desk and field research, technical assistance,
policy advocacy, developing legislation, training, and the design, im-
plementation and assessment of land tenure reform programs. Our
perspective as lawyers is likely to differ from that of members of other
disciplines – for example, economics, political science, agronomy, so-
ciology and anthropology – although we work with and draw heavily
upon insights from other disciplines in formulating our conclusions.
And our perspective as persons actively engaged not only in on-the-
ground research but in the formulation and implementation of poli-
cies, laws and programs affecting land tenure is also likely to be dif-
ferent from the perspective of those who are engaged in either desk
or field research that is not similarly action-linked. We hope, however,
that we can make the “legal element” of the discussion throughout
this book (and the linkages to recommendations for action) suffi-
ciently straightforward and understandable so as to engage and
inform those who approach these land tenure issues from other disci-
plines and perspectives. Indeed, communication about these issues
across disciplines and backgrounds is one of our central goals in writ-
ing this book.
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Box 1.2. Defining terms
“Land tenure,” simply put, is the relationship between people and
land. That relationship is typically defined in terms of various “land
rights” such as rights relating to possession, exclusion, use, transfer
and enjoyment.
“Land tenure reforms” are structural and large-scale changes to
the relationship between people and land.
“Pro-poor land tenure reforms” are reforms that increase the abil-
ity of the poor and other marginalized groups to gain or protect
access and secure rights to land. Pro-poor land tenure reforms are
typically designed to advance one or more of three objectives, often
in concert:
1. Broaden access to land by the poor and other marginalized
groups;
2. Improve “land tenure security” (see below) for the poor and
other marginalized groups concerning land rights they presently
possess;
3. Improve, in terms of both substantive rules and process, the
capacity of public sector land-related institutions to serve the pub-
lic generally and protect the interests of the poor in particular.
“Land tenure security” exists when an individual or group can confi-
dently enjoy rights to a specific piece of land on a long-term basis,
protected from dispossession by outside sources, and with the ability
to reap the benefits of investments in the land, at least through use
and, probably desirably in most settings, also through transfer of the
land rights to others.
II. Characteristics of land tenure systems
Land tenure can generally be defined as the set of rules and relation-
ships among people concerning the use, development, transfer and
succession of rights to land. Land tenure rules define the rights held
and duties owed concerning land by private and public actors, by indi-
viduals and by groups.
Four characteristics of land tenure systems are fundamental for un-
derstanding land tenure reforms. First, land tenure systems evolve,
and understanding the general patterns of that evolution is crucial in
designing reform interventions. Second, land tenure systems are com-
plex, pluralistic and overlapping. Third, land tenure systems vary
widely from place to place depending on historic, cultural, social, politi-
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cal and economic factors. Fourth, and finally, the law is an important
factor in shaping the structure of a land tenure system. We examine
each of the first three characteristics below; since the fourth character-
istic is closely connected to the book’s central theme, we consider it at
greater length and in a separate section.
Evolving nature of land tenure systems
In any given setting, the land tenure system has evolved in response to
changing economic, social and political factors and will continue to
evolve in response to those factors. Economists have long used the con-
cept of induced innovation to explain how, with increased population
density, more intensive economic activity, and advancing technology,
societies develop a more precise definition of property rights to provide
an improved incentive framework for investment and efficient econom-
ic activity.13 In general, societies tend to adopt more defined and indivi-
dualized land tenure rights as the population density increases, as
land-related investments become more necessary and profitable, and as
other factors increase the value of land.14 This evolutionary pattern is
sometimes steady and gradual, but more often long periods of relative
stability are punctuated by periods of rapid change brought about by
significant economic, political or social events. Understanding the
“hows,” “whys” and “whens” of land tenure system evolution is crucial
for considering whether and how to reform a given system to provide
opportunity to the poor and marginalized.
A common theme in the development literature concerning the evol-
ving nature of property rights and land tenure systems is an efficiency
thesis: that all systems evolve efficiently in a cost-minimizing direction
in response to a changing technological and economic environment.
According to this thesis, social groups adopt particular property rights
regimes and change their land tenure system because the benefits
from doing so exceed the costs, implying that society will always gain.15
A common inference of the thesis is that social groups should be left
to themselves to adopt and adapt land tenure systems and the state
should generally assume a “hands off” approach other than formaliz-
ing what the social groups have developed.
While this efficiency thesis has some explanatory value, it is often
faulty, particularly when different social groups interact, a state makes
laws, or a strong group overpowers others. Historical examples such as
the institution of slavery, the dispossession of indigenous peoples in
many regions, and Stalin’s treatment of the Ukrainian kulaks pose pro-
blems for the efficiency thesis.16
In this book, we align with the revised version of the efficiency thesis
offered by Robert Ellickson who asserts that the thesis applies only to
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land rules within a closely knit group.17 However, land rules created in
other settings – including rules created by states, which almost always
apply to a society larger than the closely knit group – do not necessarily
proceed efficiently in a manner that produces overall societal benefits.
We take Ellickson’s proposition a step further and assert that land ten-
ure rules created by states are likely to generate negative impacts on
marginalized groups within the broader society unless the state takes
pro-active and informed steps to protect and benefit such groups, in-
cluding through the design and implementation of land tenure rules.
This issue will arise with special acuteness in Chapter 8, which dis-
cusses formalization of rural land rights.
Complexity of land tenure systems
One can analyze the complexity and multi-dimensionality of land ten-
ure systems in a number of ways. Our own framework of analysis rec-
ognizes four generalizations: (1) there is no single best model for defin-
ing land rights or land tenure systems; (2) land tenure systems cannot
be considered solely with regard to their material effects; (3) land ten-
ure systems are often pluralistic within a given setting; and (4) such
systems vary substantially from country to country.
First, there is no single best model for defining land rights, and wide
variation exists even among highly developed land rights systems.
Although land rights are often, for purposes of general typology, cate-
gorized using terms such as ownership or lease or usufruct, such con-
cepts are deceptively simplistic.
Summary presentations in Western legal theory may focus on two or
three aspects of land rights as central. One recent formulation, for ex-
ample, emphasizes transferability and freedom of use: “Holding a fee
simple [i.e., an ownership right] allows owners to convey and devise it
to whomever they please. It allows them to use it in ways their own
self-interest dictates, free from the claims of their children or their an-
cestors.”18 Others have emphasized the aspect of exclusivity: “[T]he es-
sence of private property is always the right to exclude others.”19 Each
aspect, however, can involve multiple and complex rights.
Especially in Anglo-American legal theory, land property rights are
also often analogized as a “bundle of sticks,” with significant emphasis
given to various legal interests (sticks) into which “complete property”
(the bundle) may be divided.20 European civil law theory takes a more
or less similar approach, viewing land tenure rights (and property
rights generally) as including six kinds of legally protected “expecta-
tions”: (i) a right of possession; (ii) a right of exclusion; (iii) a right of
disposition; (iv) a right of use; (v) a right to enjoy profits; and (vi) a
right of destruction.21 While none of these theories of land property
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rights is entirely satisfactory, each illustrates that land rights are com-
plex. Moreover, the limits of the individual incidents vary among Wes-
tern market economies.22
Second, land tenure systems involve much more than economics
and cannot be treated in policy terms that consider only material di-
mensions. Land tenure systems also have anthropological, political and
social dimensions that influence the non-material aspects of life in
important ways. Land tenure rules set the platform for social and politi-
cal institutions.23 Land tenure reform that focuses on only one dimen-
sion to the exclusion of others is almost certain to fail to achieve its
goals. The importance of the often-ignored social status dimension is
discussed in Chapter 4. Broadly speaking, traditional societies based on
customary laws tend to emphasize the social dimension of land tenure
systems, while modern, market-oriented societies tend to emphasize
the economic dimension.24
Third, land tenure systems are often pluralistic in developing coun-
try settings; that is, in a given setting, one is likely to find a combina-
tion of different land tenure systems. Consider the following example.
A developing country that was previously colonized by a European
power has adopted a land tenure system resembling the system operat-
ing in the former colonial power. In a highly commercialized city of
the developing country land parcels have been carefully surveyed, are
individually owned, and are frequently sold, leased and mortgaged ac-
cording to the national law. Meanwhile, in a forested, sparsely popu-
lated area several hours from that city, a closely knit society of forest
dwellers operates under a customary land tenure system that predates
the colonial occupation and which evolved separately and slowly over
the past 500 years. The forest dwellers do not consider land to be a
commodity. They coordinate land use and possession through a com-
plex balancing of community and household rights and duties.
Although the country’s rulers hold that the statutory land law followed
in the city also governs the forest dwellers, the latter are not aware of
that law, nor has it much impacted their lives (although that may soon
change). Meanwhile, an agricultural area closer to the city involves ele-
ments of both land tenure systems. While some residents continue to
consider ancestral land as integral to their identity and follow custom-
ary land tenure rules, others sell their land to outsiders. Some sell land
based on a handshake, without registering the transaction, while others
sell using formal written contracts and register the land sales according
to the statutory law.
This hypothetical example serves to illustrate how pluralistic land
tenure systems can overlap, influence each other, and occupy the same
space. Patrick McAuslan uses the notion of three “circuits” of land rela-
tions present in many developing countries. The first and lowest circuit
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is customary land and its regulation via traditional processes. It exists
principally, but not exclusively, in certain rural settings. The second cir-
cuit is an unofficial or informal market in land regulated by custom
and practice, which exists principally in urban and peri-urban areas,
but is growing in rural society. The third and upper circuit is the mod-
ern official land market regulated by statutory law codes interpreted
and applied by professionals and state officials. It exists in both urban
and rural settings.25
Finally, because land tenure systems evolve and are multi-layered,
they vary substantially from country to country. Differing historic, cul-
tural, social, political and economic factors compound the difference.
The situational specificity of land tenure systems means that it is
usually not possible to take a system that seems to function well in one
country and transplant that system into another country. This, too of-
ten, was a path followed by colonial powers and is one sometimes fol-
lowed by international development agencies and development practi-
tioners today.
These issues are touched upon in Chapter 8, which considers pro-
blems of possible elimination of some layers of existing rights where
formalization attempts to simplify or consolidate multiple customary
rights in a single holder; and Chapter 5, which discusses the frequent
problem of allocation of rights to the male “head of household,” exclud-
ing women from the titling or rights certification process.
III. The role of law in influencing land tenure systems
Development experts and policy makers commonly either over-estimate
or under-estimate the role that law plays in influencing land tenure
systems. When considering land tenure reform, it is useful to keep in
mind several points. First, formal law and customary law often co-exist
in a single setting. Second, although law is but one factor influencing
people’s behavior, it can be a crucial tool for good or ill in reforming
land tenure. Finally, the role of formal law in influencing land tenure
systems depends on the extent to which the rule of law exists.
Sources of law: formal and customary
Let us start by defining what we mean by the various types of “law”
that shape land tenure systems. Many conventional concepts of land
tenure focus exclusively on land tenure rules defined in state legisla-
tion. In practice, however, many land tenure systems are more properly
understood as being comprised of an amalgamation of interacting mul-
tiple legal orders – national government, sub-national government,
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local, customary and religious – each of which might separately provide
a basis for claiming particular land rights. In approaching land tenure
reform, one must recognize and understand the implications of legal
pluralism where it exists. (One must also recognize that there are de-
veloping societies where such pluralism may not be a significant phe-
nomenon, or where it exists primarily with respect to areas inhabited
by small minorities of the population, such as forest dwellers or pastor-
alists.)
For purposes of this book, we define “law” as a rule of conduct or
procedure established by custom, agreement or authority. Legal orders
can be broadly categorized into either formal law or customary law.
Formal law is written and issued (and expected to be enforced) by a
state authority. It includes constitutional provisions, national statutes,
provincial and local government laws and regulations, judicial case law,
and government program and project rules. Customary law typically is
unwritten, applies within a self-identified group and grows out of that
group’s traditions and experience.
Because customary law is typically unwritten, it can be “invisible” to
outsiders. Many traditional societies or subgroups have a deeply em-
bedded preference for customary law approaches regarding questions
of land access, use, inheritance or market transfers. These customary
laws can be fundamental expressions of culture and tradition, derived
in turn from a combination of spiritual beliefs, history, geography, eco-
nomics and other factors. Although customary law is a prominent legal
regime governing land tenure in many rural areas of developing coun-
tries – including large portions of Africa, Southeast Asia and the South
Pacific – customary land tenure law is rarely recognized in formal legal
systems.
Land tenure systems governed by customary law are very often de-
scribed as “communal tenure” systems. The term “communal” can be
misleading in this context because it can be misunderstood to imply
common ownership of all resources or collective production, each of
which is relatively rare.26 Customary law systems of land tenure are
generally “communal” only in the sense that the community exercises
a degree of control over who is allowed into the group, and the fact that
group members qualify for an allocation of land for residence and
cropping, as well as rights of access to the group’s common property
resources.27 Such systems are better understood as mixed tenure sys-
tems comprised of bundles of individual, family, sub-group and larger
group rights and duties concerning a variety of natural resources. The
community usually allocates residential and arable land to individuals
or families, who most often hold them with strong and secure rights
and cultivate them separately. Families and larger clusters of house-
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holds sometimes also have preferential rights to common pool re-
sources such as water sources or desirable grazing areas.
Two important general differences should be noted between formal
land tenure law and customary land tenure law. The first is the issue
of land alienability (i.e., transferability). Most formal (at least Western)
land tenure law systems allow for relatively unrestricted alienation of
land rights, or at least do not normally distinguish between alienability
within or outside a given social group. Customary land tenure law sys-
tems often prohibit alienation of land rights to outsiders, but allow alie-
nation within the group.
The second difference is the degree to which the land possessor may
exclude others. Formal systems typically emphasize the right of right-
holders to exclude others, whereas customary law more typically
emphasizes inclusivity and the right not to be excluded.28 Depending
on the potential uses of the land, this may give rise to multiple or
layered rights in which a household that plants and harvests a particu-
Figure 1.1. Typology of property rights in land
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lar crop may be different from (or merely included within) other or lar-
ger groups that can graze animals, gather branches or mushrooms, se-
lectively harvest trees, etc.
Those considering land tenure reform must understand the extent
and nature of customary law regimes that may presently govern por-
tions of national territories and populations that are to be included
within the purview of the formal land tenure law. People functioning
under such regimes are much more likely to accept the formal law
(and the state will consequently find it much easier to implement the
formal law) if that law utilizes concepts already present in the custom-
ary law.29 Robin Mearns has distinguished between the legal legitimacy
and the social legitimacy of land tenure rights in India and has devel-
oped a useful typology of common land tenure rights according to
these parameters (see Figure 1.1).
Problems occur when socially legitimate customary land rights are
made illegal by formal law (lower left quadrant of Figure 1.1), or when
the formal law legalizes land rights that are either not recognized by or
prohibited by customary law (upper right quadrant). Where both for-
mal and customary law operate in the same space (as in McAuslan’s
“second circuit” described earlier) and there is wide and consistent di-
vergence between the formal and customary law, some breakdown in
the rule of law typically results – either in the rule of formal law, in the
rule of customary law, or both.
Law as one of many factors influencing behavior
Common sense dictates that the behavior of people and government
agencies is influenced by much more than just law. Professors Ann
and Robert Seidman use models for legal system functioning that por-
tray whether and how laws impact behavior.30 Efforts to use law as a
tool for social and economic transformation – such as land tenure re-
form – can benefit from these models.31
Laws can only facilitate social and economic transformation by chan-
ging the repetitive behaviors of both law-implementing institutions
and the citizens who are to be governed, benefited or regulated by the
law. Formal laws can be thought of as instructions to both audiences:
law-implementing institutions and citizens. However, the behavior of
both groups is influenced by much more than just the law. Law-imple-
menting institutions and ordinary people decide how to behave by
choosing among constraints and resources characteristic of their speci-
fic environments – including the law.32 Non-legal constraints and re-
sources include the objective conditions in which people live (econom-
ic, social, geographic, cultural, political, etc.), their subjective interests,
values and ideologies, and their expectations as to how the law-imple-
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menting institutions will behave. All of this occurs in the context of
country-specific circumstances and with dynamic feedback loops
among the actors.
It is clear from this model, which accords with our experience in
practice, that pro-poor land tenure law reform must be accomplished
with an understanding of the “ground realities” – for both the people
subject to the law and the institutions tasked with implementing the
law. Understanding these ground realities requires research. And the
research must go beyond observing behavior and actions to examine
the factors that influence such behavior and actions. Law reform not
informed by such research will succeed only through serendipity. What
kind of research is needed, and how should it be directed?
We identify several categories of legal and non-legal factors that in-
fluence the behavior of people and implementing authorities in the
face of laws.33 All should be carefully considered and studied in the
early stages of land tenure reform. The following categories of factors
can provide a general map to guide research into existing incentives or
behaviors embedded in the particular country-specific circumstances
that affect reform of land tenure law and institutions:
1. Rules. Which existing laws, both formal and customary, apply to the
actions of people and implementing authorities, here with respect
to the subject of land tenure?
2. Awareness of rules. To what extent do people and implementing
authorities know of and understand existing rules?
3. Opportunity and capacity to obey the rules. Do people and implement-
ing authorities have the opportunity and capacity to follow the
rules?
4. Decision to follow the rules. To what extent are people and imple-
menting authorities interested in following the rules, and what fac-
tors influence such interest?34
Only with research in hand that encompasses these factors will law-
makers and their advisors be able to assess the needs and possibilities
for fashioning new or additional rules affecting land tenure in a parti-
cular setting.
Rule of law
While law does play an important role in shaping land tenure systems,
the capacity of the law and legal institutions to help drive land tenure
reform depends, in part, on the relative existence of the rule of law or,
in other words, the overall effectiveness of the entire legal system.35
Effective legal systems share certain general characteristics fundamen-
tal to facilitating efficient and equitable economic and social develop-
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ment. These include predictability, fairness, rapid adjudication, and the
degree to which the legal system is consistent with customs, norms
and levels of administrative resources.
Predictability. Predictability of the legal system is important for indu-
cing economic growth. If the legal system allows economic actors to
predict the legal consequences of their activities and the state apparatus
can be mobilized to enforce those consequences, this is likely to encou-
rage such actors to pursue economic opportunities that they might
otherwise consider too risky. A legal system that lacks the element of
predictability (e.g., the rule of “readjustment” of land rights in China,
discussed in Chapter 7) will not encourage economic initiative. If a le-
gal system is to afford sufficient predictability, it must include substan-
tive and procedural rules that are written, published and widely known
– hence not just published, but publicized. The legal system should
spell out very clearly the procedures necessary to enforce legally pro-
tected rights and interests. The procedural and substantive rules
should also be simple, precise and unambiguous.
Fairness. Effective legal systems also place a heavy emphasis on the
relative “fairness” of the law. Laws should apply equally to all regardless
of public connections or private power. Moreover, both substantive and
procedural laws should provide for “due process” – open and unrest-
ricted access to public courts and administrative bodies for airing legal
grievances and enforcing legal rights.36 A legal system that tolerates
the unequal application of legal standards or permits the arbitrary exer-
cise of power without legal recourse tends to induce passivity and re-
sentment by citizens, neither of which is conducive to encouraging
widespread participation in economic activity. (See, for example, the
discussion in Chapter 7 relating to opaque and unequal application of
land expropriation rules and the resulting problems in China.)
Rapid adjudication of disputes. Rapid adjudication of disputes facili-
tates economic initiative and activity. Too many legal systems have an
unfortunate propensity for long delays before disputes are finally re-
solved. Such delays can be addressed by increasing the number of
judges or courts to handle anticipated litigation, keeping formalized
procedural rules to a minimum, establishing administrative procedures
to solve some problems without recourse to courts, and encouraging
private dispute resolution through mediation or arbitration. The appro-
priate balance between rapid adjudication and standards of fairness is
likely to include publicized and enforced rules specifically defining and
limiting administrative authority and discretion.37 (Aspects of this are
discussed in Chapters 6 and 8.)
Consistency between legal rules and the society’s customs, norms
and administrative resources. To remain effective, no legal system can
depart far from the traditions of the people it serves. Unless the people
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consider the laws and law-enforcing mechanisms to be fair and legiti-
mate, the costs of law adjudication and enforcement will be prohibitive.
Law should remain as consistent as possible with a country’s econom-
ic, social and political fabric even as it attempts to reform that fabric.
The design of the legal system must also reflect the country’s adminis-
trative resources and capabilities. Law reformers should take into ac-
count such resources and capabilities when drafting substantive and
procedural rules to ensure that the administrative structure can actually
implement the rules. These resources and capabilities differ signifi-
cantly among developing countries.
IV. Pro-poor land tenure reforms
Pro-poor land tenure reforms increase the ability of the rural poor and
other marginalized groups to gain access to land and also to secure
rights to land already possessed. Pro-poor land tenure reforms can be
designed to advance one or more of three objectives: (1) broadening
land access for the poor and other marginalized groups; (2) improving
land tenure security for the poor and other marginalized groups to
land rights they possess; and (3) improving the capacity of public sector
land institutions to serve the public generally and protect the interests
of the poor in particular (see Box 1.2).
Broadening access to land
Our analysis of land tenure reform objectives distinguishes between ac-
cess to land and tenure security. The primary distinction between ef-
forts to broaden land access and those that improve land tenure secur-
ity relates to the fact of land possession. Simply put, broadening land
access involves providing possession, at a minimum, to those who lack
possession of land, whereas improving land tenure security involves se-
curing and broadening the rights of those who already possess land.
Land tenure reforms can involve efforts to improve tenure security
without efforts to broaden access to land. But most efforts to broaden
access will also include measures to provide greater tenure security to
those who receive access.
The distinction and interaction between land access and secure
tenure are portrayed in Figure 1.2. A person may have both access and
secure tenure to land, which is represented by the upper left quadrant
of the figure. In general, land tenure reforms should aim to move lar-
ger numbers of people into this upper left quadrant. The upper right
quadrant represents those who have access to land, but not secure
rights. Examples include informal, at-will tenants (such a tenancy is ter-
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minable at the “will” of either party), most of those women whose hus-
bands have independent legal rights to the “family’s” landholding, and
“squatters” or informal possessors on land claimed by the government.
When people lack access to land, they almost always lack secure
rights. That is, the vast majority of people who exist in the lower half
of the matrix exist in the lower right quadrant. Among the rare in-
stances where a person lacks possession, but has a secure right, are
cases where the landowner does not have the right of possession. (Note
that the figure does not readily accommodate workers or “members”
on collective farms, who might be thought of as akin to agricultural la-
borers on a plantation but, unlike those laborers, usually having secure
job rights.)
A considerable literature documents the social and economic impor-
tance of land access, and especially secure and long-term land access,
for individuals and families,38 as well as the importance of broad access
to land at the macro-level for a country’s development prospects.39 Yet
large numbers of rural families in many developing countries are com-
pletely landless, in the sense that they lack secure and meaningful pos-
session of any land.40
Most efforts to carry out large-scale land rights reforms have in-
volved moving poor agricultural families from either the upper-right or
lower-right quadrant in Figure 1.2 to the upper-left quadrant: that is,
providing for either insecure tenant farmers (and nearly all tenant
Figure 1.2. Land access and secure tenure
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families who are among the poor have insecure rights) or landless agri-
cultural laborers to become owner-operators.41
Reforms aimed at enabling tenants to become owners have typically
involved state expropriation – with varying degrees of compensation –
of some or all of the land held by landlords that is rented out to
tenants. Chapter 2 examines the very successful post-World War II
“land-to-the-tiller” programs in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (and si-
milar successful programs in South Vietnam and El Salvador, with
which RDI lawyers were involved), as well as a number of failed pro-
grams.
One of the more striking evolutions in our own views on land tenure
reform since 1987, when author Prosterman wrote, with Jeffrey Riedin-
ger, “Land Reform and Democratic Development,”42 is our conclusion
that there are very few settings in which state-mandated land-to-the-til-
ler programs giving ownership to tenant farmers are likely to be feasi-
ble today. And, while we continue to hold to the conclusion in the ear-
lier book that legal regimes to regulate the continuing landlord-tenant
relationship are unlikely to work in developing countries, we now con-
clude that lawful and unregulated landlord-tenant arrangements, still
vastly inferior to land ownership, nonetheless represent a large step up
the ladder out of poverty for agricultural laborers. Hence, in many set-
tings, it may be worth the effort to dismantle restrictions and regula-
tions of the agricultural landlord-tenant relationship that have clearly
failed, giving greater scope for legal landlord-tenant arrangements.
Reforms aimed at helping agricultural laborers to become owner-
operators have typically involved attempts by the state to expropriate
larger landholdings above a certain size or “ceiling,” or sometimes ex-
propriation of entire plantations. There have been few successes here,
although RDI lawyers have been close observers of one such program,
in El Salvador, that was moderately successful, and two programs that
failed, in Nicaragua and in the Philippines. Chapter 3 examines these
efforts.
Broadening land access through large-scale expropriation of land is a
politically charged approach. Success requires strong political resolve
and widespread support in society. Both because of the political chal-
lenges and the relatively frequent failure of expropriatory reforms, for-
eign assistance donors, most notably the World Bank, have increasingly
promoted voluntary efforts to broaden land access through market
mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter 3 (and briefly in Chapter 6),
although market-oriented approaches have shown some potential in
certain settings, they have also aroused considerable opposition and
controversy.
Here we conclude that in the future there may actually be more
scope for well-conceived programs to distribute land to agricultural
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laborers than for land-to-the-tiller programs, whether based on expro-
priating private land with market-price compensation, on voluntary
market-based purchases of private land, or on the distribution of appro-
priate and existing public land. Such programs to benefit agricultural
laborers would likely focus on public land or on low-value unused (or
underutilized) large private landholdings.
However, traditional programs to provide land access both for ten-
ants and agricultural laborers have almost always focused on the provi-
sion of a “family farm” (or equivalent aliquot share on a larger farming
unit) sufficient to provide the beneficiary family’s entire livelihood. Pro-
viding such farms, usually close to the median size of existing farms in
the country, typically requires a set of legal measures that would ac-
quire and distribute anywhere from 10% to 40% of arable land, de-
pending on the proportion of tenants and agricultural laborers in the
rural population. The resulting political and financial hurdles are often
insuperable, and setting the financial land-valuation hurdle lower inevi-
tably means setting the political feasibility hurdle much higher. Thus,
it is of growing interest that programs are now emerging to provide
ownership of a micro-plot, often of a house-and-garden plot (or home-
garden) of a fraction of an acre, as a supplement to the existing liveli-
hood of a tenant or laborer family that presently lacks any access to
land of their own. Such programs may require 1% or less of the coun-
try’s arable land, be affordable even when paying full market price on a
willing seller-willing buyer basis, and hence face far fewer political ob-
stacles. This approach is discussed in Chapter 4, as well as in Chapter 6.
Improving land tenure security
Secure land tenure rights are clearly an important component of eco-
nomic development generally, and rural development specifically. Such
rights are exercised not only by individual possessors, but often by lar-
ger social groups.
Land tenure security has been defined and measured in a variety of
ways. Although differing notions of land tenure rights make it difficult
to develop a simple objective definition of land tenure security, the fol-
lowing definition identifies several key concepts.
Land tenure security exists when an individual or group is confi-
dent that they have rights to a piece of land on a long-term ba-
sis, protected from dispossession by outside sources, and with
the ability to reap the benefits of labor and capital invested in
the land, whether through direct use or upon transfer to another
holder.43
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The authors of this definition then go on to suggest, in an analysis that
we find highly useful, that regardless of the land tenure system, land
tenure security can then be assessed using three important measures:
breadth, duration and assurance.44 Breadth refers to the quantity and
quality of the land rights held (the sticks in the bundle),45 which may
include rights to possess land to the exclusion of others, to grow or har-
vest crops, to pass rights on to heirs, to sell land or to lease it to others,
to pledge land rights as security for credit, and to build structures.46
One important aspect of breadth involves transferability of rights.
The right to transfer one’s land rights can encompass market transfers
(e.g., sale or rental) as well as non-market transfers (e.g., inheritance).
If land possessors can transfer their land rights through sale and rental
markets, this can encourage them to invest in their land to increase its
productivity and long-term value. The ability to transfer land rights also
gives the possessors greater options to diversify their livelihoods and
react effectively to changing economic and non-economic forces. The
right to mortgage one’s land rights can also be a source of finance for
major land improvement and acquisition of additional land (through
so-called “purchase money mortgages”).
In theory, land sale rights are the most effective way of combining
efficient transfers of rights without sacrificing long-term tenure secur-
ity for possessors. However, in environments characterized by market
imperfections, especially in credit and insurance markets, land rental
transfers may produce greater efficiency and equity than land sales.47
In any case, land rental markets are likely to develop earlier than land
sales markets and are likely to be a more practicable means for the
poor to access land. International experience indicates that efforts
aimed at encouraging land rental markets that are combined with mea-
sures to reduce credit and insurance market imperfections are likely to
have much greater benefits than an exclusive concentration on land
sales markets.48
The second measure of tenure security is duration, which refers to
the length of time for which tenure rights are valid. Typically, the same
duration applies to every stick in the bundle of rights, but this is not
necessarily so. Longer durations imply greater tenure security. Owner-
ship or equivalent rights are perpetual, but other long-term rights may
provide similar incentives to land possessors and give rise to similar
behavior. Chapter 7 discusses the impact of the 30-year land rights
being given in rural China.
Assurance, the third measure, refers to the certainty of the breadth
and duration of the land rights. If an individual is said to possess land
rights of a specific breadth and duration but has difficulty exerting or
enforcing those rights, the assurance of the rights is compromised. A
land “right” that cannot be exerted or enforced is not a meaningful
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right, and the more costly it is to enforce the right (in money, time or
effort), the less valuable it is.
In sum, adequate tenure security exists when an individual or group
with rights to land possesses key rights for a duration sufficiently long
to recoup the value of investments made on the land, and with enough
assurance to prevent outside interference. Conversely, tenure insecurity
exists where an individual or group possesses an inadequate breadth of
meaningful rights, the duration of those rights is insufficient to recoup
investments made, or the ability to enforce rights is lacking.49
Compared to weak or insecure rights, secure land rights can facili-
tate economic development in a variety of ways, including:
1. raising productivity through increased agricultural investment;50
2. increasing land transactions and facilitating transfer of land from
less efficient to more efficient uses (and more efficient users) by in-
creasing the certainty of contracts and lowering enforcement costs;
3. reducing the incidence of land disputes through clearer definition
and enforcement of rights;
4. increasing access to and use of credit by improving ability of bor-
rowers to use land as collateral;
5. increasing investments in housing or other structures on the land;
6. increasing the underlying value of the land;51
7. reducing the amount of resources individual owners must spend on
defending their interests, which allows them to participate more
fully in productive work not tied to the land;52
8. reducing soil erosion and other environmental degradation to land
as the result of incentives to improve stewardship of land;53
9. creating political stability by providing farmers a more significant
stake in society;54 and
10. reducing pressure for farmers to migrate prematurely to urban
areas.55
These points are further discussed in Chapter 8.
Although tenure security is often promoted for economic objectives,
improving tenure security also typically results in less stress, improved
peace of mind and a greater hope for the future for those individuals,
families or groups who receive it.56 More broadly, secure land tenure
widely held by the rural population may play an important role in poli-
tical empowerment, democratization and the institutions of civil
society.57 These benefits may be difficult to quantify, but they are just
as real – and perhaps even more important – than the quantifiable eco-
nomic benefits.
Most land tenure reforms include efforts to improve land tenure se-
curity for individuals or groups that possess land but have insecure ten-
ure. These efforts include both giving greater rights (sometimes “own-
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ership”) to agricultural tenants (the topic of Chapter 2), issuing titles to
certify land ownership or other secure rights to land (the topic of Chap-
ter 8), and other measures to increase tenure security for non-tenant
possessors (such as those in China which are the topic of Chapter 7).
Titling, customary tenure systems and common property resources
Land tenure reforms often include measures to increase tenure secur-
ity for land possessors whose possession is not based upon tenancy or
license from a landowner. The most common method is generally de-
scribed as “titling” – issuing titles or functionally equivalent documen-
tation to land possessors to certify that the state acknowledges their
right to possess the land. These efforts and variations upon them, their
impacts, risks and limitations are discussed in Chapter 8 and are also
referenced in Chapters 6 and 7.
Even though formal title can increase tenure security in many situa-
tions, experience indicates it is not always necessary for optimal tenure
security.58 Moreover, even when formal title is a necessary condition
for tenure security, it is often not a sufficient condition. A variety of
methods are available for providing tenure security that can be admi-
nistered in a cost-effective way through institutions that combine legal-
ity with social legitimacy.
Where customary law systems are strong, state recognition of exist-
ing customary rights and institutions can be more effective than at-
tempts to provide individual titles based on Western concepts. Legally
recognizing customary land rights can improve tenure security for both
the customary group as a whole and for its individual members. In par-
ticular, demarcating the external boundaries of the group’s land can de-
crease the threat of encroachment by outsiders.59
Common property resources (CPR) are often discussed interchange-
ably with customary land tenure systems, but should be analyzed sepa-
rately. They may include many areas of forest, dryland pasture, wet-
lands and surface waters. Most customary tenure systems include
some CPRs and some individually held resources, and land tenure sys-
tems governed by formal law may also include CPRs. CPRs are
resources that are shared by different users, who often hold varying
rights. The physical nature or non-continuous and non-intensive use of
the resource typically makes it difficult for the primary users to exclude
other users, yet the use of the resource by one user necessarily reduces
the supply available to others. Many CPRs are common to members of
a defined group, and the group actively excludes non-members from
use. The group may develop use customs that have the effect of limit-
ing the extent of each member’s use of the CPR.
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CPRs are of particular importance for securing the livelihoods of
poor and marginalized groups in society. Improving their tenure secur-
ity in CPRs is crucial not only for sustaining and improving livelihoods
but for providing the user groups with the necessary tools and incen-
tives for conserving the resource base on which they depend.60
Land rights of women
The rights of women deserve special attention in all land tenure reform
efforts, but should play a particularly important role in efforts to im-
prove land tenure security. Past land tenure reforms typically ignored
women’s rights, focusing only on the household as a unit – a unit vir-
tually always taken to be represented by a male (when an adult male is
present). Women’s land rights almost always require strengthening,
under both formal and customary law. On this topic – in which “land
law” may overlap and interact with “family law” – the limitations of for-
mal law are particularly evident. While legislative reform has an impor-
tant role to play in creating “space” for progressive change, it is clearly
not sufficient. Cultural action, advocacy and education including legal
literacy play crucial roles. Chapters 5 and 8 address this important to-
pic in more detail.
Land rights of indigenous peoples
Indigenous peoples are another marginalized group that require spe-
cial attention in efforts to strengthen tenure security. Those efforts
have the potential both to harm and to benefit indigenous peoples. Past
titling efforts in many parts of the world have provided governments
with the political cover to dispossess indigenous peoples of land they
have traditionally possessed and used.61
Three characteristics of indigenous land rights merit emphasis. First,
indigenous land rights are a specific concern of international law, in-
cluding being the subject of the International Labor Organization’s
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, now in effect in a number
of countries.62 Second, indigenous lands often constitute quite exten-
sive areas, some of which are endowed with substantial oil and gas,
mining, timber and other natural resources. This often results in ten-
sions between the indigenous people and governments and business
interests.63 Third, because indigenous lands are typically under com-
munal tenure systems, efforts to promote tenure security focused only
on individual private property are likely to be wholly inadequate. These
issues are discussed further in Chapter 8.
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Reform of public sector land institutions
Capable land institutions are essential for broadening land access, im-
proving tenure security, defining and protecting public and other group
interests in land and, overall, for overseeing land tenure systems that
operate equitably and effectively. Thus, land tenure reforms often in-
clude some program to reform and build capacity within public sector
land institutions. In developing countries, such capacity is often weak,
as revealed by inadequate and outdated land records, substantial num-
bers of land disputes that cannot be addressed expeditiously, high
transaction costs and long delays for land transactions, and the govern-
ment’s inability to regulate or tax land effectively.
Efforts to reform public sector land institutions are sometimes com-
bined with land titling efforts. Where capacity is very weak, especially
following periods of armed conflict, institutional reform must be ap-
proached as a long-term process. The reform of public sector institu-
tions is not a central focus of this book, although Chapter 8 does ad-
dress the need for competent and committed land registration institu-
tions, where registration of land rights is undertaken.64
V. Guiding principles in approaching land tenure reform
The material in each of this book’s chapters is rooted in the work, re-
search and experience of RDI lawyers. The book thus necessarily
reflects some principles, biases and values that guide RDI professionals
in approaching land tenure reform work in developing countries.
Although the principles are general, none is appropriate to every situa-
tion. Rather, these are broad themes and touchstones that must be tai-
lored to particular circumstances.
Targeting the poor
Give preference to land tenure reform interventions that directly benefit the
poorest and marginalized. The objective of economic development initia-
tives must be to improve the lives of the least well-off, especially the
majority of the poor who live in rural areas. Interventions that purport
to reach the poor indirectly, through a “trickle-down” of benefits,
should be treated with suspicion. Interventions that provide benefits to
both the non-poor and the poor should be analyzed to determine if a
portion of intervention resources can be used to target the poor more
effectively. A result that is otherwise “efficient” in terms of increasing
national production or productivity may sometimes benefit better off
segments of society while actually reducing the welfare of the poor.
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Given the counter-intuitive reality that small farms are typically more
productive than large farms in developing country settings, interven-
tions that create smaller farms can boost efficiency as well as equity
(see discussion on this inverse relationship between farm size and pro-
ductivity in Chapter 3).
Protecting the rights of women should be a paramount consideration in
analyzing every land tenure reform intervention. It is important to focus
not only on the welfare of poor families, but also the welfare of women
within poor families to ensure that they share in the benefits that flow
from holding and exercising land rights. Planners should consider not
only changes in law and public education to strengthen the rights of
women, but should also look for opportunities to design programs that
promote the development of assets over which women already exercise
a high degree of authority (e.g., homegardens in many settings).
Anticipate and design against program sabotage and elite capture of bene-
fits. It is always important to ensure that reforms carefully target in-
tended beneficiaries. The primary objects of land tenure interventions
should be the poor and marginalized, including women. A natural ten-
dency exists for program or intervention benefits to be intercepted and
captured by the non-poor (“elite capture”). In addition, local officials
may impose barriers to program implementation through aggressive
rent seeking behavior. Programs should be designed to minimize op-
portunities for rent seeking and to prevent capture of benefits by elites.
One effective tool for ensuring that benefits reach the poor is to incor-
porate monitoring processes into program implementation that will
ensure the production of quantitative and verifiable assessments of the
level of benefits obtained by the target groups.
Assessing land tenure reform needs
Assess the relative importance of land among the other development issues in
a given setting. Each developing country setting is unique, and each
country may contain a number of unique settings within its territory.
And the relative importance of land as a development or poverty issue
varies in each setting depending on numerous factors. These factors
must be assessed before determining whether, how and how deeply to
intervene on land tenure issues. Land is likely to be a particularly im-
portant factor in the lives of the rural poor. In some settings it may be
that “the horse is already out of the barn” because land tenure reform
that might have deserved to be a high priority in past years is no longer
likely to be an effective way to benefit the majority of the country’s
poor.
Recognize that land tenure reform is frequently necessary but is not suffi-
cient for full poverty-fighting impact. Where a family is already on land
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and receives new, long-term rights to that land, the immediate benefits
(such as status, a sense of security, assured return on investments in
the land) will almost certainly be enhanced and complemented by var-
ious related measures. Farm credit and micro-credit, access to im-
proved seed and fertilizer, extension advice, appropriate research, mar-
keting information are likely to achieve their optimum response when
they reach beneficiaries who can now apply such aid and support to
their own land, keep all the resulting profits, and make welcome land
improvements. The point can be made in more acute form where a re-
form gives access to land to a family (for example, agricultural la-
borers) who had no access before. Such a family has lacked any piece
of land to which any such support could even be applied.
Understand ground realities before proposing land tenure reform interven-
tions. This is perhaps best articulated through the Seidmans’ approach,
which shares many of the biases of RDI’s approach. This principle has
several corollaries: (1) field research is critical to understanding the
ground realities (researchers should go directly to the field and meet
with project beneficiaries and prospective beneficiaries rather than only
relying on the reports of others); (2) researchers should interview bene-
ficiaries and other actors outside the presence of local officials, planta-
tion owners and others who may have inconsistent interests;65 (3) field
research should include both qualitative and quantitative measures of
conditions; (4) choosing among research approaches involves analysis
of the costs and benefits of various approaches; and (5) the “80/20
rule” typically applies to the quest for full information (as a very rough
approximation, 80% of full information can be attained with the first
20% of resources and time, and the remaining 20% requires four
times as much effort and time).
Scope of land tenure reform intervention
In the inevitable trade-off between quantity of beneficiaries and quality of
benefits, planners should favor the former. It is better to allocate available
benefits (or resources or land) widely among the target group than to
give only some members of the target group an ideal portion. We have
referred to the latter approach as the “purse of gold” phenomenon.66
Pick low-hanging fruit. The “low-hanging fruit” is that which is most
easily taken from the tree. Planners should do first that which is most
easily accomplished and which provides immediate benefits. A simple
cost-benefit analysis approach in analyzing land tenure reform inter-
ventions (particularly legal framework interventions) typically reveals
some interventions that offer a high likelihood of success and few sub-
stantial challenges or obstacles. Reform interventions should be de-
signed to initially achieve what is politically possible and financially af-
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fordable in the short to medium term rather than insisting immedi-
ately upon tackling larger and more complicated problems that will be
resolved, if ever, only in the long term. On the other hand, it is impor-
tant to make sure that low-hanging fruit is not “sour” in the sense that
the intervention will cause harm or will defer energy from more impor-
tant interventions (e.g., titling and registration programs that are not
controversial, but which are not targeted to the needs of the poor).
Do not let the “best” become the enemy of the “good." Seeking an ideal
solution that is improbable or impossible can preclude a “second-best”
solution that is both extremely beneficial and feasible. Effective reform
almost always (perhaps always) involves compromise among divergent
interests. This maxim is related to but distinct from the low-hanging
fruit maxim. Both involve cost-benefit analytic approaches. Examples of
“good enough” solutions include long-term use rights (in place of own-
ership, where the latter would meet strong ideological resistance) and
micro-plots (in place of full-size farms, where the latter would be
clearly unaffordable). These specific examples are central to our discus-
sion in Chapters 4, 6 and 7.
Choose interventions that are replicable. Gold-plated projects not only
waste resources, but undermine future efforts to design and imple-
ment affordable solutions that can confer benefits to a larger popula-
tion. Projects should be measured according to the cost of benefits per
family in light of resources available and the number of families need-
ing benefits. Ideally, projects should be affordable by host countries,
without outside assistance. This is related to the “purse of gold” phe-
nomenon, selection of low-hanging fruit, and the best being the enemy
of the good.
Look for ways to make interventions affordable. When pricing project
costs, do not rely solely on competition to produce reasonable prices. A
simple competitive bidding regime for awarding contracts will not pro-
duce reasonable prices in environments where service suppliers are
likely to collude. Other methods can be used to minimize the incidence
of collusive pricing. This is a subset of the replicability issue.
Choose interventions that are sustainable. Programs are worthwhile
only if results can be sustained over long periods. Interventions whose
achievements do not last can undermine the credibility of development
efforts and can cause fatigue among implementers. Interventions
should not overestimate the capacity of existing administrative struc-
tures. While interventions should take advantage of new technologies,
technology should be appropriate to host country conditions, including
the existing capacity of local clerks. For example, do not install compu-
ters where electric service is unreliable, or design programs that re-
quire computer literacy even though clerks have never used computers.
This is also related to the issue of replicability, since administrative ca-
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pacity that is sufficient to implement a pilot project may not be able to
sustain a larger program.
Timing of land tenure reform interventions
Acting to intervene on land issues involves risks and costs; and not acting
also involves risks and costs. Planners often decline to take specific inter-
vening actions on issues of land policy and law because of perceived
risks and costs. However, although too rarely done, it is also important
for planners to recognize and count the costs of inaction if they are to
perform an appropriate cost-benefit analysis.
Recognize and take advantage of political and financial windows of op-
portunity. Successful interventions to improve land relations often
depend upon the alignment of favorable political, financial and other
factors. Timing is important, and over-planning can squander opportu-
nities. This is related to the principle of not letting the best be the en-
emy of the good. It is difficult to plan for specific windows of opportu-
nity, and one cannot be certain how long the window will remain open.
Most significant and successful past land tenure reforms occurred be-
cause of sudden, well-directed interventions during a temporally lim-
ited, political window of opportunity. There is also an associated but
perhaps larger point here relating to broader developmental or histori-
cal windows as distinct from narrower political windows, which is that
rural land tenure reforms, to be most effective, should occur at a stage
of development when a large portion of the population depend on rural
land for their livelihood. A widespread redistributive land reform would
not have the same beneficial impact in Brazil today as it would have
had 40 years ago. It should also be recognized that there may be alter-
natives in program design – homestead plots in lieu of full-size farms
is a notable one – that can enlarge, even greatly enlarge, the available
windows of opportunity.
Role of law
Embody land rights in law whenever possible. Policy or custom is never as
good or as “permanent” as law, and well-formulated law can be fully
advertent to existing policy and custom.
Laws are only one of many factors affecting the behavior of the various ac-
tors. Many non-legal forces (economic, cultural, sociological, etc.)
impact people’s behavior. The more aligned the law is with those other
factors, the greater the chance that the law can actually be implemen-
ted. For example, customary laws typically represent highly evolved
(and evolving) and innovative responses to a unique and complex set of
economic, sociological and cultural factors (although this does not al-
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ways mean they represent the best practicable approach, or one geared
to recognize women and the marginalized, or one reflecting awareness
of other possibilities). Planners must first understand ground realities
such as customary law before designing, adopting and implementing
land law reforms.
Be alert for perverse, unintended consequences. It is important to learn
from past mistakes to avoid doing harm. There are many examples of
well-intended laws and programs that have led to results that under-
mine the objectives they sought (both of the major British efforts to
buy white-owned land in Africa for redistribution to poor black farmers
– in Kenya in the 1960s and Zimbabwe in the 1980s – went forward
with severe design flaws whose adverse consequences are being felt to-
day). Planners must not only understand the ground realities in order
to craft effective land tenure reform law and policy; they must also put
themselves in the position of the powerful vested interests to deter-
mine how such interests are likely to react to changes in policy or law.
This also involves determining the “implementability” of a law or pol-
icy given the realities of administrative capacity and vested interests.
While harmful consequences may be accidental from the standpoint of
planners, the results may be intentional from the standpoint of the
non-poor (including bureaucrats) who seek to capture benefits or
thwart changes in the status quo.
Role of implementation
Achieving policy or legislative reform is at best half the battle. Changes in
policy and law are typically necessary but never sufficient. Implementa-
tion is key. A policy or law that has not been implemented is worth lit-
tle or nothing. Moreover, we often hear but rarely believe that “the law
is good, but the problem is lack of implementation.” Failures in imple-
mentation can often be traced to faulty law design. For example, the
law drafters may not have taken into account the lack of capacity with-
in the implementing agency or non-legal factors influencing people’s
behavior that would make the law difficult or impossible to implement.
Test the hypotheses. Do not assume that hypotheses are correct. Revi-
sit hypotheses to test them and seek ways to refine and improve their
predictive value. For example, many observers assume that small land
plots substantially constrain productivity and design costly and poten-
tially disruptive land consolidation programs based on that assumption
without ever empirically testing it.
Set intermediate implementation goals and measure results. Land tenure
reforms are often long-term reforms. Such reforms should then be im-
plemented in stages with intermediate benchmarks and incentives for
implementers to produce results. The level of future or ongoing fund-
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ing should depend upon success in achieving intermediate results. Nu-
merous land tenure reform objectives are quantifiable such that “pro-
gress payments” can be linked to the level of ongoing achievements.
Think of construction mortgages where the bank releases funds as the
building goes up.
Local actors
Bureaucrats play key roles. It is critical to understand the interests and
motivations of bureaucrats who will implement programs and policies.
Bureaucrats are often accustomed to exercising power over land. Pro-
grams designed to reward bureaucrats for meeting targets that advance
development objectives may prove to be particularly effective.
Make beneficiaries part of the land tenure reform process. Planners
should look for ways to help beneficiaries claim and defend their inter-
ests, marshalling their energy to press officials to comply with law. Le-
gal aid is an example of a program that makes use of the fact that the
motivation of beneficiaries to defend their interests, though often
inchoate, generally exceeds the motivation of bureaucrats to ignore or
violate those interests. Chapter 9 discusses the topic of land-related le-
gal aid, which is a type of intervention that can give beneficiaries an ef-
fective voice and complement almost any type of land tenure reform.
Use public education to create legitimate expectations among the public
and among the land tenure reform beneficiaries. Law must be actively publi-
cized. When publicized, law creates expectations among the public and
even more pointedly among the beneficiaries, which can be useful in
motivating officials to fulfill expectations. Even where the law cannot
be implemented fully or immediately throughout the country, the pub-
licization of the law and explanation of its benefits can motivate the
public and beneficiaries to demand its implementation.
Civil society organizations play important roles in land tenure reform pro-
cesses. Civil society organizations are prominent in many, although not
all, settings where land tenure reform is needed. They can perform im-
portant roles in providing planners with information about the plight
of the poor and marginalized, articulating the demands of those
groups, reaching consensus among targeted beneficiaries on policy op-
tions, “selling” feasible policy choices to their constituencies, and help-
ing in the implementation of reforms.
Weigh the power imbalances. More broadly, weigh and consider the
power imbalances that operate against (or sometimes for) the interests
of program beneficiaries, and how these imbalances may be altered.
Nearly all successful land reforms involved broader arrays of factors
that favored the beneficiaries, and most unsuccessful land reforms in-
cluded the reverse (although a badly designed program can forestall
POVERTY, LAW AND LAND TENURE REFORM 45
success even with what may seem a winning constellation of forces be-
hind the reform). Some of the factors that can redress what appears to
be an adverse balance are discussed immediately above, such as legal
aid, public education, and the mobilization of civil society actors. De-
sign variables can also be crucial: a program that would contemplate
mandatory taking of landlords’ land for far less than market value will
encounter a gauntlet of fierce resistance from the landowners and their
allies; a program based upon land being voluntarily sold at market
prices (perhaps because the program needs only enough land to distri-
bute micro-plots) will encounter virtually no such resistance.
In general, planners should trust land rightholders to exercise transfer
rights wisely. We generally presume that land holders should be free to
lease out, sell, mortgage and bequeath their land. Restrictions on these
freedoms can be warranted in certain settings (typical examples include
not allowing men to disinherit their wives, a temporary moratorium on
sale by land reform grantees, and prohibiting foreigners from holding
agricultural land), but restrictions should be justified by important soci-
etal objectives and should be narrowly designed to meet those objec-
tives.
VI. Conclusions
The wise application of the law to the reform of land tenure rules and
systems remains among the most widely relevant and highly leveraged
means of improving the lives of the world’s rural poor. This book at-
tempts to summarize and synthesize much of the post-World War II
experience, both successful and unsuccessful, in applying the law to
these issues.
Centrally, we hope that the cumulative experience reflected in this
book – that of RDI and that of others – will provide help and guidance
in identifying what is needed, and what can be done, to improve the
land access and security of the rural poor in a wide variety of national
and sub-national settings over the coming years. Ultimately, it is our
goal both to show the continuing importance of "the land question,”
and to demonstrate that there are practical, legal-system answers,
sometimes rather new and different answers, to most of the variant
renderings of that question. This includes the important goals of public
and academic education on land issues, as well as communication to
policy makers, program funders, the media and others with special in-
terest in land issues.
The discussion unfolds in sequence, intended to form a single, uni-
fied volume that reflects the collaborative experience, research and con-
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clusions of the authors and editors, rather than comprising a series of
independent chapters or contributions.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 look, respectively, at two traditional and one pro-
mising alternative approach to answering the land question. Chapter 2
discusses one of the two principle arenas in which land tenure reforms
have unfolded in the past, that of landlord-tenant systems. There have
been a number of successful land-to-the-tiller programs giving owner-
ship to tenants of the land they farm, as well as a number of failures.
The design features needed in a successful land-to-the-tiller program
can be identified with considerable confidence, but it has been a quar-
ter-century since the last substantially successful program unfolded,
and there are generalized factors that make it less likely such reforms
will be seriously attempted in the future (e.g., there are fewer land-
based communist insurgencies, fewer governments likely to have the
necessary political will, and much higher values for agricultural land in
many of the potential settings).
One alternative followed in several countries involves an attempt to
impose substantial external regulations on tenure security and rent le-
vels in the ongoing landlord-tenant relationship (as distinct from end-
ing that relationship). This alternative has only one sustained success
(in the Indian state of West Bengal), but also many failures which have
often left tenants in a worse position. A better approach in most set-
tings today is to adopt a more “market friendly” approach to farmland
rental markets. Doing so may provide an opportunity for the poorest to
move “up the ladder” from agricultural laborer to tenant farmer.
Chapter 3 discusses the other principal arena in which land tenure
reforms have unfolded in the past, that of large estates worked by agri-
cultural laborers. There have been fewer successes in such settings,
and numerous failures. Again, the design features needed in a success-
ful program can be identified with considerable confidence. Somewhat
paradoxically, there may be greater opportunities for successful new
programs here, and some serious efforts at such programs continue.
The prospects for success appear much greater for underutilized es-
tates or underutilized portions of estates than for intensively used and
heavily capitalized lands.
Chapter 4 examines an important alternative or supplemental ap-
proach that is gaining favor in some developing-country settings, that
of small micro-plots for the rural poor. The chapter reviews scattered
experiences from a variety of settings that lead to the recognition that
micro-ownership of plots as small as one-twenty-fifth hectare – one-
tenth of an acre – or even less can provide vital supplementation to the
livelihoods of the rural poor. Compared to the reforms discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3, these require far less land and far fewer financial re-
sources. Planning for and design of programs to distribute such plots
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(using land purchases on the market or existing public land), including
important complementary measures, are discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 analyzes the important ways in which improving women’s
access to land and strengthening the security of women’s rights to land
provide both economic access to markets and social access to non-mar-
ket institutions. The chapter explores how land tenure policy can be
shaped to provide benefits to women, as well as the need for planners
to take care that policies do not inadvertently reduce women’s land
rights.
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the two largest – and very different – con-
temporary country settings for land tenure reforms, India and China,
respectively. Looking first at a developing country whose agriculture
was never collectivized, Chapter 6 reviews India’s specific experience
since Independence in 1947 with the approaches to land tenure reform
outlined in the previous chapters, concluding that the greatest hope
lies in a combination of micro-plot distribution (now going forward in
several Indian states, with market-based acquisition of the needed land)
and (with an important exception) credible restoration and deregula-
tion of tenancy.
Chapter 7 looks principally at the processes of transformation of col-
lectivized farming and tenure, reviewing China’s specific experience
with land tenure reform since the Communist accession to power in
1949. The present efforts to give farmers 30-year land rights, often
against the resistance of local cadres and officials, represent the playing
out of a dynamic which has parallels in landlord resistance to land-to-
the-tiller programs, except for the important fact that the land is al-
ready publicly (collectively) owned. It represents a setting in which
broader issues as to implementation and achievement of the rule of
law are unfolding and being tested in the specific arena of land tenure
security, with implications far beyond the Chinese countryside. Full
physical reorganization of collective farms into family farms was com-
pleted a quarter-century ago in China. This invites comparison with
the very different experience seen in the countries that formerly com-
prised the Soviet Union.
Chapters 8 and 9 deal with two important cross-cutting issues on
which the law has a heavy bearing, relating to the access of the rural
poor and marginalized to rights in land: the issues of formalization of
land rights, and legal aid. Formalization may confer benefits on the
poor in some settings, but each circumstance must be evaluated sepa-
rately to determine whether the poor are likely to benefit, and formali-
zation programs must be designed to ensure that, at the very least, the
programs do not adversely affect the poor and marginalized. Land
rights legal aid holds great potential for benefitting the poor, whether
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in concert or independent of land tenure reform programs targeting
the poor.
Chapter 10 embodies our concluding reflections as to what impor-
tant changes have occurred with respect to the perception, prospects
and practice of land tenure reform since we began our work on those
issues some 40 years ago.
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2 Tenancy reform
Roy L. Prosterman and Jennifer Brown
I. Introduction
This chapter covers one of the principal potential beneficiary groups of
land reform programs: those whose chief source of livelihood comes
from cultivating, as tenant farmers, land owned by others. The chapter
will focus on the experience with redistribution of land to tenant farm-
ers, as well as alternatives to distribution such as regulation of land-
lord-tenant relationships, and will offer recommendations as to what
should be done, or sometimes undone, in programmatic terms with
respect to landlord-tenant relationships. In the category of “tenant
farmers” we include not only those who pay a fixed amount of rent,
but also sharecroppers, who are simply tenants whose rent is set as a
percentage of the actual crop harvested.1
Both theory and policy as to agricultural land tenancy have evolved
considerably over the course of the last half-century. The initial stance
of many policy makers and advisors, implemented most notably in the
years following World War II, was that tenancy was a negative and ex-
ploitative practice where landlords held all the power, with tenants
holding little tenure security and largely being at their landlord’s mercy
with regard to the terms of the tenancy arrangement. Especially in that
period of intensely impoverished and highly agrarian societies, there
was considerable empirical support for this view, extending to a range
of countries, especially in Asia.2
As one prominent outcome, this vision strongly supported owner-
ship as a better alternative for existing tenants, leading to the success-
ful postwar land-to-the-tiller programs of East Asia in which govern-
ments took ownership from landlords and transferred it to tenants.
Later successful, or largely successful, land-to-the-tiller programs can
also be found, extending into the 1980s, but there were also a number
of unsuccessful programs during this period. An alternative, or some-
times supplementary, outcome of the widely negative view of tenancy
was the widespread adoption of laws heavily regulating tenancy. Still
other legislative reforms – generally in the context of efforts to give
ownership to the existing tenants – attempted to ban all tenancy from
that time onward.
The common stance among many policy makers and advisors that
has evolved over the course of the past two decades views tenancy
much more positively and optimistically as an effective mechanism (or
at least a more realistic mechanism than sales markets or administra-
tively imposed land tenure reform) for increasing access to land for
land-poor but labor-rich producers and for ensuring that land and labor
are both being fully and efficiently used. Government program plan-
ning has begun to follow suit, and some governments that previously
sought to stamp out or carefully regulate tenancy have lifted restric-
tions (Mexico)3 or are urging the rolling back of tenancy restrictions
(India).4
Rural relationships have evolved over the past half-century in a num-
ber of societies, from virtually feudal arrangements based on highly
imbalanced power relationships, to arrangements in which landlords
and tenants may have more equitable bargaining positions and where
both increasingly have alternative sources of income outside of agricul-
ture. Land tenure reforms, including land-to-the-tiller programs, are at
least partially responsible for this shift in rural power relationships.
Landlord-tenant relationships are certainly not universally equitable
now; however, in many settings tenants today are in a much improved
bargaining position relative to that which existed when World War II
was ending.5
Another part of the shift in perspective lies in the realization that
many countries that might consider widespread reforms aimed at ben-
efiting tenant farmers – such as land-to-the-tiller, or extensive regula-
tion of the tenancy relationship – do not presently have the resources
or political will to implement such reforms. Indeed, many impractical
or poorly thought-through programs of the last 50 years remained un-
implemented or only partially implemented, sometimes having led to
much worse consequences – such as massive evictions of existing
tenants – than if the government had not attempted them.
The economic, demographic and political landscapes have changed
in many ways over the past half-century, but the issues revolving
around agricultural tenancy and what, if anything, to do about it are
still prominent today in much of South and Southeast Asia, and are
also found, though to a lesser degree, in parts of Latin America and
Africa.
The Rural Development Institute has worked extensively in a num-
ber of the settings where tenancy questions have been important,
among them India, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador and Egypt.
In addition, RDI has done past fieldwork that encompassed the te-
nancy issue in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Brazil. As in later chapters,
we shall draw significantly here on RDI’s own practical experience in
the field.
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We divide the further discussion in this chapter into four sections.
Section II will focus on land-to-the-tiller programs, Section III will fo-
cus on programs emphasizing substantial regulation of tenancy rela-
tionships, and Section IV will consider “freed” tenancy markets. Final-
ly, Section V will summarize the practical conclusions as to policy and
design for possible future programs.
All three policy approaches to tenancy – conferral of ownership, sub-
stantial regulation or letting the market prevail – may produce negative
as well as positive impacts. For example, land-to-the-tiller approaches
can greatly undermine the tenure security of landowners, making
them unwilling to rent out land for fear such a reform is coming, and
even leading them to evict current tenants. The positive impacts are
more obvious, and include a long time horizon for land investments by
tenants who have become owners, with concomitant increases in pro-
duction and crop diversification; wealth creation (assuming the land
rights are made transferable); and escape of the tenant from the
“power domain” of the landlord, thus enhancing the tenant’s status.6
The key questions concern the extent to which the positive impacts can
be achieved without the negative ones, and the degree to which various
factors, including the specific features of program design, are likely to
determine whether the result is positive or negative.
The alternative approach of heavily regulating the tenancy relation-
ship may produce some of the same negative impacts and is likely to
produce far fewer positive impacts. The administrative difficulty of en-
forcing these rules on an ongoing basis (however well-designed) greatly
limits the positive potential of this approach. Whereas land-to-the-tiller
is a one-time reform, regulation of tenancy relationships is ongoing.
The third approach, in which the state either does not regulate te-
nancy, or regulates it in a very limited way, assumes that tenancy can
be an effective mechanism for increasing land access if largely left to
market forces. Many commentators have come to the conclusion that
tenancy today could be an important means of increasing access to
land for land-poor rural families and have recommended that presently
existing but poorly implemented tenancy regulations should be re-
pealed. Little grounded data exist on whether the hoped-for outcomes
from rolling back tenancy restrictions would be seen in practice, but
we close the chapter by providing recommendations on how to end
such regulation in ways most likely to achieve improved land access
for the land-poor.
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II. Land-to-the-tiller
There are three fairly well-known and notably successful post-war land-
to-the-tiller programs, each of which made a substantial majority of
tenant farmers – who at that time constituted a large part of the rural
population and were the dominant group among those who were land-
less – into owners of the same land which they had farmed as tenants.
We examine briefly in turn the cases of Japan, South Korea and Tai-
wan. RDI has also done village fieldwork in each of these three set-
tings, two decades or more after the reform was carried out, to talk
with farmer beneficiaries – and also with former landlords – about the
effects of the reforms on their lives and livelihoods.
In Japan, the land tenure reform was carried out soon after World
War II under the American military occupation, and to a large degree
at the insistence of General Douglas MacArthur.7 To summarize its
characteristics briefly8: The two main sources of land for distribution
to tenants were the land of absentee landlords, all of which was to be
taken, and the land of village landlords, who were permitted to keep
up to 1 hectare of tenanted land in their village of residence. Thus,
there was what may be referred to as a “zero ceiling” permitted for
absentee-owned land, and a “1-hectare ceiling” for resident-landlord
land with tenants on it. In each case, the tenant received in ownership
exactly the same land he or she farmed as a tenant. (The parcels of ten-
anted land that were to be retained by resident landlords, with the
tenants remaining upon the land, were determined by the Village Land
Committee.9)
The land price to be paid to the landlords by the Japanese govern-
ment, and repaid to the government by the ex-tenants, was very low as
a result of the extreme post-war inflation. It was calculated in 1945
prices, and to be paid mostly in bonds redeemable after 30 years, bear-
ing 3.6% annual interest. Indeed, from a landlord standpoint, the prac-
tical result was virtually equivalent to confiscation of the land, and
from a tenant standpoint virtually equivalent to free distribution.10
The land reform transferred nearly 80% of the previously tenanted
area and affected about 37% of all agricultural land.11 The small num-
ber of tenants who continued renting (on the retained land of resident
small landlords) received strict legislative protection as to both tenure
security and rent levels they could be charged. The tenants who be-
came owners could sell the land they received, though only with ad-
ministrative permission, and only to someone who would cultivate it
and who remained below a 3-hectare maximum for owner-operated
land.12 The distributed land could also be mortgaged, including for
purchase money mortgage.13
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By 1970, both the ceilings on landholdings and the regulation of
tenancy had been eliminated, and absentees could now own land and
make their own market arrangements with their tenants. Of course, by
then the Japanese economy was transformed.14
Administration of the Japanese land reform program at the grass-
roots village level was carried out in a highly public and transparent
manner, by a Village Land Committee on which tenants and small
owner-operators held most seats.15 Implementation by these village le-
vel groups was instrumental to the success of the reform, because local
groups understood local tenure arrangements and were able to imple-
ment the reforms swiftly.
Another large land reform occurred in South Korea, beginning in
1950 shortly before the Korean War, and continuing during the war.
The reform was carried out under the authoritarian government of
Syngman Rhee and, as in Japan, was implemented with substantial
American support.
The South Korean land reform law terminated ownership of all ten-
anted land, whether the owner was an absentee or a resident landlord,
with minor exemptions.16 In addition, there was a 3-hectare maximum
for owner-operated land but very few holdings reached this size. As in
the Japanese reform, tenants received ownership of the same land they
presently farmed. Land compensation was, unlike that in Japan, at least
meaningful, though far from generous. For annual cropland the gov-
ernment paid the landlord 1.5 times the gross value of one year’s an-
nual production,17 dividing the payment into equal installments over a
five-year period. Thus, during each of the five years the landlord re-
ceived 30% of the value of the initial or baseline annual gross crop as
his entire compensation, as compared to a previous expectation of
rents that had ranged from a 30% to 80% share of the gross crop in
an ongoing (theoretically perpetual) stream, with a 50% landlord share
(and the tenant bearing all expenses) being a common rate.18 The cus-
tomary valuation formula for farmland in Korea had been 10 times the
annual rent,19 which would have yielded a total price of 3 to 8 times
gross crop value, and typically 5 times that value. Clearly, most of the
value of the land was being commandeered by the government while
landowners received only a fraction of the actual value.
The beneficiaries repaid the government the same 30% per year for
five years, thus receiving an immediate increment in income (com-
pared with the rents they had paid) that was typically 20% of their pre-
vious gross crop level plus 100% of whatever additional crops they
were now producing above the previous gross crop level. After complet-
ing payment, the new owners could sell or mortgage their land, but
not rent it out, since all tenancy was prohibited. The South Korean
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land reform reached about 69% of the intended land and affected
about 30% of all arable land.20
A third post-war land reform occurred on Taiwan. Shortly after flee-
ing to Taiwan from the mainland with the remnants of his army and
administration in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek carried out a major land-to-
the-tiller program that was completed in 1953.21 This was likely done,
in large part, in recognition that the failure to address the land-based
grievances of mainland China’s tenant farmers had been a decisive fac-
tor in the victory of the Communists over Chiang’s Nationalists in the
civil war.22 For the Taiwanese program, too, there was substantial
American support.
The Taiwanese reform began in 1949 with a rigorous reduction of
tenant rents from an average of 50-60% of the gross crop value to a
maximum of 37.5%.23 The reform continued with distribution of ten-
anted public lands, then went on, in 1953, to take most private land-
lord-owned lands for redistribution to their tenants. Taiwan allowed
both absentee and resident landlords to retain a portion of their ten-
anted land, taking all tenanted land above approximately 3 hectares for
average paddy land and 6 hectares for average dry land.24 The govern-
ment paid landlords an amount equal to 2.5 times the gross value of
the main annual crop, with 70% of that paid in bonds linked to the
price of rice (for paddy land) or sweet potato (for dry land), payable
with 4% interest in equal installments over 10 years. The remaining
30% was paid with shares of stock in major industrial or utility enter-
prises that the government was privatizing. It appears that 2.5 times
gross crop value was not greatly out of line with the market value of
land, which had apparently been worth roughly 4 times gross crop va-
lue before the 1949 rent reduction.25
The ex-tenants repaid the government the same total amount, spread
over 10 years. This amortization meant a yearly payment equal to about
30% of their initial gross crop value, versus the existing rent of 37.5%,
and versus a prior rent level around 50% to 60%. In addition, the new
owner gained the full income from any increased value of production.
The law allowed sale and mortgage, but not lease, after the beneficiary
had made full payment.
The Taiwanese reform distributed about 71% of tenanted croplands
into ownership26 – mostly through taking it from private landlords,
but also including distribution of tenanted public lands and negotiated
tenant purchases from landlords that had been largely due to the rent
reduction and the prospect of further land reform. The distribution
covered about 30% of Taiwan’s cultivated land.27 Nearly all remaining
tenanted lands came under protected-tenancy restrictions, which were
not substantially lifted until 2000.28
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A number of commentators have concluded that the major land ten-
ure reforms in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were key to the rapid
post-war growth of these economies.29 In Taiwan, for example, where
very extensive data collection took place, annual rice yields per hectare
increased 60% on average in the decade following the land-to-the-tiller
program of 1949-1953, and the average income of farm households
rose by 150%.30 Much of the dramatic increase in farm incomes was
due to diversification into higher value production: between 1952 and
1979, rice (despite a large increase in its total production) declined as a
relative proportion of the value of all agricultural production from 50%
to 27%, while fruits, vegetables and livestock grew from 21.5% of such
value to 60.5%.31 Higher farm incomes quickly translated into substan-
tial improvements in living conditions: “This can be seen from pay-
ments for food, clothing, dwellings, travel, education and entertain-
ment, and from the number of children attending school.” There were
also large increases in farmers’ community participation and holding
of public office at the village, county and province level.32
Over the longer term, Taiwan’s small owner-operator farmers trans-
formed themselves into entrepreneurs and modern consumers. Field-
work conducted by RDI in 2000 (the third round of such fieldwork in
Taiwan since the 1970s) found that the great majority of farmers inter-
viewed not only owned cars, computers and cell phones, but had also
bought stocks and traveled overseas.
In addition to the programs in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, four
lesser known land-to-the-tiller programs were carried out in the time
span between 1949 and 1984 which accomplished much the same dis-
tributional results. These occurred in mainland China, South Vietnam,
Kerala State in India, and El Salvador. All four programs – like that in
South Korea – terminated ownership of all tenanted land, whether the
owner was an absentee or a resident landlord. And all but the China re-
form hold important lessons for program design.
After the Communists came to power in 1949, China carried out a
massive program giving full private ownership to the former tenant
farmers (who had provided the core support for Mao’s revolution). The
program was superseded by the mandatory collectivization of China’s
farming after 1956, and thus has been largely forgotten, although its
production and farm-income results were highly impressive, and these
may provide useful lessons for the current Chinese tenure reforms.
Over the period 1949 to 1956, grain production increased by 70% and
total farm income rose 85%.33 However, its lessons for program design
are likely to have very limited application for other countries. It is
briefly discussed in Chapter 7.
South Vietnam carried out a large-scale program in 1969-1973, giv-
ing ownership of some 44% of total farm area to approximately three-
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quarters of all tenant families. The reform produced a number of posi-
tive results both economic and political, but came too late to affect the
outcome of the conflict. The positive results included a roughly 30%
increase in rice production in the villages – comprising the majority of
all villages – where land reform was implemented,34 and an overall de-
cline of approximately four-fifths in indigenous recruitment within the
South by the communist Vietcong.35
In addition, a 1972 sample survey of nearly a thousand respondents
found that farmers in villages that had high implementation (with ex-
tenants receiving written titles confirming their ownership) were twice
as likely to keep chickens or ducks or have fish ponds and four times
as likely to keep pigs than were farmers living in villages that had not
yet distributed titles.36 Over 70% of those who had received their titles
made comments to the effect that the program was bringing about
“the beginning of the good life,” more than twice the proportion of
those who had not yet received titles. And the interviewers concluded
that “ex-tenants who have become farm owners want to produce more,
venture into other crops, risk cash outlays to improve or increase their
yields, and work harder and longer. Many say this.”37
Although largely lost to view after the Communists took power in the
South in 1975, the land-to-the-tiller program remained in substantial
part viable and helped lay the groundwork for the individual family
farming that eventually came to be practiced countrywide in the 1990s
after break-up of the collective farms, although under 20-year use rights
rather than private ownership for the resulting family farmers.38 Box
2.1 describes aspects of RDI’s experience with the 1969-1973 program.
Kerala State in India carried out a near-universal program giving
ownership to almost all tenant farmers in the state beginning in
1970.39 The 1.3 million tenant family beneficiaries comprised 43% of
all agricultural households and received, in place, about the same per-
centage of all land planted in annual crops. For a number of reasons,
this substantially successful program deserves more attention than it
has received, not least because it was carried out by a democratic, non-
authoritarian government and in the absence of war or major civil con-
flict (although there were grassroots demonstrations by supporters and
– mostly nonviolent – political turmoil at the outset). It has lacked high
visibility, both because of the generally low-key and undramatic setting,
and because it affected only a single, relatively small Indian state.
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Box 2.1. Land-to-the-Tiller in South Vietnam
The Land-to-the-Tiller law, based on a 1967 prototype drafted by one
of the present authors, was adopted in nearly its original form on
March 26, 1970.
The intent was to “eliminate tenancy,” affecting all tenanted crop-
land except for the small amounts under industrial crops and orch-
ards.
Primary administration was through a Village Land Distribution
Committee, comprised of elected officials and skewed towards
tenants and small owner-operators. In a highly public application
process, the committee assisted the former tenants in preparing ap-
plications and briefly inspected each claimed piece of land (normally
with an accompanying crowd of villagers) and marked that appli-
cant’s land with an identification number on an aerial photograph
of the village, placing the same number on the application form.
Unless there were conflicting claims to a particular piece of land
that could not be resolved on the spot, the committee approved the
applicants’ claims and forwarded them to Saigon, where a USAID-
supplied computer printed out final titles. These were then sent
back down to the village and distributed. This was sometimes re-
ferred to as a “once up – once down” administrative process, with
only two contacts required in the case of the great bulk of benefici-
aries – one contact to receive the application and gather all essential
information and a second contact to deliver the final title. Copies of
all titles were placed in the land registry.
At its inception, The New York Times (editorial April 9, 1970)
called it “probably the most ambitious and progressive non-Commu-
nist land reform of the twentieth century.” Ultimately, nearly a mil-
lion final titles were distributed, reaching approximately 75% of all
wholly or partly tenant families in the South.
For a detailed account of the South Vietnamese reform, see R.
Prosterman & J. Riedinger, Land Reform and Democratic Development,
Chapter 5 (John Hopkins 1987).
El Salvador carried out a program giving ownership to approximately
30% of its tenant farmers and, as in Vietnam, implemented it in the
midst of a civil conflict.40 In El Salvador, however, the program (paral-
leled by a program to give estate lands to agricultural laborers, dis-
cussed in Chapter 3) was timely enough to play a likely role in tipping
the result against the Communist insurgency.41 This program, under
which land distribution began in 1980 and substantially ended in
1984, is the most recent on the planet to have made a significant effort
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to make tenants owners of the land they till. While this program was
also broadly successful in both political and economic terms,42 it did
not benefit as high a proportion of tenant families as the Asian pro-
grams discussed above. Some reasons for this are described later in
this chapter and in Box 2.2.
We will describe selectively further elements of each of these pro-
grams in what follows. We will also refer to elements of the generally
(or even wholly) unsuccessful land-to-the-tiller programs in Pakistan,
Bangladesh, most Indian states other than Kerala, the Philippines, and
the earlier South Vietnamese land reform program of the 1950s.43 Both
the successes and the failures of the various programs may offer les-
sons as to the extent to which it is still feasible, in the early twenty-first
century, to design and undertake programs that will successfully confer
upon tenants ownership of the land they till.
Lessons to be learned
Examination of the existing body of experience with land-to-the-tiller
programs indicates that a complex of mutually interacting variables –
beginning with geopolitical and financing issues – are likely to bear on
the feasibility and success of such a program in any given country set-
ting. In effect, for each setting one must attempt to predict how likely
there is to be a positive alignment of these variables, and whether any
of these variables might be influenced in a direction more likely to sup-
port the reform. In most cases today the answer is very likely to be that
it is probably not possible to successfully launch and carry out a reform
in which tenant farmers receive ownership, or equivalent rights, to
land they farm as tenants. Many of the lessons, however, remain highly
relevant today in the design of other kinds of land tenure reform pro-
grams.
The geopolitical “macro” environment
Of course, a threshold condition for a land-to-the-tiller program is the
presence of a large population of tenant farmers mired in poverty and
insecurity. Beyond this, we note that six of the seven successful land-to-
the-tiller reforms involved “macro” factors that are generally unlikely to
be duplicated – and, perhaps more to the point, that one would not
wish to duplicate deliberately. At least four (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
and China) involved highly authoritarian forms of government in
power at the time of the reform; two others (South Vietnam and El Sal-
vador) were carried out under weakened, but certainly not democratic,
governments fighting for their existence against strong Communist
forces attempting to overthrow them. All of the programs except that
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in Kerala State reflected situations of chaos and disruption either im-
mediately post-conflict or with violent conflicts actually ongoing. Also,
except for Kerala (and of course, China), all featured a degree of official
U.S. advocacy and support for the land reform that went well beyond
mere technical assistance or “foreign aid” and seems unlikely to be du-
plicated (the least U.S. pressure or insistence having been needed in
Taiwan, whose leadership had just been traumatized by the loss of the
mainland, the most pressure having been applied in Japan). Kerala, as
already noted, was exceptional: land tenure reform went forward under
Communist or left-front governments, but ones that were elected and
could be replaced through the ballot; conditions were peaceful, with
the reform neither preceded nor accompanied by major conflict; and
there was certainly no U.S. pressure to carry out the reform – indeed,
there was barely any awareness outside India of its existence. In Kerala,
it was extensive grass-roots political organizing, building on a history
of radicalism that had grown out of landlord abuses, coupled with a
simple land reform program design (universal transfer to tenant farm-
ers, no land retention by landlords – to be discussed below) that made
land reform possible.44
Thus, today, apart from possible exceptional situations of violent
Maoist movements rooted to a significant degree in the land-based
grievances of tenant farmers (it is unclear, as this is being written,
whether Nepal’s new government, largely traceable to such an insur-
gency, will provide a contemporary example), one might wish to con-
sider the extent to which the very different factors present in Kerala
might now exist or be created. And one must also consider the extent
to which entirely distinct, but still democratic and non-violent, models
might be developed.
Landlord compensation
Since the earliest days of our involvement with the land reform issue,
we have urged adequate compensation to land-losing owners.45 Such
compensation need not necessarily be full “market value” in all circum-
stances. And planners may recognize the general impracticality of pay-
ing the entire sum – or even most of it – in cash in the case of a large-
scale land redistribution. Indeed, such large payments in unrestricted
cash would be likely to fuel inflation, which might eat away at the va-
lue of such cash even as it was received. But adequate compensation
should be that which, at least, creates a fund likely to be sufficient to
replace, in perpetuity, the net income that the land had produced for
the landowner. In cases of tenanted land, this amount would equal the
annual rent received. And former owners should be able to use such
compensation very quickly for making investments, for example by
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using bonds paid as compensation as collateral for loans to make such
investments.46 Of the seven successful post-war land-to-the-tiller pro-
grams, Taiwan probably came closest to providing adequate compensa-
tion, but none of the programs paid, or purported to pay, full market
value.47
What should not be attempted, however, is a taking of private land
rights for little or no compensation. This happened in China, in an
ideologically motivated and deliberate way as part of the communist re-
volution there, and also happened in the Japanese reform, nominally
blamable on the great post-war inflation, but readily avoidable had the
law been written differently, and to that extent also deliberate.48
Intermediate approaches are found in the other successful programs,
including in El Salvador, where payment was based on the landlord’s
own earlier declarations of land value for property tax purposes,49
which of course erred on the low side, but allowed the argument by
the takers, “what’s sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander.” An in-
teresting variation was also used in Kerala State, where the payment
for tenanted paddy land was inversely progressive, ranging, very
roughly, from 4 times gross crop value for the smallest landlords down
to 2 times gross crop value for the largest, according to a statutory for-
mula.50
An important related variable, even if the compensation formula ap-
pears reasonably adequate, is whether the government’s promises to
pay in a deferred form such as bonds will be viewed as credible by
landowners. For example, the largely unsuccessful 1972 Philippine pro-
gram to give land to tenant farmers provided that most of the payment
would be in government bonds. But the bonds did not carry the “full
faith and credit” of the Philippine government; that is, they were not
backed by the full revenues and taxing power of the government like
other government bonds. Rather, they were to be vaguely financed and
guaranteed (apart from collection of repayment from the beneficiaries)
by shares in government-owned enterprises.51
And even where cash payment is to form a significant portion of
compensation – as in El Salvador, for example, where landlords who
owned less than 100 hectares were to receive 50% of their compensa-
tion in cash52 – the government must still be willing to appropriate the
necessary funds in a timely way. Failure to do this during the early per-
iod of implementation of the Salvadoran land-to-the-tiller program con-
tributed to landlord opposition.53
A number of mutually reinforcing reasons support payment of ade-
quate compensation:
(1) To the extent that any future land-to-the-tiller programs are unli-
kely to rely on authoritarian government, and are instead more likely
to resemble the “Kerala approach,”54 something close to adequate com-
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pensation will probably be a pre-condition for success. Especially if the
government is neither authoritarian nor one with a strong electoral
mandate, this is likely to be a threshold practical consideration: in a de-
mocracy, even in cases where there may not be sympathy or focused
political opposition on behalf of what is likely to be a relatively well-off
and well-educated group (the affected landlords), inadequate compen-
sation for land takings will still be unsettling for many other voters
who are property owners and so will be opposed on those grounds.
(2) To the degree that landowners consider the offered compensation
to be unreasonably low, the result may go well beyond voting for the
opposition, and entail social instability or violent protest, perhaps even
the overthrow of a democratic but weak government. Although invol-
ving chiefly plantation land and not tenanted land, this was a factor in
the initiation of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, was clearly a preci-
pitating factor in the U.S.-sponsored overthrow of the Guatemalan gov-
ernment in the 1950s, and may have been a factor in the military coup
in Brazil in the 1960s.55
(3) Even if it does not lead to overt violence, poor compensation is
likely to give rise to strenuous landowner efforts to undermine and sa-
botage the program by various means discussed later in this section.
Such pressure makes it much more difficult to design a workable pro-
gram.
(4) Closely related to the foregoing point, severely inadequate com-
pensation makes it more difficult to threaten credible penalties for
landowners who obstruct the program. Assuming that landlords who
evade the land reform law through non-violent means will not believe
that courts will apply criminal penalties to them, the most effective ci-
vil penalty for program obstruction (e.g., the landlord’s failure to de-
clare all the land he owns) may be the loss of the land without compen-
sation. However, precisely to the degree that the proffered compensa-
tion is quite low or merely nominal, landowners may feel they have
nothing to lose from attempting to keep land outside the reach of the
program.
(5) In some settings, providing low compensation for the land to be
taken may represent a generalized attempt to punish all landlords or
plantation owners as a class or group through the political system.
Such generalized condemnations have always been extremely difficult
to justify, and they have become even more so as rural societies lose
feudal characteristics. The public, even if desiring more equitable land-
ownership patterns as a social goal, is increasingly less likely to support
“punishing” landlords as a means of achieving this goal.
(6) If low compensation or no compensation for land is sought to be
justified as being more in the nature of an adjudicated fine for specific
past landlord behavior, then due process, which is increasingly ac-
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cepted as an international norm, demands that distinctions be made
based on the actual facts with respect to each owner. Even in a situa-
tion as extreme as that of deprivation of black farmers’ lands solely be-
cause of race, done in South Africa for decades after 1913, that coun-
try’s 1994 restitution law requires specific factual findings as to how
the present white holder of the land obtained it before a decision can
be made as to whether and how much the government will pay to the
present holder.56 These provisions are discussed in Chapter 3. The pre-
sent point together with point (5) support the case that the determina-
tion of land compensation should not rest on generalized ideological
grounds.
We thus conclude that, in any projected universal or near-universal
distribution of land to tenant farmers, it will be desirable to determine:
(a) how many hectares are to be redistributed;57 (b) the market value of
the land;58 (c) the level of reasonably adequate compensation for the
land, taking account of market value, rent levels, deferred payment and
other factors; (d) a realistic schedule of payment to landlords, including
any deferral; (e) a realistic schedule of beneficiary repayment – contem-
plating that they should receive immediate economic benefits, and thus
pay substantially less than their previous rents; (f) based on all of the
foregoing, how much government financing is likely to be needed;59
and (g) whether and how the government can credibly mobilize the re-
sources that would thus be necessary. If the clear answer to the final
question is, “It cannot!,” then reformers will need to identify some al-
ternative to a traditional land-to-the-tiller program.
Market-assisted land reform
One variant approach attempted in recent years is “market-assisted
land reform.” Under this approach, the land market itself is used to
acquire land on the basis of a willing buyer and willing seller. The gov-
ernment (or other funder) provides credit to the intended beneficiary
to purchase land on the open market. Alternatively, the government
may buy the land and then transfer it to the ownership of the intended
beneficiary. This approach has been championed by the World Bank,
and the longest experience with it has been in non-tenant, large-estate
settings such as Brazil and South Africa. Hence our discussion of its
strengths and weaknesses appears in Chapter 3. There is, however, no
inherent reason why this approach cannot be used – to the extent it
shows itself to be practical – in a sector of small and medium-sized
landholdings as well, including tenant-occupied holdings. Indeed, it is
presently being implemented in the three Indian states of Andhra Pra-
desh, Karnataka and West Bengal, in programs that have focused on al-
lowing landless agricultural laborers to acquire ownership of very small
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plots. Chapter 6 discusses this experience. Tenant farm families who
own no agricultural land can also qualify as beneficiaries though the
land they receive is not normally part of the land on which they are
tenants.
Beneficiary selection
Most land-to-the-tiller programs have involved in-place distribution to
existing tenants, which means that beneficiary designation should be
fairly straightforward. Some potential issues can arise, however, includ-
ing in relation to possible landlord attempts to undermine land-to-the-
tiller legislation.
A frequent and highly important issue that has arisen as to benefi-
ciary designation is that of an artificially narrow definition of “tenant.”
This term should include all those who possess an agricultural holding
continuously over the course of one crop season or longer while recog-
nizing the superior rights of another (usually denominated the “land-
lord”) and paying to the latter a rent for the possession and use of the
land. It should make no difference whether the rent is calculated as a
fixed amount set in advance (a “fixed-rent” tenancy) or as a specified
share of the crop actually produced (a “sharecropping” tenancy). Nor
should it matter whether the rent is paid in kind or in cash, or whether
cash rent is paid before or after the harvest.
Of the foregoing possibilities for fastening on a “distinction without
a difference,” a common mistake in unsuccessful land-to-the-tiller pro-
grams has been to deny tenant status to sharecroppers. This unwar-
ranted limitation is found in several state-level land reform laws in
India, and is discussed in Chapter 6. The fact that such a limitation
has been inserted in the law at all is, in itself, generally sufficient to
cast grave doubt on the political will of the legislating government to
carry out a meaningful land tenure reform.
A related problem is that of sub-lease, in which the original tenant
leases the land to a third person who becomes the actual cultivator and
pays rent (which may be different from the original tenant’s rent) to
the original tenant. Some land-to-the-tiller laws deem the original
tenant, sometimes referred to as the sub-lessor, to hold a superior right
vis-a`-vis the cultivating sub-lessee. Such sub-tenancy is likely to be pre-
sent with respect to only a very small fraction of tenanted land, largely
because owner-landlords much prefer to choose their own actual culti-
vator. For this small fraction of cases in which sub-leases exist, the best
general practice for land-to-the-tiller programs is to entitle the actual
cultivator – whether tenant or sub-tenant – to claim rights and benefits
under the program.60
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A further issue is whether the law will impose a ceiling on the
amount of land that tenant farmers can receive. Many laws that abolish
landlord ownership of tenanted land have also applied ceilings (some-
times the same, sometimes lower) on what the ex-tenant may own fol-
lowing the reform. The concern here is over the “reverse” of what is of-
ten thought of as typical tenancy: instead of small tenants renting in
land from large owners, in some settings large tenants are increasingly
renting in land from small owners. Even where the overall land tenure
reform has been successfully implemented, one may find that this
additional provision is being ignored, as not worth the administrative
effort and political fallout of implementation. The most criticized ex-
ample of an in-place distribution to tenants without a sufficient limit
on land to be received has been Kerala State, where tenants using more
than 2 hectares, a relatively large holding by local standards, received
64% of the land redistributed.61 One strong policy consideration for in-
cluding a lower maximum provision in Kerala (the actual ceiling was
4.85 to 6.1 hectares) would have been that it would have allowed the
government to acquire excess lands, at the expense of larger tenants, to
provide to the many non-tenant agricultural laborer families.62
A somewhat different setting of large holdings held by tenant enti-
ties that lease in land from small owners is found in parts of the for-
mer USSR and is discussed in the final section of Chapter 7.
It should be noted that without an enforced ceiling on what tenant
beneficiaries receive, an in-place land-to-the-tiller program yields no
land for distribution to non-tenants. Notably, it provides none for agri-
cultural laborers, especially that category of laborers who work peripa-
tetically for various cultivators (including both tenants and owner-
operators). Another potential source of land for such families is a ceil-
ing on self-cultivated land, as discussed in Chapter 3, but one must
raise the policy question of whether it is possible to argue persuasively
for a ceiling that would only apply to pre-existing owner-cultivators, or
whether the same ceiling must also apply to new owner-cultivators
(land-to-the-tiller beneficiaries) who were formerly tenants.
Another consideration involves the potentially competing interests of
tenants who cultivate the land of the same landlord. If the law allows
the landlord to retain some tenanted land, which tenants of a particular
landlord will become owners – to some degree – and which tenants
will not? Will this still be an in-place distribution and depend wholly
on which land gets taken and which land the landlord retains? This
would seem to be the simplest solution, but may often not prove the
fairest. This issue is related to the question of who ultimately chooses
the retained portion of the land – the landlord or the administering
agency. If the landlord is permitted to choose the retained land, does
the law impose restrictions, such as a requirement that the landlord se-
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lect “average” land, or select a single contiguous part of the total hold-
ing? And if the administering agency chooses the land to be taken,
should it do so with an eye to spreading “in place” benefits to as many
of the landlord’s tenants as possible?63
A final issue as to beneficiary identification is one that has almost
never been addressed, even in land-to-the-tiller programs that are
counted among the most successful.64 This is the question not of
which tenant families should benefit or to what extent, but of who
within those tenant families should be recognized as a beneficiary. In
particular, should the law recognize a wife as receiving the same bene-
fits as the husband, and equal status as a beneficiary? Because wives
the world over jointly cultivate land with their husbands as farmers
and depend on family land for their livelihoods, they also deserve the
security of receiving land tenure reform benefits. This raises program
design questions as to how to ensure that all documentation issued will
include the name of the wife as well as that of the husband, and what
provisions in the law can help safeguard the wife’s interest in case of
inheritance, divorce, separation or abandonment. These issues are dis-
cussed principally in Chapter 5 on gender.
Ensuring presumptive beneficiaries are not evicted
A serious issue in achieving land distribution goals under land-to-the-
tiller programs has been anticipatory eviction of tenant farmers before
the law is formally adopted, or between the time it is adopted and the
time it is actually implemented. This was, for example, a huge problem
in most of India’s state-level land reform programs undertaken in the
1950s and 1960s, as discussed in Chapter 6. Several variables can
make this a greater problem. A long period of public debate, during
which landlords come to understand that a law redistributing some or
all tenanted land is very likely to be adopted, increases opportunities
for evasion, although at the same time, public debate on legislation is
necessary and desired in a democratic society. This problem could be
partially surmounted by retroactively applying the legislation from a
point in time prior to the start of debate. But this will not be possible if
there are constitutional or other legal constraints that prevent the law
from having retrospective application, and it will still leave the poten-
tially daunting administrative task of going back in time to trace and
undo past evictions. Some countries have overcome these problems by
legislating an enforced “freeze” on tenant evictions while the land re-
form law is being developed. Kerala is one such example, where legisla-
tion to halt evictions was passed to protect tenants during the period
while the legislation was drafted but before its implementation.65 Fi-
nally, evictions are more likely if the government fails to ensure admin-
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istrative capacity to uncover violations or apply credible penalties
against violators.
In Taiwan, the combination of legal protection for tenants’ existing
possession and administrative follow-up to reinstate illegally evicted
tenants kept problems to a minimum. These measures responded to a
significant wave of illegal anticipatory tenant evictions or coerced
tenant “surrenders” of their land rights that occurred after adoption of
the 37.5% limitation on rents but before adoption of the land-to-the-til-
ler program. Out of 393,000 lease contracts entered into by June 1949,
over 35,000 (around 9%) had purportedly been terminated before the
land-to-the-tiller program got underway.66 The government responded
by introducing a comprehensive system employing 62 inspectors to
provide information, conduct inspections and settle disputes. By June
1952, fewer than one-half of 1% of protected tenants had lost their
lands.67
A number of factors can help restrain anticipatory evictions of tenant
farmers. First, tenants’ rights under any program, including restraints
on their eviction by landlords, should be persistently publicized,
through publicity channels most likely to reach them.68
Second, a program that does not allow landlords to retain ownership
of any tenanted land – a so-called “zero ceiling” approach, as in South
Korea, South Vietnam, Kerala State or El Salvador – may provide
tenants with the confidence to resist eviction. This signals to tenants
that each of them – not just some presently unknown portion – will be-
come owners, and free of the landlord’s influence in the future. This
probably gives all tenants a greater sense of their capacity to resist land-
lord demands that they surrender their leases in return for some small
payment. Thus, if all landlords will soon be out of the picture, their
tenants need not stay in the landlord’s “good graces” (hoping, for exam-
ple, to be leased another piece of land later, or at least hired as an agri-
cultural laborer). Moreover, only regimes with a strong political com-
mitment to carrying out land reform have ever adopted a zero ceiling
on landlord retention of tenanted land.69
Third, evictions may be restrained by strong administrative capacity
combined with political will and a firm central authority, as in Taiwan
or Japan. As in those cases, this combination may restrain evictions
even where landlords are allowed to retain some tenanted land, and
there is therefore the prospect that some tenants (even if under “regu-
lated” tenancy) will remain tenants after the land reform.
Also related to outright eviction of tenants is the problem of allowing
landlords to evict tenants “legally” by reclaiming the land for personal
cultivation. Many Indian states with less successful land-to-the-tiller
programs permitted landowners to evict tenants if the landlord
planned to cultivate the land personally, and such “personal cultivation”
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was often defined to include the use of hired wage laborers under the
landowner’s supposed supervision. Allowing landlords to resume culti-
vation, especially when implemented in a way so as to allow the use of
hired laborers, defeats the main purpose of the reform – moving land
ownership into the hands of tenants who are the actual cultivators. It
also harms the tenants’ interests by incentivizing their eviction. This is-
sue is discussed further in Chapter 6.
In terms of program design, as distinct from exogenous political or
other factors,70 it is clear that the principal step that program drafters
can take to help forestall anticipatory evictions is by designing a pro-
gram that prohibits landlords from retaining any tenanted land or re-
suming personal cultivation on formerly tenanted land. These rules
must, in turn, be effectively publicized as a basic step in their enforce-
ment.
Anticipatory transfers
Where governments have attempted reform programs that allow land-
lords to retain some portion of their tenanted land, the largest single
problem of evasion and program sabotage has usually arisen from the
landlords’ anticipatory transfer of above-ceiling land to relatives, friends
or strawmen.71 Thus there is created at least the appearance (and per-
haps the reality) that such landlords hold no tenanted land in excess of
the ceiling as of the effective date of the land reform law.72 This is an
“appearance” if the transferees are simply nominal holders of title to
the formerly above-ceiling land, with the landlord still collecting the
rents and exercising ultimate control over such land, but is a “reality”
if it is a bona fide transfer of all rights to the land, as, for example, a
transfer made during the landlord’s life to adult children or others who
might have been presumptive heirs upon the owner’s death. In some
cases, the transfer is not even actually made before the land-to-the-tiller
law becomes effective, but is fraudulently pre-dated, sometimes with
the collusion of a corrupt local notary.
This method of evasion through anticipatory transfer of above-ceiling
land is easier for many landlords than tenant eviction, since it both
avoids possible physical confrontation and removes the need to find
some other way of cultivating the land, especially if the landlord does
not wish to self-cultivate directly.
The measures that may deter such anticipatory (or pre-dated) trans-
fers include most of those discussed above in relation to anticipatory
eviction of tenants in cases where landlords retain tenanted land. These
include retroactive application of the law, a preliminary freeze on trans-
fers prior to full adoption of the land reform, publicizing the rights of
tenants, and a grass-roots administrative effort. If a program is adopted
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that does allow landlords to retain some tenanted land, the following
additional design elements may also play a useful role.
First, the legislation should be drafted to disregard any transfers
made after the law’s adoption by the landlord to members of the land-
lord’s immediate family. Certainly this should include the wife and
minor children, as well as adult children or parents living under the
same roof and should preferably extend to adult children living apart.
In this way landlords would not be allowed to transfer to those they
might most easily use as nominal transferees, while retaining actual
benefit from the land for themselves (what some legal systems might
denominate “beneficial enjoyment”).
Second, the law should forbid bogus transfers by explicitly providing
that post-law transfers will be recognized as valid only if the landlord
has parted with all rights and benefits. This, in turn, opens up at least
the theoretical possibility that program administrators could question
tenants as to whether their obligations as tenant had now shifted to the
supposed new owner, and in particular whether they still pay rent to
the old owner.
Third, the law could require that any claimed transfer of above-ceil-
ing land not only be evidenced by a deed dated before the effective date
of the law, but by a registry record of the transfer that pre-dated the
law. Fraudulent pre-dating of entries in the land register is possible –
and indeed RDI has been told that this was sometimes done in the
Philippines, under non-zero-ceiling laws there – but tampering with
the land register is at least more difficult than getting a pre-dated no-
tarization on a non-registered deed, and may require the knowledge
and collusion of more than one registry official.73
Fourth, other design measures may deter anticipatory transfers. In
particular, provided that village-level bodies are not dominated by land-
lords, the law could make them responsible for fact finding and admin-
istration at the village level. Such bodies functioned in the Japanese re-
form, where resident landlords were allowed to retain one hectare of
tenanted land. And in Taiwan an administrative presence extending to
the grass-roots level may have served a similar function, again in the
context of a program that allowed landlords to retain some tenanted
land.74
Finally, the combination of a reasonable level of compensation and
the threat that it will be withheld if the landlord makes false state-
ments or obstructs the program may serve as a deterrent. Both the pro-
mise and the threat, however, must be perceived as reasonably credible.
This being said, we are not aware of any program in which sanctions
were actually applied. In Taiwan, where landlords were allowed to re-
tain some tenanted land and where compensation was not insignifi-
cant, local administrators seem to have relied far more on persuasion
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and “jaw-boning” than on the use of formal penalties.75 Of course, this
was in the context of a strong government with strong political will
and (being under the control of the Nationalists, who had fled from
the mainland in 1949) with few connections to indigenous Taiwanese
landlords.
Beneficiary rights
When former tenants do receive land as a result of the reform pro-
gram, further questions concern how “owner-like” will be the bundle of
rights they receive.76 (A set of parallel issues is discussed in Chapter 7.)
Where the reform provides that the government shall acquire exist-
ing landlord rights of ownership, governments have provided, corre-
spondingly, perpetual rights to tenant beneficiaries. The principal issue
that arises in such cases is the breadth of the rights beneficiaries will
receive; that is, how “owner-like” are such rights? For example, some
reforms have limited the rights of beneficiaries to transfer the rights
they have received. Transfer restrictions are often adopted either be-
cause policy makers regard transfers by beneficiaries as inconsistent
with basic concepts embedded in the land reform program, as for ex-
ample, where the land-to-the-tiller law forbids landlords from retaining
tenanted land and also ban the creation of any future tenancies. Such a
ban would logically include any attempted leasing by the beneficiaries.
Or policy makers may wish to limit transfer (or mortgage) of the land
by the new owners because they believe that the new owners must be
protected against their own unwise or imprudent actions. On the other
hand, consistent with the concept of the perpetual duration of the
rights being given to former tenants, land-to-the-tiller programs always
allow rights to be passed on to succeeding generations, although there
may sometimes be restrictions as to beneficiary-directed dispositions
by will as distinct from predetermined dispositions to presumptive or
statutory heirs.
Restrictions on transfers, where they exist, may be unlimited in time
or may take the form of a time-bound moratorium (e.g., no sales for
the first 10 years) or a contingent limitation (e.g., no sales until the
beneficiary has paid the government for the land). Even where restric-
tions are initially without time limit, lawmakers may subsequently de-
cide to abolish the restrictions, thus bringing the beneficiaries’ rights
in line with those held by other landowners in the society.
To obtain the fullest benefits of the land distribution in both enhan-
cing political stability and beneficiary motivation, unlimited restrictions
on either transfer or mortgage appear to be generally undesirable and
unadministratable. If there is to be restriction, at most a moratorium
or contingent limitation should be used, after which the new owners
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should be treated like any other owner. As to regulation or prohibition
of leasing, see the discussion in section III below, as well as Chapter 6.
Another type of limitation on transfer sometimes found is one that
allows transfer only to transferees with certain characteristics. For ex-
ample, the law might provide that the total area of land the transferee
proposes to acquire plus the land already held will not exceed some
statutory ceiling on owner-cultivated land. Or the law might provide
that a transferee must indeed be an agriculturalist who will self-culti-
vate (rather than an investor or “speculator”), or is not a foreigner, or is
a natural person and not a corporation. Sometimes there is provision
for local administrators to approve transactions to verify that they meet
these or other criteria. Again, in terms of program design, it is desir-
able that any such restrictions, at least after some initial time period,
not be any more limiting for new owners than for agricultural land-
owners generally.77
Aside from duration and breadth, the further dimension of assur-
ance in the “bundle” of land rights is usually provided principally
through some type of formal documentation given to the benefici-
aries.78 A persistent problem in some land-to-the-tiller efforts has been
that the documents endorsing beneficiary rights have simply not been
issued, or issuance has been subject to long delays. This may, in turn,
reflect a range of circumstances, from those in which the government
has paid the old landlord but has failed to prepare and physically hand
over the title documents to the tenant, to those in which the landlord
is contesting the propriety of the taking, perhaps frivolously, and the
dispute remains tied up in a laborious court system, possibly for years.
Several program design steps can help ensure documentation of bene-
ficiary rights, thereby greatly improving the assurance with which those
rights are held. These measures are discussed in Chapter 8, which deals
with titling and registration issues generally. There is a growing body of
evidence (also discussed in that chapter, and in Chapter 7) that, in many
country settings, issuance of formal documentation is important in gen-
erating behavior that land tenure reform programs seek to bring about,
such as beneficiary investment in land improvements.
Time-bound implementation
The available experience suggests it is unwise to set deadlines for key
aspects of program implementation. Of the seven land-to-the-tiller pro-
grams that we consider largely successful, only El Salvador used an im-
plementation deadline. And that program was the least far-reaching of
the seven, with about 30% of tenant farmers benefiting versus large
majorities in the other six. The more modest success in El Salvador
can be traced at least in part to the vulnerabilities created by a deadline,
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under which the program initially provided that beneficiaries had to
submit their applications for ownership within one year of the adop-
tion of implementing regulations.79 This provision in itself might not
have definitively limited the program, but for two additional factors.
First, the implementation process was not localized and contained
unnecessary complications. For example, beneficiaries generally had to
submit applications at the county seat rather than in the village; the
law required issuance of a “provisional title” as a separate step, rather
than simply letting the applicant retain a verified copy of the applica-
tion; and the procedure called for time-consuming on-the-ground land
surveying rather than relying largely or entirely on aerial surveying, a
technology that had been successfully used in South Vietnam a decade
earlier. These features slowed down the implementation process. But a
second and unpredicted factor, political changes in El Salvador that
brought to power both an administration and a legislature that were
less supportive, or were even hostile, to the reform process proved even
deadlier in conjunction with the deadlines, through the machinations
described in Box 2.2.
Nor did the absence of a deadline in other land-to-the-tiller settings
lead to drawn-out implementation. Of the other six land-to-the-tiller re-
forms we characterize here as successes – indeed, all of them greater
programmatic successes than the Salvadoran reform in terms of the
proportion of tenants who became owners – none had a deadline, yet
none took more than five years to implement.
Presumed tenancy
As noted above, local village bodies that are not dominated by landlords
are probably in the best position to adjudicate the reforms and deter-
mine who has a rightful claim as a tenant. Without such local knowl-
edge it may be easy for politically connected landlords to succeed in
disputing the existence of a tenancy relationship in the first place, or to
coerce tenants into not claiming their rights. Kerala State’s reform in-
cluded another interesting variation: it created a series of presumptions
as to the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship, placing the bur-
den of proof on the landlord to show that there was not a tenancy rela-
tionship, rather than on the tenant to show that there was a tenancy
relationship.80 The existence of landlord-tenant relationships is so well
and widely known at the village level that the issue has hardly arisen
where the law provided for a public, local, non-landlord-dominated
fact-finding process.
TENANCY REFORM 79
Box 2.2. Time-bound implementation in El Salvador
Advising the Salvadoran government, RDI argued against any dead-
line provision for beneficiary applications, but ultimately had to
withdraw that opposition to get the land-to-the-tiller decree approved
at all.
We anticipated that the Salvadoran government, with urging from
the U.S., would extend the deadline, and initially they did. But the
new and much-less-favorably disposed legislature ultimately took ad-
vantage of the deadline provision through a rather sophisticated pair
of legal maneuvers:
(1) They adopted a law requiring that any land not applied for by
the deadline would return to the ownership of the former landlord.
This effectively negated a provision of the original law that had ta-
ken all tenanted land out of the landlord’s ownership and conferred
it on the tenants “by operation of law” as of the law’s effective date,
April 28, 1980. That provision had made the original application
process merely a confirmatory one, rather than the source of the
tenant’s title.
(2) Under intense pressure from supporters of the reform in the
U.S. Congress, the legislature had previously extended the applica-
tion process for further one-year periods, but now having made
timely applications necessary for the tenant’s title, they balked at
further extensions, and the time for beneficiary applications was al-
lowed to expire on June 30, 1984.
Thus, the provision of a deadline in El Salvador proved to be deci-
sively negative in its ultimate consequences, allowing not only a cut-
off of further applications but allowing former landlords to reclaim
ownership of all land not yet applied for.
For a detailed account of the Salvadoran reform, see R. Proster-
man & J. Riedinger, Land Reform and Democratic Development, Chap-
ter 6 (John Hopkins 1987).
Outside support
Leaving China aside, as a post-revolutionary reform in which no out-
side support would be expected or needed, five of the land-to-the-tiller
reforms we discuss received varying outside support from the U.S.
(those of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam and El Salvador).
Kerala carried out a successful program without any foreign support,
having been implemented by a fully committed state government with
extensive grass-roots outreach and support, and in a peaceful country-
side.
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Looking to settings where one or more of these factors – government
commitment, grass-roots outreach and peace – is either missing or
variable over the period of implementation, the contrast between U.S.
support in South Vietnam and that in El Salvador is instructive. In
both cases, RDI provided the principal technical assistance for the initi-
al formulation of the land-to-the-tiller program.81 In South Vietnam,
the Nixon administration fully and consistently supported the land
tenure reform, and had put 30 of USAID’s own direct-hire staff on the
ground within weeks after the adoption of the land-to-the-tiller law to
assist in the implementation and monitoring of the program. There
was also continuous random-sample surveying to verify progress and
results. In El Salvador, the Carter administration was supportive, but
was greatly distracted by the 1980 U.S. election campaign; it was suc-
ceeded by the Reagan administration, which might be characterized as
a “net supporter” on the whole, but which went through various stages
and was pulled in various directions (e.g., a supportive USAID admin-
istrator, but an initially hostile U.S. ambassador, only later succeeded
by a supportive ambassador, Thomas Pickering; and with a powerful
conservative senator, the late Jesse Helms, persistently in opposition).
The ultimate result in El Salvador was that the USAID mission in
that country failed to include any full-time direct-hire professional staff
support for the Salvadoran land-to-the-tiller program until a single po-
sition was created towards the end of 1982, more than two years after
the land tenure reform was adopted. Only in 1984 was this commit-
ment gradually increased to seven full- and part-time staff devoted to
the program, but with time running out. USAID also engaged a num-
ber of outside contract technicians, but they had little apparent influ-
ence or power with respect to either Salvadoran or U.S. land tenure re-
form policies. Based upon RDI’s own experience with the Salvadoran
reform, we can say that this paucity of assistance contributed to the
Salvadoran government’s persistence in an implementation process
that was too centralized and unnecessarily complex.
If a land-to-the-tiller program were to be adopted anywhere today,
past experience strongly suggests that external support from bilateral
or multilateral public agencies – if desired by the implementing coun-
try and judged to be worth providing at all by the outside actors – must
be fully sufficient, highly timely and non-grudging. However, no wide-
spread, mandated land-to-the-tiller reform to confer ownership upon
tenant farmers has been initiated since that of El Salvador commenced
in 1980. The closest to an exception is the Philippines, where a pro-
gram initiated under martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos in
1972 had largely languished, but was partially revived after 1986 under
the post-Marcos Aquino and Ramos presidencies.82
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Even where all of the foregoing “design” lessons can be absorbed
and applied, we believe that the combination of political and financial
constraints – especially of generally less-authoritarian governments and
fewer threatening, land-based rural rebellions in potential candidate
countries, together with generally much-higher rural land prices – will
make the incidence of such land-to-the-tiller reforms in the future
rare.83
III. Regulating tenancy
As an alternative to land-to-the-tiller reforms, many governments have
sought to provide benefits to tenants through substantial regulation of
the ongoing landlord-tenant relationship. One seeming attraction to
this approach is that it does not require the government to purchase
land for redistribution to the tenants. From an administrative perspec-
tive, regulation has the appearance of being easier because policy ma-
kers can simply legislate a ceiling to rents and a minimum period of
tenure (perhaps even making tenants’ rights perpetual and inheritable)
that they hope will transform the tenant’s economic situation. The cen-
tral problem, however, is that this type of reform is not possible by the
stroke of a pen, and considerable and ongoing oversight is required for
it to have any chance of working. For example, the law would at a mini-
mum need to require a new, written lease between each tenant and his
or her landlord embodying the new, mandatory terms of the tenancy.
And the process of entering into, verifying and enforcing such new
leases would presumably require a continuing active government role.
Indeed, in virtually all less-developed country settings in which they
have been tried on any scale, such programs to regulate the tenancy re-
lationship in substantial ways have proven unworkable.84 They do not,
therefore, represent a practicable solution to the problems of tenure in-
security, concomitant inability to make long-term investments, high
rent levels, or poverty that typically affect small tenant farmers in less-
developed countries.
In contrast to the land-to-the-tiller discussion, where we were able to
cite and describe seven generally successful programs, we can cite only
one success in broad regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship in a
less-developed-country setting – that of the state of West Bengal in
India – and even this success must be weighed against a lengthy list of
failures. Moreover, in some of the failures many or even most existing
tenant farmers not only gained no protection from the purported regu-
latory improvements, but actually ended up substantially worse off
than they were before the attempted reform, sometimes subject to
widespread evictions. Apart from the one success in West Bengal, fail-
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ures have included most other Indian states, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the
Philippines, South Vietnam in the 1950s and up to the land-to-the-tiller
program, and the Chinese mainland under the Nationalists, before the
Communists took power in 1949.85 There is also evidence in parts of
Africa and in India that regulation resulted in widespread evictions of
existing tenants.86
The central problem with landlord-tenant regulation is that virtually
none of the less-developed countries where such regulation has been
tried, or where it might be attempted now, has the administrative capa-
city to constrain and regulate successfully – in the tenant’s favor – the
ongoing landlord-tenant relationship. We identify at least three key rea-
sons that tenancy regulations have not been successfully implemented
in these settings.
First, unlike the land-to-the-tiller programs, which are characterized
by a complete severing of the landlord-tenant relationship, all landlord-
tenant regulation efforts, by their very definition, must deal with a con-
tinuing relationship, one which is intended to go on year after year
and must keep that relationship always within the prescribed bounds.
Successful implementation, correspondingly, will require an ongoing
allocation of financial resources and personnel by the government.
Second, the landlord’s motivation to cheat is likely to be strong pre-
cisely to the extent that the new regulation attempts to make signifi-
cant – and from the landlord’s standpoint, economically adverse –
changes to the previously existing market-driven terms of the tenancy.
Thus, a problem arises which is the direct counterpart of the adequate-
compensation point that figured prominently in our discussion of
land-to-the-tiller programs, but a problem which here has no even theo-
retically possible solution, because here there is no attempt to provide
“compensation” to the landlord for whatever economic loss the landlord
experiences as a result of the regulation, nor any thought of compensa-
tion.
Third, and greatly compounding the difficulties raised by the first
two points, much of the regulatory effort must deal with matters that
are non-transparent and easily hidden, especially in so far as the power
relationship of the parties tends strongly to favor the landlord and thus
keeps the tenant from coming forward to government administrators
with complaints about landlord cheating.87
The central conclusion here is that in virtually any developing coun-
try setting, there are probably no design features that will make land-
lord-tenant regulation predictably or probably feasible over its necessa-
rily extended and indefinite time-span. At most, it may be said that the
least-hurtful programs have been those that tolerate, in practice, land-
lords who demand rents in excess of the amount permitted by law,
while the existing tenant is at least allowed to remain on the land. Such
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has largely been the case with landlord-tenant regulation in the Philip-
pines, and was the case in South Vietnam in the late 1950s and until
the successful land-to-the-tiller program. In both cases landlords
charged tenants an agreed-on rent much higher than the statutory le-
vel, and there was virtually no state enforcement activity.88 However,
even in settings where effective administration of regulatory measures
seems unlikely, landlords may engage in precautionary evictions. This
has occurred, for example, in some African settings.89 Some of the
worst results have been experienced in India.
We save a more detailed discussion of attempted regulation of the
landlord-tenant relationship for Chapter 6, which is focused on India,
where individual states have demonstrated most of the variations on
failure. Here we briefly describe what began as an exceptionally effec-
tive tenancy regulation program but ended as an abject failure – the at-
tempt in Egypt – and point out the lessons that this failure may hold
for the single current success story in a developing-country setting:
landlord-tenant regulation in West Bengal. Egypt’s regulation of the
landlord-tenant relationship spanned 40 years (45 if we include the
years during which it was fully phased out). This was among the most
extreme of such initiatives with respect to the extent to which it sought
to divorce both duration of tenure and rent levels from market condi-
tions. The Agrarian Reform Law establishing the regulation of tenancy
was adopted just six weeks after the July 1952 Revolution that over-
threw the monarchy and brought to power the socialist-military regime
associated from 1954 until 1970 with Gamel Abdul Nasser.90 As long
as they paid their rent, the law guaranteed tenants perpetual tenure, re-
quired written tenancy contracts which they could continually renew,
and allowed tenants to pass their tenancy rights to their heirs. Rent
was fixed at seven times the land tax, which, even after some increase
in that tax after Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser in 1970, typically trans-
lated (as our own village interviewing in the late 1970s and into the
1980s indicated) into a very low rent level of 15-20% of the gross value
of the crops produced. In addition, the tenant was entitled to receive
one-half the sale price if the landlord sold the land for non-agricultural
purposes. The effects of the law were widely felt, since tenants farmed
as much as 60% of Egypt’s cropland at the time the law was intro-
duced.91 The rights of such a tenant, under a regime of full enforce-
ment, could be characterized as “owner-like” for the 40 years the law
was enforced.92
That the Egyptian legal regime with respect to landlord-tenant rela-
tions was successfully enforced may have resulted from a combination
of factors not commonly found in other developing-country settings
where such regulation has been attempted. These included a consider-
able tradition of respect for the law, a grassroots bureaucratic and ad-
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ministrative presence (facilitated by a cultivated area that was limited
to about 2.5 million hectares, concentrated in the Nile Valley and Nile
Delta) and, perhaps most important, the fact that the program was in-
itiated by a government that came to power as a revolutionary regime,
and one whose socialist ideology made the threat of punishing non-
complying landlords a credible one.
After Nasser’s death in 1970, and with a gradual softening of the re-
gime’s ideology, there were muted calls for a rollback of the reform by
landlords and their supporters, but there was also a clear opportunity,
at least until the beginning of the 1990s, for a more progressive
course. If there had been even modest political will at the top, the re-
form could have been “perfected” in favor of the tenants, by buying out
the relatively small residual rights of the landlords that had been left
with them after the 1952 reform, and giving the tenants full owner-
ship.
We urged such a course on the Egyptian government in the 1980s,93
pointing out that the old landlords by then mostly lived in the cities,
had diversified to other sources of income, and had had over three dec-
ades to reconcile themselves to a situation that most recognized as a
fait accompli. Thus, we argued, it was highly desirable to obtain an “in-
surance policy,” at modest cost,94 by buying out the remaining rights
of the nominal landlords and completing the transfer of rights to the
tenants. Otherwise, we pointed out that from a pro-reform point of
view (which was still the government’s position) there remained a con-
tinuing risk of the landlords gaining the ability to overturn the law at
some future time.
However, the government rejected this course and subsequently ful-
filled these warnings by annulling the long-standing protection of
tenants with dazzling speed as the 1990s began. A good deal of the
blame for catalyzing and encouraging the reversal lies with the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which, in the early euphor-
ia over the rollback of communist economies in Europe, decided to in-
sist on the rollback of Nasserite “socialism” in Egypt, a longstanding
symbol of which was the regulation of agricultural tenancy (never
mind that Egypt had made no attempt at collectivization of agriculture,
or that a number of non-socialist societies had tried landlord-tenant
regulation). The law reversing tenant protection was adopted pursuant
to the World Bank–IMF “structural adjustment” program in the early
1990s.95
In the end, Egypt’s parliament, in which the landlords held the
upper hand (there were no tenant members), and without hindrance
or objection from the Mubarak government, lifted the tenancy protec-
tions.96 This occurred in 1992 and was accompanied by an immediate
tripling of the rent level, from seven times the land tax to 22 times the
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land tax. In 1997, after a five-year transitional period, landowners were
allowed to evict any tenant family, many of whom had held secure cul-
tivation rights since 1952. After 1997 they could also charge rents not
subject to any legal limit.97 These huge changes in the law impacted
an estimated 1 million tenant families (6 million individuals, or 1/10th
of the population) who at the time cultivated one-quarter of Egypt’s
farmland.98
Research by Bush found that this policy reversal caused widespread
dispossessions of former tenants, increased rural poverty and indebted-
ness, and spurred an increase in urban migration by the young.99 An-
other study found that rents increased by 300% and that small farmers
and rural tenants were not able to compete with wealthier interests to
rent or purchase Egypt’s scarce arable land.100
The ultimate psychological and political impact of the Egyptian roll-
back of their successful landlord-tenant regulation may take many
years to make itself felt and, of course, relates not only to the current
economic situation of the tenants or ex-tenants viewed in isolation, but
also to the enormous worsening of that situation relative to what it had
been – essentially as a fixed expectation – for decades prior to 1992.
Psychologists in such circumstances may refer to potential aggression
arising out of the frustration of an ongoing activity (here, secure pos-
session of land which is the source of livelihood, at a low rent).101 Such
aggression may take a variety of forms: one might wonder, for exam-
ple, what has been the subsequent life-experience of the young men
who were driven to migrate to the cities by the reversal of their family’s
economic fortunes at the hands of the landowners, the lawmakers and
the government.102
The tenancy reforms in the Indian state of West Bengal are now the
last remaining tenancy reforms with broad application that are still ef-
fective in a less-developed country setting. The Egyptian experience
may suggest that West Bengal should seek to achieve what Egypt failed
to do while it is still politically feasible: as much full ownership for the
protected tenants as possible, as soon as possible. These possibilities
are discussed in Chapter 6.
A final issue concerns what may be regarded as the most extreme
form of tenancy “regulation”: a total ban on tenancy or the creation of
new tenancies.103 Such bans were implicitly or explicitly based on the
then-prevalent view that agricultural tenancy is inherently exploitative
and undesirable. These attempted bans have usually been enacted as
part of a land-to-the-tiller program in which those tenants or other
non-owners who would be affected are first entitled to receive owner-
ship or owner-like rights to their existing land, and thereafter forbidden
to become landlords themselves. This was done, with narrowly defined
exceptions, in South Korea, for example, although RDI interviewing of
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older and retired Korean farmers indicated that friendly tenancy ar-
rangements subsequently developed, and the ban did not remain
broadly enforced.104 The generally negative impact of the tenancy pro-
hibitions found in several Indian states is discussed in Chapter 6.
Notably, the most recent enactment of legislation providing for the
widespread conferral of ownership upon existing tenants was more
than a quarter-century ago, in El Salvador in 1980. To the extent that
governments are unlikely to enact such legislation in most contempor-
ary tenancy settings, and to the extent that existing legislation prohibits
or otherwise reduces landowner willingness either to maintain or cre-
ate tenancy relationships, large numbers of the rural poor can be se-
verely disadvantaged. Having thus been denied the ability to lease in
land, they are thereby pressed towards earning their livelihood as tem-
porary agricultural laborers. Such work is much less desirable than the
option of working land as tenant farmers who possess land for at least
one crop season at a time – and usually for at least one year – and who
typically have some scope for deciding how to operate that land. In
most agricultural settings, tenancy is likely to represent a step up the
ladder out of poverty compared with the status of temporary laborers.
One recent World Bank analysis for India, for example, suggests sub-
stantially higher remuneration per day worked for tenant farmers than
for wage laborers.105
IV. Freeing tenancy markets
Having examined the many problems that can plague government at-
tempts to regulate landlord-tenant relations, in this section we argue
that governments should consider formally restoring and deregulating
the tenancy option in settings where it is currently the subject of such
unsuccessful restriction or regulation.
As a threshold matter, we should be clear about one point: market-
based (unregulated) tenancy is a severely inferior second-best in com-
parison to a poor family becoming owner-operators of that same land.
Such a family is left in the “power domain” of the landowner, even if
some of the most feudal practices have receded over the past half-cen-
tury in many settings. Tenants are likely to have far less status in the
community than they would as owners of the same land. In terms of
production, they are highly unlikely to have the security of tenure that
allows mid- to long-term investments in the land, thus constraining
many of the potential increases or diversifications of production on the
land they farm.106 And they will have no realizable wealth based on
that land.107
TENANCY REFORM 87
Yet we have seen in Section II above that legislative provision of
ownership under land-to-the-tiller reform is not likely to be a realistic
option today in most settings where widespread tenancy persists; nor,
as seen in Section III, is it realistic to expect successful regulation of
the landlord-tenant relationship that gives more “ownerlike” rights and
mitigates or partially reverses some of the problems (such as uncertain
length of tenure and perceived high or at least rising rents) that inhere
in most market-based tenancy relationships.
Thus, to insist upon ownership via land-to-the-tiller or nothing, is to
permit the (unattainable) “best” to be the enemy of the “good,” or at
least the enemy of the “adequate.” In this context the “adequate” out-
come would be a lawful tenancy relationship, which is preferable to the
generally much less favorable outcome of being only a casual agricul-
tural laborer. And to insist upon substantial pro-tenant regulation or
nothing, is to let that (also unattainable) “good” be the enemy of the
same, at-least “adequate” achievement of market-based tenancy.
The first consequence of this reasoning would seem to be that mini-
mally regulated free-market tenancy, in the great majority of those set-
tings where it currently exists, should be left alone: the downside risks
of most attempted regulation are likely to far outweigh the probable
upside potential.
But if deregulation is to occur and tenancy markets are to be pro-
moted in settings where the present legal regime does not freely allow
such tenancy for agricultural land, advocates must address three impor-
tant issues, depending upon the specifics of the setting.
First, to the extent that those who are presently cultivating the land
have already received long-term tenure security benefits under a regu-
latory regime, those benefits must be preserved, and, when possible,
such tenants should be converted to owners by compensating landlords
for the market value of their remaining land rights.
Second, landowners are likely to enter into newly lawful, unregu-
lated tenancy arrangements only if they are persuaded that the rules re-
stricting tenancy have now changed and can be relied upon to remain
so.
Third, where possible, reformers should consider whether any as-
pects of the landlord-tenant relationship can be incrementally
improved to reduce the common disadvantages of the tenant, without
making landowners substantially more reluctant to enter into formal
and legally recognized tenancy agreements. That is, the law should pro-
vide some regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship that leads to
both predictability and certain basic protections for the tenant and the
landlord.108
A problem lurks here, however, that did not exist in our analyses
above of what makes land-to-the-tiller programs workable or unwork-
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able, or what makes landlord-tenant regulation programs workable or
(usually) unworkable. In each of those other instances, we were able to
draw upon a substantial body of comparative experience with actual
programs, often including RDI’s own experience with implementation
or in observing attempted implementation. But a program to carry out
a general reversal of an unsuccessful tenancy-prohibition or tenancy-
regulation program, while it may be strongly supported in theory, is
something that has been attempted in only one case, so far as we are
aware.109
That one possibly instructive case is in Mexico, where until 1992 the
law prohibited ejidatarios, who received land under the land reform,
from renting out their holdings. Despite the change that permitted the
leasing of these plots, RDI research found that as of 2001, ejidatarios
interviewed in Mexico’s Oaxaca state were still nervous about openly
leasing out their land (although some had been leasing out the land il-
legally prior to the repeal of the ban, as appears to be have been widely
true in Mexico) and were confused about their ability to lease out the
land legally.110 This bears on the second of the three points above, sug-
gesting that tenancy regulations might tend to distort tenancy markets
even after policy makers scale back or repeal them. This, in turn,
underscores that such scale-back or repeal, if done, should be accompa-
nied by reiterated grass roots publicity and education. Publicity and
education are among the seemingly easiest measures for implementing
legal rules in general (not only in the land tenure area) but are ones
which, in RDI’s experience, governments often do not focus on, do not
budget for, and tend ultimately to ignore.
However, the Mexican experience offers no guidance on our first
point above as to the need to identify and protect existing tenants who
may already have received some benefits (a point further discussed in
Chapter 6). That concern relates largely to settings in which traditional
landlords – who may fear being subjected to future land-to-the-tiller or
ceilings legislation – might seize upon tenancy deregulation measures
as an occasion to evict an existing minority of tenants who, contrary to
the landowner’s wishes, had actually received tenure security benefits
from the regulations that were being undone.111
What the concern expressed in our first point does suggest, in other
settings in which at least some tenants are supposed to have received
some benefits (even becoming owners under certain circumstances), is
that at a minimum, reform proponents must conduct careful field re-
search to determine whether there is a sector of families who have
benefited from landlord-tenant regulation (even though most families
may not have done so) contrary to the landowner’s will, and how they
might be adversely affected by the contemplated measures of deregula-
tion.112
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Nor does the isolated Mexican example offer much guidance on our
third point, which relates to redressing the relative power relationship.
On that point, it appears in principle that reformers should consider at
least four issues when devising rules that may help prospective tenants
while not alienating prospective landlords.
Process-facilitating measures. The designers of the rules should consid-
er adopting seemingly “neutral” measures – either as part of deregula-
tion or in settings where tenancy already operates entirely under the
free market – that may make the situation more transparent or other-
wise facilitate tenancy contracting. These might include, for example,
drafting and publicizing non-mandatory model rental contracts. Also,
“listing” services – such as a village bulletin board or local radio pro-
gram or newspaper – to bring together prospective lessors and les-
sees.113 Reduced-fee or free-of-charge formalization and public registra-
tion of longer-term leases may also encourage parties to conclude for-
mal rental contracts.
The FAO’s Good Practice Guidelines for agricultural leasing arrange-
ments offer, among others, these recommendations:114
– The preparation of a model lease or lease terms
– An undertaking to refer to a model agreement when lease terms are
in dispute (this would not supersede agreements by the parties, but
would fill the gap on matters where a clear agreement was lacking)
– Improvements in transparency (either registration of leases, or a se-
nior member of the local community to act as a recorder or reposi-
tory)
– Access to appropriate information (a simple recording system for
rents, fees and input/output shares)
Stable tenancy relations. Some regulatory changes seem overwhelmingly
likely to benefit both prospective landlords and prospective tenants.
Here, for example, we would include the termination of an existing
rule providing that anyone who was allowed to be a tenant on the same
parcel for more than one year was entitled to become a permanent ten-
ant or, perhaps, was entitled to claim the right to become owner of that
parcel. Where such a provision is law, the general result is likely to be
either frequent shuffling of tenants from parcel to parcel or owners not
renting out their land at all, seemingly disadvantageous to both land-
lords and tenants. Still, one would have to investigate whether some ex-
isting tenants might already be entitled to benefits – though not yet ac-
tually claimed – under the existing rules, and if so whether these bene-
fits could be successfully “grandfathered in” and preserved.
Rules that reinforce access for small tenants. In many settings, espe-
cially developing country settings where non-mechanized agriculture is
used and labor is readily available, tenancy can more equitably distri-
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bute access to land. This is the opposite of the common fear by some
policy makers that tenancy will concentrate landholdings, with the
powerful renting in plots from smallholders. Evidence that small-
holders and the landless most commonly rent in land and that rental
markets act to equalize operational holdings has been uncovered by
researchers in a number of different country settings.115 Conversely, re-
verse tenancy, whereby large holders rent in land from smaller holders,
is more common in regions that practice capital-intensive and land-
extensive agriculture – less characteristic of most developing country
settings where, more typically, plentiful labor and relatively little land
or spare capital is available.116
This raises the important question of whether anything can be done
to enhance this effect of tenancy markets in tending to equalize hold-
ings in developing country settings (benefiting especially those with lit-
tle land but surplus family labor) by restraining the concentration of
landholdings through lease. Some measures would seem self-evident,
such as ending any existing subsidies for farm-machinery purchase,
which artificially inflate the competitiveness of larger operational units
(whether owned or rented in) as against small, labor-intensive units.117
But is it possible – and even if possible, would it be desirable – to in-
troduce effective direct limits on the size of rented-in holdings or of to-
tal operational holdings, whether rented in or owned? Administratively,
as discussed in Chapter 3, it appears more feasible to limit the size of
holdings operated as a single unit than to try to place ceilings on “own-
ership” divorced from usership. But, politically, existing large tenants
are likely to oppose the imposition of such ceilings on the amount of
land tenants may rent in almost as much as existing owners would op-
pose ceilings on ownership of unitary operational holdings. Moreover,
ceilings on already rented-in lands, if successfully implemented, would
seemingly cause the large tenant simply to return the land to a number
of small owners from whom the tenant had rented it, many or most of
them because it was the best deal those small owners could make.
And, as the discussion of Ukraine in Chapter 7 makes clear, there may
be settings (especially where land is plentiful but local capital is not) in
which many of the rural poor can benefit from renting to large, well-
financed tenants.
All of this argues for any new ceiling affecting tenanted land to be
applied only prospectively, to land that large holders attempt to rent in
after the new rule becomes effective.118 Even then, where such reverse
leasing to large tenants represents the only, or nearly the only, option
in a very limited land-rental market, it should be generally presumed
that such ceilings are inappropriate. By contrast, where a robust rental
market among smallholders or involving the landless exists, it might
be a concern that large tenants were exercising their “clout” or winning
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leases for non-market reasons that might be hard to detect. Hence one
might, prospectively, apply ceilings in such cases.
Carrots for landlords who go further. In some settings, it might also be
possible to create material inducements for landlords who voluntarily
agreed to provide tenants, or some tenants, more protection than they
would receive in a free tenancy market. For example, on leases of more
than a given length to small cultivators, the state might forgive the col-
lection of any agricultural land taxes. All fees for registration of such
transactions – such registration being a protection for both parties –
might also be waived.
V. Conclusions
The classic land-to-the-tiller approach of giving ownership of “full-size”
farms to tenant farmers – usually of the land the tenants presently cul-
tivate – had a number of successes, as well as many failures, in the per-
iod from the end of World War II to the beginning of the 1980s. While
one can distill from that body of experience lessons in program design
that would likely lead to successful land-to-the-tiller programs in the fu-
ture if it were merely a matter of such design, it is not simply a design
question. Rather, there are threshold issues of political will and finan-
cial feasibility that make such programs generally unlikely in the fu-
ture (and for the past quarter-century no government has seriously at-
tempted to initiate a land-to-the-tiller program on a major scale). How-
ever, this chapter’s detailed discussion of program design is important
for at least three reasons: (i) some of the analysis will prove useful in
our discussion of the redistribution of large estates in the next chapter,
an arena in which there is somewhat more scope for future action; (ii)
some design lessons here may also bear on “market-assisted land re-
form” programs likely to affect smaller, or much smaller, portions of a
country’s arable land, whether in the context of the next chapter, or that
of Chapter 4 on micro-plots; and (iii) there may still be exceptional si-
tuations where compulsory redistribution on a land-to-the-tiller model
remains an option, with Nepal a possible example.119
Past regulation of the ongoing landlord-tenant relationship, unlike
the outright transfer of ownership through land-to-the-tiller, has had an
almost uniformly dismal track record. Thus, our central conclusion on
that subject is that tenancy regulation cannot be viewed as a feasible or
desirable option. The leading exception to such universal failure is
West Bengal. One notable lesson – this from past experience in Egypt,
where long-standing protections were rolled back, resulting in wide-
spread evictions – would seem to be that the West Bengal state govern-
ment should move to achieve as much full ownership for the protected
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bargadars as possible, as rapidly as possible. These issues are further
discussed in Chapter 6.
Finally, it seems desirable to deregulate the landlord-tenant relation-
ship in many, and perhaps most, settings where regulation of tenancy
has failed. However, while some improvements in tenancy markets can
probably be identified that are fairly easy and non-controversial, others
must be thought through carefully if policy makers are to satisfy the
important threshold standard of “do no harm.” Moreover, a general ca-
veat attached to the deregulation discussion is that – with the exception
of the only tangentially relevant experience in Mexico – deregulation
has never been seriously attempted in practice in a setting where past
regulation has been unsuccessful. Thus, while deregulation may poten-
tially be the most widely applicable of the approaches canvassed in the
present chapter, the discussion of deregulation is less empirically
grounded than the discussions of lessons learned with respect to land-
to-the-tiller and mandated regulation.
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Taiwan, Working Paper 16: The Japan Program Working Paper Series on Priorities
and Strategies in Rural Poverty Reduction: Experiences from Latin America and Asia
(paper presented at the Japan Program/INDES 2001 Conference, Japan).
22 See Chen, supra note 21, at 113-14.
23 The 37.5% was arrived at by excluding 25% as belonging solely to the tenant, then di-
viding the remaining 75% between tenant and landlord. A survey done prior to the
reform showed average rents were 56.8% of the tenant’s harvest in 1948. See id. at
20.
24 The retainable amount was then varied upward for lower-quality land, and downward
for higher-quality land, both paddy and dry land being divided into 26 “grades” (for
the highest-quality paddy land, for example, grades 1 through 6, only 1.45 tenanted
hectares could be retained). The Land-to-the-Tiller Act, art. 10 states landlord reten-
tion of paddy field cultivated by tenants was to be 3 chia or 7.1901 acres for average-
grade land – 7th to 12th grade – that is, 2,9109 hectares, and dryland retention was
set at two times the retention for equivalent grades of paddy field. For the relevant ar-
ticles, see Chen, supra note 21, at 204-05.
25 Koo provides data indicating that the average value of paddy land in relation to gross
crop value had been fairly stable at ratios between 4.0 and 4.3 throughout the pre-
war period 1926-1940. See Koo, supra note 21, at 12, table II.D. Land values had cer-
tainly not surged in in-kind terms: Chen indicates a value (adjusted for hectares ver-
sus chia) of 23,880 kg of unhulled rice for high-grade paddy field in 1948, compared
to Koo’s figure of 22,387 for an average paddy field in 1936-1940. Chen, supra note
23, at 45. If one considers rent reduction followed by transfer of ownership as a sin-
gle integral program, then what was being paid was roughly 62% (a multiplier of 2.5
versus one of 4.0) of the market value of the land before land reform began.
26 See Chen, supra note 21, at 82.
27 See id. at 307 (table 1), 312 (table 10).
28 See C.-Z. Liu, Diversification of the Rural Economy in Taiwan, The Japan Program
Working Series Paper No. 16, at 12 (presented at the Japan Program/INDES 2001
Conference, Japan).
29 See generally A. Alesina & D. Roderik, Distribution, Political Conflict, and Economic
Growth: A Simple Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, in A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz
& L. Leiderman, eds., POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 46 (MIT
Press 1992).
30 Chen, supra note 23, at 84, chart 12.
31 S. Kuo, G. Ranis & J. Fei, THE TAIWAN SUCCESS STORY: RAPID GROWTH WITH IMPROVED
DISTRIBUTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1952-1979, at 57, 59 (Westview 1981). See also
E. Thorbecke, Agricultural Development, in W. Galenson, ed., ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN 142-43 (Cornell University Press 1979).
32 Chen, supra note 23, at 87-89.
33 China Institute of Reform & Development, HISTORY OF CHANGES AND INNOVATIONS
OF CHINA’S RURAL LAND SYSTEM 32 (1999); G. Zhang, RURAL REFORM IN CHINA 3-4
(Haitian Publishing House 2001).
34 H.C. Bush, G.H. Messegee & R.V. Russell, THE IMPACT OF THE LAND-TO-THE-TILLER
PROGRAM IN THE MEKONG DELTA 16 (Control Data Corporation/AID Dec. 1972). See
also C.S. Callison, LAND-TO-THE-TILLER IN THE MEKONG DELTA 199 (University Press of
America 1983).
35 R. Prosterman & J. Riedinger, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 139-41
(Johns Hopkins 1987). See generally id., ch. 5; C.L. Sulzberger, Vietnamizing the
Peace, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 27, 1972. Despite the impact within the South, the re-
form could not, of course, affect divisions coming across the border from the North,
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as the conflict became increasingly “inter-statal” rather than predominantly “civil” in
nature.
36 Bush, et al., supra note 34, at 17.
37 Id. at 50. Another researcher, doing an intensive three-village survey, found that the
land-to the-tiller program "was clearly stimulating rural investment in both house im-
provements and consumer durables and thereby increasing market demand for these
domestic industries.” Callison, supra note 34, at 218.
38 The South Vietnamese experience also holds important lessons with respect to the
earlier, failed land-to-the-tiller program attempted after 1956, following the initial
peace agreement between the Communists and the French that had divided the
country into North and South. That program had involved a high ceiling for landlord
retention – 100 hectares – and even that went largely unenforced by a government
that had little political commitment to the program. Most of the land that was ac-
quired came from the departing French landlords, and from Vietnamese landlords
who feared a Communist takeover of the South, but most of this land was permitted
to be rented out by local officials rather than being actually given to tenants. See
Prosterman and Riedinger, supra note 35, ch. 5.
39 P. Radhakrishnan, PEASANT STRUGGLES, LAND REFORMS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: MALABAR
1836-1983, at 149-163 (Sage Publications 1989); R.J. Herring, LAND TO THE TILLER: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTH ASIA 196, 210-12 (Yale University
Press 1983).
40 Estimates of beneficiary numbers range from about 43,000 to 52,000 out of El Salva-
dor’s roughly 160,000 tenant households (a further element of the reform, taking
large estates, benefited about 27,000 additional households, and is discussed in
Chapter 3). For the 52,000 estimate, see J. Strasma, Unfinished Business: Consolidating
Land Reform in El Salvador, in W. Thiesenhusen, ed., SEARCHING FOR AGRARIAN RE-
FORM IN LATIN AMERICA 411 (Unwin Hyman 1989), and for the 43,000 estimate, see
R.W. Scofield, Land Reform in Central America, in R. Prosterman, M. Temple & T.
Hanstad, eds., AGRARIAN REFORM AND GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT: TEN CASE STUDIES
144 (L. Rienner 1990). See generally Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note 35, ch. 6.
41 Land Reform: An Ambassador’s Views, text of remarks delivered by Ambassador Tho-
mas R. Pickering, former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and for-
mer U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Seattle, Jan. 12, 2004, on file with Rural Devel-
opment Institute.
42 See Strasma, supra note 40, at 422. Strasma cites research soon after the reform
showing both income increases and substantial land investments by beneficiaries:
21% of former tenants had made soil conservation investments such as terracing;
13% had planted trees; and 6% had improved upon irrigation or drainage. Also, be-
tween 1982 and 1984, income from the distributed parcels rose 9% in real (after in-
flation) terms (note this did not include the new trees, which were not yet mature)
and “off-farm income rose even more strongly [apparently by more than one-half in
real terms], perhaps because the former tenants now had a secure base. No longer
did they have to spend time and energy to please a landlord or to find a parcel to rent
the following year.” Strasma, supra note 40, at 427 n. 5. Compare the findings on ti-
tling of urban squatters in Peru, where research showed that “Individuals in titled
households spend fewer hours inside the home guarding property and engaging in
home-based entrepreneurial activities, and a greater number of hours in both em-
ployment and private leisure activities outside the home. . . . These results provide
empirical support for the anecdotal evidence that untitled squatters commonly attain
informal rights by taking time off from work to participate in such activities as
guarding their property, participating in community groups, and filing administrative
claims for formalization.” E. Field, Property Rights, Community Public Goods, and
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Household Time Allocation in Urban Squatter Communities: Evidence from Peru, 45(3)
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW 837, 867-868 (2004).
43 We categorize the failed Indonesian land reform program of 1960-1965 as one that
was never likely to include tenant farmers as the main beneficiary group, and discuss
this program briefly in Chapter 3.
44 See, e.g., R.J. Herring, Explaining the Anomalies in Agrarian Reform: Lessons from
South India, in Prosterman, et al., supra note 40 at 49, 53-65.
45 See R. Prosterman, Land Reform in Latin America: How to Have a Revolution Without
a Revolution, 42 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 189 (1966); R. Prosterman, Land Reform
as Foreign Aid, 6 FOREIGN POLICY 128-141 (1972); Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note
35, at 194-202; T. Hanstad, Philippine Land Reform: The Just Compensation Issue, 63
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 417 (1988).
46 A decree was issued governing the bond portion of compensation in the Salvadoran
reform (covering both tenanted and plantation lands affected) which authorized such
a bond monetization option, but that option never appears to have been implemen-
ted. See Decree No. 220 of the Revolutionary Junta of Government, Special Law for
the Issuance of the Agrarian Reform Bonds, clauses (h) and (j) (1980). There was
also discussion of such a bond-monetization possibility for the Aquino-era stages of
the Philippine reform, around 1986. See J. Riedinger, AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE PHI-
LIPPINES: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND REDISTRIBUTIVE REFORM 171 (Stanford Univer-
sity Press 1995). Other possible options for converting deferred payments to immedi-
ate use, non-inflationary at least to the extent that some spare capacity exists in those
sectors of the economy, might be to make them usable to pay for school expenses for
the ex-landlord’s children, or medical expenses for the ex-landlord’s family.
47 There have, however, been other land tenure reform programs that have paid full
market value, or even more than full market value. These include the taking of land
of large landlords in Japan under the Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century; the
buying-out of the large intermediaries (Zamindars) in India in the years immediately
following Independence in 1947; the rather small-scale acquisition of large private es-
tates in Venezuela in the 1960s; and some of the more recent, again small-scale,
“market-assisted land reform” efforts of the World Bank in Brazil and elsewhere.
Some aspects of these are discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 6.
48 To some degree that may simply have been done to save money by a military admin-
istration that had the power to do it; perhaps the landlords were also considered as al-
lies of the political elements that had been responsible for Japan’s aggressive war-
making, and thus deserving of punishment.
49 See Basic Law of Agrarian Reform (Decree No. 153) of the Revolutionary Junta of
Government, art. 13 (1980).
50 See Kerala Land Reforms Act (1963), sec. 72A and table 1 (reflecting a sliding scale
based on total amount of the otherwise-calculated compensation from “100%” down
to “50%” as a minimum), and secs. 27, 33, 35 (the effect of which is to make the “fair
rent,” which is to be multiplied by sixteen in order to arrive at the 100% compensa-
tion figure generally be 25% of the gross crop, leading to the calculation of 16 x 25%,
or 4 times gross crop value for the smallest landlords).
51 Our direct impression from interviewing after the promulgation of the 1972 reform
was that landlords were skeptical of the value of such enterprises as a back-up guar-
antee for the payment. However, by the time of the 1987 Aquino reforms, the possi-
ble distribution of stock shares as part of a direct landowner compensation package
had become quite attractive, since this now included an array of “sequestered” prop-
erties that the new Aquino government had seized from ousted President Ferdinand
Marcos and his cronies, as alleged ill-gotten gains of his rule. Riedinger, supra note
46, at 171 & n.83.
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52 See Decree No. 207 of the Revolutionary Junta of Government, Law for the Expro-
priation and Transfer of Land to the Tiller, art. 5 (1980).
53 There were later efforts to remedy this shortcoming, including changes to the U.S.
Foreign Assistance Act. See Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note 35, at 166, 171-73,
286-87 nn.84-86.
54 Kerala was, after Taiwan, probably the closest to meeting the adequate compensation
standard.
55 See further discussion in Chapter 3. Also see, e.g., H. Thomas, THE SPANISH CIVIL
WAR 81-82 (Harper & Row 1977).
56 Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994, ch. 3, sec. 33 (South Africa).
57 If this is to be an in-place distribution, the number of hectares to be distributed will
turn on the size of existing tenanted holdings, subject to possible maximum caps on
what can be received by larger tenants.
58 There may be wide variations in land values in different settings: from $10,000 or
more per hectare in densely populated East Java with its rich volcanic soils and ample
rainfall, to the low hundreds of dollars per hectare in semi-arid areas of the sparsely
populated Brazilian northeast.
59 Also taking into account contingencies such as drought or crop failure affecting ben-
eficiary repayment.
60 The program should probably allow for the non-cultivating tenant to retain benefi-
ciary status where there are special circumstances leading to the creation of the sub-
tenancy, such as illness, widowhood or temporary status as a student or military con-
script.
61 R. Herring, LAND TO THE TILLER 212 (Yale University Press 1983). The Kerala land ten-
ure reform law set a ceiling on self-cultivated land (also applicable to the tenant bene-
ficiaries who became owners) that was twelve to fifteen acres (4.85 to 6.1 hectares)
for most families; Kerala Land Reforms Act (1963), secs. 82, 16, 16A, 17. Pushing this
to a logical extreme, one would conclude that a universal land-to-the-tiller approach,
which set no limit on land received, would certainly be undesirable in a setting of
widespread “reverse tenancy” where a substantial proportion of tenanted land was
held by large tenants who were renting it from small owners.
62 Such a provision was put into law in South Vietnam, but the limitation was deferred
and never implemented due to the perceived administrative, and possibly political,
difficulties of implementation. It was adopted in a form (3 hectares maximum in the
Mekong Delta and 1 hectare maximum in the Central Lowlands) that would have af-
fected an estimated 10% of land reform beneficiaries, taking back a portion of the
land they received, but was then indefinitely deferred as to actual application by the
implementing regulations. See Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note 35, at 136.
63 A potentially horrendous example of (apparently) ignoring the administrative ease
and fairness of giving “in place” benefits, combined with a poorly thought through
attempt (apparently) to give idealized benefits was found in Presidential Decree No.
27 by the President of the Philippines, Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from
the Bondage of the Soil Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till
and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor (1972). This decree seemed
to contemplate that each tenant to be benefited would receive ownership of 3 hectares
of the irrigated or 5 hectares of the unirrigated lands that were presently tenanted.
Since a holding of such size, however, would be approximately three times the aver-
age size of existing tenant holdings, a literal interpretation might have suggested
that, on average, two existing tenant families would have to be evicted in order to cre-
ate an idealized holding of the required size for a fortunate third family of existing
tenants. When this consequence of a literal interpretation was pointed out, the gov-
ernment effectively abrogated the “3-hectare” and “5-hectare” provisions and pro-
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ceeded to carry the program out (to a limited extent) or an in-place distribution to the
existing tenants. Implementation was further limited by the presence of a non-zero,
seven-hectare retention area of tenant farmed land for each landlord.
64 This may in large part be due to the fact that most, if not all, of those successful pro-
grams were completed before policy makers in most settings had even gained aware-
ness that this was an issue.
65 See Herring, supra note 61, at 186.
66 See Chen, supra note 21, at 27, 32.
67 See id. at 33 (estimating that only 5% of the evictions had not yet been resolved by
that date; 5% of 9% evicted equals 0.45% of all tenants). Chen adds: “. . . the remain-
ing five percent [of cases] were being settled one by one.” Id.
68 See Chapter 7 on China for a discussion of the impact of publicity on implementa-
tion.
69 In the case of El Salvador, successive regimes came in through elections that had
varying, sometimes much lesser, degrees of commitment; under some subsequent
less-committed administrations, an effort was made to include a seven-hectare reten-
tion area for landlords (when supposedly accompanied by one of five criteria, such as
the owner being a widow with children), although without any warrant in the govern-
ing law. It was clear from the beginning, however, that the campesinos themselves,
where there was obvious inequity, were highly unlikely to apply for the land: self-
administration by them of such tacit limits would have been a far better approach.
See Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note 35, at 167-68, 285-86 n.71.
70 The fact that a strong insurgency was underway was almost certainly a further factor
in limiting anticipatory evictions in South Vietnam and El Salvador. In some areas of
the Vietnamese and Salvadoran countryside, landlords could not even have full access
or be able to remain in the village overnight. Moreover, in each case landlords were
to receive at least moderate compensation, versus the risk of losing the land without
any compensation if the revolutionaries won (as they ultimately did in South Viet-
nam). Of course, in China, where the revolutionaries had already won, and were car-
rying out a zero-ceiling program, landlords had become an officially reviled group,
and were probably generally more concerned about losing their lives than their land.
71 There may also be cases where the “ceiling” is set at such a high level to begin with
that most landlords escape the program even without such evasion: that was the case
with the “100-hectare” ceiling of the initial, failed program in 1950s South Vietnam
under President Ngo Dinh Diem. Stanford Research Institute, LAND REFORM IN VIET-
NAM, SUMMARY VOL. 5, at 68-70, 185-188 (Stanford Research Institute 1968). In a
number of other settings, the combination of high ceilings on land ownership and
poor compensation proffered for land, accompanied by anticipatory and often fraudu-
lent transfers of above-ceiling land by landowners, has rendered land-to-the-tiller pro-
grams ineffectual. This was true of successive programs in Pakistan and Bangladesh,
in both of which the principal beneficiaries would have been the sharecropping
tenant farmers. See R. Herring, LAND TO THE TILLER: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTH ASIA ch. 4 (Yale University Press 1983); M. Khan, UNDER-
DEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIAN STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN chs. 4 & 5 (Westview 1981);
F. Jannuzi & J. Peach, THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE OF BANGLADESH: AN IMPEDIMENT TO
DEVELOPMENT chs. 1 & 2 (Westview 1980). Further on the method of calculating the
ceilings in Pakistan, see note 75 to Chapter 3. Even with a ceiling as low as seven hec-
tares, a land-to-the-tiller program in the Philippines confronting similar landlord re-
sponses had provided ownership of land to only a small minority of tenants 13 years
after its inception. See J. Riedinger, AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES: DEMO-
CRATIC TRANSITIONS AND REDISTRIBUTIVE REFORM 91-96 (Stanford University Press
1995) (under Operation Land Transfer, which became a national program in 1972, a
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potential beneficiary universe of at least 914,000 tenant families initially identified
shrank to an estimate of 587,000 families and then, apparently, to 427,000 because
of the seven-hectare retention limit. But by the end of 1985 only 137,000 titles had
been printed and about 134,000 beneficiaries had begun their amortization payments
to the government).
72 See Chapter 6 regarding India; O.B. Jones, PAKISTAN: EYE OF THE STORM 245-249
(Yale University Press 2002); F.T. Jannuzi & J.T. Peach, THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE OF
BANGLADESH: AN IMPEDIMENT TO DEVELOPMENT 50-53 (Westview 1980); Riedinger, su-
pra note 46, at 160, 218.
73 To forestall and uncover such predating one could theoretically ask tenants when, if
ever, they started paying rent to the supposed new “owner.”
74 Among the successful programs that forbade landlords from retaining tenanted land,
South Vietnam and Kerala State also had variations on local-level administration in
which beneficiaries were substantially involved. South Korea was a seeming excep-
tion (at least in the formal way contemplated in its land reform law) due to the pen-
dency of the Korean War during much of the time the land reform was being imple-
mented. In El Salvador, the democratic campesino organizations played an important
local role, but an unofficial one; for various bureaucratic and political reasons, imple-
mentation there had no official local involvement, was more complicated and slow,
and (for this reason among others, discussed below) reached the smallest fraction of
intended tenant beneficiaries (about 30%) among the seven programs we consider
largely successful. See generally Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note 35, at ch. 6.
75 See Chen, supra note 21, at 33.
76 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of property rights as a “bundle of sticks.”
77 Still another limitation sometimes found is a restriction on divisibility, or on “mini-
mum size” of permitted parcels. Some warrant can be found for such restrictions
with respect to subdivision as a consequence of inheritance of agricultural land, espe-
cially in the case of statutorily mandated succession not done at the landowner’s di-
rection; however, it seems very difficult to justify “minimum size” limitations where
there are market transfers being made. There, it seems that private parties are likely
to know better what constitutes an efficient size landholding than any general, a
priori determination that legislators have embodied in the law. This approach also
finds support in the general evidence that smaller holdings are more productive and
efficient than larger holdings, discussed in Chapter 3. (And Chapter 4, on benefits of
micro-holdings.)
78 See Chapter 8 on formalization of land rights.
79 See Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note 35, at 160-161, 163, 165. RDI had argued
against this deadline provision in working with the drafters, but the Christian Demo-
crats who were then a key supporting constituency were adamantly opposed to drop-
ping it; ultimately, it came down to having an otherwise well-conceived decree with
such a limitation, or having no land tenure reform at all for tenant farmers.
80 See Kerala Land Reforms Act (1963), secs. 4-12.
81 Compare generally chapters 5 (South Vietnam) and 6 (El Salvador) in Prosterman &
Riedinger, supra note 35.
82 See generally Riedinger, supra note 46.
83 For a discussion of the factors at a macro level that are likely to be implicated in the
creation of much higher market prices for land, see Chapter 1. To complete the logic
of this analysis, we also point out that achieving ownership of full-size farms for the
majority of tenants in a setting where tenancy is widespread, via financing for volun-
tary market-price purchases is no more financially feasible than mandatory land-to-
the-tiller redistribution at or near market-price levels. Indeed, it is less so, to the ex-
tent that lack of the mandatory feature is likely to cause landowners’ asking prices –
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where one may be talking of the need to acquire 20%, 30% or 40% of total arable
land – to rise sharply. The issue of voluntary market-based acquisition for full-size
farms or equivalent per-family allocations is further discussed in Chapter 3. The dis-
tinct issue of market-based land acquisition for allocation of micro-plots is discussed
in Chapter 4.
84 In developed market economies with fully developed legal systems, regulation of the
landlord-tenant relationship in the agricultural sector (including perpetual or very
long-term tenure and fixed lower-than-free-market rents) has been successfully intro-
duced and maintained, for periods now sometimes very close to a century. That is
the case in the Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium and France. It was also done,
starting in the English colonial era, in the territories that became the Republic of Ire-
land and Northern Ireland, from 1881 until 1923 and 1925, respectively, then to be
superseded by full-scale programs giving ownership to the tenants. See J.E.W. Wylie,
IRISH LAND LAW 21-52 (2d ed. Butterworths 1986) (noting, at 30, “But the cost and
time consumed in the exercise were enormous” for the Irish and British administra-
tors and tribunals implementing the 1881 landlord-tenant regulation law); C. O’Gra-
da, IRELAND BEFORE AND AFTER THE FAMINE: EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 1800-
1925, at ch. 4 (2d ed. Manchester University Press 1993). There was also successful
regulation for decades-long periods in both Japan and Taiwan, as to the minor sectors
of tenanted land that remained after their land-to-the-tiller programs due to the law’s
allowance of some landlord retention of tenanted lands (about 2.9 hectares of average
paddy land in Taiwan, and 1 hectare of resident-owned land in Japan, were permitted
to be retained). Japan ended its regulation of remaining landlord-tenant relationships
in 1970, and Taiwan largely did so in 2000.
85 See discussion in Chapter 6 (India); N. Islam, Growth, Poverty, and Human Develop-
ment: Pakistan, UNDP Occasional Paper 31, available at http://gd.tuwien.ac.at/soc/
undp/oc31aa.htm (Pakistan); Jannuzi & Peach, supra note 72, at 52-53 (Bangladesh);
Riedinger, supra note 46, at 75, 259 n.11 (Philippines); Prosterman & Riedinger, su-
pra note 35, at 122-24 (South Vietnam); Chen, supra note 21, at 18-21 (mainland Chi-
na).
86 For Africa, see, for example, A.F. Robertson, THE DYNAMICS OF PRODUCTIVE RELATION-
SHIPS: AFRICAN SHARE CONTRACTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 27-30, 275 (Cam-
bridge University Press 1987), who finds that sharecropping levels were reduced by
state control over sharecropping conditions. South Africa has experienced extensive
evictions of tenants and other occupiers despite post-apartheid legislation intended to
secure their possession without transferring ownership. See M. Wegerif, et al., STILL
SEARCHING FOR SECURITY: THE REALITY OF FARM DWELLER EVICTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
(Social Surveys and Nkuzi Development Association, Pretoria 2005). For discussion
of the situation in India, see Chapter 6.
87 Two examples, derived from RDI field experience and interviews with supposedly
“protected” tenants: (1) On the important matter of rent levels, the tenancy contract
may correctly specify a level of “rent” within the limits imposed by the law. But what
real option does the tenant have – if he is fearful of his future access to the land, or
of impairing his future relationship with this landlord or with the village landlords
generally – if the landlord demands that the tenant pay an additional amount “under
the table”? How are administrators to learn of such payments, their frequency, or
amount? (2) In an alternative cheating scenario the tenant agrees to the landlord’s de-
mand that the contract specify an inflated production or land-area figure, so that
what appears to be a legal rent level in relation to that figure is a much higher rent
in proportion to actual production or land area. This, in turn, can thrive under a pro-
cess of governmental oversight of such contracts which – whether distant, under-
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staffed, uncaring, or corrupt – fails to detect such overestimates of production or land
area.
88 For South Vietnamese tenants, see the results of the 1000-household sample survey
carried out in 1967-1968, in Stanford Research Institute, LAND REFORM IN VIETNAM:
WORKING PAPERS, VOL. 4, at parts 1 and 2 (Menlo Park, Cal. 1968, Mimeo). The pri-
mary author of the present chapter, R. Prosterman, acted as land-law consultant to
the survey. For the Philippines, see Riedinger, supra note 46, at 96; G.M. Bautista,
W.C. Thiesenhusen & D.J. King, Farm Households on Rice and Sugar Lands: Margen’s
Village Economy in Transition, in A.J. Ledesma, P.Q. Makil & V.A. Miralao, eds., SEC-
OND VIEW FROM THE PADDY: MORE EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON PHILIPPINE RICE FARMING
AND TENANCY 73-92 (Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University
1983).
89 See Robertson, supra note 86, at 275.
90 Law No. 178 of 1952 (Egypt). See R. Saad, Egyptian Politics and the Tenancy Law, in R.
Bush, ed., COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN EGYPT’S COUNTRYSIDE 105 (Zed Books 2002).
91 J.S. Oweis, The Impact of Land Reform on Egyptian Agriculture: 1952-65, INTERMOUN-
TAIN ECONOMIC REVIEW 54 (Spring 1971) (reprint published by the University of Wis-
consin Land Tenure Center).
92 RDI fieldwork in Egypt confirmed the law’s continuing enforcement during the peri-
od from the late 1970s until the law’s demise. We were surprised to find widespread
enforcement of the law, especially after our earlier fieldwork showing the prevailing
non-enforcement of landlord-tenant regulations in many parts of Asia.
93 Letter from R. Prosterman, Professor University of Washington School of Law, and
Jeffrey Riedinger (now Professor and Dean of International Studies and Programs,
Michigan State University), to Dr. Youssef Wally, Minister of Agriculture Egypt (July
12, 1984) (on file with the Rural Development Institute) [hereinafter the Wally Let-
ter].
94 See id. at 6. “We would ourselves most prefer an alternative that reflects the fact that
the ‘registered tenants’ are much more like owners – and have been for 30 years –
than the nominal ‘owners’ who were the previous landlords of the land. Our own pre-
ference would thus be to ultimately transfer full ownership directly to the present re-
gistered tenants. Possibly this could be done through increasing the payment by the
registered tenants to the old owners by 50% or thereabouts, to be made during the
next 30 years, but treating those payments as full and final payments for ownership
of the land. Thus, from the year 2015 onward, all such payments would end, and the
registered tenant would be the sole owner.” (Emphasis in original.)
95 See M. Aal, Agrarian Reform and Tenancy Problems in Upper Egypt, Paper presented at
South Africa Conference on Land Tenure Issues, Capetown, South Africa, 2001. For
a description of landlords’ arguments for rollback, see R. Springborg, State-Society Re-
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3 Redistributing land to agricultural laborers
Roy L. Prosterman
This chapter will focus primarily on land redistribution affecting all
types of large agricultural estates in which all or the bulk of the land is
operated as a single production unit, and on which workers who are
not the landowner or members of the landowner’s family provide the
great majority of the labor.1 This includes privately owned plantation
land, haciendas (a term sometimes used in the Latin American setting
to refer to large estates not used intensively or effectively), and other
large farms or ranches (the latter being of interest for reform especially
where land suitable for crop production is instead being used to graze
animals). Also included are public or state lands, and plantations oper-
ated by private corporations using state land (as in Indonesia).2
This chapter complements Chapter 2. The two chapters together cov-
er the main potential beneficiary groups – respectively, tenant farmers
and agricultural laborers – that stand to benefit from land tenure re-
form programs in settings of traditional, non-collectivized agriculture.
These groups have in common the fact that their predominant source
of livelihood comes from cultivating land owned by others.3
Large estates worked by agricultural laborers are found today in La-
tin America, and in some portions of Africa that were temperate en-
ough to attract European colonists to farming. They are also found in
scattered parts of Asia, especially in the Philippines, but also in a min-
or agricultural role in places such as Indonesia (state lands privately
worked) and India. The Rural Development Institute has worked in a
number of countries where these issues have been salient, among
them El Salvador, pre-collectivization Nicaragua, Brazil, the Philip-
pines, Indonesia and India. And, while we discuss issues relating to
the possible break-up and privatization of collective farms (with a spe-
cial focus on China) in Chapter 7, it should be borne in mind that
there are some interesting parallels there to issues and questions that
may arise from the break-up of large estates and the distribution of
those estate lands to agricultural workers. These include the impact of
eliminating supervision and shedding “free rider” problems, the possi-
bility for increases in motivation and production, issues surrounding
marketability of individualized land rights, and prospects for other
kinds of empowerment of the beneficiaries.
The discussion in this chapter proceeds in four sections. The first
highlights the main features likely to differentiate land tenure reform
programs benefiting agricultural laborers from those benefiting tenant
farmers. The second section reviews the global evidence as to whether
larger operational holdings may be characterized by “economies of
scale,” an argument sometimes made for exempting such holdings
from land tenure reform legislation. The third section discusses major
themes and substantive lessons as to what types of land tenure reform
provisions have been most likely to provide actual benefit to agricultur-
al laborers. The final section discusses practical lessons gleaned for de-
signing future programs to distribute estate land to agricultural la-
borers in countries where this issue may arise.
I. Distinct characteristics of reforms to benefit estate laborers
Identification of land to be taken
The first major difference between reforms to redistribute estate land
and reforms to redistribute tenanted land relates to identifying the ex-
tent of the landlord’s holding. When tenant farmers are the intended
beneficiaries, there is almost always a wide discrepancy between the
amount of land the landlord owns and the size of each farm operated
by the landlord’s tenants. However, when laborers on plantations or
other large holdings are the intended beneficiaries, the size of the hold-
ing owned is the size of the farm operated.4
That is, in tenancy settings a single owner holds land rights with re-
spect to numerous separate holdings operated by individual tenants.
The visible facts on the ground with respect to each operational hold-
ing thus do not normally reveal how much total land any particular
landlord owns. Where a land-to-the-tiller law prohibits landlords from
retaining ownership of any tenanted land, the extent of the landlord’s
holdings do not affect the redistribution since as soon as the program
administrator finds that a specific piece of land is tenant-cultivated, he
knows that such land is to be taken from the landlord and transferred
to that tenant farmer. However, in any land reform program that allows
the landlord to retain ownership of tenanted land above a specific ceil-
ing, the program administrator is faced with the task of determining
the total amount of tenanted land owned by each landlord. As we saw
in Chapter 2 (and as also discussed in Chapter 6 in the specific context
of India), this is likely to be a highly demanding undertaking, and it is
often the case that a significant portion of the anticipated “above ceil-
ing” land eludes successful capture.
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By contrast, the taking of land in estates that are above a certain size
usually avoids these problems since the size of the holding owned
equals the size of the holding as it is actually operated. Once the pro-
gram administrator views the operational holding on the ground (or
looks at a map or an aerial or satellite image of known scale), he can
make a well-informed initial judgment as to whether the holding ex-
ceeds the ceiling size established by law. If the holding exceeds the ceil-
ing, the law may require the government to acquire all or a portion of
the estate.5 Thus, the application of quantitative ceilings on ownership
in order to identify lands subject to the reform is likely to be much
simpler and more assured in the taking of large estates.6
However, this may not be the end of the land identification story, for
many laws intended to take large operational holdings have introduced
additional qualitative factors rarely if ever found in laws intended to
take tenanted land. These may create problems which can be just as
great as the land identification problems present in land-to-the-tiller re-
forms.
Capital stripping
Large estates often employ machinery, or have herds of animals or
other moveable property, that is not under the continuous control of
specific workers. Thus, where the estate owner has advance notice of a
coming reform that will encompass his lands – and especially to the ex-
tent that payment will be below market value or deferred or uncertain –
he may engage in “capital stripping,” clandestinely removing whatever
can be moved to some other location. Tenant farms are less likely to
contain such landowner-owned moveable property, and what they do
contain is likely to be under the immediate control and watchful eye of
the tenant. Capital stripping has occurred in El Salvador, Chile, Portu-
gal and other settings where acquisition of estates was either underway
or an immediate prospect.7
Identification of those who are to benefit
Most reforms affecting tenanted lands have been land-to-the-tiller re-
forms, with “tiller” used to mean the existing tenant farmers who culti-
vate particular parcels of land. Some such reforms establish (but have
rarely enforced) limits on how much total land a benefiting tenant
farmer can receive, with the excess land supposed to go back into the
land tenure reform pot for distribution to another qualifying family.
And the law may allow the landlord to keep a part of the tenanted land
despite the fact that a specific tenant is cultivating that land. But with
those two exceptions, nearly all land-to-the-tiller reforms have been de-
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signed to transform the tenant into the owner of exactly the same land
that he or she presently farms as a tenant. Thus, there is generally an
obvious and automatic match between particular beneficiaries and par-
ticular pieces of land.
By contrast, there is often no such obvious match when the govern-
ment takes an estate for distribution. The most likely beneficiaries are,
of course, the permanent workers employed on the estate. But the gov-
ernment may not view them as the exclusive beneficiaries.8 This may
be because the resulting amount of land per household seems exces-
sively large. Or it may be because there are other groups who seem at
least as needy and equally deserving of land. Such groups might in-
clude temporary laborers who work on the holding at peak times of
planting and harvest.
Moreover, if policy makers consider the amount of the land that will
be available for distribution per household to be very large in relation
to the permanent labor force, and even somewhat large relative to the
entire existing labor force (including temporary laborers), they may de-
sign the reform program to include still other groups. Such additional
beneficiaries might, for example, be members of nearby communities
that claimed and used the land prior to the creation of the estate; other
agricultural laborer families not associated with the estate (including
some working in the medium- or small-holding sector); nearby tenant
farm households; nearby owner-operators whose holdings are very
small; or landless households who make their present living outside
agriculture.
In some cases, groups may invade estate lands to occupy and control
them by force in the hope that the government will subsequently con-
fer legal rights upon them. This tactic may bring together a variegated
group of would-be beneficiaries, perhaps assembled through common
political affiliation. This appears true of the Movement of the Landless
(MST) in Brazil, whose land-invading groups may also include house-
holds of the urban poor.9 We are unaware of any case in which the at-
tempted self-selection of beneficiaries and identification of land to be
taken, via the phenomenon of land invasions, has been encountered in
land tenure reforms involving tenanted land.
In cases where the beneficiary group expands beyond permanent la-
borers on the estate and those temporary laborers or others who live
within easy distance of the estate, further questions arise regarding re-
settlement needs and costs. If resettlement costs are added as part of
the government outlays for the land tenure reform program, average
costs incurred per household benefited may increase substantially, and
prospects for wider replicability of the reform may become less certain.
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Land per family benefited
Whenever there is no automatic or nearly automatic link between ben-
eficiaries and land, the question arises as to how much land should be
allocated per household. This question is presented regardless whether
future utilization of that land will be joint or individual. For example,
by what process will program administrators decide whether the
amount of useable land on the estate would yield an “excessive” figure,
if it were divided only by the number of permanent worker house-
holds? Clearly the answers to such questions should also take into ac-
count the characteristics of the land being taken. Is it cropland or pas-
tureland, irrigated or unirrigated, single-crop or double-crop? If it is
presently used as pasture, is it nonetheless suitable for crop produc-
tion? The issue of land productivity is sometimes addressed in the law
through the concept of a “standard” hectare as a land unit, with less-
than-average land requiring more than one physical hectare to com-
prise one “standard” hectare, and better-than-average land requiring
less than one physical hectare.10 Where the pool of program benefici-
aries includes groups besides the permanent workers, and land is to be
individually farmed, program guidelines may provide that they shall re-
ceive a smaller allocation per household or per capital.
Individual versus joint cultivation
The question of whether beneficiaries should henceforth cultivate the
land individually or jointly almost never arises under land-to-the-tiller
programs in which tenant farmers become owners of the same parcels
they farmed as tenants.11 Tenant farmers are accustomed to farming in-
dividually, and continue to do so after the reform is implemented, but
now with a greater psychological and economic stake in that particular
land and with the motivation to invest in and improve it for the long
term.
By contrast, when the government takes large estates the existing
workforce has, by definition, been working that land – or the great bulk
of it – as a single production unit. Experience has taught, however, that
given a free choice, even permanent workers often prefer to divide the
estate land and cultivate individual parcels that will be identifiably
“theirs,” and on which they can realize directly the benefit of the effort
they expend in cultivation.12 Other beneficiary groups from outside the
estate may be accustomed to working land either individually or in
common, but have no habits of cultivation on the land of the particular
estate.
Thus, the question of subsequent mode-of-operation – i.e., whether
it is to be individual or joint, or perhaps partly both – often arises in an
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acute fashion where the government is taking large estates for redistri-
bution. Beyond the threshold question of whether the law should allow
beneficiaries to choose the mode of subsequent operation, planners
should consider how the program design can ensure that such a choice
is reasonably well-informed and freely made. In settings of “export
crops” or capital-intensive plantations, some opinion leaders (govern-
ment officials, union leaders, academics, journalists, etc.) may call for
excluding such choice entirely in drafting the enabling law, arguing
that it would be economically damaging to allow beneficiaries to subdi-
vide such estates into individual holdings. This point is closely related
to our discussion in Section II below.
Limiting transferability and transactability
To the extent the governing rules will require beneficiaries to continue
cultivating the estate land as a unitary operation, such rules must logi-
cally constrain any subsequent sale or lease of any part of the land less
than the whole, or at least any part of the land whose loss would be in-
consistent with unitary operation. Even if the law allows sale or lease
of the whole estate, the law must require a decision by the enterprise
through which the beneficiaries hold the land – often a cooperative in
form – to approve such a transaction. Thus, no individual household
could separately decide to transfer any portion of jointly owned land.
One important consequence is that there is likely to be a much more
limited wealth-creation effect on a jointly owned and non-subdivisible
enterprise: children or other heirs who do not wish to live and work on
the enterprise would stand to inherit only a very limited benefit, if any,
and the original beneficiary households might find few opportunities
to “cash out” their interest in the jointly owned land. There are, of
course, some intermediate possibilities, such as allowing production
cooperatives formed as a result of a land tenure reform to adopt a gov-
erning charter under which members can depart and be “bought out”
by the enterprise (in effect, by the remaining members) upon depar-
ture. This in turn raises the question of how one can diminish the im-
pact of having such a monopsonistic, one-buyer “market”; for example,
through requiring third-party appraisal.
Also, if the law is to allow beneficiaries to choose between individual
and joint modes of ownership and operation, will the law require the
beneficiaries initially to choose one or another outcome with regard to
all land and other assets of the enterprise, or can some beneficiaries
choose to withdraw a proportionate amount of the land and other as-
sets to use individually? And must the beneficiaries make such a
choice once-and-for-all at the beginning, or may beneficiaries make a
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subsequent choice to subdivide all or a portion of the land and assets,
either to operate an individual farm or to sell the land and assets?
II. “Economies of scale”
Related to the question of subdividing large estates many people as-
sume that smaller farm sizes are a major constraint upon increasing
agricultural productivity. Some would then argue either that large es-
tates should not be taken in a land tenure reform program or, if they
ever are to be taken, that the law should prohibit any subdivision of
that holding, regardless what the beneficiaries might desire if allowed
to choose.
However, “[a] large literature has demonstrated that many agricultur-
al activities do not exhibit true economies of scale in production.”13
This is particularly true when agriculture is unmechanized, which is
the case in most developing country settings characterized by an abun-
dance of labor and a lack of capital. Most studies find a negative rela-
tionship between farm size and productivity (i.e., a larger farm pro-
duces less per unit area),14 and others are unable to reject the hypoth-
esis of constant returns to scale in agricultural production.15 In fact, a
World Bank study asserts that “the literature contains no single exam-
ple of economies of scale arising for farm sizes exceeding what one fa-
mily with a medium tractor could comfortably manage.”16 That is, con-
trary to the conventional wisdom of casual observers, small family
farms are almost always more productive than large farms in develop-
ing country settings.17 The few exceptions include cases of highly spe-
cialized machinery, livestock production, and certain plantation crops,
discussed below.18
The exception of plantation crops exists only for certain crops and is
related to scale economies for processing and marketing rather than
for crop production itself. Plantation crops, especially, are typically
characterized by a dualistic system of production in most countries:
large farms employing substantial numbers of hired wage labor and
small family farms relying mainly on family labor, which is supple-
mented by casual labor during harvesting seasons. Each mode of pro-
duction has its own advantages and disadvantages.
The advantage of small family farms – for all crops, including plan-
tation crops – lies in their predominant reliance on the labor of family
members. Family members have a strong incentive to work hard for
the family’s well-being, unlike hired wage laborers, who tend to require
close supervision. Thus, any potential economies of scale are offset by
costs resulting from the need to monitor the quality and amount of ef-
fort expended by plantation workers (or, in the case of a cooperative,
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“members”). Such costs are sometimes referred to as “agency costs.”
The need to supervise labor has profound implications for the organi-
zation of industrial production, in particular the optimal size of the
firm.19 These agency costs are particularly important in agricultural
production due to the large area over which production occurs and the
need for the manager or workers to constantly adjust cultivation prac-
tices to micro-variations of the natural environment.20 An estate of
1000 hectares utilizing primarily hired laborers under supervision can,
for example, be thought of as a “factory floor” of 10 square kilometers
in size – vast almost beyond imagining for any actual industrial factory
– where such operations must be carried out. Analysts have long recog-
nized that family-operated farms tend to be superior to wage-operated
large-scale agricultural enterprises in this regard because family farms
tend to minimize the agency costs.21
Considering the unique advantage of family farms in agricultural
production, why did large-farm plantation systems originate? Primarily
for two reasons. The first – applicable only to certain crops – is that
economies of scale can exist at the level of processing or marketing.
Vertical integration of a large plantation with a large-scale central pro-
cessing unit can make sense when the crop is best processed within a
short time after harvest. This is the case for palm oil, sisal and certain
types of tea.22 Large-scale production can also have marketing advan-
tages that, in certain settings, may offset disadvantages relating to
agency costs. This is particularly true for overseas markets. Traders
dealing with commodities in bulk quantities prefer standardized pro-
ducts that are preferably guaranteed by a brand name, which can give
large-scale producers advantages.23 Even despite the possible proces-
sing and marketing advantages for certain crops, many of these crops
are often grown by small family farms, which address the scale econo-
mies in processing or marketing through the use of nuclear estates24
or marketing cooperatives.
A second reason for the existence of large-scale plantation systems
relates to the establishment costs of plantations in many developing
country settings. The establishment of many plantations was driven by
the sharply increasing demand for many tropical products in the latter
half of the 19th century. At that time, many regions physically suited
for growing such products were remote, sparsely populated and uncul-
tivated. Opening these lands for growing new crops involved substan-
tial capital for clearing and developing land and constructing the
needed physical infrastructure such as roads, irrigation systems and
ports. Large farm sizes were necessary for the investors to internalize
gains. However, once the infrastructure was developed, the share of
smaller family farms in the area tended to increase, particularly where
114 ROY L. PROSTERMAN
the specific crops did not present significant scale economies in proces-
sing and marketing.25
In sum, for most crops in most developing country settings, small
family farms are more productive than large farms.
The issue of parcel fragmentation is related to farm size, but differs
in several respects. An owner’s agricultural landholdings may be frag-
mented – that is, may be spread among separate plots – and this may
be true whether the owner owns much land or very little. It might
seem intuitively apparent that a single farmer’s cultivation of plots lo-
cated in different places leads to productivity loss, even in the absence
of economies of scale, because of increased transport costs among
fields and the apparent loss of arable land to boundaries separating
fields. However, empirical evidence for such productivity losses is
weak. Binswanger argues that the productivity costs of fragmentation
are often overstated or, in some cases, even outweighed by benefits that
fragmentation may provide.26 Moreover, of potentially great impor-
tance to the farmers themselves in assuring a minimum adequate live-
lihood, fragmentation can act as an insurance mechanism similar to
growing several different crops.27 It is noteworthy that in China, where
average grain yields per hectare are more than double those in India,
average farm size is not only small – around two-thirds of a hectare in
China versus around two hectares in India – but the average Chinese
farm contains more than six parcels.
The general superiority of small farms in developing country set-
tings does not mean, however, that small farms will always remain
small. International experience shows that as a country’s economy de-
velops, farm size tends to grow because better paying non-agricultural
job opportunities gradually attract labor from agriculture to the non-
agricultural sector (while the amount of cultivated land remains rela-
tively constant).28 Moreover, increasing agricultural wages gives farm
owners an incentive to replace labor with farm machinery. Thus, farm
size is greatly affected by a country’s changing factor endowments,29
and growing farm sizes are a consequence and not a cause of econom-
ic development and growth.
There might, however, be additional considerations if the question
were one of transforming an existing large estate – by virtue of its ac-
quisition under a land tenure reform program, coupled with giving re-
cipient families the option to farm individually – into a series of much
smaller individual farms on the same land. One consideration would
be the extent to which there were “sunk costs” on the existing estate.
Thus there may be a distinction between modern, capital-intensive, al-
ready heavily improved “plantations,” and largely unimproved, low uti-
lization “haciendas” (a terminological distinction sometimes used in
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the Latin American setting), or nominal “ranches” that are really more
suitable for planting crops rather than for grazing cattle.
However, not all “sunk costs” are identical, in the sense that many
existing capital improvements are fully capable of being utilized by a
series of individual small farmers on the same land, and this is espe-
cially so if the beneficiaries agree to maintain the same crop or crops
on the bulk of the estate’s former land.
Still, even if one could thus make a reasonable theoretical argument
for acquiring and redistributing plantation land and assets, even where
there were large sunk costs, such heavily improved estates are likely to
be very costly for the government to acquire under the principle of ade-
quate compensation, a principle which we have argued in Chapter 2 is
strongly supported by a series of mutually reinforcing policy considera-
tions. In most settings we believe this cost argument should be disposi-
tive – although only as to portions of the holding that are actually in-
tensively used and capital intensive.
Unimproved haciendas of low productivity, or large “ranches” actu-
ally suitable for planting crops, where the land may have even a full
market value that is only in the low hundreds of dollars per hectare
may be more suitable candidates for acquisition and – if wished by the
beneficiaries – subdivision. The same would hold true for portions of
plantations not the subject of large sunk costs that remained unim-
proved or poorly utilized. In these cases, the subdivided land will
almost certainly also be more productive than the same land is in its
present use, quite apart from any theoretical debate as to the potential
productivity of large estates versus small farms.
A further exception, where compensation for land would not be re-
quired at all, arises where such underused estates exist on government-
owned land on which no private party has any continuing claim of
right.30 But the cases where such an exception might come into play
are limited: one can, for example, identify such government-owned es-
tate lands in Indonesia and the Dominican Republic. The preeminent
situations of state or publicly owned land with no need for compensa-
tion for the land or improvements are, of course, those encountered in
formerly centrally planned economies. See the discussion in Chapter 7.
III. Designing programs to benefit agricultural laborers
Many of the differences identified in Section I above, which distinguish
the present reforms from those intended to benefit tenant farmers, also
figure among the themes in this section, as we examine how programs
might be designed to benefit agricultural laborers, chiefly using land
from estates or other large operational holdings. And there may also be
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relevant lessons on program design and benefits to be gleaned both
from the termination of collective-farming systems (discussed in Chap-
ter 7), and from programs to allocate individual rights to micro-plots
(discussed in Chapter 4 and also in Chapter 6).
Overall experience with success and failure
As compared to land-to-the-tiller programs, it is more difficult to identi-
fy clear successes in programs that have taken large estates for alloca-
tion to agricultural laborers.31 For estate agriculture, probably the most
notable experiences – in terms of successfully taking most of the land
in a dominant estate sector and transferring that land to agricultural
workers – have been those of Mexico and Bolivia.32
After its 1910 revolution and violent civil war, Mexico undertook an
initially delayed and then very gradual program that unfolded from the
1930s to the 1970s, and Bolivia carried out a much quicker program
after its much-less-violent 1952 revolution.33 In both countries, at the
time their land tenure reforms began, there was a dominant sector of
very large estates,34 which could be broadly described as having the fol-
lowing characteristics:
– Low productivity and low capital investment, with large areas of the
estates suitable for planted crops often used instead as low-intensity
pasture.
– A permanent workforce – denominated peons or colonos – that often
operated without a cash wage and was often “paid” with use of a
small piece of land for their work on the dominant central hacien-
da.35
– A broader system having many characteristics that might be de-
scribed as feudal: workers were often tied permanently to the estate
by debt or custom, owed money to the “company store,” were re-
turned by the police if they sought to run away, and were otherwise
completely within the power domain of the landowner.36
Interestingly, from the beginning the Mexican and Bolivian land re-
forms clearly allowed beneficiaries on the redistributed estates freely to
choose to farm individually. As a result, well over 90% of beneficiaries
on Mexico’s reform ejidos chose individual farming, and the proportion
choosing individual farming was similarly high in Bolivia.37
The Mexican land tenure reform was unusual, and seemingly un-
ique, in being carried out in “slow motion,” over a period of roughly
four decades. After its completion, it was estimated by Thiesenhusen
that the reform had reached “about half the farmland in Mexico,” and
that “some 3.1 million peasant families are ejidatarios.”38 This would
appear to have been very roughly 65% of total agricultural households
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at that time.39 To be an individually cultivating ejidatario, until the re-
cent changes discussed below, meant having perpetual usufructuary
rights to arable land (but not to pasture land or forest, which were held
in common under the Mexican ejido), which could be passed by inheri-
tance but not sold or leased. See Box 3.1.
The 1952-1956 Bolivian land reform appears to have distributed over
three-quarters of all cropland and over half of all pastureland40 to
around a quarter-million peasant families, or around 49% of total agri-
cultural households at the time of the reform.41 The land was generally
granted in ownership to the individual beneficiaries and could be sold,
but not leased out or mortgaged. Titling of beneficiaries proceeded very
slowly, with only a minority apparently titled even four decades after
the reform.42
One might speculate that the giving of choice as to mode of farming,
and the perceived benefit of individual farming pursuant to that choice,
were important in mobilizing grass-roots political and psychological
support for carrying through the Mexican reform and maintaining at
least the bulk of the Bolivian reform against the opposition of estate
owners who were receiving little or no compensation. Certainly, the ex-
istence and accommodation of strong beneficiary preferences as to
mode of farm organization are significant factors in determining
whether the relevant social, political and economic forces will combine
to produce a consistently implemented land tenure reform program.
RDI’s own research with agricultural laborers in both the Philip-
pines and Nicaragua (the latter conducted on the eve of the Sandinis-
ta’s initially collectivist reform, which later moved substantially to indi-
vidual farming) appeared to indicate that the great majority of these
workers, given a free choice, would choose individual farming rather
than a unitary cooperative or collective organization of production. In-
deed, on the initially seized Samoza lands in Nicaragua, a flexible mix
of individual holdings, small co-ops, and larger units were allowed.43
On the other hand, there have been settings in which intense organi-
zational or ideological considerations seemed to have led beneficiaries
to support the idea of unitary operation, at least at the leadership level,
and brought initial successes in the taking of estate lands. For example,
the militant left in Portugal in 1975-1977 after the overthrow of the
long dictatorship, and the campesino unions in El Salvador in 1980-
1981 in the midst of the civil war, were intent upon creating unitary
large enterprises that could maintain a high level of common mobiliza-
tion for political or even (in El Salvador) mutual-protection purposes. A
similar militancy and desire for unitary operation appears characteristic
on the estates expropriated in Brazil in recent years after occupation by
groups formed by the Movement of the Landless.44
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Box 3.1 Factor productivity after the Mexican land tenure reform
One study that provides an unusually comprehensive picture of the
relative efficiency of large farms, small farms and collective farms
was carried out in the Mexican district of Laguna in 1967 by Shlomo
Eckstein for the World Bank. It included large private farmers with
an average of 93.9 cultivated hectares each; small private farmers
with an average of 3.8 cultivated hectares each; ejidatarios farming
individual plots averaging 2.2 cultivated hectares each that were dis-
tributed in the Mexican land reform process; and ejidatarios farming
collectively on land reform holdings whose per-family aliquot share
would average 2.5 cultivated hectares (nationwide, 10% or fewer of
ejidal families opted to farm collectively). Cotton was the largest sin-
gle crop in the district, but a number of other crops were grown.
What emerged was a sophisticated and persuasive picture of relative
agricultural performance, which called forth this judgment as to the
small-owner farms and individual ejidatarios groups from the World
Bank analysts: “Together these two groups, which have small indivi-
dually operated farms, are clearly above the larger farm operations –
private or collective – on all measure of total factor productivity, i.e.,
in general economic efficiency.”
The study looked closely at the gross value of production per hec-
tare, versus the value of all of the inputs that went into such produc-
tion: land value, capital invested, purchased inputs, cost of hired
labor, and imputed value of owner’s family labor.
For “total factor productivity,” that is, gross value of production di-
vided by value of all inputs, the small farmers showed a ratio of
1.29, the individual ejidos 1.24, the large farmers 1.15 and the collec-
tive ejidos were loss-making at 0.90. Thus, the individual ejidos had
a total factor productivity that was 38% greater than the collective eji-
dos (1.24/0.90), and 8% greater than the pre-existing large farms
(1.24/1.15). At 1.29, the pre-existing small farms did even better.45
Source: S. Eckstein, et al., Land Reform in Latin America: Bolivia, Chile, Mexi-
co, Peru, and Venezuela, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 275 (World
Bank 1978). See also R. Prosterman & J. Riedinger, LAND REFORM AND DEMO-
CRATIC DEVELOPMENT 57-60, 261 (Johns Hopkins 1987), from which por-
tions of the above are adapted.
Whether due to their initial cooperativist bent, or for other reasons,
and in contrast to the programs in Mexico and Bolivia that gave benefi-
ciaries a choice as to the mode of operation from the beginning, pro-
grams intended to take estate land primarily to benefit agricultural
laborers have fallen considerably short of meeting goals or perceived
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needs in Brazil, Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, the Philippines, South
Africa, Namibia, and Portugal, among others. Of these, the most suc-
cess was achieved in Peru and El Salvador. In Peru, the most signifi-
cant aspect of the reform was that which took the large coastal planta-
tions; after roughly a decade of unitary operation, most of these expro-
priated estates were broken up by the beneficiaries to farm
individually.46 In El Salvador, the largest size-category of estates, those
over 500 hectares, were taken; but political will was insufficient to fol-
low up by implementing the land tenure reform law with respect to
the more numerous medium-large size-category of estates down to a
ceiling of 100-150 hectares.47 Apart from programs focused on large es-
tates, other programs have been intended to set ceilings low enough to
capture portions of non-tenanted holdings operated by medium- or
even smaller-size owners, chiefly to benefit paid agricultural laborers
working in that sector. These have almost all been failures, for reasons
discussed below. The experience with such programs in India is further
explored in Chapter 6.
The current program in Zimbabwe, which has now taken most of
the former large-estate land, may be said to be sui generis and does not
qualify as a “reform” in any normal sense of that word. It was not im-
plemented for the benefit of agricultural workers; most allocations ap-
pear to have gone to well-connected cronies of President Mugabe, and
recent estimates are that over 80% of the 4,500 former white-owned
commercial farms are no longer even in production.48 Indeed, the nor-
mal core group of beneficiaries for such a land distribution – the per-
manent workers on the estates – seem largely to have been driven off
those lands by threats and violence at the hands of thugs organized by
Mugabe’s ruling party.49
While the misallocation was less extreme, there is some analogy to
the post-independence Kenyan allocations of rural land, beginning in
the 1960s and sporadically continuing for decades. Many of these pro-
grams, largely distributing land acquired from large white-owned farms
that were established in the colonial era (but later extended and includ-
ing so-called “public” lands) were carried out in the Rift Valley. In initial
planning, “it was intended that settlement areas would be taken up by
communities already living in adjacent areas – so allowing local com-
munities to ‘take back’ lands that they had claimed prior to the advent
of European settlement, or to take ownership of lands upon which they
may have ‘squatted’ as tied labourers over many years.”50 But things
turned out differently under the successive presidencies of Jomo Kenya-
tta and Daniel arap Moi, with a combination of ethnic Kikuyu from
other geographic areas and persons who were better-connected pre-
empting many of the local poor as recipients, who were ethnic Kalenjin
and who often considered the land as originally or historically theirs.
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These grievances, stirred up by local and national politicians, gave
rise to episodes of substantial violence and displacement in 1992 and
1997, and most recently in January-February 2008 after the disputed
national election of December 2007. Many of those displaced appear to
be Kikuyu who are perceived as having earlier displaced rightful Kalen-
jin holders, but the large, new, commercial and politically connected
landholders in the Rift Valley seem at least as much precipitators as
the Kikuyu settlers.51
Focus on the poor
Apart from the crippling impact of inadequate financing and compen-
sation arrangements common to both kinds of programs, programs to
redistribute estate lands have given rise to a varied litany of design
flaws often different from those found in programs targeting tenanted
lands. These are flaws that make it difficult to replicate the estate pro-
grams broadly or achieve a comprehensive reform.
One persistent feature of programs to redistribute estate land has
been a tendency to include too few beneficiaries relative to the amount
of land intended to be taken. Thus, there has been little or no prospect,
even if there were full implementation of the program, that most po-
tential beneficiary families would be reached. One such flaw is the es-
tablishment of an unreasonably large “minimum” amount of land to
be distributed per beneficiary family. Where the minimum distributed
holding is unreasonably large, the program exhausts the available land
long before reaching most of the potential beneficiary universe.52 This
may be considered an example of what has elsewhere been called the
“purse of gold” phenomenon.53 We have referred in note 49 to the un-
duly large 60-hectare average distribution made in the earlier phase of
Zimbabwe’s reform.54 Brazil now employs a 30-hectare per family tar-
get,55 far too high when considering the number of needy families,
likely available land and costs. South Africa is apparently now empha-
sizing the creation of so-called “commercial” black-owned farms, as dis-
tinct from smallholder farms, on acquired land.56
Except for the last example – which may also deliberately deempha-
size the poorest as beneficiaries – the foregoing country programs ap-
pear at least broadly neutral on the question of which categories of ben-
eficiaries would receive the generous per capita benefits being contem-
plated. In contrast, other country programs (besides South Africa
currently) have limited the program’s reach and pro-poor impact by tar-
geting a narrow group of households to be benefited. This can be seen
in the distribution of large plantations in Peru,57 of estates exceeding
500 hectares in El Salvador,58 and the large estates that became asenta-
mientos in Chile.59 Each of these reforms substantially limited the class
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of beneficiaries to the well-organized permanent laborers on those
plantations. Each of these foregoing reforms also contemplated, at least
initially, the continuing operation of the holding as a single unit, prob-
ably in each case reflecting the proclivities of the union leadership or
affiliated political movement that had demanded the reform. RDI saw
this directly in its own field research during the land reforms in El Sal-
vador.60
In the ongoing (if just barely) allocation of financial grants for land
tenure reform beneficiaries in South Africa, under the program of Land
Redistribution for Agricultural Development LRAD, at least some pro-
vinces appear to interpret the legal rules to limit beneficiaries to perma-
nent laborers on the affected large (white-owned) farms. When thus in-
terpreted, as one analyst notes, “LRAD will do little to redistribute
wealth, income, and skills to the poorest people in the Province.”61
The Indonesian land reform of the early 1960s, which set a low en-
ough ceiling to have affected medium and even smaller non-tenanted
holdings (as small as five hectares), was supposed to ensure that at the
end of the program the beneficiaries would each own 2 hectares of
agricultural land, even though most of the actual farming was on a far
smaller scale than that at the time.62 The first priority group for benefi-
ciaries, under the Indonesian law, moreover, was “cultivators who culti-
vate the land concerned,” followed by “permanent peasant laborers . . .
who cultivate the land concerned,” with “peasants or other peasant la-
borers” (the latter a very large group including itinerant or temporary
agricultural laborers) listed only in eighth place.63 Little land acquisi-
tion or redistribution, however, actually occurred.
Many of the foregoing examples of high per-household minimums
or a stringently narrow beneficiary group can probably be traced at least
in part to variations of the persistent and erroneous view that larger
farms are better, and that there are economies of scale. Another potent
factor, however, is that in many settings the poorest rural families are
less likely to be literate, less likely to be connected to various activist
groups, and generally less able to give effective voice to their needs.64
Another reason programs become restricted in scope and non-replic-
able is excessive cost per family benefited. Flaws in the procedures for
calculating compensation for land to be acquired – discussed below in
the sub-section on compensation – may sometimes lead to excessive
compensation, thereby raising the cost of the program per beneficiary.
This appears to have been a problem in the earlier land reform in Ve-
nezuela, in the Brazilian land reform, and perhaps in at least some of
the “market-assisted land reform” programs promoted by the World
Bank in Brazil, South Africa, and elsewhere.65
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Resettlement
A sub-case of excessive cost per family benefited also arises where plan-
ners define the beneficiary group to encompass families that live suffi-
ciently far from the land being distributed to require program adminis-
trators to resettle the families closer to the land. Such cases are, for ex-
ample, found with respect to land-invading groups in Brazil and
Indonesia, to the extent the government then legally acknowledges
their claims. (It has also been found in programs to reallocate suppo-
sedly vacant and already publicly owned land located at a long distance
from beneficiaries, in settings such as Indonesia and the Philip-
pines.66) Resettlement programs are costly. Even if resettlement is to
be on lands already under cultivation, side-by-side with an existing
farm-laborer population – so that the government need not bear costs
to open up new lands, support settlers until new crops are planted and
harvested for the first time, or establish marketing outlets – other reset-
tlement costs are likely to arise for housing, schools, medical facilities
and other basic infrastructure. Even where resettlement costs are in-
curred in an effort to reach poorer groups in the rural population, such
as casual, non-permanent laborers, resettlement often does not repre-
sent the best or most cost-effective way of extending land rights to such
families.
Criteria for acquiring land
Most land reform laws intended to use compulsion to acquire estate,
ranch or similar large-scale unitary operations proceed by establishing
a maximum size limit for such holdings. The government then uses
the maximum in one of two ways: either (1) it acquires land that ex-
ceeds the ceiling, or (2) it acquires all land in the holding. However,
many laws aimed at taking land from large-scale holdings set forth ad-
ditional criteria that must be satisfied for the land to be subject to
acquisition. These additional criteria often make the taking process far
more complicated and uncertain than it would have been if based so-
lely on the quantity of land in the holding. Some examples of such ad-
ditional criteria:
– Only lazy, “underutilized,” or “uncultivated” land in the holding will
be taken, or such land will be taken first, followed only later by
other land in the holding.67
– “Intensively used” holdings (i.e., holdings that are capital-intensive
or have been the subject of significant investment) are not subject
to taking.68
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– A further quantitative standard, often based on land quality or sup-
posed productive capacity, is used in parallel with a purely quantita-
tive area maximum.69
– An even more layered and complicated formula is used to deter-
mine whether the holding qualifies for taking (in Brazil, one study
suggested the ceiling law’s application in one southern state would
exempt holdings with at least 30,000 hectares of grazing land or
21,000 hectares of unused land).70
Such criteria may be very difficult to apply consistently, either because
they require complex factual determinations or because they grant too
much discretion to program administrators.
Such problems are greatly compounded when the law also provides
that the landowner’s claims that his land is not properly subject to tak-
ing under the law must be adjudicated in court before the government
can physically take and distribute the land. A far better approach is one
in which the law authorizes the agency administering the program to
make an initial determination that the land is subject to taking, which
the law then deems a sufficient basis for the agency to take the land
and redistribute it to the beneficiaries. The owner may contest the tak-
ing by filing a claim in court, whereupon the agency pays the appropri-
ate compensation into the court, to be held by the court pending final
adjudication of the owner’s claim.71 If the owner wins, he gets his land
back (plus some fair recompense for the interval when he lost posses-
sion); if he loses, he receives the money that was paid into court (or
more money, if he successfully persuades the court that the proffered
compensation is insufficient). This approach also motivates the owner
to seek a rapid determination of his claims, in contrast to the no-physi-
cal-taking-until-formal-adjudication approach, in which owners are
usually motivated to seek protracted delay in the adjudication.
Public or state lands
An important use of public lands in some parts of the world takes the
form of a reservation for use by the local rural poor as “common prop-
erty resources” (CPR).72 Sometimes, however, these benefits are appro-
priated by local elites, as in densely populated east and central Java,
where such traditional community lands (tanah bengkok) are now used
as “village salary lands," in very generous allocations in lieu of cash sal-
aries to the elected village officials.73 One of the most striking historical
examples of appropriation of such village common lands by elites was
the Enclosure Movement in England, in which the landed gentry, over
the course of more than a century, were able (largely through indivi-
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dual acts of Parliament) to separate or “enclose” most CPRs and add
them to their private estates.74
Where local CPRs still exist, they are sometimes used for the com-
mon grazing of animals and sometimes for individual crop-growing
under short-term allocations to the needy. The challenge today is often
the preservation of the remaining CPRs against individualization and
full privatization – for example, by auction to the highest bidder – un-
der the heavy pressures of population growth, urbanization and in-
creased land values.
It sometimes occurs that planners propose using areas of supposedly
unused public lands as a source for land to be redistributed to the land-
less.75 Sometimes such lands can, indeed, make a significant contribu-
tion to meeting the needs of the landless (see the discussion of land al-
location programs in India’s Andhra Pradesh state, in Chapter 6). But
over the years there has been a series of reasons why “solving the land
problem through distribution of public lands” proves to be unsatisfac-
tory:
– In the government’s records, located perhaps in a far away capital
city, the land is shown as ‘‘unused.’’ But in fact it is being used, lar-
gely by the rural poor, forming part of what they regard as local
CPRs, perhaps under long-established customary regimes of use
and allocation.
– If the land is not being used but is near to needy populations, this
may signal that it is of very poor quality and not suitable for produc-
tive agricultural use.
– If the land is not being used but is distant in location, the govern-
ment will be faced with the manifold problems and high costs (dis-
cussed above) of resettling beneficiaries to those distant areas. Only
where such resettlement is sua sponte, self-initiated, and largely un-
subsidized (as under the U.S. Homestead Acts) is there likely to be
a prospect for widespread replication.
Land invasion
Land invasions, which almost always relate to land in large estates and
almost never to tenanted land, raise difficult issues of policy, law and
politics. In considering whether the law should, at least in some cir-
cumstances, recognize land invaders as rightholders on the invaded
lands, a series of questions should be answered:
First, would the land that has been invaded have been subject to dis-
tribution under existing land tenure reform laws and regulations (even
if the government has routinely failed to follow the law’s procedure for
land acquisition)? If the land would not have been subject to distribu-
REDISTRIBUTING LAND TO AGRICULTURAL LABORERS 125
tion even under proper procedures, the case for recognizing invaders
must be considered severely weakened.
Second, does a present private rightholder claim existing rights re-
garding the land invaded? If the land is neither privately claimed nor
subject to an ongoing valid lease or concession from the state, the inva-
ders’ case is likely to appear more acceptable.
Third, have the invaders excluded the pre-existing labor force on the
invaded holding from receiving benefits? Normally that labor force
would be a priority group in benefiting from the taking of that land un-
der a land tenure reform law. Inclusion of the existing workers, as in
Brazil, rather than exclusion, as in Zimbabwe, builds a far more plausi-
ble case for legalizing the invasion (assuming the invaders themselves
have some claim to be members of at least some potential beneficiary
group under land tenure reform, and even this apparently is often not
the case in Zimbabwe).
Fourth, do the invaders act under some historical claim of right,
even if any relevant period of limitations for bringing such a claim has
expired? Put another way, is this largely a newly forged or ad hoc group
of claimants, or are they the remnants of, or direct successors to, his-
torical occupants of these same lands? Such a historical factor may
help legitimize the invaders’ claim to recognition, subject, however, to
questions of social and political stability discussed below.
Where the core beneficiary group of permanent laborers have them-
selves seized estate land, this should perhaps not even be classified as
a “land invasion.” This becomes still more complicated in a setting like
that of the tea plantations of the state of West Bengal in India, where
seizures by a plantation’s labor force have occurred: (a) on plantations
that are excluded from the land reform ab initio, by virtue of their
crop76 but (b) on which the labor force has not been paid for an ex-
tended period, and thus may have a lien on the enterprise’s assets – in-
cluding its land – for unpaid wages, but again (c) on which there has
simply been direct self-help through seizure of the land rather than for-
mal enforcement of the possible wage lien according to procedures pre-
scribed by law.
Beyond specifically legal questions, any land invasion raises broader
issues relating to social and political stability. Notably, will recognition
of one or a few groups of existing land invaders as rightholders trigger
a wave of additional land invasions? Moreover, is there a danger that
widespread and formally illegal land invasions might lead to a violent
response by large landowners and their allies, perhaps even to a coup
d’etat or civil war? This question may also be related to the govern-
ment’s willingness and ability to pay appropriate and credible compen-
sation to landowners who lose their land through invasions: an ability
which grows less credible if invasions become widespread and extend
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to highly valuable capital-intensive holdings. Such a reaction by the
landowners and their allies may be a real danger in some settings and
historically was probably at least a significant factor in catalyzing Fran-
co’s ultimately successful seizure of power in Spain through the civil
war of 1936-1939 and the Brazilian generals’ coup d’etat and overthrow
of a weak democratic regime in 1965.77
Outright reversals
The most striking case of reversal of a land tenure reform in which es-
tates were taken occurred in Guatemala, following a 1954 coup against
the regime of Jacobo Arbenz. This is now widely recognized as having
been collusively organized by the United Fruit Company – which had
seen around two-thirds of its vast, but largely unused, banana planta-
tions expropriated for a compensation based on the previously declared
tax value of about US$8.20 per hectare78 – and (via the CIA) the Uni-
ted States, which feared “communist” incursions. For the United States
this marked a stunning reversal of its post-war record of support for
land tenure reforms in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (although the
U.S. was later to return to support for land tenure reform in South
Vietnam and even in Guatemala’s Central American neighbor, El Salva-
dor, as well as theoretically but largely ineffectively having supported
land tenure reform under Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress”). After the
coup, virtually all of the Guatemalan land tenure reform was re-
versed.79
Another example of a partial reversal was the experience in Chile fol-
lowing the military coup against Salvador Allende in 1973 (which was
largely motivated by concerns unrelated to the land tenure reform).
About half of the land tenure reform beneficiaries80 were allowed to re-
tain about 57%, by value, of the estate lands previously expropriated.
The new military government largely subdivided the land into family
holdings, something most beneficiaries had apparently wished to do
from early in the reform, but had been forestalled from doing both by
an initial legislated moratorium on subdivision and by an ideology that
had favored cooperative farms. But the new government sold off the
machinery and animals to pay off debts previously amassed by the co-
operatives and also cut off credit to the new individual farmers, leading
many to sell their land.81
The violent reactions to land invasions in 1930s Spain and 1960s
Brazil, and the reversals of formal, legislated land acquisitions in 1950s
Guatemala (and partial reversal in 1970s Chile) are sobering. They re-
mind the designers of land tenure reforms, and emphatically so in de-
mocratic settings, that they must make informed and reasonable
efforts to take the interests of existing landowners into account.82
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A further point of interest is that there have been no outright rever-
sals of land-to-the-tiller reforms that predominantly gave in-place own-
ership rights to existing tenants in the traditional developing country
settings. This suggests, perhaps, that stronger ties come out of indivi-
dual ownership rights and are politically harder to undo. The nearest
thing to an exception would be under communism, in China’s collecti-
vization of farmland (not a return to the former owners, but a disaster
in its own right) in the mid-1950s, after first purportedly giving it in
ownership to tenant farmers. The Chinese experience is discussed in
Chapter 7.
Compensation issues
Most compensation issues related to takings of estate land are similar
to those discussed for acquisitions of tenanted lands in Chapter 2. But
several matters concerning compensation, while not inherently limited
to land tenure reforms involving large estates, have tended to arise pri-
marily in relation to such lands: (1) arrangements leading to above-mar-
ket compensation, (2) “market-assisted land reform,” (3) restitution, (4)
enforcement of wage liens, and (5) equity in lieu of land.
Arrangements leading to above-market compensation have occasionally
been present in programs to acquire large estates. Examples are found
in the limited land tenure reforms in Venezuela in the 1950s and
1960s and currently in Brazil. The essential problem in the rules gov-
erning compensation in these cases has been that the fair market price
of land existing just prior to the program has not served as a limit on
compensation paid. In the Venezuelan case, with respect to the earlier
land tenure reform attempt of the 1950s and 1960s, “this oil-rich coun-
try . . . paid handsome compensation to landowners whose estates were
expropriated.”83 The law did not specify that the program itself was not
intended to bid up the land price from what it would have been in the
absence of the program.84 Consequently, prices asked by landowners
skyrocketed and, as one consequence, the program shifted away from
its original focus on taking and distributing cultivated private lands to
a much more dubious emphasis on largely unused (and perhaps unu-
sable) public lands. In Brazil, the ultimate possibility of expropriation
by the government exists, but only after potentially protracted litigation
in the courts and the satisfying of complex threshold criteria stated in
the law; thus, the government often takes the easier path of agreeing
on a “negotiated price,” frequently resulting in payments well above
the previous market price.85
Market-assisted land reform is, as the name suggests, an approach by
which the government (or beneficiaries subsidized by government
grants or loans) aims to acquire land through voluntary sales at, or
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close to, pre-existing market price, although in theory accompanied by
the motivating factor for the landowners that the government might in-
voke compulsory taking procedures under existing law if too few land-
owners are willing to negotiate. This approach has been used in recent
years in World Bank-supported programs to acquire estate lands in
Brazil, South Africa and elsewhere.
Questions have arisen as to possible excessive compensation to land-
owners under this approach and as to other matters involving program
design. In many settings, existing land markets are quite “thin,” invol-
ving relatively few transactions. If, for example, the setting is one in
which only 1% or 2% of estate land would “normally” come onto the
market for sale each year, but the population of landless laborers is so
sizeable that one might want to acquire 50% of the estate land, then to
carry out a full-scale program over a 10-year period would involve an
average acquisition of 5% of the estate land per year. But such a large
increase in estate land coming onto the market is highly unlikely un-
less the existing “market” price increases greatly. It would seem likely
that a government could acquire such large amounts of land at the pre-
existing market price only by invoking eminent domain powers and
compulsorily acquiring that land rather than relying upon voluntary
negotiation.
Moreover, if there is to be an acquisition on a negotiated basis
through the land-acquiring beneficiaries (to whom the government
then loans the funds to make the purchase) and the owner who is sell-
ing his land, extensive safeguards may be needed to ensure that an
adequate amount of land of appropriate quality and location is ac-
quired, within the maximum land costs permitted.
The redistribution aspect of the South African program has pro-
ceeded almost entirely on a market-assisted basis without expropriatory
takings and has moved slowly relative to the overall goal of transferring
30% of agricultural land (inclusive of pasture land) by 2014. Current
estimates are that restitution plus redistribution have together trans-
ferred only 4% of agricultural land – of which 90% was white-owned
at the end of apartheid – to blacks.86
Apart from the question of excessive compensation and willingness
of owners to sell, commentators have questioned whether such market-
based programs primarily benefit the truly poor. Thus, an argument is
made that, at least in settings like Brazil, the “groups” that are formed
to avail themselves of the proffered program-supported loans may be
constituted by better-informed, better-connected and more entrepre-
neurial campesinos, and consequently tend to exclude the poorest
households.87 In response to these criticisms, several design changes
have been introduced in the market-assisted land tenure reform pro-
grams in Brazil88 and South Africa.89 Under a program recently in-
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itiated in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, the government acquires
land that comes onto the market from landowners who are not below
the poverty line and allocates it to benefit landless women from below
the poverty line, principally agricultural-laborer households. Design
changes for this program, discussed further in Chapter 6, show early
promise for resolving problems encountered in the earlier programs of
other countries.
Restitution programs that return land to its former small or medium
owners may involve special compensation issues. These programs have
usually been introduced in settings of previous seizure and forced col-
lectivization of land that had occurred under the prior communist re-
gimes in eastern Europe.90 But at least one program of restitution, that
in South Africa, has involved undoing seizures of black-owned land
that were made for private use in a non-communist setting. This is the
branch of the three-branch South African land tenure reform program
(restitution, redistribution and reform of tenure for existing holders91)
that attempts to reverse, in part, the seizures of black-owned farmland
that occurred over the decades from the Native Lands Act of 1913 until
the later stages of white-minority government under apartheid. Some
land seizures at issue go back more than 80 years and may involve sev-
eral generations with differing relationships to the land initially taken
from its black owners. For example, the original white beneficiary of
land seized from black farmers in the 1920s may have sold the land in
the 1940s, and that buyer might have resold it in the 1960s to a farmer
whose grandson may now be farming the land, held under inheritance,
and with a long series of investments and improvements having been
made over the intervening years.
Many potential complexities and variables are reflected in the key
language of South Africa’s Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, set-
ting the criteria and modalities for return of land or cash compensation
for its loss. Under the Act as amended in 1997, the Land Claims Court
is to consider 10 separately listed factors, including such broad ones as
“the requirements of equity and justice,” as well as such demandingly
specific ones as “the history of the dispossession, the hardship caused,
the current use of the land and the history of the acquisition and use
of the land.” There can also be “an order for equitable redress in the
form of financial compensation” rather than return of the land itself.
With nearly all claims supposedly now settled after a slow start, close
to 60,000 rural households should now have benefited.92 Perhaps the
two key, interrelated criticisms are that: (1) financial compensation,
rather than actual land restoration, had been the remedy in nearly
three-fifths of settled claims at least as of 2004, and (2) the total area
of actual land transferred to claimants is still only about 2% of South
Africa’s agricultural land (inclusive of pastures).93
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Assertion and foreclosure of liens relating to unpaid wages of workers on
the estate is another possibility in some circumstances, and one which
appears to have been used on some tea plantations in India.94 These
transfers of land use to the workers may not have involved formal fore-
closures based on assertion of a worker’s lien on the assets of their em-
ployer for unpaid wages. But the availability of the legal claim – and
the underlying fact of wages owed and unpaid, contemporary in time
and upon which no statute of limitations has run – should substan-
tially distinguish this situation from more usual cases of “land inva-
sion,” as discussed earlier.95
Equity-in-lieu-of-land rights may best be considered as a kind of “nega-
tive land reform” scheme because it has arisen in settings in which the
government asks potential or actual beneficiaries of land redistribution
measures to give up their benefits (or promised benefits) in return for
an equity interest – common stock or its equivalent – in an enterprise
that will use the land that the same beneficiaries either used (or
owned) or had expectation of using (and perhaps owning) under a land
tenure reform program.96
This issue has arisen with greatest persistence in China, where some
schemes have offered farmers “equity” in resulting enterprises in re-
turn for giving up their present land rights for use by those enter-
prises. RDI’s field review of the most prominent of the Chinese stock-
share programs, that in Nanhai County of Guangdong Province, found
numerous problems in actual practice. Among these were the nearly
complete lack of meaningful participation or oversight by the farmers
who had ceded their land rights; the lack of transparency as to enter-
prise operations, including such key issues as the calculation of profits
or the incurring of expenses, which could lend itself to management
manipulation of calculated profits; “dividends” to the farmer-share-
holders which appeared to be only about 10% of acknowledged profits;
and what appeared to be generous outlays on offices and transport for
the local officials who managed the stock-share enterprise.97 Another
country setting where equity or equivalent participation is permitted is
South Africa, where a number of examples exist and have been stu-
died.98 The government wants to assist and empower black farmwor-
kers – and the desire is probably even stronger if it can do so while pre-
serving effective unitary operation on many of the larger, presently
white-owned farms. The law does not specify in detail the modalities
for such “equity share” arrangements, and much seems to depend on
what is worked out between the white owners and the black workers or
other residents on a particular holding. NGO or government represen-
tatives often assist, and beneficiaries receive government Land Redistri-
bution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) grants of R20,000 (cur-
rently equivalent to about US$2,600) per household – and more with
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sufficient self-contribution – as a contribution they can bring to the
transaction.99 The resulting enterprise – and these are all cases where
continuing unitary operation is contemplated – may take any of a num-
ber of institutional forms allowed under general South African law.
The arrangements must clearly be negotiated and are consensual, in
form at least. Still, a number of problems appear to exist. The choices
to be made and their implementation mechanisms are clearly complex,
requiring a great deal of outside technical support and leaving consid-
erable doubt about whether many participating families adequately un-
derstand their new rights. The genuineness and durability of empower-
ment for black workers who become equity holders may also be ques-
tionable, especially given that they often, perhaps in all cases, hold a
minority interest and have only minority representation on the board,
and given that the former owner (though this is usually a mutually de-
sired result, to ensure adequate management skills) normally stays on
as the manager of the enterprise. These concerns seem to be given
further weight by initial research that indicates widely varying results
from holding to holding where equity-share schemes have been put in
place.100
Individual versus joint operation
Section I has already raised the issue of whether the large unitary hold-
ing that is being transferred to its workers is to be operated henceforth
as a single unit, as a series of individual family farms, or as some com-
bination of these. Do the beneficiaries have a choice in this matter, or
has the issue been decided in the governing law and regulations? Is
the decision on this issue to be made once-and-for-all at the beginning,
or can a majority (or super-majority) of the beneficiaries change their
minds later? Can individuals “opt out,” either initially or later, with
their allocable shares of both land and other assets? And if the benefici-
aries are to have any of these choices, how can they meaningfully exer-
cise them?101
These questions also suggest the need, implicit in any situation
where a group of workers gain control over a unitary estate and must
make at least some group decisions – whether only for definitive break-
up, or continuing with partial or fully fledged group functioning – to
settle on modes of decision making and modes of self-governance (for
the longer term).
On these primarily procedural issues there appears to be a long-
standing best-practices example found in the Mexican ejidos, initially
pursuant to the Agrarian Code of 1934, and then amplified under the
reform of 1992.102 These self-government arrangements remain rele-
vant for both the collective and individual ejidos, and cover a wide range
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of the organization’s internal affairs. (The Israeli moshav is broadly
similar to the individual ejido in Mexico, though its governance struc-
tures exist in what is essentially a developed-country setting.103)
The key elements of ejido governance that appear most empowering
for the member households are the following:104
(1) The community requests the grant of land (a process ended in
1992), either on the basis of restitution if the community previously
held title or non-restitutionary expropriation if there was no pre-
vious title.105
(2) After government approval and the formal grant of land to the ejidal
community, the community elects an ejidal commissariat to provide
daily management and a vigilance council to act as a watchdog.106
(3) Ultimate authority is vested in a General Assembly of all members
that meets once a month.
(4) Very importantly, voting for the councils is by secret ballot.107 And
if there is a divided vote on the election of the commissariat, the
vigilance council must be elected from among members of the los-
ing minority.
(5) All terms of office are for three years, and re-election, which is con-
sidered rare,108 requires a two-thirds vote, not just a simple major-
ity.
(6) Although the president is the leading official, “The intent of the eji-
do system is egalitarianism and the president is meant to be first
among equals.”109
(7) There are also well-developed federal oversight mechanisms in
place to ensure ejidal democracy, now including an Agrarian Tribu-
nal for dispute resolution established in 1992.
One weakness in the Mexican scheme, however, is that only one
person per household is normally a voting member in the General
Assembly, and almost invariably that person is the husband and not
the wife.110
Mexico adopted its constitutional mandate for land reform in 1917
after a polarizing and bloody revolution and adopted more specific gov-
erning rules in 1934 in an era when “private property” was ideologi-
cally suspect there and in many other country settings. Consequently,
Mexican law severely restricted the individual’s right to opt out,
whether or not the ejido had individualized its holdings. Members
could not sell or rent their land rights or sell their undivided share, nor
even hire labor to help work their land; however, they could pass their
rights to a single heir, but only if that person was or became a member
of the ejidal community and continued to work the land.
As often happens where provisions of law forbid what large numbers
of people consider to be appropriate and beneficial activity, these re-
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strictions came to be widely ignored, and an informal “shadow market”
in ejidal land rights grew up over time.111 Thus, in 1992, Mexico
amended both its Constitution and the law112 to allow formal titling of
individualized holdings on the ejidos pursuant to a two-thirds vote of
the members. A large majority of ejidos have now completed the volun-
tary no-cost registration process that leads to the distribution of certifi-
cates for individual parcels. Today, ejidatorios can lease out their land
and can sell it within the ejidal community. But only if the land is for-
mally privatized (either in full, with the ejido disbanding, or partially,
for members wishing to exercise this option) can the land be sold to an
outsider, and even then the sale remains subject to a right of first refu-
sal by ejidatorios.113
As a final point under this individual-versus-joint operation heading,
it should be noted that, in a number of reforms where operations be-
gan as joint ones, most large holdings were later divided among the
beneficiaries for individual farming.114
Nuclear estates
Closely related to the previous point is a model of operation that is
partly unitary and partly individual. As one clearly identified variant,
the so-called “nuclear estate” approach has been used, in such coun-
tries as Indonesia, Malaysia and Kenya. In the “nuclear estate” (or “nu-
cleus estate”) model, a “nucleus” or core part of the large holding is
used for production of an export crop (such as oil palm) using capital-
intensive methods and a force of permanent workers. This core area of
joint farming is then accompanied by a large number of much smaller
family-size farms, producing the same crop and cultivated mostly by
the families that provide the permanent work force on the core estate.
The management of the core farm provides support to the entire opera-
tion, gathers in the entire crop (including purchase of the raw crop
produced on the family plots), processes the crop and markets the final
product.115 The land used often consists of large tracts of (supposedly)
public land, either allocated to a private investor or to a state-owned
company. Sometimes this has been done in conjunction with resettle-
ment programs, such as the Indonesian transmigration program, dis-
cussed in note 66. Similar problems, such as the existence of conflict-
ing customary users, can often arise.116
To the extent that a particular land tenure reform program will deal
with existing large holdings in which a substantial portion of the estate
land is presently used for capital-intensive production, the “nuclear es-
tates” model may offer a useful option. Even if one is inclined (as we
recommend) to exclude capital-intensive portions of estates from a re-
distribution program, this may still leave other, peripheral or non-capi-
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tal-intensive portions of such holdings appropriately subject to taking,
and in such cases these additional lands might be distributed as family
farms. If the family farms produce the same crop as that produced on
the portion of the holding that remains undivided, the effect would be
to create an overall operation similar to a nuclear estate.
In some Latin American settings, such peripheral lands might al-
ready be farmed individually, for subsistence crops, by laborers work-
ing on the central estates, under the colono system.117 In the traditional
setting, the central estate in such cases would not be capital intensive,
and thus would also be subject to taking and redistribution under the
assumption (taking of non-capital-intensive lands) made in the pre-
vious paragraph. It should also be noted that in some Latin American
settings, the beneficiaries who received estate lands have ended up by
farming individual parcels, as well as farming together on a central
“core” holding. But the individual parcels, like pre-reform colono parcels
(although they may now be owned by the beneficiaries) are usually
farmed with subsistence crops rather than cash crops, and there is
probably a tendency to subdivision of the “core” holding by the benefi-
ciaries (now the joint owners), at least in part because of “free rider”
and supervision problems.118 We are not aware of any systematic at-
tempt to compare the “free rider” and supervision problems on differ-
ent kinds of large holdings, but we would hypothesize that they are
likely to be inversely related to the power of supervisors or manage-
ment to dismiss non-performing workers: hence, a smaller problem on
privately owned large plantations, more of a problem on large collective
farms, and an even greater problem on large holdings that remain
jointly operated by land tenure reform beneficiaries.
Ceilings that capture medium-size and small holdings
In a number of countries, ownership “ceilings” laws have been adopted
in the past that would have taken non-tenant-farmed lands operated in
holdings much smaller in size than what would usually be thought of
as “estates,” “plantations,” or “ranches.” These laws, affecting what
most might characterize as “medium-size” – or even “smaller” – hold-
ings, not cultivated by tenants, have been adopted in several Asian set-
tings and have generally failed to achieve any significant degree of land
redistribution.
For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, various Indian states adopted
ownership ceilings on non-tenanted landholdings typically ranging
from 10 to 20 acres (4 to 8 hectares) for irrigated land, and up to 50
acres (20 hectares) or more for lesser-quality land, with the excess to
be taken and redistributed.119 Indonesia sought to take holdings above
five hectares in more densely populated parts of the country (with
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higher ceilings, up to 20 hectares, in more thinly populated areas) and
also sought to take the entirety of the holdings of absentee owners.120
The list might be extended.
Through a combination of usually unchallenged false or anticipatory
transfers to relatives or strawmen and simple governmental non-imple-
mentation (which may be further abetted by administrative complica-
tions the landowners succeed in inserting into the governing law), the
great majority of such land has escaped acquisition.121 Several factors
may be at work here to defeat implementation:
First, there is a relatively large political counterweight of owners who
would be affected.122 And, as with almost all of these earlier post-World
War II land tenure reforms, the proffered compensation for land was
far below market value, exacerbating the owners’ reaction.
Second, there is often not a well-identified beneficiary group, in con-
trast to situations where either large estates or tenanted farms are to be
taken and redistributed. In the former case, the permanent workers are
generally the presumptive core beneficiary group, and in the latter
case, the tenants are almost always the in-place beneficiaries. But with
medium and smaller non-tenanted holdings, there are often few or no
permanent laborers: beneficiaries are expected to be drawn from the
ranks of temporary or itinerant workers, who may consist of different
people from season to season and year to year, whose levels of work on
the particular land may differ considerably, and who in any event have
no links with either particular parcels (as do tenants) or at least specific
larger fields (as do permanent laborers). Hence, putative beneficiaries
may be less expectant, less organized, and exert less countervailing
pressure against that of the existing landowners.
Third, as a further complication, some temporary or itinerant work-
ers may own (or be tenants on) other parcels of land, changing or per-
haps eliminating their status as potential beneficiaries. Thus, the com-
pletely landless among them – who should be preferred beneficiaries –
may lack to an even greater degree the kind of cohesiveness often
found among tenant farmers in a small village or permanent workers
on a single estate. Yet the law is often written – unwisely, and as one of
the administrative complications the landowners may succeed in im-
planting – to require the would-be beneficiaries to take the initiative in
making a claim to particular land.
And, finally, even though legal provisions potentially affecting med-
ium or small holdings did find their way into the statute books in
some countries early in the post-war era, they may have lacked much
of the broader political and ideological support which underpinned par-
allel and contemporaneous legal provisions dealing with tenanted lands
or large estates.
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IV. Possible future approaches to distributing land to benefit
agricultural laborers
Drawing together the principal threads of the previous discussion, the
following points, both positive and negative, seem vital ones to keep in
view when designing and implementing programs to benefit agricul-
tural laborers.123
There should be a general presumption against taking capital-inten-
sive estate lands that are privately owned. These lands are likely to in-
volve a relatively high cost per family benefited. It may be necessary to
continue operation of these lands in a unitary mode, with beneficiaries
of any redistribution limited largely or entirely to the existing perma-
nent labor force. Indeed, an initial litmus test here might be “if the pri-
vate estate holding is such that the beneficiaries will not be given the
option of subdividing it into individual family farms, do not take it.”
Although this should be a strong presumption, there may be excep-
tional political circumstances – perhaps in South Africa and Namibia,
for example124 – in which social stability will demand that the govern-
ment take and redistribute such holdings.
In other country settings one option might be for the government to
allow the present owners to retain core estates while taking a portion
of the estate using compulsory purchase powers. The government
might encourage owners to improve and intensify operations on the re-
tained core estate by using compensation they received for the remain-
ing portions of their land. The government would allocate the taken
lands to beneficiaries and allow them to operate such lands in any
mode they choose, which in most cases is likely to be on an individual
basis. The new small holders might produce largely the same crop as
the core estate – in which case the entire operation might approximate
the “nuclear estate” model – or might produce other crops chiefly for
subsistence and local marketing. It should also be borne in mind that
beneficiaries might in many cases operate both field parcels and home-
garden plots received under the reform. This option might make sense
in Brazil and some other parts of Latin America.
Thus, with rare exceptions, there should be a general presumption
against acquiring any portions of private estate lands that are already
intensively used. Rather, governments should focus on acquiring
underutilized lands, including lands presently used for extensive graz-
ing that are agronomically suitable for cropping (for example, some
valley lands such as those RDI has seen in Colombia used for grazing
cattle, while small farmers used steep hillsides for crop production, the
reverse of ecologically and agriculturally sensible usage patterns). In
such cases, except for lands suitable only for extensive pasture,125 bene-
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ficiaries should always be given the choice of farming the land on an
individualized basis.
In some settings, the government may acquire underutilized estate
land at a per hectare market price in the low hundreds of dollars or
even less. This can provide a potentially large “replicability dividend” in
reaching larger numbers of beneficiaries. Program designers must be
careful not to squander such a prospect of wide replication by then pro-
ceeding to allocate excessively large amounts of land per beneficiary
family.
In a related vein, there should be a focus on benefiting poorer rural
households by ensuring that the beneficiary group prominently in-
cludes temporary or casual laborers who are presently landless. But in
this case as well there should be a strong presumption against paying
any substantial resettlement costs, and against using resources to pay
for housing. In general, if the estate lands that are candidates for acqui-
sition are located so far away from most putative beneficiaries that relo-
cation seems impractical – at least without large resettlement subsidies
– then one should look carefully at possible candidate lands closer to
the beneficiaries, including considering such variables as the distribu-
tion of smaller homegarden plots.
Considerations as to whether and to what extent the government
might legalize land invasions involve a complex of factors, as discussed
above.126 In general, there should be a presumption against legalizing
the results of this kind of self-help. Where the circumstances warrant
legalization of the seized land, at a minimum the government should
use the invasion to identify land that the government will formally
acquire by eminent domain, paying adequate compensation to the
owners.
With rare exceptions, beneficiaries of estate land acquisitions should
have broad options, both at the start and continuing subsequently, as
to their desired mode of cultivating the land. For this and other govern-
ance purposes, where at least some group decisions will continue to be
made, the procedures used on the Mexican ejidos can serve as a useful
model. Some potential options for enterprise organization, notably
those identified as “stock share” or “equity participation” that do not
provide beneficiaries with any substantial voice in enterprise manage-
ment, are likely to be so inimical to beneficiary interests that they
should almost never be included among the governance options.
Where estate lands are not available or otherwise an appropriate
source of land for large numbers of non-permanent agricultural la-
borers or other poor landless families, planners might be inclined to
consider using eminent domain power to acquire and distribute med-
ium-sized holdings, using a ceiling low enough to capture a significant
amount of non-tenanted, self-cultivated land. This option seems highly
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problematic because of likely widespread opposition and in light of the
lack of success in using such an approach in the past (e.g., Kerala, In-
donesia). Indeed, it is likely to invoke all the problems cited against the
prospects of contemporary land-to-the-tiller programs in Chapter 2,
without even offering the political counterweight of beneficiaries who
are already on the land as tenants. But in occasional settings the gov-
ernment can perhaps use negotiated acquisition via “market-assisted
land reform” to acquire enough land from medium as well as large
holdings to allocate even full-sized plots to significant numbers of the
rural poor, as distinct from allocating small homestead plots. As experi-
ence with market-assisted land tenure reform accumulates and pro-
gram methods improve, governments may find they are able to acquire
sufficient land to do this, at least in settings where land prices are low.
Notes
1 Large size is not an exclusive touchstone for determining whether non-family labor
predominates, as can be seen in some settings where ample capital can be mobilized
to substitute for labor. For example, in the United States it is common to find “family
farms” of 400 hectares (1000 acres) or more, on which the preponderance of the la-
bor is provided by a single family or siblings, using hundreds of thousands of dollars
in farming equipment.
2 This chapter will not discuss collectivized or state-operated lands, or successor opera-
tions, in the former Soviet Union, or in Cuba, North Korea, or Nicaragua in the San-
dinista era. The present chapter will, however, include situations where the law estab-
lishes land ownership “ceilings” that are set low enough that medium-sized and even
smaller (non-tenanted) operational holdings may theoretically be impacted.
3 Or, to put it more exactly, their predominant source of income derives from cultivat-
ing land to which some other party holds and exercises a superior right, such that
they require a payment from the tenant for the privilege of cultivating, or limit the
agricultural laborer to a wage or other work-related emolument – in some cases, the
temporary use of another, small piece of land – while themselves disposing of what
the laborer has produced. Our principal focus in Chapters 2 and 3 thus differs from
the principal focus of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, author of a popular
book on land rights, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (Basic Books 2000). Among other differences, whereas
we are focused on creating new rights for persons cultivating land to which another
party is clearly asserting the dominant right, de Soto’s focus is the formalization of
land rights that are already being exercised without the presence of any separate pri-
vate owner or other active paramount right-holder. Chapter 8 and also Chapter 7 bear
on these latter issues.
4 Though the discrepancy does not disappear entirely. In the Salvadoran reform, for ex-
ample, some owners held more than the triggering amount of land only by virtue of
lumping together two or three physically distinct holdings. J. Strasma, Unfinished
Business: Consolidating Land Reform in El Salvador, in W. Thiesenhusen, ed., SEARCH-
ING FOR LAND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 408, 425 (Unwin Hyman 1989).
5 The applicable law may, in general, be framed in one of two ways insofar as quantita-
tive ceilings are concerned. Either an estate that is found to exceed the ceiling is then
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taken in its entirety, or only that portion of the estate which is in excess of the ceiling
is taken. In the latter case, as with tenanted land that has been determined to exceed
a non-zero ceiling, there is the further question of who chooses which portion is to
be taken and which portion retained by the owner.
6 This may also include the situation on large holdings in Latin American settings in
which a single unitary holding is divided into a majority portion managed directly by
the owner using agricultural laborers, and a minority portion divided into individual
parcels which those laborers are allowed to cultivate (usually used for subsistence
crops). In the more traditional version of this colono system, the laborers gave their
labor on the centrally managed lands as payment for use of their individual parcels,
with neither a separate wage paid to them nor a separate rent paid by them. See,
e.g., S. Lastarria-Cornhiel, Agrarian Reforms of the 1960s and 1970s in Peru, in Thie-
senhusen, supra note 4, at 127, 131.
7 W.C. Thiesenhusen, BROKEN PROMISES: AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE LATIN AMERICAN
CAMPESINO 106 (Westview 1995); S. Clark & B. O’Neill, Agrarian Reform in Southern
Portugal, 4 CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 47, 50-51 (1980).
8 Rarely, a government with a particular political agenda may not consider the estate
workers to be beneficiaries at all. This appears to be the case in Zimbabwe currently,
in a program that must generally be viewed as a travesty of “land reform.” For the
position of estate workers in Zimbabwe, see International Crisis Group, Blood and
Soil: Land, Politics, and Conflict Prevention in Zimbabwe and South Africa, ICG Africa
Report No. 85, at 92-94 (International Crisis Group Press 2004).
9 W. Wolford, Producing Community: The MST and Land Reform Settlements in Brazil, 3
(4) JOURNAL OF AGRARIAN CHANGE 500-501, 505-510, 518 (2003). Such land-invading
groups may also accommodate the existing workforce, as they do in Brazil, or may
exclude them, as in Zimbabwe.
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pare the division of Taiwan’s land into 26 grades of paddy land and 26 grades of dry-
land for purposes of deciding how much a landlord could retain. See Chapter 2,
n. 26.
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the enterprise land to farm individually – are discussed in Section VII of Chapter 7.
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search Report 83 (World Bank & Oxford University Press 2003).
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ics 2001); R.M. Netting, SMALLHOLDERS, HOUSEHOLDERS: FARM FAMILIES AND THE
ECOLOGY OF INTENSIVE, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 146-56 (Stanford University Press
1993); M.R. Carter, Identification of the Inverse Relationship between Farm Size and Pro-
ductivity: An Empirical Analysis of Peasant Agricultural Production, 36(1) OXFORD ECO-
NOMIC PAPERS 131-145 (1984); H.P. Binswanger, K. Deininger & G. Feder, Power, Dis-
tortions, Revolt, and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations, in J. Behrman & T.N. Srini-
vasan, eds., HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 41-49 (Elsevier Science 1995);
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691-709 (1994); G.P. Kutcher & P.L. Scandizzo, THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY OF
NORTHEAST BRAZIL (World Bank 1981); C. Udry, Recent Advances in Empirical Microe-
conomic Research in Poor Countries: An Annotated Bibliography, 28(1) JOURNAL OF ECO-
NOMIC EDUCATION 58-75 (1997). Some of the observed inverse relationship can be ex-
plained by differences in land quality, yet even after controlling for land quality and
other differences associated with farm size, empirical studies still indicate a signifi-
cant inverse correlation. Deininger, supra note 13, at 83.
15 See generally R. Burgess, LAND, WELFARE, AND EFFICIENCY IN RURAL CHINA (London
School of Economics 1997); X.L. Dong & L. Putterman, Prereform Industry and State
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Current Options, in J. van Zyl, J. Kirsten & H.P. Binswanger, eds., AGRICULTURAL
LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA: POLICIES, MARKETS AND MECHANISMS 64 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1996).
17 One study in India found that for an average farm size of 2.9 acres the income per
acre was 737 rupees; for an average farm size of 9.3 acres it was 607 rupees; for 19.5
acres, 482 rupees; and for 42.6 acres, 346 rupees. Netting, supra note 14, at 147-148.
A study in Brazil using 1970-1980 data found that net income per hectare consis-
tently decreased as farm size increased. Net income per hectare for farms less than
one hectare was almost three times greater than for farms between one and 10 hec-
tares and nearly 30 times greater than for farms between 200 and 2,000 hectares.
W.C. Thiesenhusen & J. Melmed-Sanjak, Brazil’s Agrarian Structure: Changes from
1970 through 1980, 18(3) WORLD DEVELOPMENT 402 (1990). A World Bank study on
the higher efficiency of small versus large farms in Kenya found that output per hec-
tare was 19 times higher and employment per hectare was 30 times higher on hold-
ings under 0.5 hectare than on holdings over eight hectares. World Bank, KENYA
GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE: ISSUES IN KENYAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT,
VOL. 2, at 372 and table 22, 373 at n.105, 380-382 (World Bank 1983). Author Proster-
man and Jeffrey Riedinger, using data from 117 countries, found that 11 of the top 14
countries in terms of grain yields per hectare are countries in which small-scale fa-
mily farming dominates. R. Prosterman & J. Riedinger, LAND REFORM AND DEMO-
CRATIC DEVELOPMENT 44 (Johns Hopkins 1987).
18 Deininger, supra note 13, at 83.
19 G.A. Calvo & S. Wellisz, Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm,
86(5) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 943-952 (1978).
20 Mechanization in industry involves stationary machinery, which implies that the
number of workers can be increased substantially without increasing labor supervi-
sion costs. In agriculture, labor and machines are both mobile, making supervision
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Zyl, J. Kirsten & H.P. Binswanger, eds., AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRI-
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See also R.C. Ellickson, Property Rights in Land, 102(6) YALE LAW JOURNAL 1327-1332
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share in the risk, and (c) can be employed more flexibly without incurring hiring or
search costs. Thus, important negative economies of scale exist when farming opera-
tions are conducted in a manner, or on a territory sufficiently large, as to require a
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22 Y. Hayami & A. Damodaran, Toward an Alternative Agrarian Reform: Tea Plantations
in South India, 39(36) ECONOMIC & POLITICAL WEEKLY 3993 (2004). The authors com-
pare the manufacturing of black tea and green tea to explain the point. The manufac-
turing of black tea at standardized quality for export requires processing within a few
hours of plucking. Green tea, however, does not. This difference explains the tradi-
tional use of the plantation system for black tea and the predominant mode of family
farming for green tea.
23 Id. at 3993. On the other hand, in some instances, traders will deliberately favor
small producers as in the fair trade movement. For examples of programs that favor
small producers, see generally Transfair USA, Producer Profiles, http://www.transfair-
usa.org/content/certification/profiles.php.
24 Hayami & Damodraran, supra note 22, at 3995.
25 Id. at 3997. See also Y. Hayami, Family Farms and Plantations in Tropical Develop-
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(Johannesburg, South Africa 1994).
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versity Press 2005).
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sense. Where labor is abundant and relatively inexpensive, using capital to mechan-
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low opportunity cost. As agricultural labor becomes more scarce and expensive (be-
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other constraints on the transferability of land rights).
30 Even if no compensation for the land is required, questions as to subdivisibility may
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least if the capital has been efficiently used.
31 This is in contrast to the clear evidence of post-war successes for land-to-the-tenant
programs in at least six settings (not counting pre-collectivization China), detailed in
Chapter 2.
32 There have been very recent programs, begun or announced, again in Bolivia, and in
Venezuela and Paraguay, all probably too new to incorporate meaningfully in our pre-
sent analysis. We should note, however, that their prospect or undertaking seems
generally supportive of the twin conclusions that substantial land tenure reforms in-
volving large estates may not yet be occurrences virtually all of the past, and therefore
that examination of earlier experiences may take on added significance. See, e.g., D.
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Takes Over 32 Landholdings for Land Reform, Venezuelanalysis.com, Apr. 14, 2008; J.
Suggett, Land Reform Conflict in Venezuela’s Strategic Water Source, id., Aug. 11, 2008.
Compare the more moderate approach apparently being pursued by the new presi-
dent of Paraguay as reported in A. Glendenning, Anti-corruption bishop becomes Para-
guay president, Associated Press dispatch (Aug. 15, 2008); A. Barrionuevo, Difficult
Road Ahead for New Paraguay Leader, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 16, 2008).
33 See Thiesenhusen, supra note 7, at chs. 2 (Mexico) and 3 (Bolivia); Eckstein, et al.,
supra note 10, at 19-20 (Mexico) and 22 (Bolivia); G. Otero, Agrarian Reform in Mexi-
co: Capitalism and the State, in W. Thiesenhusen, ed., SEARCHING FOR AGRARIAN RE-
FORM IN LATIN AMERICA 276 (Unwin Hyman 1989) (Mexico); D.B. Heath, C.J. Eras-
mus & H.C. Buechler, LAND REFORM AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN BOLIVIA (Praeger
1969).
34 In pre-reform Mexico (1923) and pre-reform Bolivia (1950) estates of more than
1,000 hectares were estimated to hold, respectively, 70% and 79% of cropland, and
an even higher proportion of total farmland including pasture. Eckstein, et al., supra
note 10, at 13.
35 Thiesenhusen states in Broken Promises that in Mexico the usual ratio was six days a
week worked in the landowner’s fields and one day on the individually allocated plot.
Thiesenhusen, supra note 7, at 31. And in Bolivia, at least in some cases, workers la-
bored in the landowner’s fields five or six days a week during the growing season
and every day at harvest time. Sometimes, especially in Bolivia, workers also had to
pay a share of the crops from that small parcel in rent to the estate owner. Id. at 54.
Where land tenure reforms give ownership of the small peon- or colono-operated plots
to those workers, the result can perhaps to that degree be assimilated to the land-to-
the-tiller programs described in Chapter 2 (insecure holder of small plot gains in-
place ownership or equivalent rights to that self-same plot), although the context is a
reform whose basic design needs follow those of the estate takings discussed in the
present chapter.
36 For the “power domain" concept, see E.R. Wolf, PEASANT WARS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 290-91 (Harper & Row 1969).
37 Eckstein finds that in Mexico by 1960 about 95% of all ejidos were farmed individu-
ally with the remainder being collective or semi-collective. In Bolivia following the
Revolution of 1952 and the agrarian reform law of 1953, approximately 25% of all cul-
tivatable land going to beneficiaries was collectively titled, but these production coop-
eratives did not function for long and by the early 1970s almost all the land had been
distributed for individual farming. Eckstein, et al., supra note 10, at 20 (Mexico) and
22 (Bolivia). Thiesenhusen estimates in 1995, after the completion of the long Mexi-
can reform, that “perhaps 3% of the total of 23,000 ejidos were organized as collective
ejidos”. Thiesenhusen, supra note 7, at 40.
38 Thiesenhusen, supra note 7, at 40.
39 Thiesenhusen does not give a direct percentage estimate, but the 1995 FAO estimate
of 24.2 million in Mexico’s agricultural population, using 5 persons per average rural
household, would yield a total of roughly 4.8 million agricultural households. UN
Food and Agricultural Organization, 2003 PRODUCTION YEARBOOK, Table 3 (UNFAO
2004). The 3.1 million figure in text, divided by the 4.8 million total figure, yields
the rough 65% proportion. Given the extended time span, it is not meaningful to
pinpoint the percentage benefited at any specific date closer to the beginning of the
reform.
40 Eckstein, et al., supra note 10, at 14, Table 4.
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16 (table 5).
42 Writing even in 1995, Thiesenhusen notes there had been little improvement in the
title issuance situation that had existed in 1972, when “titles had reached only 30 per-
cent of beneficiaries.” Thiesenhusen, supra note 7, at 62. While the Bolivian reform
had considerable initial success in terms of land distributed and poor households af-
fected, the significance of agriculture grew over succeeding decades in the geographic
regions that had not been substantially affected – together with in-migration by the
still-numerous rural poor and the increasing role of very large and not very produc-
tive “latifundios” in those regions. These exacerbations of the land problem were ac-
companied by the overthrow of the pro-reform government in 1964, to be succeeded
by hostile and authoritarian military governments from 1964 to 1978, which also in
some degree connived at the de facto reversal of the previous reforms. All this has
laid the groundwork for the current attempt to expand and strongly renew the re-
form. See Hertzler and Ledebur, supra note 32. See generally World Bank, Country
Social Assessment for Bolivia: Bolivia Towards a New Social Contract – Options for the
Constituent Assembly (World Bank 2006).
43 See R. Prosterman & J. Riedinger, Shore Up Nicaragua’s Moderates, WALL STREET JOUR-
NAL, Oct. 2, 1979. See also R. Scofield, Land Reform in Central America, in R. Proster-
man, M. Temple & T. Hanstad, eds., AGRARIAN REFORM AND GRASSROOTS DEVELOP-
MENT 139, 153-161 (Lynne Rienner 1990).
44 The comparisons become even more striking when excluding the farm families’ la-
bor, and thus focusing on the relatively more scarce factors of production – land, ca-
pital and inputs – where the small farms show a ratio of 1.53, the individual ejidos
1.54, the large farms 1.16, and the collective ejidos 1.03. Here the individual ejidos
show a factor productivity 50% greater than the collectives, and 33% greater than the
large farms (if all labor is excluded, their advantage over the collectives grows to
62%, while it shrinks slightly to 28% over the large farms).
45 Paradoxically, many of these estates may have been selected for occupation due to
perceived underutilization of their extensive lands, giving rise to a stronger economic
case (in comparison with capital-intensive plantations with large “sunk costs” such as
many of those in Portugal and El Salvador) for immediate break-up and individua-
lized farming.
46 J.S. Melmed, Interpreting the Parcellation of Peruvian Agricultural Producer Cooperatives,
Land Tenure Center Research Paper No. 96, at 8-9 (Land Tenure Center 1988).
47 See generally Strasma, supra note 4; Thiesenhusen, supra note 7. It should be borne
in mind, however, that taking account of the reserve-area claims for the first 100-150
hectares (the exact amount depending on land quality), even full implementation of
this “Phase II” of the Salvadoran land reform would have likely produced a net area
for distribution substantially less than that affected in the “Phase I” over-500-hectare
estates program. Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note 17, at 153 & 282 n. 37. Govern-
ments also carried out major reforms involving estate lands in Guatemala in the
early 1950s and Chile up to the early 1970s, both of which were substantially or
wholly reversed by subsequent anti-reformist regimes.
48 International Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 92-93, 107.
49 Id. at 92-94. Almost forgotten now, an earlier and much more meaningful land ten-
ure reform was carried out immediately after Mugabe’s revolution ousted the break-
away white government in 1980, with significant financial support from Great Brit-
ain and other donors for buying underutilized white-owned land on a willing buyer-
willing seller basis. The program acquired and redistributed 3.3 million hectares be-
tween 1980 and 1989, amounting to about one-fifth of the white-owned agricultural
land in Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, although beneficiaries overwhelmingly chose to re-
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per family benefited was around 60 hectares and thus the program reached only
54,000 families. Id. at 32 (for white-owned land) and 39 (for 1980-1989 redistribu-
tion); M. Bratton, Ten Years After: Land Redistribution in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990, in R.
Prosterman, M. Temple & T. Hanstad, eds., AGRARIAN REFORM AND GRASSROOTS
DEVELOPMENT 273-290 (Lynne Reinner 1990).
50 D. Anderson & E. Lochery, Violence and Exodus in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable
and Preventable?, 2(2) JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 328,335 (July 2008).
51 Id. at 335-339; J. Klopp & P. Kamungi, Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse?,
Winter 2007/2008 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL 11, 13 (Feb. 16, 2008).
52 There have sometimes been attempts to set minimums in reforms affecting tenanted
land, but these efforts have generally been forestalled, perhaps because of the obvious
common-sense link between the existing pattern of tenant holdings and the amounts
of land to be distributed to each. See the discussions of Marcos’ initial “5 hectare”
and “3 hectare” goals in the Philippines in Chapter 2. Maximums in land-to-the-tiller
programs, on the other hand, may enjoy a fairly strong policy rationale – see Kerala
discussion in Chapter 2 – but have rarely, if ever, proven enforceable.
53 Prosterman & Riedinger, supra note 17, at 191 (the reference is to the fairy-tale phe-
nomenon in which the king orders his groom to throw a purse of gold to someone
in the crowd who has caught the king’s eye, leaving the great majority of his subjects
just as impoverished as before).
54 See supra note 49.
55 A.M. Buainain, J.M.F.J. da Silveira & M. Magalha˜es, Decentralized Access to Land:
Issues for Debate, Regional Workshop of Land Issues in Latin America and the Carib-
bean Panel on Redistributive Land Reform 3 (World Bank 2002).
56 Noting that, “the most significant change made to the land reform program by the
Mbeki administration has been in land redistribution . . . [which is now] focused on
creating 70,000 new black commercial farmers by 2017, with less emphasis on
smallholder agriculture and poverty alleviation.” International Crisis Group, supra
note 8, at 165.
57 Strasma, supra note 5, at 425.
58 Id.
59 Thiesenhusen, supra note 7, at 98-102.
60 In El Salvador the bulk of the permanent workers on the estates identified for redis-
tribution had been organized by the campesino union that was supportive of the
Christian Democrats and non-violent reform (with both the violent left and the vio-
lent right arrayed against them in the setting of Salvador’s civil conflict). There was a
more fluid situation in the occupation of estates in southern Portugal in the mid-
1970s, a setting where RDI also carried out field research. The occupancies were car-
ried out largely through a grassroots imitative, without direction from political parties
or unions (although many of the beneficiaries were, or became, members, especially
of the Communist Party), and the occupiers were a mix of permanent and temporary
workers, sometimes from other estates. As in El Salvador, operation as a single pro-
duction unit generally continued, perhaps in part because the members of many of
the new cooperatives perceived considerable hostility from the outside, especially
from those who wished to return the land to the former owners: “Hostility from out-
side the new production units created a sort of ‘siege mentality’ within them. The
need for ‘solidarity’ was underscored time and again in conversations and in meet-
ings.” N. Berneo, THE REVOLT FROM WITHIN THE REVOLUTION: WORKERS’ CONTROL IN
RURAL PORTUGAL 116 & ch. 5 (Princeton University Press 1986). Ultimately, the “soli-
darity” availed little, and much of the land was restored to the old owners.
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61 P. Greene, Design and Implementation of an Equity-Share Scheme on Sherwood Farm in
the Midlands of Kwazulu-Natal, in M. Lyne & M. Roth, eds., ESTABLISHING FARM-BASED
EQUITY-SHARE SCHEMES IN KWAZULU NATAL: LESSONS FROM USAID’S BASIS RESEARCH
PROGRAMME, PROCEEDINGS OF A MINI-CONFERENCE HELD 26 JULY 2004, at 43 (Nov.
2004).
62 This was soon scaled back to goals of allocating holdings of not more than 0.5 or 1
hectare of land, depending on beneficiary category. The 2 hectares was not manda-
tory, and families who already owned land could receive enough to bring their hold-
ing up to 2 hectares. Indonesia, Government Regulation No. 224 of 1961 Concerning
Implementation of Redistribution of Land and Provision of Compensation, art. 10.
63 Id. art. 8.
64 See generally R. Chambers, RURAL DEVELOPMENT: PUTTING THE LAST FIRST 18-20
(Longman 1983).
65 Eckstein, et al., supra note 10, at 24, 88 (Venezuela); K. Mitchell, Market-Assisted Land
Reform in Brazil: A New Approach to Address an Old Problem, 22(3) NEW YORK LAW
SCHOOL JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 576-583 (2003); J. Frank,
Two Models of Land Reform and Development, 15(11) Z MAGAZINE (2002) (Brazil); K.
Deininger, Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Brazil, Colom-
bia, and South Africa, World Bank Development Research Working Paper 2040, at
24-27 (World Bank 1999) (South Africa).
66 Indonesia’s “transmigration” program of planned and supposedly voluntary resettle-
ment of rural poor people from the crowded island of Java to land on other, less den-
sely populated islands, encountered serious problems as to cost, return on invest-
ment, sustainability of land, land-claims of traditional users, and environmental de-
gradation. Even when little or no cost for land (which was regarded as public) was
included, the program at its peak – resettling 366,000 families at a total cost of $2.3
billion in 1979-1984 – required $6,300 per family benefited. Adjusting 1979-1984
dollars, the equivalent cost in current dollars would be more than $15,000. The
World Bank had supported part of the cost, but eventually became quite critical of
the prospects. See World Bank Country Study, Indonesia – The Transmigration Pro-
gram in Perspective xx-xxxix (World Bank 1988).
67 Eckstein, et al., supra note 10, at 12.
68 Id. Broadly to the same effect, but affording less discretion and cause for protracted
dispute, are provisions in the land tenure reform law simply excluding holdings that
produce specifically named crops, often crops that are thought of as “export” crops.
See, e.g., N.C. Behuria, LAND REFORMS LEGISLATION IN INDIA 137 (Vikas Publishing
1997) (exemptions of tea plantations and other plantations from state Ceiling Laws
on landholding size).
69 In Pakistan, the successive land tenure reforms of 1959, 1972 and 1977 each estab-
lished successively lower ceilings for irrigated and unirrigated land, together with a
parallel set of Produce Index Units (PIUs), supposedly reflecting the productivity of
that land. The owner was then permitted to retain the higher of the two actual
amounts of land thus determined, for example under the latest reform (Land Re-
forms Act II of 1977), 100 irrigated acres or 8,000 PIUs could be retained. But the
PIU calculation dated back, unchanged, to 1947, at a time of substantially lower pro-
ductivity, and one author estimates that the earlier 1972 ceiling, 50% higher at 150 ir-
rigated acres and 12,000 PIUs, would allow actual retention of about 400 irrigated
acres in Punjab province and 480 irrigated acres in Sind province (ceilings on unirri-
gated land were twice those for irrigated land). See M.H. Khan, UNDERDEVELOPMENT
AND AGRARIAN STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN 155 (Westview 1981).
70 Under Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute – still in effect – it appears that a first-step conse-
quence of allowing the statutory exemption of 600 “modules” in one Brazilian state
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would be to allow a landowner to retain up to 1,800 hectares if used for vegetables,
9,600 hectares if used for grain, 30,000 hectares if used for grazing cattle, and
21,000 hectares even if not used at all. See P. Kluck, Small Farmers and Agricultural
Development Policy: A Look at Brazil’s Land Reform Statute, 38(1) Human Organization
44, 45 (Spring 1979). For a partial English translation of the Land Statute, see Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), XIV(2)/V 1b Food and Agriculture Legislation –
Brazil 1-49 (especially arts. 2 & 4).
71 The landowner’s claim may also, or alternatively, involve the calculation of compensa-
tion to be paid. In this case, the compensation originally offered may, as a provisional
matter, be paid into court.
72 See generally D.W. Bromley, ed., MAKING THE COMMONS WORK—THEORY, PRACTICE
AND POLICY (ICS Press 1992); N.S. Jodha, Common Property Resources, A Missing Di-
mension of Development Strategies, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 169 (World Bank
1992).
73 See E. Rajagukguk, Agrarian law, land tenure and subsistence in Java: Case study of the
villages of Sukoharjo and Medayu 128-29, 167-69, 226-27, 262-64, 267-72 (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Washington, available from UMI Dissertation Services, Ann
Arbor).
74 See, e.g., J.L. & B. Hammond, THE VILLAGE LABOURER (Longman 1966, originally
published in 1911); J.A. Yelling, COMMON FIELD AND ENCLOSURES IN ENGLAND 1450-1850
(MacMillan Press 1977).
75 There are, of course, far fewer unsettled “frontiers” on a planet with 6.7 billion peo-
ple than on one, say, with 3 billion, the population as recently as 1960. Large-scale
settlements on public lands, with accompanying privatization occurred, for example,
in the United States throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries under the
Homestead Acts.
76 Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce of the Parlia-
ment of India, Sixty-Fourth Report on Export of Tea 14-16 (Aug. 2003). See generally
Behuria, supra note 68.
77 H. Thomas, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 45-46, 50-57 (Harper & Brothers 1961); see also
W. Wolford, Producing Community: The MST and Land Reform Settlement in Brazil, 3
(4) JOURNAL OF AGRARIAN CHANGE 503-505 (2003).
78 Thiesenhusen states, “Over 99 percent of the land distributed in the agrarian reform
was returned to its owners, including that of the United Fruit Company.” Thiesenhu-
sen, supra note 7, at 76 & 79. US$1.2 million was paid to UFC for 146,000 expro-
priated hectares. The land tenure reform law took all uncultivated land in private
farms of more than 270 hectares in size (and down to farms of 90 hectares, where
less than two-thirds was under cultivation).
79 Id. at 80.
80 The beneficiary group had consisted largely of the better off, permanent workers.
81 Id. at 99-114.
82 A somewhat different example of government hostility and eventual substantial rever-
sal came in Portugal, after the Socialists came to power two years following the 1974
overthrow of the long Salazar dictatorship. See the background and discussion supra,
note 63 and Berneo, there cited. From RDI’s fieldwork and discussions with policy
makers during the two years just after the restoration of democracy and the forma-
tion of the Socialist government, we would suggest that the subsequent pressure to
reverse a great part of the 1974-1976 takings of the large southern estates – and
meanwhile to give the land takers little credit or support – had its roots in the consid-
erable ill-feeling between the Socialists, committed to democracy, and a Communist
Party that was authoritarian in bent and had not wished to see the dictatorship suc-
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4 Micro-plots for the rural poor
Robert Mitchell, Tim Hanstad and Robin Nielsen
Most redistributional land reform efforts around the globe have been
founded on the assumption that the government should give poor rural
households at least one hectare (10,000 square meters) of land and of-
ten much more. Distribution of such “full-size” or “typical” individual
farms (typical according to local standards) essentially forms the as-
sumption behind attempts to implement land-to-the-tiller programs for
tenants and, to a somewhat lesser degree, takings of large estates for
reallocation to agricultural laborers. That assumption, however, has
stalled many if not most large-scale land redistribution efforts.
In many settings, government attempts at traditional land reform
confront inflexible financial and political realities. The sheer numbers
of tenants and laborers would require the government to acquire so
much of the country’s total arable land for such traditional reform
methods as to render the program financially unaffordable. If the gov-
ernment attempts to reduce the costs of reform by paying little or noth-
ing for the land acquired for redistribution, the program becomes poli-
tically untenable and administratively unfeasible in the face of land-
owner resistance.
Micro-plot allocation programs offer a viable alternative. Micro-plots
are plots of land comprising one acre or less that include or are located
near the household’s house. When sufficient in size and location to
erect basic shelter and engage in vegetable gardening, tree cultivation,
small-scale livestock raising, home-based businesses, and other in-
come-generating activities, these small plots immediately diversify live-
lihood strategies and provide a cushion for the most vulnerable popula-
tions against economic and environmental shocks. Developed with
what is typically the family’s most abundant resource – their own labor
– such plots often serve several functions simultaneously, including in-
creasing family income, enhancing family nutrition, providing physical
security, serving as a vehicle for generating wealth, and securing the fa-
mily’s status within the community.
Micro-plot allocation programs are distinguished from traditional
methods of land tenure reform discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 because
they require only a small fraction of the amount of land traditional
land reforms require and, in many settings of the greatest need, appear
capable of being carried out – at least in significant part – using land
purchases from willing sellers to obtain the needed land. Under such
circumstances, there is no need for mandatory taking from the haves
to benefit the have-nots, no need for exercise of eminent domain
powers, and little or no need to focus on local power relations that of-
ten undermine efforts to carry out traditional land tenure reforms. In
this sense, micro-plot allocation programs using a land purchase ap-
proach can be understood as a sub-class of the “market-assisted land
reform” programs discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, market purchas-
ing of land in service of a micro-plot program has special characteris-
tics (notably the much smaller amount of land required) that allow it
to avoid some of the problematic issues that have arisen when a mar-
ket-assisted land reform is attempted in support of a land redistribu-
tion program involving greater amounts of land.
Despite the important benefits that can be obtained from small
amounts of land, the poorest of the poor often do not have access or
clear property rights to micro-plots of adequate size. Where the poorest
families have permanent shelter on lands of their own, the plot is often
so small that the dwelling occupies almost the entire land plot, allow-
ing essentially no additional use of the land. Alternatively, they may
own no land, and rely on a landlord for occupancy of a tiny hut. In
many settings, allocating adequately sized micro-plots to landless and
land poor families in rural and peri-urban areas is a highly feasible,
cost-effective way of improving the livelihoods of the poor. Unfortu-
nately, this simple and implementable approach to poverty alleviation
remains largely unrecognized in the arenas of international develop-
ment planning and foreign economic assistance.
India represents a notable exception. After several years of increasing
interest in alternatives to traditional land reforms, India’s central gov-
ernment recently embraced the concept of allocating micro-plots to
landless laborers. India’s recently adopted 11th Five-Year Plan (2007-
2012) identifies the enormous need within the population of landless
households that micro-plots can address:
An estimated 13 to 18 million families in rural India today are
reported to be landless, of which about 8 million lack homes of
their own. They either live in a house constructed on the land of
others, or provided by land-owners in return for some forced la-
bour. Some of these persons do not have land to construct a
house, while others may have small patches of land but no re-
sources to build a hutment.
The right to a roof over one’s head needs to be seen as a basic
human right, along with the right to freedom from hunger and
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right to education. . . . The Eleventh Five-Year Plan provides the
opportunity to realize this vision.1
The Plan notes that several state governments have recognized the role
that micro-plots can play in improving the livelihoods of previously
landless rural households and directs the extension of such programs
countrywide:
Several State Governments have already taken steps to provide
each family with a minimum size of land (10-15 cents) [0.10 to
0.15 acres], so that they have enough space to live and, also a lit-
tle extra space for supplementary livelihood activities, such as
growing fodder and keeping livestock, planting fruit trees or ve-
getables, or undertaking other land-based economic activities
(farm or non-farm) to improve their food, nutrition and liveli-
hood security. Kerala has a scheme of providing 10 cents of land
to each landless family and this has had a notable impact on
poverty reduction in the state. Similarly, in 2005, the Govern-
ments of Karnataka and West Bengal initiated schemes to give
homestead–cum-garden plots to landless families. These experi-
ments should be generalized across all states.
All landless families with no homestead land as well as those
without regularized homesteads should be allotted 10-15 cents of
land each. Female headed families should have priority.2
RDI has been working with the states of Karnataka, West Bengal, Oris-
sa and Andhra Pradesh,3 and with a planned micro-plot pilot program
in Pakistan’s Punjab province. RDI has also done research and advisory
work on micro-plots in Indonesia and has advised on the tenure re-
forms related to similar small plots in the former Soviet Union. The
knowledge and experience that RDI gained from this work informs the
discussion that follows.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines ways in
which micro-plot programs can provide the poor with small amounts
of land to use for homegardens and other activities that advance liveli-
hood objectives. The second section discusses factors bearing upon the
development of micro-plots on newly allocated land or through intensi-
fied use of existing micro-plots. The third section discusses how plan-
ners can assess the suitability of micro-plot allocation in a particular
setting. The fourth section discusses steps for implementing a micro-
plot allocation program, from selecting beneficiaries and acquiring
land, to monitoring program outcomes.
An important caveat qualifies the discussion that follows. Although
micro-plots may make a substantial difference in the livelihoods of the
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poor, planners should not consider allocation of micro-plots as a substi-
tute for more traditional land tenure reform that provides larger plots
in settings, such as those identified in Chapters 2 and 3, where such
reform may be possible. Traditional land tenure reforms that provide
larger field plots are designed to create sustainable livelihoods for farm-
ers, and if such reforms are feasible, they should be pursued. In con-
trast, micro-plots supplement and diversify existing livelihood strate-
gies, and flexible micro-plot allocation programs can be targeted to
reach different (and broader) rural and peri-urban populations than
those targeted by traditional land tenure reforms.
I. Characteristics and potential benefits of micro-plots
Intensive gardening and other productive use of micro-plots appear to
have developed independently on the Indian subcontinent, Indonesia
and other parts of Southeast Asia, the tropical Pacific islands, the Car-
ibbean, and various parts of tropical Latin America and Africa. Such di-
verse and intensive productive use of micro-plots – variously referred
to as homegardens, kitchen gardens, house-and-garden plots and
homestead plots – is found in almost all tropical and subtropical eco-
zones where subsistence land-use systems predominate.4
Micro-plots have several identifying characteristics. First, they in-
clude the household’s residence or are located nearby the residence.
Second, micro-plots usually contain a garden and are used for keeping
poultry, livestock or other animals. The proximity of these to the house
makes it easier and less time-consuming for residents to care for and
protect these assets. Third, the garden contains a high diversity of
plants. Fourth, production on the micro-plot is typically supplemental
to rather than the primary source of family income or consumption.
Fifth, the micro-plot occupies a small area, which makes it easier to
fence the plot, further reducing the risk of crop damage from animals
or loss of assets to theft.5
The issue of micro-plot size is of particular interest. Although most
commentators identify homegardens as occupying “small” plots, this
criterion is applied to a wide range of plot sizes, varying from a few
square meters to more than one hectare.6 Because we are interested in
examining how poor households can obtain and beneficially use micro-
plots, we focus on plots of one acre (0.40 hectare) or less. If limited
public resources are to be used to provide the poor with land for hous-
ing and gardening, the size of parcels distributed will determine the
number of households benefited.
A sixth distinguishing characteristic of micro-plots is their support
of activities that the poor can easily enter at some level. For example,
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families may begin a vegetable garden or tree cultivation with virtually
no economic resources, using locally available planting materials, nat-
ural manures, and indigenous methods of pest control.7 At its most ba-
sic level homegardening does not require any members of the house-
hold to be “entrepreneurial” in any sense: one need only to be able to
plant seeds to raise a few basic crops. Similarly, engaging in compost-
ing or vermiculture requires simple skills and little initial outlay of ca-
pital, and rearing small livestock requires an initial investment in the
animals, but the necessary skills are easily learned.
Depending on how they are used, micro-plots can provide a number
of benefits to families, ranging from improving nutrition to improving
the status of women within the household, as described below.
Improved nutrition
Homegardens are one strategy for addressing two of the most recalci-
trant elements of severe poverty – malnutrition and micronutrient defi-
ciencies – by providing poor families with an immediate source of ani-
mal products, vegetables and fruits. A number of studies have reported
that homegardens produce a high percentage of the fruits and vegeta-
bles consumed by homegardening families.8 A study of wage-earning
families in India’s Kerala state who cultivate micro-plots revealed that
the value of micro-plot production was the most consistent positive pre-
dictor of child nutrition, especially during the slack employment sea-
son, as well as in households in which the mother is not employed out-
side the home.9
Families often combine gardening with keeping animals on micro-
plots. The household uses the animal manure as fertilizer for the gar-
den and as a fuel source. In Javanese homegardens, animals are not
confined and receive only minimal feeding: chickens range freely and
eat leftovers from the kitchen, while buffalo, cows, goats and sheep
graze on village common lands and are fed additional food at night
from grasses cut from dykes of rice fields and other areas.10
Homegardens and animal rearing can provide important protections
against family food insecurity. On Java, climatic conditions mean that
owners of homegardens have plants and animal products available for
harvest throughout the year. This year-round production is especially
important to the economic stability of poor households, particularly
during the period between rice harvests.11 Homegardens may become
the principal source of household food and income during periods of
stress, as in Kampala, Uganda, after the civil war, where urban agricul-
ture is reported to have substantially fed the city.12
The household garden plots on the former Soviet collectives and the
“dacha plots” held by urban residents in the former Soviet Union (dis-
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cussed in Section VII of Chapter 7), have played a major role in ensur-
ing household food security in both the Soviet and post-Soviet era.
Such plots – occupying approximately 5% of the arable land – played a
similar role in China during the collective farm era. And in then-impo-
verished Puerto Rico, a 1941 Land Law that provided for allocation of
house-and-garden plots to landless agricultural workers helped to en-
sure food security for recipient families.13
Increased and diversified household income
It is a common misconception that micro-plot production is exclusively
oriented towards subsistence; in fact, returns to land and labor are of-
ten higher for such small plots than for field agriculture.14 Micro-plots
can contribute to household income in several ways. The household
may sell products produced on the plot, including fruits, vegetables,
animal products and other valuable materials such as bamboo and
wood for construction or fuel. The household may also use the micro-
plot to conduct cottage industries to produce crafts or manufactured
items for sale to third parties.
In addition to direct earnings from the sale of micro-plot production,
production consumed by the household frees up household earnings
for other purchases.15 Alternatively, families may use a portion of the
cash income from micro-plot activities to purchase additional food for
household consumption. Micro-plots provide households with a num-
ber of options for satisfying their livelihood objectives, and each house-
hold can determine for itself what combination of consumption, trade
and sale of micro-plot production best fits its livelihood strategy.
Enhanced wage security and household status
Ownership of a micro-plot can make important contributions to im-
proved and sustainable livelihoods in ways that are often overlooked,
including improved leverage in labor markets, enhanced social status
and greater political participation. In the 1940s the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment distributed small micro-plots of between one-quarter acre and
one acre to the families of agricultural laborers. The law recognized:
[a] fundamental human right of all the human beings who live
exclusively by the tilling of the soil, to be the owners of at least a
piece of land which they may use to erect thereon . . . their own
homes, thereby delivering them from coercion and leaving them
free to sell their labor through fair and equitable bargaining.16
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Roughly 50,000 families received micro-plots under the law, along
with a degree of “peace and spiritual satisfaction.”17 Access to small
plots of land also allowed the agricultural laborers to participate in elec-
tions without selling their votes to the landlord.18
As noted in Box 4.1, for rural households in Karnataka, India, in-
creased status within the village was the most cited benefit of new land
ownership, surpassing even income and nutrition benefits.19 Increases
in household status not only provide psychological benefits to house-
hold members but are believed to provide better access to trade rela-
tions within the village as well as better access to government pro-
grams serving village households. Micro-plots can also contribute to a
more cohesive social environment.20
Box 4.1. Additional benefits of owning a residential micro-plot
For otherwise landless families, ownership of a micro-plot used for
construction of a house can provide numerous livelihood benefits
beyond those derived directly from the activity itself:
1. Place for residence. Although perhaps the most obvious, this bene-
fit should not be overlooked when millions of households lack se-
cure rights to land for a house. Secure legal rights to the plot also
provide the family with proper incentives to construct a quality
house and make other long-term improvements to the plot.
2. Status. Studies in India indicate that formerly landless recipients
of government-allocated micro-plots cite their increased status as
landowners as the most important benefit derived from the plot
(more important even than increased income and food consump-
tion).21
3. Wealth generation. Micro-plots and occupying structures are typi-
cally the most important wealth asset of poor households. As
these poor households build and improve their house, build
wells and other structures, plant trees, and make other labor-
intensive improvements to their plots, they create wealth for
themselves.
4. Bargaining leverage in labor markets. Agricultural laborers who do
not own their own house site frequently rely upon their employ-
ers for a place to live. This often creates a dependency relation-
ship that severely limits the laborers’ bargaining leverage for
wages. RDI researchers interviewed a group of landless women
in Madhya Pradesh state in India who had been living on their
landlord’s land for decades. Although they did not pay rent, the
landlord paid them only half of market wage rates, did not allow
them to work for other farmers, and at times even prevented
them from leaving or entering their homes.
MICRO-PLOTS FOR THE RURAL POOR 159
5. Post-harvest activities and storage. In many settings, the micro-plot
is the site for important post-harvest activities such as drying
and threshing. The plots also typically provide space for storing
food, tools and other capital assets.
6. Non-agricultural income generation. Owning a micro-plot with
some extra space can enable poor households to pursue non-
agricultural production, service or retailing activities such as
handicraft production, bicycle repair, blacksmithing or petty
shop.
7. Access to credit. In a study of government-allocated house-and-gar-
den plots in Karnataka, India, more than one-third of respon-
dents reported that obtaining the plot had increased their access
to credit, and nearly one-quarter reported actually receiving credit
as a result of owning the plot.22
Benefits to women
Rural women are primarily responsible for raising children and, often,
caring for elderly parents and relatives – activities that tie them to the
house site for long periods of their lives. During these periods, women
may be unable to engage in wage labor, migrate to jobs, or work on fa-
mily-held agricultural land. Even when women are able to work away
from the residence, they usually have primary responsibility for numer-
ous residence-based tasks, such as cooking and cleaning, and caring
for livestock and poultry. Women are most likely to be physically close
to the home and are thus often in the best position to develop micro-
plots to suit the needs of the household.
Significant benefits can accrue to women and their households when
women have space under their control that can support various home-
based activities. A micro-plot of sufficient size for a range of uses and
activities can provide a foundation for a woman to contribute to the fa-
mily’s food and income through cultivating a homegarden, raising live-
stock and poultry, and engaging in income-generation activities. Pro-
gram designers should therefore consider the possibility that receipt of
a micro-plot may add to the workload of women members of house-
holds.23 However, the micro-plot may also provide women with some
control over household assets and valuable experience. Sale of micro-
plot production may be one of the only sources of independent income
for women and may become an important income source.24 Where wo-
men control micro-plot garden resources, household nutrition – espe-
cially nutrition of the children – may improve.25 A home-based enter-
prise may be a first step toward the woman’s management of larger en-
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terprises, such as agricultural land or a small shop, and can be an im-
portant source of status for women.26
Environmental benefits
Distribution of micro-plots may have beneficial environmental effects
on nearby land. For example, where population pressures and lack of
arable land threaten to push families to resettle in forests and wet-
lands, the distribution of micro-plots to landless and land-poor families
can reduce pressures to migrate. This not only helps to reduce conver-
sion of lands better left as forests and wetlands, but also limits the
growth of unplanned informal settlements and allows families to re-
main in areas with established social services and markets in which to
sell surpluses produced on the micro-plot.27
On the micro-plot itself, cultivation of homegardens, composting
and vermiculture may assist in recycling nutrients in the soil. A de-
tailed study of four traditional Thai homegardens found that the house-
hold practice of refraining from harvesting everything that could be
harvested ensured minimal nutrient export from the system.28 Another
potential impact of homegardening is land conservation: terraced
micro-plots have been recommended to preserve soils on sloping areas,
and fruit trees, bamboo and other trees can be used to rejuvenate infer-
tile soils.29
II. Factors related to developing productive micro-plots for the
poor
A number of factors combine to determine whether micro-plots are an
appropriate strategy for improving the livelihood of poor families.
Among these, perhaps the most fundamental factor is access to suita-
ble land – that is, a land plot that is large enough and otherwise physi-
cally suitable for the potential uses of the plot, and to which the family
has ownership or ownership-like rights. Where access to suitable land
is not a constraint to establishing micro-plots (or once planners have
arranged to provide secure access to suitable land), other important fac-
tors become relevant. Depending on the potential uses for the micro-
plots, such factors may include access to water, access to information,
and access to stocks of appropriate plants and animals. Cultural accep-
tance of homegardening, livestock rearing, vermiculture, and other
contemplated home-based activities are equally important, as are access
to sufficient capital and labor.
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Land
Although some poor populations have adequate access to land for
micro-plot activities,30 inadequate access to land remains a significant
problem for poor families worldwide, even in areas that commentators
commonly associate with micro-plots, such as Java.31 Even where a fa-
mily has nominal access to land, the insecurity of their rights to such
land may dissuade the family from making long-term investments to
improve the land, such as by planting trees, improving drainage, instal-
ling fencing or building a fishpond. Squatters and others with particu-
larly insecure rights may even worry that their improvement of the
land may lead to eviction as others seek to reap the benefits of the in-
vestment. Thus, not only the quality and size of the land, but the nat-
ure of the family’s right to control the land are critical.
The optimal size of a of micro-plot depends, to some extent, on the
activities that the household will undertake. In the case of vegetable
and tree cultivation, the size of micro-plots varies considerably across
cultures, and even within the same community. In a study of 62 rural
homegardening households in Karnataka, India, RDI researchers
found that cultivation of trees increased markedly once plot size
reached 1800 square feet (about 170 square meters) (see Figure 4.1),32
suggesting there is likely to be a critical minimum plot size above
which households will begin planting more trees. The footprint of the
house itself, which commonly occupies 500 square feet or more, is pre-
sumed to reduce greatly the number of trees that can be planted on
the smallest parcels.
In a separate study, RDI researchers identified Karnataka households
making intensive use of land. Researchers found that families who re-
ceive land from the government appear to be as likely to plant trees or
Fig. 4.1 Trees planted by Karnataka homegardening househoulds.
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raise animals as are families who inherit or purchase the micro-plot,33
which suggests that for some families in Karnataka, access to land of
adequate size is a primary barrier to tree planting and animal raising.34
Water
Some micro-plot activities, such as vegetable gardening and livestock
raising, require attention to the availability of water. Although gardens
on micro-plots are primarily rainfed, homegardeners commonly irri-
gate during the dry season. Watering depends on the type of crop and
can vary from twice daily to twice annually.35 Several studies have
found that drawing and transporting water and hand irrigating the gar-
den are the most onerous and time-consuming gardening tasks.36
Homegardens that require even a few gallons of water per day may re-
quire too much labor to be worthwhile, depending on the location of
the water source.
In some areas, lack of water may be the major factor limiting the
use of micro-plots for gardens. In Papua New Guinea, potable, piped
water for irrigation is the most expensive input for urban homegard-
eners, and water is especially expensive during the dry season.37 It can
be prohibitively expensive for the household to install a system for
bringing water to the house, and there is a large social cost for provid-
ing irrigation water to households, especially in urban areas.38 On the
other hand, labor-intensive and appropriate technology improvements
such as micro-catchments for holding rainwater or scavenged and plas-
tic containers perforated to function as a no-cost substitute for drip irri-
gation may allow the maximum use of the available water.
Capital
The need for capital to invest in micro-plot activities varies according to
which activities the household selects and the physical attributes of the
plot. Where households have access to capital, their micro-plots can be
more productive.39 However, capital is not always necessary for garden-
ing if households use sustainable practices, such as composting, terra-
cing land, and planting leguminous trees to improve soil fertility.
These activities may be labor intensive (and require the household to
value the benefits of such activities), but do not require large amounts
of capital.
Other activities, such as livestock rearing, may require initial invest-
ments in stock and construction of fencing and shelters, but thereafter
require only limited on-going expenditures. The capital requirements
of home-based businesses will necessarily depend on the nature of the
business. For example, stocking a small shop or establishing a handi-
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craft business from scratch will require an initial outlay of capital, but
expanding an existing enterprise may require far less.
Culture and experience
Cultural norms, traditional practices, personal preferences, and local
experience may all influence the activities selected for micro-plot devel-
opment. Although projects to promote gardening often prefer to work
with communal organizations, household-level food production must
be a family undertaking since labor, space and time are valuable re-
sources to poor households. Thus, the presence of viable homegardens
in the immediate vicinity of the project area is the best predictor of suc-
cess since such homegardens demonstrate that homegardening is so-
cially and culturally acceptable and is valued by households.40
Cultural preferences may inhibit households from taking up garden-
ing. Households may associate homegardening with poverty and there-
fore decline to establish gardens. Public education may be very useful
in promoting gardening, poultry and livestock raising, and other bene-
ficial uses such as vermiculture and composting. And in different set-
tings, different uses may be emphasized: RDI researchers in the south
of Pakistan’s Punjab province, for example, observed a strong local pre-
ference for varied animal husbandry on micro-plots, while in the In-
dian state of Gujarat, one micro-pilot colony of weavers used their
house plots to support their weaving business, including building cov-
ered areas for their looms and sheds for storing materials and finished
products.
III. Assessing the suitability of micro-plot programs
In what settings does it make sense to consider using public or private
resources to help poor populations gain possession of micro-plots? As
an initial matter, policy makers and planners should determine
whether traditional land tenure reform measures remain viable, includ-
ing in circumstances such settings that may emerge unpredictably as,
for example, through changes in political leadership. In such settings
the allocation of micro-plots should not be considered a substitute for
more traditional land tenure reform that would benefit families whose
income derives primarily from farming land, but who do not own the
land on which they work.
For example, some Indonesian NGOs assert that traditional land ten-
ure reform may be necessary both to correct fundamental inequities in
the distribution of farmland and to correct government policies that
have deprived farm families of access to land they or their ancestors
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have farmed historically. As this is written, it remains unclear whether
Indonesia may be a setting where traditional land tenure reform,
which was neither politically nor financially supported and a failure
under President Sukarno’s earlier attempt in the 1960s, is presently a
serious possibility.
Identifying potential beneficiary populations
In determining whether to adopt micro-plot allocation as a strategy for
improving the livelihood of poor families, planners must begin by de-
fining the class of prospective beneficiaries. Definition of the general
class of beneficiaries is presumed to depend upon the base poverty
line, family ownership of land and various other assets, established re-
sidency in the target region, and other measurements already familiar
to planners. Using the program’s threshold eligibility requirements,
planners should gather preliminary information regarding the popula-
tions of potential beneficiaries in a given area. Based on the survey
findings, planners can determine target areas for assessing the general
suitability of the program. Where planners find that potential benefici-
aries are located throughout the state or country, more specific inqui-
ries will help identify areas where the program can be initiated to best
effect.
Assessing general suitability of micro-plots in target area
A second threshold question is whether allocation of micro-plots, as
well as improvement of existing micro-plots, are likely to benefit sub-
stantial numbers of the rural poor in the target areas. To answer this
question, planners should first ask whether micro-plots presently pro-
vide benefits to families in the vicinity of the target areas. The analysis
of the extent of beneficial use of micro-plots in a region should encom-
pass all productive uses. Areas in which households have historically
been unable to overcome climatic, economic and cultural constraints to
homegardening may not be appropriate areas for homegardening inter-
ventions. However, the same areas may be conducive to other uses of
micro-plots, such as livestock rearing or handicraft production.
If micro-plot gardens do not exist or do not appear to be providing
substantial benefits to families within the target area, planners can
consider whether micro-plots are providing benefits in settings that
planners judge to be analogous to the target setting, including settings
in other communities with comparable climates and cultural norms
and similar resource constraints. Planners should draw upon the
knowledge and experience of NGOs, local leaders, teachers and other
individuals with a good knowledge of the target area and potential ben-
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eficiaries. In some areas, circumstances may suggest that residents are
well equipped to make use of new micro-plots. For example, the target
area may include potential beneficiaries with no house plot or perma-
nent shelter who would obtain immediate benefits from receiving mi-
cro-plots, or a local NGO may already be working with the poor on pro-
jects such as vermiculture, composting or production of handicrafts
that families could expand on land received in a micro-plot allocation
program.
The preliminary assessment should examine the availability and cost
of land and water in the target area, and the cost of other inputs such
as capital and plant and animal stocks. Where land is prohibitively ex-
pensive to purchase, or where adequate water cannot be brought to the
micro-plot site for a reasonable cost, allocation of micro-plots may be
impractical. Figure 4.2 presents a decision tree summarizing some of
these considerations, which are explored in more detail in the remain-
der of the chapter.
In assessing whether micro-plots might provide benefits to the target
population, planners will likely gain important knowledge from field
inquiries, using rapid or participatory appraisal methods41 to investi-
gate the following issues:
(1) What are the existing typical uses of micro-plots by the local population,
what typical benefits do families derive, and what constraints to plot use
do families confront? Inquiries should focus on a representative sam-
ple of the beneficiary population using micro-plots of various sizes.
(2) What potential uses and benefits do micro-plots offer the beneficiary po-
pulation? Inquiries should focus on a purposively selected sample
of the local population that have well-developed micro-plots, looking
also at why such families are able to use their micro-plots produc-
tively.
(3) What best practices have emerged from NGO or other interventions re-
lated to micro-plots in the target area? In some areas, NGOs or gov-
ernment departments may work with the local population on pro-
jects that involve micro-plots, such as vegetable growing, tree culti-
vation, animal husbandry, and home-based businesses. Project
implementers and beneficiaries can reveal what is working (and not
working), and such populations may be good candidates for the al-
location of new (or larger) micro-plots.
Selection of target area and teaming with local groups
Once planners have evaluated the preliminary information gathered,
they can select specific locales for micro-plot projects and assign pro-
ject staff. Project staff, who will often be local government officials,
should ideally have some experience in rural development and working
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Figure 4.2. Analyzing appropriateness of micro-plot allocation
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with poor and marginalized groups. Project staff should also consider
teaming with local NGOs that have worked with the local community.
The process of gathering information and making decisions relating to
project implementation will benefit greatly from the expertise available
through local NGOs, community workers, and others with local knowl-
edge. Project staff should, however, take care that NGO partners are
well established and have solid records of success with local commu-
nities, and particularly with the poorest members of the communities.
Project staff should be alert to any biases or pre-existing relationships
between NGOs and potential beneficiaries of the project.
Review of the legal framework
At the planning stage it is useful to consider legal issues likely to affect
the allocation and future use of micro-plots so that these can be ad-
dressed at the program level. Planners should be aware of current land
uses, classifications and restrictions that might impact the allocation
and development of the land. Where politically feasible, government
programs should streamline the administrative requirements (such as
the need to convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural use) and
eliminate or reduce fees to facilitate projects and reduce opportunities
for bribes and rent seeking at local levels. However, even if some legal
issues can be addressed at a program level, at the local level project
staff must also be able to identify legal issues and take appropriate ac-
tion. For example, project staff must know how they will determine the
lawful owner of the land that is to be acquired, sub-divided and allo-
cated as micro-plots, and should be able to determine whether the land
is subject to unregistered rights, such as squatter rights.
Finally, prior to finalizing the design of the program, planners
should determine what rights can be granted to beneficiaries (e.g.,
ownership versus restricted rights), what restrictions will accompany
the allocation (including whether the beneficiaries will have the right
to transfer the land), whether the rights will be registered in the names
of both women and men, whether the government will retain rights to
the land (such as for community uses), and what additional support
beneficiaries can receive. For example, the program may allow benefici-
aries to qualify for low-cost financing for investment in the micro-plot,
requiring a financing framework and links to a financial institution.
IV. Implementation of micro-plot programs
Implementation of a micro-plot program requires a great deal of de-
tailed work at the village level, and large-scale projects will require a
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significant number of local staff. Planners of a large-scale project
should give substantial thought to the design of the framework for staff
training and project management. In some settings, local government
bodies with experience in implementing economic and social programs
and land initiatives may have the capacity, experience and human re-
sources to implement a micro-plot project independently. In other set-
tings, the government may need to partner with an NGO or other en-
tity to ensure successful implementation. We divide implementation
considerations into eleven steps, discussed in the following pages.
Step 1: Select beneficiary households
Selection of beneficiaries for a micro-plot project begins with creating a
list of selection criteria. At the time project staff begin identifying po-
tential beneficiary households, staff may not know how many house-
holds will ultimately be included in the project since it may not yet be
clear how much suitable land is available.
Adopt site-specific criteria. Programs should focus on households that
do not own a suitable micro-plot, and basic threshold selection criteria,
such as income and asset levels, should apply to all beneficiaries. In ad-
dition, the program should allow project staff to apply additional site-
specific criteria tailored to the population in the target area. Project
staff should choose the additional criteria to take into account the ob-
jectives of the micro-plot project and any special characteristics of the
target area. Local NGOs and community workers can often help identi-
fy useful criteria. These criteria will provide project staff a basis for
prioritizing among poor households and organizing households into
residential colonies. Examples of additional criteria include households
headed by women, households containing members suffering from
HIV/AIDS, and households displaced by regional conflicts.
Define household. In many settings it is common to find that married
children occupy the homesite of their parents, such that several genera-
tions comprised of several nuclear families occupy the same homesite.
Often, the second generation is functionally landless since they own no
land of their own, and the homesite is too small to support significant
non-housing uses by the occupying nuclear families. Planners may
therefore be inclined to adopt a definition of household that refers to
nuclear families consisting of parents and unmarried children, such
that the family of each married child is considered a separate house-
hold. Planners might consider drafting parameters to include in the
program any household that does not have access to an adequate
amount of land, whether owned by that household or a relative.42
Use existing lists of disadvantaged families. When program managers
identify certain areas or villages for a micro-plot project, project staff
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may receive a list of potential beneficiaries from that area – lists pre-
pared earlier by project staff while investigating the target area, pre-
pared in the past by other poverty alleviation programs, or prepared as
part of a general census. Such lists form a useful starting point but
should be verified in the field to determine the eligibility of each listed
household and to make certain that no eligible family has been over-
looked. In particular, lists may not include the poorest and most mar-
ginalized families since these are often the least visible members of ru-
ral society, the least likely to have learned of a census or other survey,
and the least able to protect their own interests.43
Meet with prospective beneficiaries. In applying the site-specific criteria
to make the final selection of beneficiaries, project staff should meet
with each prospective beneficiary family. The more project staff can
learn about the population, the better able the staff will be to make
good decisions about the selection of beneficiaries and tailor the project
to their needs.
Box 4.2. Characteristics of successful micro-plot families
Research on new colony developments in India indicates that, in ad-
dition to the formal eligibility requirements imposed, beneficiaries
with the following characteristics contribute to the success of a mi-
cro-plot project:
– A genuine desire to relocate to the new homesite;
– Expressed interest in preparing a plan for using the micro-plot to
benefit the household;
– A willingness to contribute their own labor or resources to the
micro-plot project – to improve both their individual plots, and
roads and other shared land; and
– Confidence that participating in the micro-plot project will ulti-
mately have a positive impact on their lives.
Focus on women beneficiaries. Project staff should pay special attention
to women throughout the implementation process. As was noted ear-
lier, women are most likely to spend a significant amount of time on
the micro-plot, and to the extent women control the use of the plot and
its production, their children and households benefit. Project staff
should conduct a separate evaluation of the village population to identi-
fy any widows, single women and women heads of household (who
otherwise satisfy program criteria) to ensure their inclusion in the pro-
gram, and should take particular note of women’s opinions and inter-
ests in the project design and implementation.44 Because women’s
voices may be muffled by more powerful voices in the community, pro-
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ject staff should meet separately with women individually and in
groups to ensure their voices are heard at every stage of the process.
Composition of micro-plot colonies. In many cases, project staff will be
designing a project that involves the creation of new colonies of micro-
plots, which may be adjacent to an existing settlement or separately lo-
cated (see discussion of locating new colonies in step 2). Practical con-
siderations of land availability, numbers of local beneficiaries, econo-
mies of scale relating to infrastructure development, project resources,
and management and governance of the site will likely result in initial
colonies of between ten and 50 households.
Although the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the beneficiary group
does not necessarily affect the success of the projects, research con-
ducted in India suggests that beneficiaries are generally most comforta-
ble with an environment that reproduces their current living situa-
tion.45 Thus, where prospective beneficiaries live in ethnically mixed
villages, they tend to be comfortable with a mixed group, and where
prospective beneficiaries live in a more homogeneous environment,
they prefer a community of a single social or economic group.46
Step 2: Identify sources of land
Ideally, the beneficiaries should participate in the land selection, and
the final land selection should therefore follow beneficiary selection;
however, since land is a critical component of the project, project staff
should begin considering land selection issues as soon as they select
the target area.
Enlarging existing micro-plots. In the course of selecting beneficiaries,
project staff will simultaneously determine the need for land. Some po-
tential beneficiary households may own a micro-plot that is too small
for anything other than habitation. Others may be nuclear families
crowded onto land owned by parents or other relatives, and thus have
insufficient land for gardening or income-generating activities. Where
households already use very small micro-plots, project staff should in-
vestigate whether it is possible to acquire land adjacent to those plots
that could be used to enlarge the plots to provide each nuclear family
ownership of an adequately sized plot.
Creating new micro-plots. In most cases, land will not be available ad-
jacent to the plot currently occupied by the household. Project staff
must therefore identify “new” land that can be acquired and used to
create new micro-plots for allocation to beneficiaries. This will require
project staff to determine the basic characteristics of land sought and
possible sources. At this stage, project staff should identify as many
parcels as possible. Project staff can work through this list of possibili-
MICRO-PLOTS FOR THE RURAL POOR 171
ties as they visit the parcels and learn more about the needs, interests
and capacities of the beneficiary households.47
Siting new micro-plots. In some cases, project staff will identify avail-
able land – such as degraded communal land or abandoned private
land – within existing boundaries of the village where beneficiary
households reside. If such land is available, project staff should consult
with the owners and users of such land, as well as with prospective
beneficiaries of the project, to determine the land’s suitability for new
micro-plots.
Where sufficient land is not available in the village, project staff
must seek land outside the village to create a new residential colony,
having in mind the following: (1) proximity to beneficiaries’ village; (2)
proximity to beneficiaries’ employment; (3) availability of water for
drinking and for watering livestock and gardens; (4) access to main
road, markets and primary schools; and (5) soil quality and slope of the
ground. Project staff should also confirm that a colony would not cre-
ate an environmental problem or place stress on natural resources in a
given area.
The proximity of the planned colony to the village and employment
is often critical to the success of the project, and project staff should
openly discuss the issue with the group of prospective beneficiaries
prior to selecting the land. In some cases, prospective beneficiaries will
only be interested in a colony that is adjacent to the village, or no
further than a certain distance, often measured by the time it takes to
walk from the nearest settlement or employment. In other cases, pro-
spective beneficiaries may be willing to move farther, particularly if the
new colony will be large and will include significant infrastructure.
Culture also plays a role: in some cultures, people take security and
pleasure in living in more dense arrangements, while other cultures va-
lue open space and independent living.48
In addition, because women often have primary responsibility for
childrearing, caring for elderly relatives, food preparation and main-
taining the house, they are more likely to spend time in and around
the micro-plot, and their experiences will inform their opinions regard-
ing land location. Women often have specific concerns about how the
organization of plots relates to their physical safety and the safety of
their children, and may also be concerned about the distance between
the micro-plot and schools and opportunities for day labor.
Land sources. Some programs will limit land sources to publicly
owned land, others may require consideration of available public land
but allow the project to purchase private land, and other programs may
deal exclusively with purchased private land.
Programs allowing land purchase should have clear guidelines for
the process of identifying private land for purchase to prevent existing
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landowners from taking advantage of the program to drive up land
prices and dispose of unsuitable land (see Box 4.3). The guidelines
should also include safeguards, such as disclosure of the economic po-
sition and status of the landholder, to prevent the government from
purchasing land from impoverished owners through distress sales. In
all cases, the project plan must include procedures whereby project
staff verify that landholders have clear ownership rights and the legal
authority to sell.
If the project is implemented by the government, as it usually will
be when on any large scale, there may be a preference for using public
land, where available and suitable, to avoid the need to purchase land.
In addition, local officials may be less familiar with sources of private
land, and it may take longer for project staff to locate private sellers, in-
spect the land, confirm the ownership, and negotiate the purchase.
However, public land should not be used for micro-plot projects simply
because it is available; public land must meet the same criteria de-
manded for private land to be regarded as suitable for the program.
Plot size. How big should micro-plots be in order for the household
to reap the substantial benefits available? In determining optimum plot
size, planners should consider that the goal of the allocation is not to
provide each household with a plot it will use to earn its primary
source of income but to provide a plot that the household can use to
meet a portion of its food needs and supplement family income. The
plot should be large enough that the majority of the micro-plot can be
devoted to activities beyond simply sheltering the household, but small
enough that a household can develop it, maintain it, and invest in ac-
tivities on the plot without crippling the household’s resources. In addi-
tion, limiting the size of the micro-plot and siting them in colonies
comprised of poor households may also reduce the threat that local
elites will seek to capture the benefits of the program.
In part, the optimum size of the plot depends on the activities
planned for the plot. RDI’s research in India leads us to conclude that
in many Indian settings a minimum plot size of 1800 square feet (170
square meters) is necessary to allow a household to garden intensively
and raise small livestock, and that a plot size of 3000 to 4000 square
feet (280 to 370 square meters) is much preferred. Our preliminary
research in Java has revealed that households are able to garden inten-
sively on plots in the same size range.49 The question of what mini-
mum micro-plot size is sufficient to allow a household to garden, raise
livestock, and make other economic use of the plot is an empirical one
that must be answered with reference to local practices, local economic
conditions, and the productive potential of the land itself. However, in
the early design of programs, planners can use a plot of 3000 to 4000
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square feet (280 to 370 square meters) for planning, and later refine
the range after collecting more information.
Land cost. While the cost of purchasing private land on the market
may be quite affordable, the nature of land – the fact that it is immova-
ble, and the fact that access to land can have important social and poli-
tical implications – makes its allocation more complicated than alloca-
tion of other inputs such as water, know-how, and plant and animal
stocks. For these reasons, it is appropriate for planners to evaluate the
costs of identifying, obtaining and allocating land independent of other
costs.
In Karnataka, India, a November 2001 sample of 400 rural house-
holds in four districts estimated the value of unimproved and non-irri-
gated agricultural land to be between 21,000 and 44,000 rupees per
acre, with an average of 33,250 rupees per acre,50 which equates to ap-
proximately US$694 per acre (US$1714 per hectare) at then current ex-
change rates. This represents an average cost of approximately US$64
per family if each receives 370 square meters (4000 square feet) of
land.51 These estimates reflect the likely purchase price of acquiring
agricultural land at market prices, but do not include administrative
costs of acquisition and allocation, or costs of constructing simple
roads, tubewells and electrification. Although such costs are likely to
be low in comparison to land acquisition costs, they are not negligible.
If planners determine that appropriate land is available in the vici-
nity of the target population, they should then calculate the cost of pur-
chasing such land (if it is private), as well as the administrative costs of
obtaining and allocating the land, calculated in terms of costs per fa-
mily benefited. Planners must also consider whether and to what ex-
tent the beneficiaries should share in the costs of land purchase as well
as other costs. Important factors to consider include: affordability for
what are likely to be among the society’s poorest households, adminis-
trative costs of collection (relative to benefits of such collection), and
the desirability of cost-sharing by beneficiaries to promote their “owner-
ship” of the program activities.
Step 3: Evaluate possibility of adverse impacts
During selection of land for the micro-plot project, project staff should
be alert for any potential adverse impacts from the project. In most
cases, such impacts can be avoided through adequate planning. This
step occurs during identification of the land.
Common property resources. Project staff should take special care to
verify all the users of the land to be allocated as micro-plots. The gov-
ernment often claims ownership of common property resources such
as community forests or wastelands located near villages and suggests
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that the project use those lands. Project staff should determine who is
using such land; the poorest families often depend on access to and
use of forests and other public lands to hunt, graze livestock and gath-
er plants for consumption, fodder, medicine and fuel.52 Even where the
staff recognize that such activities occur, they may underestimate the
importance of these activities in the household economy of the poorest
families. It would be counterproductive to eliminate a common prop-
erty resource that provides a low level of support to a large number of
poor families in order to distribute micro-plots to a smaller number of
families, even if the total economic use of the land would be enhanced
by such a use conversion.
Arable land. In siting projects, project staff should consider whether
the creation of micro-plots will reduce the amount of arable land, possi-
Box 4.3. Controlling the purchase price for land
Project staff often cite program ceilings on the rate they can pay for
land as the most significant factor inhibiting the process of finding
land to purchase for projects. Some tactics that program designers
and project staff can consider to create more options for land pur-
chases include:
– Advertise the project’s ability to pay for the land immediately
and in a lump sum. Landowners selling to private parties often
receive payment over time and may worry whether they have suf-
ficient security for the unpaid balance. Even if the seller’s reten-
tion of title until final payment is considered sufficient security,
the opportunity to obtain a lump sum payment versus smaller
payments spread over years is very attractive to sellers. Land-
owners may be willing to sell to the government for a lower price
– or be willing to sell land they would otherwise not sell – if they
receive an immediate, lump sum payment.
– Consider offering a landowner other benefits in addition to cash
payment for the land. For example, if the project purchases a
portion of the landowner’s land and will be making improve-
ments on that section, offer to make similar improvements on
land retained by the owner, such as providing a bore well, ex-
tending a road, or providing electricity service.
– If large rural development projects are acquiring land, such as
for an irrigation project, include some land for micro-plot colo-
nies in the plans for the larger project.
– Possibly use a “Dutch auction,” where landowners compete to of-
fer the lowest price for a given size (including quality and loca-
tion) of land parcel.
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bly causing a fall in overall agricultural production or exacerbating food
security concerns. In Indonesia, some government planners have ex-
pressed concern that land located near rural villages on Java is prime
irrigated rice paddy land, the terracing of which has been undertaken
at great social cost. Strict policies are in place to prevent the conversion
of such land to other uses, though the conversion of rice paddy land to
residential land sometimes continues to occur.
Even if arable land is used to create micro-plots, the new uses are
likely to be beneficial for several reasons. First, since only very small
plots are needed to provide important benefits to families, the total
amount of land needed for a micro-plot colony is modest. Assuming
that 5% of the acquired land is used to construct roads, drainage and
other infrastructure, a one hectare plot could provide 380 square meter
plots (4100 square feet) to 25 households. To place this in perspective,
in India, distribution of 380 square meter plots to each of the nation’s
estimated roughly 15 million completely landless rural families would
require only 600,000 hectares of land, which is approximately 4/10 of
1% of the nation’s 161.8 million hectares of arable land.53
Second, if households develop their plots for homegardens and live-
stock at a moderate intensity, the plots will likely produce as least as
much agricultural value per unit area as had been produced on the ara-
ble land. A study of Javanese homegardens found that net income per
square meter of homegardens was higher than for rice fields and
required much lower costs of production.54 The latter is particularly
important for poor households, who typically have less access to credit
and are less able to insure against risk. A study of well-developed
homegardens in Karnataka indicates that the income per square meter
is several times higher than arable land in the same area used for grain
crops.55
Finally, even if homegardens on micro-plots did not produce as
much per hectare as arable land in some specific setting, any general
social loss would be offset to the degree that micro-plots efficiently pro-
vide foods to one of the most food-insecure segments of the popula-
tion. Homegardens are likely to make such foods available to the poor
more efficiently than other government food programs since the poor
themselves control the choice, use and distribution of homegarden pro-
ducts.
Women’s workload. One potential adverse impact of micro-plot allo-
cation programs is an increase in the workload of women beneficiaries.
Because women tend to be the primary caretakers of children and the
elderly and often have full responsibility for house-related tasks such
as cooking and cleaning, they are likely to spend more time near the
family residence than men. If the household receives a larger plot, par-
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ticularly with the expectation that the new micro-plot will support one
or more activities, women’s workloads will likely increase.
As an initial matter of simple equity, the likely increase in women’s
workload and responsibilities requires that they receive joint or indivi-
dual title to the micro-plot. In many cases, women may welcome the
opportunities presented in micro-plot programs. Because of their phy-
sical connection to the micro-plot, women may have a greater input
into decision making regarding micro-plot activities and more signifi-
cant control over the production from the micro-plot, including the
management of any income earned.
In addition, women may have an opportunity to obtain skills and ex-
perience in new areas, such as raising livestock and growing vegetables
for household consumption and sale in the market. RDI researchers
working in the Indian state of Karnataka found that women who re-
ceived house plots from a government program and technical assis-
tance with income-generation activities from a local NGO used their
plots to begin a diverse range of income-producing activities, including
egg production, tailoring and milk production. In South Sulawesi, In-
donesia, RDI researchers met a self-help group of women who used
credit available through a local women’s cooperative to begin busi-
nesses on their micro-plots selling baked goods and dried seaweed. In
both cases, aided by capacity building and NGOs, the women had sub-
stantial control over their activities and the earnings from those activ-
ities.
These positive impacts and achievements are by no means assured,
however. Programs that best serve the interests of women and their fa-
milies include early and consistent involvement of women in all stages
of the program design, focused attention on the issue of titling of the
micro-plots, and capacity building for beneficiaries (both individuals
and households) on issues of gender equity, and also recognize the va-
lue of linking micro-plot programs with local NGOs with experience
working with local communities, including specific programs for wo-
men.
Step 4: Ensure access to water
Water deserves special consideration during project planning. In many
environments, water is likely to be the most important consideration
after land. Access to water is necessary for consumption (household
and livestock), washing and bathing, and garden irrigation. In some
environments, water may be even more scarce than land and more ex-
pensive to supply during the dry season. Where water is scarce
throughout the year, its absence may preclude establishing new colo-
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nies or encouraging homegardening as a viable strategy for the use of
micro-plots.
On the other hand, the amount of water needed for homegardening
is often not great, and carrying water to the garden may be a reason-
able solution. In addition, water availability should be considered when
identifying which trees and other plantings to promote in homegarden-
ing. Project planners may be able to reduce garden water demand by
providing extension advice on water conservation and subsidizing low-
cost techniques home gardeners can use to collect, store and use rain-
water and household wastewater efficiently.56
Step 5: Consider housing options
Housing is a critical element of a micro-plot allocation program, and
project staff should determine at the design stage how housing require-
ments will be addressed and communicate those program terms to
prospective beneficiaries to ensure that expectations match the project
realities.
Where separate government housing programs exist, project man-
agers can assist beneficiaries in applying for benefits under the appro-
priate program. Where such programs do not exist, project managers
must discuss with prospective micro-plot beneficiaries the options for
house construction, including the need for beneficiaries to rely on their
own resources. Some households will be prepared to construct a per-
manent house on the micro-plot, while others may opt to build a tem-
porary shelter with plans to replace it later with a more permanent
structure. Others may be unwilling to build a house unless the project
finances construction.
In evaluating the social value of distributing micro-plots, it is useful
to evaluate the efficacy of alternative programs targeted to assist the
same populations. In India, for example, RDI has found that govern-
ment resources devoted to constructing housing for landless families
would reach more beneficiaries if some portion of program resources
were diverted from housing construction and instead used to obtain
larger house sites that provide space for gardening, livestock rearing,
and other activities. Our own field research in India indicates that even
the poorest rural households are able to accumulate the resources to
construct a house (in stages) if they have secure rights to an adequate
house site.57
Step 6: Issue ownership titles to land
Programs often contain requirements relating to title to the land and
to any house constructed on the land. Requirements may include fac-
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tors such as whose name must be on the title and restrictions on the
use or sale of the land. The following recommendations can maximize
benefits to micro-plot beneficiaries (also discussed more broadly in
Chapter 8):
First, project guidelines should require the micro-plot (and any new
house provided) to be titled jointly in the name of husband and wife,
with a clear right of survivorship, or titled individually in the name of
the woman beneficiary (whether single, married, widowed or head of
household). This provides some additional protection to women in the
event of abandonment, divorce or death of the husband. In addition,
where women have land rights and control production from the land,
they tend to use the assets to care for the welfare of children and the
household. In addition, land rights increase the respect women receive
within their marriages, households, and communities.58 These and
other benefits of protecting women’s land rights are examined in detail
in Chapter 5.
Joint titling may also provide another incremental advantage (legally
irrelevant, but potentially significant psychologically) by requiring the
wife’s name to be listed first in the title documents. Listing the wo-
man’s name first helps maintain accurate records of ownership since
drafters and clerks may be tempted to list only one of multiple right-
holders to save time. If women’s names are in the primary position,
the drafters and clerks are less likely to drop the second name.
Second, project guidelines should include providing beneficiary
households with education relating to women’s property rights, and the
positive impact of such rights on the family.
Third, the guidelines should require registration of the title in accor-
dance with applicable procedures and law.
Fourth, the guidelines should require that project staff provide bene-
ficiaries with a copy of the title document.
Fifth, where land is restricted to agriculture or other non-residential
uses, the guidelines should require project staff to work with the local
government to amend the classification of the land to allow the con-
struction of houses. Project staff should ensure that such changes oc-
cur prior to subdividing and titling the land in the name of benefici-
aries. As an alternative to addressing the issue locally, the state or cen-
tral government may include a general enabling provision as part of a
broad micro-plot distribution program.
Finally, if the government places restrictions on future transfers of
the property, planners should work with the government to limit the
restrictions to a reasonable period (e.g., five or ten years) and also limit
the scope of the restrictions (e.g., allowing short-term leases). The lim-
ited restrictions will help ensure that the household directly realizes
the benefits of the asset, but will also allow the household to sell or
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lease the land in the future to accommodate the changing needs of the
household. RDI’s observations in a variety of field settings suggest,
however, that even in the complete absence of legal restrictions house-
holds are generally not likely to sell such plots in the early years, and
micro-plots occupied by a house are almost never leased out.
Step 7: Design and develop residential colony
Project staff should work in partnership with a committee representing
the beneficiaries regarding design of the micro-plot residential colony.
Issues that the team should decide include how the space will be laid
out, and what infrastructure and common areas will be provided within
the colony. The team should plan the development and identify the par-
ties responsible for implementing each element of the development.
The project staff together with beneficiaries should consider incorporat-
ing “covenants” or other requirements concerning the micro-plots.
Typically, colony development will ultimately include: (a) developing
water sources; (b) platting plot sites, roads and common spaces; (c)
preparing the land through clearing, leveling, draining, etc.; (d) build-
ing roads to link the colony to existing roads and provide access to each
plot; and (e) installing infrastructure such as electricity and sanitation.
Depending on their size and resources, some colonies may wish to in-
clude construction of a place of worship, community buildings, and de-
velopment of green spaces or other common areas. As a practical mat-
ter, all desired infrastructure may not be possible in the early stages,
and project staff and beneficiaries should prioritize various types of
infrastructure in the development plan.
The development plan should also address how the colony will gov-
ern itself. An informal committee or governing body can assist a new
colony in handling issues that arise in the early days, such as develop-
ment of infrastructure and use of common facilities. The committee
should include at least one member from each represented community
or sub-community and should include both women and men. The
committee should be responsible for ensuring that the project provides
equal treatment to various groups and households. The committee
should appoint one or more individuals to be the spokesperson in deal-
ings with local government and project staff.
Step 8: Address cultural barriers
Cultural issues are among the most powerful forces determining the
success or failure of poverty alleviation projects, yet among the least re-
cognized. Cultural preferences and attitudes may impact all aspects of
a project, such as defining who are appropriate beneficiaries, what kind
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of land beneficiaries prefer to receive, what groups should be included
in a new colony, what activities are appropriate to engage in on the
house plot, who in the household should perform the tasks related to
the activity, and who should control income generated on the plot. In
planning projects, staff should be alert to the impact of cultural prefer-
ences and traditions. In some cases, projects may be redesigned to har-
monize with cultural preferences, while in other cases, the project may
see whether it is possible, through public education, to modify some
practice or attitude that threatens to undermine the objectives of the
project.
As examples, some cultural practices and beliefs may impact the suc-
cess of homegardens. In India, many rural Hindu households that
have only a small space beyond the footprint of the house will elect to
use the space to grow flowers for religious ceremonies and decorations
before considering vegetables. In some areas of the world, households
may associate homegardening with poverty and therefore decline to es-
tablish gardens.59 In Nepal, dark green leafy vegetables are often con-
sidered low-status foods, which might help to explain why researchers
found that consumption of vitamin A-rich foods did not increase along
with homegarden size in the studied groups.60
Public information campaigns can play an important role in addres-
sing some cultural barriers to the effective use of micro-plots. Many
families are not aware, for example, that vegetables and fruits are nutri-
tious. In Bangladesh, for example, researchers found that dark green
leafy vegetables are widely believed to be bad for young children,61
while a study of Philippine urban homegardeners found that mothers
generally had no knowledge of vitamins and iron in foods until in-
formed by community health workers.62 The good news is that there
is evidence that poor families who receive health information will re-
spond by planting more fruits and vegetables, including dark green lea-
fy vegetables, than families who have not received such information,
regardless of socio-economic status, size of the micro-plot, and general
knowledge of nutrition.63
Step 9: Provide access to capital and inputs
Most beneficiaries of micro-plot allocation programs will, by definition,
have little or no capital to invest in the development and operation of
any activity on their micro-plot.64 However, as was noted earlier, one
important characteristic of homegardening is that the poor may pro-
duce returns without making large investments of capital. For example,
in India, a “kitchen garden kit” developed for a pilot activity containing
seven varieties of tree seedlings, high-quality vegetable seeds and five
hybrid chicks cost 600 Rupees, or about US$16 at current exchange
MICRO-PLOTS FOR THE RURAL POOR 181
rates. Elsewhere in India, businesses that sell products such as woven
cloth or incense hire households to produce the finished product in
their homes, supplying the households with the raw materials and de-
ducting the cost of materials from the final price paid for the com-
pleted product.
Ultimately, allocation of micro-plots is most likely to be a useful
strategy for improving the livelihoods of poor households to the extent
that they are willing to invest scarce savings in productive activities.
For example, in India, we have met very poor agricultural laborer fa-
milies who invested scarce family capital to construct housing, plant
trees and raise poultry and livestock once they obtained secure owner-
ship of small plots of land. These families received no government as-
sistance in purchasing inputs for homegardening and instead decided
to use their own very limited resources to invest in their micro-plot.
As with many development interventions, programs to distribute mi-
cro-plots to the poor bring with them the risk that beneficiary families
will not value what they receive free of charge. One solution to this pro-
blem is for program guidelines to require that micro-plot recipients in-
vest their own time and labor to make improvements to the plot, such
as construction of a house. Families are likely to value such assets
more if they make active investments of this type. Some programs also
provide the land at a non-zero, but subsidized price, payable by the
family over a period of years. If the family purchases the land over a
period of years, there are nevertheless sound reasons for the family to
receive ownership of the land at the time of allocation (and attach a
mortgage on the land as security for payment of the debt), rather than
delaying transfer of ownership until payments have been completed.
The more that can be done to instill a sense of ownership in the land,
the more likely the family is to invest its time and scarce capital to im-
prove it.
The introduction of improved inputs can make a significant contri-
bution to micro-plot productivity. One illustrative example is a project
undertaken by Helen Keller International to improve animal husban-
dry in rural Nepal, Cambodia and Bangladesh. In all three countries,
within a year the number of eggs consumed in the household rose
from a weekly average of 5 to a weekly average of 12, while the number
of eggs consumed weekly by household children rose from an average
of 2 to an average of 3.65
Another important limiting factor in micro-plot cultivation is the use
of inputs to improve soil fertility. Where soils contain insufficient nu-
trients to support gardening, extension advice should include instruc-
tion on accelerated composting and the benefits of gardening in con-
tainers while establishing better soils.66 Households might also benefit
from instruction on the construction of terraces to improve soils.
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Where gardening tools and other inputs are absolutely necessary, the
government may find it useful to establish small local stores to sell
simple tools and supplies at affordable prices. Where fencing is re-
quired to reduce foraging by animals or theft of micro-plot production,
live fencing can be used to reduce costs. Plants used in fencing can
also provide additional products for household use or sale.
One promising approach related to plant stocks involves the creation
of local private nurseries to satisfy the needs of gardeners while earn-
ing a profit for the nursery. Sometimes homegardeners and self-help
groups can cultivate nursery stocks for certain plants or trees, selling
them to other gardeners or to small farmers. Planners should avoid in-
troducing plant species that are locally unknown, no matter how nutri-
tious and economical the plants are.67
Step 10: Provide extension services and technical advice
Education on nutrition. Project staff should consider providing all bene-
ficiaries with education on nutrition and the nutritional benefits of
plants, fruits and livestock before beneficiaries develop plans for their
micro-plots. All community members will likely benefit from the infor-
mation, and even those planning to use their plots for a small shop or
cottage industry may decide to devote space to a garden and area for
livestock. The education on nutrition can also assist families purchas-
ing items for their families’ consumption.
Extension. An extension service can provide beneficiaries engaging in
homegardening and raising livestock with help designing the layout of
the plot for the best results, selecting appropriate plants, trees and ferti-
lizers, and addressing animal husbandry issues. Agricultural extension
can contribute significantly, and sometimes to an extraordinary degree,
to micro-plot production. At the beginning of the Helen Keller Interna-
tional pilot homegardening project in Bangladesh, 50% of households
reported having a garden with mean size of 61 square meters and
growing an average of 3.1 varieties of vegetables, whereas after two
years with the project 100% of households reported having a garden
with mean size of 138 square meters and growing an average of 17 vari-
eties.68
When designing effective means for communicating an appropriate
nutrition strategy, planners must understand the traditional diet and
food taboos, seasonal food shortages, food storage practices, food cook-
ing practices, and distribution of food within the household. With this
nutritional information, homegardening households can select plant
varieties that meet taste preferences and will supply nutrients year-
round.69
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Skills training. In areas where micro-plot beneficiaries contemplate
taking up other specialized activities, such as handicrafts or other
home-based businesses, project staff should evaluate the needs of the
beneficiaries for training in necessary production skills, as well as mar-
keting, recordkeeping and money management.
Labor. Although projects to promote gardening and other activities
sometimes prefer to work with communal organizations, household-
level food production must be a family undertaking since labor, space
and time are valuable resources to poor households and “cannot be
risked on the uncertain participation of a number of individuals,” even
on a small scale.70
Homegardens typically are cultivated using “marginal” labor, which
is marginal in the sense that it is flexible and its use reflects low oppor-
tunities for alternative employment.71 Although there is not much data
on the volume and timing of labor inputs,72 commentators tend to
agree that most traditional gardening practices involve only a few days
of preparation and less than an hour per day for maintenance and har-
vesting.73
However, it is important to appreciate that the opportunity cost of
spending time on gardening is not zero, and labor-intensive technolo-
gies may not be appropriate in many contexts since household mem-
bers do not have unlimited time available for gardening.74 Homegar-
dens are more sustainable if labor requirements are low and somewhat
flexible.75 Planners contemplating homegardening projects should con-
sider the availability of marginal labor among households targeted for
assistance.
Labor needs will vary by task and household. In India’s Gujarat state,
RDI researchers met with families who, in addition to maintaining
home gardens, produced incense sticks to supplement often erratic
wage labor. The families used the space on their plots to store the raw
materials, lay out the materials during production, and produce the
sticks. The families sold the finished product to a buyer and controlled
the volume of sticks produced to suit their needs. The families gave
priority to agricultural labor, which paid more per hour, and during the
growing season limited their work on the incense sticks to the eve-
nings. When agricultural labor was not available, or when one head of
household injured himself and was unable to work in the fields, they
increased the time devoted to producing incense sticks.
Conservation. Even where homegardening families have experience
in producing various plants and animals, they may not fully under-
stand the long-term consequences of various production techniques.
For example, gardeners who do not take proper steps to preserve soil
fertility may eventually find that the soil is exhausted. Extension agents
can explain the benefits of using animal manures, and composting of
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kitchen wastes can help restore nutrients to soils. The persistence of
homegardens for generations in some societies without the addition of
artificial fertilizers suggests that viable low-cost strategies exist for pre-
serving soil fertility. Programs promoting homegardening should in-
clude advice that helps families to appreciate the importance of soil fer-
tility and affordable techniques that will preserve soil nutrients.
Ideally, the local community will value homegardening and other
micro-plot activities as an appropriate strategy for all families rather
than as either a leisure activity of wealthier households or a mark of
household poverty. For example, if program managers present home-
gardens as a universal strategy for improving household nutrition and
household independence (rather than as a “poor man’s” strategy of sub-
sistence), any social stigma of gardening as an activity of the poor
fades, and the relative status of poor families improves because they
share an activity with wealthier families. For these reasons, agricultural
extension should ideally include households of all economic brackets.76
Step 11: Monitor and evaluate outcomes
Monitoring the project following beneficiary occupancy and develop-
ment of the micro-plots is an essential part of the program’s success.
Project staff should review specific project components at regular inter-
vals, and should be in active communication with the beneficiary com-
mittee for the six to twelve months following habitation of the micro-
plots (which in some cases may be several years after the plots are allo-
cated). If the project has been fortunate enough to partner with an ex-
perienced NGO, that organization will also play an important role in
ensuring the project provides the anticipated benefits to the house-
holds as the months pass.
Many government programs measure success by the numbers: num-
ber of households benefited, number of acres distributed, number of
houses constructed. The numbers often do not sufficiently reflect
whether a project has been successful, especially from the perspective
of the intended beneficiaries. As program managers design programs,
they should set objectives for the program that include not only the
numbers of beneficiaries served but the impact of the project on their
lives and livelihoods. Section I discusses a number of potential bene-
fits. Success should also be measured in relation to the achievement of
those objectives.
Over a broader project area, baseline and follow-up random sample
surveys can provide detailed information on results. In the case of
smaller or pilot projects, such results can help inform government de-
cisions to replicate the project widely. Collection of data about results
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can also be critical for “mid-course corrections” to refine project design
and implementation to improve the benefits received.
V. Conclusion
In the right settings, the allocation of micro-plots is a viable alternative
to traditional land reform. In areas where the availability of land, num-
bers of landless families, program financing, and political realities dic-
tate against traditional reforms, micro-plot programs can substantially
improve the lives of the landless rural poor. Micro-plots provide land-
less households with the means to diversify livelihood strategies by pro-
viding secure access to land and water, improved financial security, im-
proved leverage in wage bargaining, improved nutrition, improved so-
cial status and political weight, and better access to basic
infrastructure.
Where poor families lack secure rights to micro-plots of suitable size
and quality, programs to obtain and allocate land to such families will
often be a constructive and socially beneficial use of government re-
sources. Where low-income families already have secure rights to
micro-plots of suitable size and quality, governments should consider
investing in water infrastructure, agricultural extension and nutritional
education, as well as programs to ensure that appropriate stocks of
plants and animals are available to homegardening families. Although
some public funds will doubtless be necessary to establish or strength-
en homegardening for landless and land poor families, a successful
micro-plot intervention will be one in which the micro-plots become
self-sustaining, satisfying the particular livelihood objectives of the reci-
pient family, while reducing the family’s continued dependence on
public resources.
We would like to see international donors advance the issue of mi-
cro-plots as an alternative to traditional land reforms, including the
idea of allocating micro-plots to establish homegardens and other liveli-
hood-enhancing activities, in three principal ways: through supporting
research, by promoting consensus building among donors, government
planners and project implementers, and by directly supporting govern-
ment or NGO micro-plot projects. Research and implementation pro-
jects can both drive the consensus-building process and benefit from
the consensus reached at any given stage.
The process of developing and implementing a micro-plot strategy
will itself require cultivation and some degree of risk taking. One way
to focus the sequencing of decisions is suggested above in Figure 4.2,
which includes a strong focus on ensuring access and secure rights to
land that will be used for homegardening and house construction. Do-
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nors, government planners and project implementers can gain a head
start in planning by conducting rapid rural appraisal to assess the op-
portunities for establishing and promoting homegardens in a particu-
lar setting. Donors in particular should look for ways to encourage gov-
ernment planners to assess such opportunities, including by learning
from NGOs that have practical experience in implementing micro-plot
projects.
Research should generally focus on documenting and studying the
costs and benefits of existing micro-plot projects to determine which
models hold the most promise. A special subject of research is the on-
going assessment of micro-plot project impacts, particularly from a
sustainable livelihoods perspective. Successful projects and resulting
best practices should be reported widely in the donor community. At
the international level, donors could usefully support research that at-
tempts to establish uniform standards and benchmarks for measuring
and analyzing the costs and benefits of micro-plot projects.
But research on existing micro-plots and encouraging consensus-
building should not be substitutes for acting to allocate new micro-
plots and improve existing micro-plots. Once donors, government plan-
ners or NGOs conclude that micro-plots are likely to provide an accep-
table threshold of benefits to target beneficiaries in that setting, they
should fund, implement and monitor micro-plot programs. In this
way, the potential for micro-plots can be explored in the process of pro-
viding current benefits to those most in need.
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5 Gender and land tenure reform
Rene´e Giovarelli
I. Introduction
In most developing countries, land is a critical asset for women and
men, and especially for the urban and rural poor. Property rights in
land – whether customary or formal in nature – act as a form of both
economic access to key markets and social access to non-market institu-
tions such as household and community-level governance structures.
Because of land’s fundamental importance in conferring such access, it
is essential that policies seeking in any way to alter the distribution or
to formalize property rights in land provide benefits to women and
take great care not to disenfranchise the most vulnerable members of
the target population, including women.1
Women’s economic development and their rights to land are intrinsi-
cally linked. More than half of all women in the developing world still
work in agriculture. Africa’s women produce 78% of the continent’s
food, mainly through subsistence agriculture and small landholding.2
In India, 86% of rural women workers work in agriculture as com-
pared with 74% of rural male workers. In addition, females head a
large percentage of households: 20% in Bangladesh and India and
30% in sub-Saharan Africa.3 Among the poor, women and women-
headed households are the most vulnerable and account for a growing
majority of the extreme poor.4 Land ownership can ensure safety, sta-
tus, and adequate housing and food security for women and children.5
Land rights clearly confer direct economic benefits to women. Land
is a key input into agricultural production, it can be a source of income
from rental or sale, and can be used as collateral for credit that can be
used for either consumption or investment purposes. Moreover, if wo-
men are unable to legally own, control and inherit property they have
little economic autonomy because they lack access to wealth, and their
contribution to the household can remain unremunerated and invisi-
ble.6 Comparative analysis of data from Nicaragua and Honduras, for
example, suggests a positive correlation between women’s property
rights and their overall role in the household economy; women with
property rights have greater control over agricultural income, higher
shares of business and labor market earnings, and more frequent re-
ceipt of credit.7
In addition to the short- and medium-term economic gains gener-
ated by greater access to product, capital and land markets, women
with stronger property rights are also less likely to become economic-
ally vulnerable in their old age, or in the event of the death of or di-
vorce from their spouse. In her study of gender and inheritance in ru-
ral Honduras, for example, Roquas finds that widows (and women
landowners in general) are more likely than men to work their lands
indirectly – relying on some combination of hired labor, family labor,
and rental to generate income – or to use the land as collateral for
loans for non-agricultural undertakings.8 Moreover, land ownership
may be one of the few vehicles through which elderly women can elicit
economic support from their children, either in the form of labor con-
tributions to agricultural production or receipt of cash or in-kind trans-
fers for use of the land. In the absence of other forms of social security,
the elderly rural population relies heavily on inter-generational trans-
fers for their livelihoods, and children are more likely to contribute to
their parents’ well-being if the latter retain control over a key produc-
tive, and inheritable, resource such as land.9
Land is a particularly critical resource for a woman in the event she
becomes a de facto household head as a result of male migration, aban-
donment, divorce or death. In both urban and rural settings, indepen-
dent real property rights under these circumstances can mean the dif-
ference between dependence on support from her birth family and the
ability to form a viable, self-reliant, female-headed household. Women’s
land rights within marriage may afford them greater claims on the dis-
position of assets upon divorce or the death of their husband.10
Property rights may also empower women in their household and
within the community and society at large. In the event of a disagree-
ment within a household, resolution may depend on the relative bar-
gaining power of each individual within the household, and control
over assets is one determinant of bargaining power.11 Intra-household
economic research suggests that the strength of each spouse’s “fallback
positions," that is, how well they can do in the absence of economic co-
operation with their partners, is an important determinant of their abil-
ity to shape household preferences and decisions about allocating
resources.12 Data from Central America, for example, indicate that in-
creasing the size of female landholdings is associated with modest in-
creases in food expenditures and child educational attainment.13 An-
other study found a positive relationship between the amount of assets
(including land) that a woman possesses at the time of marriage and
the shares of household expenditures devoted to food, education,
health care, and children’s clothing during marriage.14
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5.1. Land rights and vulnerability within the household
Land rights can alleviate some of the collateral effects of women’s
lower status to men in society, like domestic violence. Women gener-
ally have less power and lower status than men, and are very often
dependent on men for their well-being. This means that in situa-
tions of abuse within the household, which is pervasive worldwide,
women may find themselves not only physically and emotionally
vulnerable but also without resources, making escape from an abu-
sive situation difficult.
Studies and interviews with women from many parts of the world
who have experienced domestic violence attest to the fact that they
feel trapped with no place to go because their home and land are
owned and controlled by the perpetrator of the violence. One study
in India found that women with property who experienced violence
from their husbands were far more likely to leave their marital
home (71%) than those women who did not own property (19%).
Another study of 450 women in West Bengal, India, found that
among women without property, 57% said they experience some
form of violence, compared with 35% of women with property. A
third study in Kerala, India, found that while 49.1% of women with-
out property experienced long-term physical violence in their rela-
tionship, only 6.8% of those who owned both land and other prop-
erty experienced long-term physical violence.
Without direct property rights women are only able to gain access
to resources through their partners or fathers, perpetuating depen-
dency. Thus, property rights for women may reduce domestic vio-
lence as it can interrupt the dependency on the abuser.
Sources: P. Panda & B. Agarwal, Marital Violence, Human Development and
Women’s Property Status in India, 33(5) WORLD DEVELOPMENT 836 (2005) (wo-
men with property more likely to leave home); J. Gupta, Property Ownership
of Women as Protection for Domestic Violence: The West Bengal Experience,
Sept. 2005, ICRW Summary Brief (study from West Bengal), and P. Panda,
Domestic Violence and Women’s Property Ownership: Delving deeper into the
Linkages in Kerala, Sept. 2005, ICRW Summary Brief (study from Kerala).
In many countries, both law and practice discriminate against women
with regard to land rights. Land rights that are taken for granted by
men may not even exist for women.15 Unlike their male counterparts,
women may lose rights to land or not gain rights to land for a number
of reasons. First, it may be culturally or legally impossible for women
to acquire land rights through markets, inheritance, transfer or gift.
Second, marriage, divorce, bride price, dowry or polygamy may create
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barriers to women’s land rights. Third, privatization or individualiza-
tion of land may result in loss of non-ownership rights that women
have to land (e.g., the right to use land). Finally, land titling programs
may fail to formalize women’s rights.
Entrenched customary laws or practice may limit the type of rights a
woman may freely exercise. In many countries, while women have ac-
cess to land through their husbands or fathers, they do not own land
or have ownership-like rights to land. Moreover, cultural prohibitions
against women’s ownership of land can be more powerful than written
laws allowing women’s ownership of land and may limit the type of
rights to land a woman may freely exercise. For example, in sub-Sahar-
an Africa, women may have a right to cultivate and dispose of a crop,
but do not have the right to allocate or alienate land, although their
husbands and fathers do have this right.16
Women may have inferior rights to land as a result of laws or admin-
istrative policies. The laws or policies may be outright discriminatory
or simply poorly drafted, failing to state clearly what rights women
may exercise. Moreover, legislation is powerful but may not be suffi-
cient alone, since rights to land and other property must be both legally
and socially recognized to be usable and enforceable. Thus, overcoming
gender biases in property rights systems requires overcoming gender
biases within the social and cultural context in which the property right
system is created and functions.
In spite of all this, laws can legitimize the possibility of change.
While legislation does not itself change custom, it allows those who
are brave enough or desperate enough or organized enough to use the
law to support change. Additionally, equity is increased when women
directly participate in the design of a policy. In many cases, increased
gender equality can also lead to increased economic equality.17
Land tenure reform policies should address gender biases in access
to property rights. This can be done by: (1) identifying the social and
cultural factors and limitations that constrain women’s property rights;
(2) drafting legislation that both takes account of the reality of custom-
ary practices, and also ensures that women and men have equal access
to property rights; and (3) designing and implementing social and cul-
tural programs that help women overcome cultural obstacles and rea-
lize their property rights.
The remainder of this chapter reviews gender issues in the context
of land tenure reform. Section II covers gender issues in programs that
create new rights to land through privatization of state land. Section
III gives an overview of issues that arise when communal land is indi-
vidualized. Gender concerns that arise in the formation of land rights
through titling are covered in Section IV. Section V discusses legal
rules related to shared tenure. Section VI reviews women’s access and
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barriers to land markets. Intra-household transactions, including di-
vorce and inheritance, and their impact on women are discussed in
Section VII. Section VIII further discusses inheritance issues. Section
IX emphasizes the critical role that women’s knowledge of land rights
plays in the implementation of land legislation. Gender biases within
statutory law, customary law and in practice are pertinent to each sec-
tion and are addressed in each. Section X summarizes recommenda-
tions and lessons learned.
II. Privatization and distribution of state land
Depending on the country, privatization programs usually distribute le-
gal title to the household, the individual, or the head of household.
Each of these affects women and their immediate and future rights to
land in different ways.
Distribution of land to the household
Government policy makers may choose to distribute and title agricul-
tural land in the name of households when the cultural unit of farm
operation is the household or when there is a concern about fragmen-
tation of land. For instance, in China and the Kyrgyz Republic, the cul-
tural unit of farm operation is the household, and the population-to-
land ratio is quite high.18 Distribution of land to individuals would
have created very small plots of land and would not have made sense
in either country. Thus, land was distributed to families based on fa-
mily size, with larger families receiving more land. However, in neither
case did the legislation define the individual’s rights within the family;
this was due in part to cultural norms, which do not emphasize indivi-
dual property rights.
When a household is the legal unit with the right to land, women
generally have rights to land through their status as daughters or
wives, especially if the custom is for a wife to live with her husband’s
family. In the land distributions of both China and the Kyrgyz Republic
mentioned above, even when women were not disadvantaged in the in-
itial land distribution, problems arose as populations grew, and women
left their families to live with their husbands on his family’s land. Ad-
ditionally, custom generally dictates that men make the final decisions
regarding what to plant and when to plant it, how to improve the land,
or whether or not to sell or lease out the land. Thus, in practice, the
male head of household has greater actual rights to the land than his
wife or daughter, even though all members of the household are nom-
inally considered rightholders to an equal ‘‘share.’’
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In China, land contracts, where they exist, are issued in the name of
the head of household. Household member names are usually not
listed in the contract, and the contracting party is the household head.
Even if family names are listed, no specific land parcel or parcels are
attributed to individual members. Contrary to the intent of the 1998
Land Management Law, which provides farmers with a 30-year use
right to land, some communities give young men more land on the
assumption that they will later marry and bring a woman to their
household; other communities do not give unmarried young women
land because the community assumes the women will marry and leave
the village within the 30 years.19
The 2002 Rural Land Contracting Law intends to protect existing
contracted land rights from readjustments while also allowing villages
to reserve land to designate to new entrants to the village. The law also
provides that women have equal rights to land. Under this law, if a wo-
man does not receive a land share in her new village, she retains her
land share in her family’s village. However, practical issues and cultur-
al norms may obfuscate the efficacy of this law as well. The author in-
terviewed women farmers in China and found that few women would
exercise the right to continue farming their portion of the land after
they are married. One reason for this is that women who leave their vil-
lage to marry are not able to travel back and forth to the land. Also, ex-
ercising the right to a portion of the family’s land is shameful for many
women. On the other hand, families that are able to keep their daugh-
ter’s land are more likely to allow a divorced or abandoned daughter to
return home and assert her right to that land.
Similar contradictory results can be found in the Kyrgyz Republic.
While land legislation provided for individual rights to land within the
family, division of the household parcel during the first nine years of
the law’s implementation was prohibited. The primary impetus for this
rule was a concern about land fragmentation. Nearly 10 years after the
land reform began, legislation was enacted that allowed individuals the
right to the value of their portion of the land, but not to demarcate or
partition the land.20 In the Kyrgyz Republic, women leave their house-
holds to join their husband’s families upon marriage. Thus, to receive
the value of the land apportioned to a woman when she leaves her fa-
mily, the remaining co-owners of the land (her family) must purchase
her share of the land value. However, very few women request the va-
lue of their land when they leave to join their husband’s household as
the request would be considered shameful for her and her family.21
Additionally, three events create land pressures on families in the
Kyrgyz Republic: daughters-in-law who join households, children who
are born after land distribution, and divorce of daughters. Each of these
events requires caring for additional people without the provision of ad-
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ditional land. With no access to credit, a very limited land market, and
little rural industry, economic well-being of the family decreases with
each new addition to the household. Thus, women who return to their
families after divorce (often bringing children with them) can create
enormous land pressure on their families.22
Distribution of land to individuals
Individual titles to former state land have succeeded in securing wo-
men’s right to land in societies where women have the cultural and
social right to own land, but have not succeeded in societies where wo-
men do not. For instance, state land was distributed to individuals and
not families in Russia (and most of the European former Soviet Repub-
lics), and the distribution was based on the status as a member or for-
mer member of a collective or state farm. In Bulgaria land was resti-
tuted to those who owned the land before collectivization and to their
heirs, regardless of gender or marital status. In both of these cases, wo-
men are able to exercise full ownership rights to their land because in
addition to the legal right to land, they have a socially accepted right to
own land. However, when state land is distributed to individuals in cul-
tures where individual ownership of land is not the custom and is not
socially accepted, women do not necessarily gain equal rights to land.
The unequal outcome may be related to cultural practices and biases.
Even when land is individually titled to women, it may shift back to
male control because women may not be permitted to produce effi-
ciently on their land. Take for example, the land reform in Tigray,
Ethiopia. The Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), during its lib-
eration movement in Ethiopia, carried out land reform between 1975
and 1989 in Tigray, which was a contested area. The TPLF held mili-
tary control there in early 1980, and they developed a land distribution
plan where all land became public property and was equitably distribu-
ted among all males above 22 years of age and females above 15 years
of age.23 The TPLF gave all use rights over land to individual members
of the household.24 Children then living had a right to a share of land,
but children born after the distribution did not. Such a seemingly equi-
table distribution did not, however, produce equal success for women
and men. Later studies found that oxen ownership (not land owner-
ship) is the best predictor of farming success in Tigray. Thus, although
women in Tigray became owners of land, in most study areas land was
transferred through tenancy from women-headed households to house-
holds capable of farming with traction power, oxen or labor.25 In the
end, primarily female-headed households were limited in their ability
to farm because of both cultural taboos and a lack of resources.
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Villages in the Indian state of Karnataka offer a unique opportunity
to witness an ongoing evolution from the situation in Tigray to that in
Bulgaria. Beginning in 2000, a Karnataka housing program required
state-allocated houses and house plots to be titled individually in the
name of women beneficiaries. Field research confirms almost uniform
compliance with the requirement beginning in 2003; however, in areas
where no education or instruction accompanied the grant of title, the
impact on women is virtually nonexistent. As one woman noted, how
could it matter to her what a “small writing on a small paper” said? If
her husband told her to leave the house, she would go.26
In contrast, other villages that included education of the community,
the house plot program met with great success. In successful villages
local officials and community workers educated women and men re-
garding the titling requirement and potential benefits to women, their
households and their communities. Also, local NGOs provided training
on home-based income-generation schemes and helped establish bank-
ing relationships, village committees, and project self-help groups. Far
from being dismissive of the power of a piece of paper, the women ac-
tively contemplate how their ownership rights can enlarge their liveli-
hood options, including allowing them to establish small home-based
businesses, and they openly acknowledge the physical and psychologi-
cal security they gain from their new rights.27
Distribution of land to head of household
In other instances, government schemes have titled land solely in the
name of the male head of household. Although Karnataka has been
praised among Indian states for the success of its land reform efforts,28
the earliest programs did not target women as beneficiaries, and the
state granted titles to agricultural land almost exclusively in the name
of the male head of household.29
III. Individualization of communal land
In many African countries, individualization of customary land tenure
is a major objective of land tenure reform programs.30 The oft-cited
reason for this is that market forces should determine the efficient allo-
cation of land. In many cases, individualization comes to mean that
the state replaces local customary institutions as both the source and
arbiter of rights. However, recently some countries have come to regard
communal tenure as a legitimate and legal form of land tenure (e.g.,
Uganda and Tanzania). Moreover, the underlying notion that individua-
lization of land is necessary for investment in communal land has
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been challenged by studies that found that customary communal ten-
ure can have a strong positive impact on investment as well as land va-
lues.31 See Chapter 8 for a general discussion of the relationship be-
tween tenure security and investment.
Individualization of communal land often results in women losing
rather than gaining rights to land. If communal land, which was for-
mally held by the tribe, is titled to the heads of households, wives may
lose their property rights, especially if joint ownership is not compul-
sory under formal law. Moreover, customary rights of women for seaso-
nal or other shared use of land can be eliminated in the process of in-
dividualization of ownership rights. Individualization that occurred un-
der British rule, for example, did not take into account that male
community members were obliged to provide women with temporary
usufruct; consequently, the formal registration of only ownership rights
deprived women of this “secondary” right of access.32 In fact, formal
ownership of land and property, in communal land settings, has in
general strengthened the control of already powerful groups, has ren-
dered women’s rights and access to resources less secure, and has
caused women to lose their rights in many cases.33
In addition to women’s secondary rights on tribal land, women tend
to have equal access for gathering or grazing in the commons areas,
owned by communities due to custom (not necessarily one tribe). In
fact, women tend to rely upon these lands disproportionately to men.
If commons land is titled to households, and women’s rights to gather
or graze are not specifically preserved by registering them, women’s
rights can be lost.
Under a patrilineal and communal land tenure system, women have
always been vulnerable to losing use of communal land in the event of
the husband’s death, divorce or polygamy. As land becomes more valu-
able due to cash cropping and increasing population, women stand an
even greater risk of losing their rights to land when a family breaks
down. For example, in Tanzania, widowed women who had previously
been permitted to remain on communal land are now being dispos-
sessed of that land as it increases in value.34 This practice may cause
women to respond by not improving the value of the land for fear of
losing it to a husband or male relative. There are cases found in sub-
Saharan Africa where women have lost control over land after they in-
troduced irrigation and other improvements.35
In some parts of Africa, controversy has surrounded legislation en-
couraging joint titling of land in the names of husbands and wives to
ensure women’s rights to land during the individualization process.
For example, in Tanzania, the Land Commission promoted a provision
requiring joint ownership of land between spouses, but the provision
was not included in the final land policy of 1995.36 Likewise, in Ugan-
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da, drafts of the Land Act of 1998 provided for co-ownership of land by
married spouses. By all appearances, the Ugandan parliament agreed
that customary land on which the family lived or depended for suste-
nance should be held in co-ownership, but the final enactment of the
Land Act contained no such provision.37
During the transition process from communal to individual tenure,
legislation should make co-ownership the presumption in a marital re-
lationship. However, this is an enormous legal step that will not likely
have the acceptance of the community. In that case, donor-funded pro-
jects should educate policy makers and local customary leaders on the
economic value of women having secure rights to land. Such projects
should also provide funding to ensure women have access to some
form of dispute resolution to enforce and guard against interference
with their tentative rights.
IV. Formalization of land rights: titling and registration
While in many cases women have access to land, they do not have a for-
mal right to land. Rights to land imply security that is tied to an en-
forceable claim, while access to land is more informal and less enforce-
able.38 Because women spend their incomes differently than men and
generally have greater responsibility for improving the nutritional well-
being of their children, a woman’s formal right to and control over land
can determine her income generating ability and therefore the well-
being of her family.39 Furthermore, formal title to land may empower
women. Focus group interviews in Uganda, the Kyrgyz Republic and
India indicate that women regard formal title to land as a means to
make them less vulnerable to divorce or abandonment and in some
cases less likely to suffer violence from their husbands.40
However, the design and implementation of titling programs have
not generally made an effort to include women. A review of the “one ti-
tle holder per household” practice has shown that, typically: (a) titling
guidelines do not call for the identification of more than one property
rightholder in the household; (b) titling procedures do not allow for en-
quiry into the number of property rightholders in the household; (c) ti-
tling forms do not permit the listing of more than one property right-
holder; (d) titling brigades are not trained to look for and identify more
than one property rightholder; and (e) titling activities with commu-
nities and households (informational meetings, workshops, etc.) focus
on male heads of household and do not encourage or facilitate the par-
ticipation of women and other persons.41
In Bolivia, for example, the legal framework is very positive with re-
spect to women’s land rights; however, regulations governing land ti-
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tling did not provide any guidance in safeguarding those rights. There-
fore, during its first three to four years, the title regularization process
was implemented without regard for women’s land rights and without
monitoring whether titles were being issued to women either as indivi-
duals or as joint owners. The registration forms did not include a place
for more than one name as titleholder. Personnel were not instructed
to identify all landowners within the household. Women were not en-
couraged to attend public meetings and workshops, nor were they
sought out when the titling brigade visited their land for adjudication
and parcel measurement.
After several years and after critiques by civil society, the implement-
ing agency, INRA, began to design and implement procedures to
increase the participation of women in the process and on the titles.
Gender training workshops were also implemented.42 In areas where
gender training has taken place with staff, titling brigades and benefi-
ciaries, there appears to be a positive impact on women’s knowledge
and assertiveness with regard to their land rights.43
Joint titling has been recommended as a means of targeting women
and ensuring that their name is included in the title documents for
lands acquired by the family. However, joint titling often confronts the
same difficulties and constraints in extending property rights to wo-
men that are confronted by “traditional” titling programs (in which
state authorities name only one household head in the land title certifi-
cate). While specific legislation, regulations, and procedures that focus
on women’s rights to land are needed to title women both as individual
owners and as joint owners, cultural constraints to recognising women
as full citizens, with the same and equal set of rights that men enjoy,
may undermine those efforts.
Formalizing land rights raises several issues specific to women. On
one level, women are not often made aware that they have a right to
title their land. On another level, local governments and registration of-
fices may not register land in the names of both spouses if it is cus-
tomary for only the head of the household to have a formal right to
land ownership. In addition, many rural women do not have formal,
statutorily required, legal documentation for their marriage, especially
if the marriage occurred under customary law or religious law. Some ti-
tling rules may exclude titling for couples living in a consensual union
without a legal marriage and this may impact the woman in the union
more severely than the man if it is not customary for a woman to hold
land in her name.44
Many Latin American countries took up the issue of how to treat
consensual unions in their titling and registration projects by applying
principles of co-ownership.45 In many property systems, any two peo-
ple can be co-owners, while married people can be co-owners or joint
GENDER AND LAND TENURE REFORM 205
owners. Co-owners can independently use or transfer their share of the
property, although the co-owner wishing to use a portion of the prop-
erty must request a partition of the property first. By contrast, a joint
owner cannot transfer his or her share separately and must instead
agree with other joint owners regarding any action affecting the prop-
erty. Joint ownership requires the permission of both owners before a
sale or mortgage can occur, while co-ownership does not. Also, joint
owners can choose to partition their property and become co-owners.
In Peru and in Ecuador, people who live together but who are not mar-
ried are registered as co-property owners46 as distinct from joint prop-
erty owners; thus, their marital status is not important because they
both own a separate share of the property rather than owning the prop-
erty together as a whole, as would be the case if they held the land
jointly. This means that both the man and the woman in a consensual
union has an equal right to a separate portion of the land, and consent
to use that land is not required from the other owner.
Public awareness and training of officials
Education, training and communication are essential for promoting
gender equity in land administration projects. Public awareness and
training programs serve three main purposes. First, they raise aware-
ness about the rights of men and women with respect to land and
property within the country. Second, they provide guidelines for project
implementers and improve their awareness of the social and cultural
implications of land administration. Finally, they increase the participa-
tion of women and men in the land titling process, subsequent regis-
tration and other related activities.
Studies have shown how critical public awareness is for the benefici-
aries. For example, a study looking at six land titling projects in Latin
America found that in Honduras, where joint titling was voluntary,
only 16.7% of titles corresponded to women, all other titles were issued
to men only. The joint titling program was weak because women were
rarely aware of their rights under the program, and the titling of land
to women varied across the country according to the willingness of re-
gional functionaries to issue joint titles.47
Awareness programs and training can also ensure that program im-
plementers are aware of the social context in which they work. In the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, women from most ethnic groups
benefit from a tradition of matrilineal inheritance (traced through the
maternal side of the family), and the family law states that land pur-
chased during marriage shall be regarded as joint property.48 Despite
this, women’s rights to land were not always recognized in practice,
and it was found that land titling was only done in the name of males.
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The initial reason given for this was that men were the public face of
the family, and titling and registration were seen as public activities.
However, after a local women’s non-governmental organization pro-
vided training to community women and the staff of the Department
of Land on the topic of women’s right to receive land titles, surveys
showed an increase in the number of titles in the name of women and
an increase in the number of joint titles.49
V. Legal rules regarding shared tenure
Titling and registration serve to formalize land rights, and joint owner-
ship of land is sometimes thought of as the equivalent of jointly titled
land. However, most countries have separate family law or land law
that provides how land is owned and distributed among married peo-
ple, regardless whether the right has been formalized.
Shared tenure is the term used to refer to the broad category of rights
to land and housing shared by two or more people. Shared tenure can
be formal or informal. Formal shared tenure conventionally refers to
legal co-ownership or co-lease rights. In most countries, a range of land
rights and tenure types exist that form a continuum from informal to
formal. For all tenure rights along the continuum, secure tenure for
women within the household and within the community remains a
crucial issue.50
A specific, formal form of shared tenure is joint tenure. Joint tenure
refers to land or housing held by both spouses – or by both members
of a couple living in consensual union – wherein both spouses have
equal rights over the marital property.51 Joint tenure rights may be held
whether the tenure has been formally titled and registered or is instead
created through operation of law applicable to marital property. While
any tenure type can be jointly held, joint tenure usually refers to own-
ership. According to this concept, more than one person owns the
whole of the property. Each owner of land held in joint tenure can only
deal with the land with the consent of all the owners, as each owner
acts on behalf of all owners on the whole of the property. For example,
for land to be disposed of, all the joint owners must agree to do so.52
Joint titling can satisfy two objectives related to legal rights for wo-
men. The fundamental objective is to enhance the status and power of
women by improving their access to and control over land. The other
objective derives from these property rights: by virtue of having prop-
erty rights to land and housing, women are able to make decisions on
the use of that property, are able to, in conjunction with their hus-
bands, use the property as collateral to secure credit (including credit
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to finance improvements to the property), and increase their ability to
provide for the well-being of themselves and their family.
Joint tenure forms can be universal or presumed, and compulsory or
voluntary in law. Universal joint tenure means that all property brought
into or acquired in marriage in any manner is jointly held. Presumed
joint tenure means that there is a presumption that a married couple
holds the property acquired during marriage jointly, but either spouse
can prove that certain property is individually held (usually property
that is inherited or gifted to one of the spouses only).
Compulsory joint tenure indicates that the law mandates joint tenure
in certain circumstances (marriage, for example). A presumption of
joint tenure can therefore be compulsory by law and not dependent on
whether the property is formalized (titled and registered) in the name
of both parties. In much of Eastern Europe, community property for
marital couples is compulsory (Russia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and
Croatia, for example), though the rate of legal marriage appears to be
declining in these areas.53 In unregistered marriages the compulsory
joint title provisions will not take effect.
Voluntary tenure means that all parties must choose who will be
property owners or occupiers and what form the ownership will take.
This can be done in a marriage contract or through the titling and re-
gistration process.
Larger groups (such as customary communal tenure, family tenure,
community titling, or co-operatives) may hold land and property in
either joint tenure or tenure in common, depending upon law and cus-
tom.55 Tenancy in common means that each person owns a portion of
the whole of the not-yet-demarcated property. If the amount each per-
son holds is not specifically stated, the assumption is that the owners
own equal parts. Each owner can request demarcation of his or her
portion of the land and thereafter deal with that portion independently.
Separate property for married couples or household members is also
a possibility under the law in some countries. Countries that have a se-
parate property regime as the default regime have the presumption
that both members of a couple (married or not) have a separate right
to land or property acquired during a marriage or consensual union.
Table 5.1 illustrates the three tenure arrangements described above
and whether they are voluntary or compulsory under civil or family law
and then whether they are voluntary or compulsory under land law
and what the arrangements mean in terms of inheritance and transfer
rights.
Even when the concept of compulsory joint tenure is a part of formal
law, there can be many variations in implementation. The specific
parameters of the presumption of joint tenure can have a major influ-
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ence on the implementation of this concept. The variations in joint
titling regimes are related to the following issues:
1. When does property become the property of the marital community
(joint owners)?
2. Which property is jointly owned?
3. Who will manage the joint property?
4. If there is separate property, will the income from that property be
owned by the individual or the joint owners?
Table 5.1. Forms of property tenure
Tenancy in Common:
Each party owns a
separate share of
the whole
Joint Tenure: Parties
own the property
together as a whole or
undivided share (each
owns the whole)
Separate Tenure:
Each party owns
property separately
Compulsory
or Voluntary
(Civil Law)
Usually voluntary. Can be compulsory or
presumed compulsory
(unless contract to the
contrary) for married
couples, those in
consensual unions, or
household members
of a farm. Can also be
voluntary.
Can be the
presumption for
married couples and
those in consensual
union.
Compulsory
or Voluntary
(Land Law)
Can be compulsory
when land is
privatized or
individualized (land is
distributed to all, or all
adult, household
members on a per
capita basis).
Can be compulsory
when land is
privatized or
individualized for
married couples or
families living in one
household.
Can be compulsory
as part of state
distribution of land.
Inheritance Can bequeath a
separate share of the
property by will, or
share will be
distributed according
to intestacy rules.
Either the deceased’s
share of the control of
the whole
automatically vests in
the remaining owners,
or the property must
be divided and
becomes a tenancy in
common.
Separate bequests.
Transfer Can transfer a
separate share of the
property without
permission from other
co-owners.
Usually permission of
other joint tenants is
required for any
transfer of any right in
the property.54
Can transfer without
permission.
Source: Adapted from R. Giovarelli & S. Lastarria-Cornhiel, Shared Tenure Options for
Women: A Global Overview, Table 2.1.1 (UNHABITAT July 2005).
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5. Do consensual unions trigger the joint titling rules and protections?
6. If a presumption of joint tenure is created by civil law, does the land
law mandate that all land that is jointly held also be jointly titled
and registered?56
Both compulsory and non-compulsory joint tenure rights can be ad-
versely affected by legal regulations, customary or religious practices
and norms, gaps in legislation, and poorly implemented laws. While ci-
vil legislation establishes marital property regimes, the procedures reg-
ulating documentation and registration of joint ownership, usually
found in land legislation, greatly influence the frequency with which
women formalize their rights to land and other property. Procedures
can be complicated, time consuming, and expensive. Formalization of
ownership may require evidence that women do not have.
VI. Land markets
Apart from privatization of land, women may acquire land rights
through purchase, inheritance, labor or other investment in improving
the resource, adverse possession, prescription, or leasing.
The customs and attitudes of society toward the purchase and sale of
land by women can have a significant effect on women’s involvement
in the land market. For instance, in some parts of Uganda, village men
often oppose women purchasing land during the marriage because it
indicates that she intends to divorce. Men will only allow such pur-
chases if they are convinced of the economic benefit of women owning
land.57 To illustrate, in a 100-person household survey in Uganda fewer
men and women thought married women should have the right to pur-
chase land than thought widows or single women should have such
purchase rights.58
In Karnataka State in India, women have the legal right to own land
but rarely do so in practice due to traditional gender roles and lack of
Table 5.2. Ugandan attitudes to whether women should own land
Marital Status Men who condone
female ownership (%)
Women who condone
female ownership (%)
Widows 68.2 98.2
Single Women 67.4 96.5
Married Women 46.5 69.5
Source: R. Giovarelli & E. Eilor, Land Sector Analysis: Gender/Family Issues and Land Rights
Study (unpublished report, Government of Uganda 2002), Table 3-1.
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independent financial resources. Household land is most commonly
titled only in the name of the male head.59 Likewise, in Chile, because
women only participate in the land market when they have resources
at their disposal, only 8% of women who owned farms acquired them
through purchase as compared to one-quarter of the men.60
Another reason why women may not purchase land is because of
the perceived collateral effect it may have. Since land ownership is eco-
nomically empowering for women, women’s land ownership can be re-
garded as threatening to men or to the family as a unit. This perceived
threat may underlie legal barriers to women’s land rights; for example,
under Muslim personal law in the Philippines, a woman must have
her husband’s consent to acquire any property even if by gift, except
from her relatives.61
Clearly, land market programs should not focus exclusively on own-
ership; it may be easier for women to lease land than to purchase it.
Leasing land can present less of a threat to men and the social order
than purchasing land, and leasing requires less money. Of course, leas-
ing is perceived to be less threatening because it does pose less of a
threat – it does not create permanent, secure property rights in the les-
see. In Burkina Faso, for example, the increased and changing market
value of land has had the surprise effect of creating non-traditional ave-
nues for women to lease land long-term on an anonymous basis where
they might not have been able to in the past.62 Male landholders are
more willing to lease to women because women cannot claim perma-
nent rights to land. Husbands generally support this borrowing of land
by their wives, and women are therefore better able to cultivate land in-
dependently, even though they do not own it.63
An additional consideration affecting their participation in land mar-
kets is women’s access to resources. Women who are able to accumu-
late their own resources are often able to acquire land. Rural women
may have limited access to money, credit and information that would
allow them to take advantage of land markets both because they are
poor and because of their status in the family and society.64 Women
who are able to purchase agricultural land usually live in urban areas
and are employed or live in peri-urban areas and grow food for the ur-
ban market.65
There are ways that poor rural women can work around the restric-
tion of resources. For example, pooled resources can make it easier for
women to receive credit using social collateral.66 Additionally, pooling
resources may allow women to purchase land without credit at all.
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VII. Intra-household rights to land
Women’s rights to land are almost always related to their relationship
to a family. Within a household, there are two separate questions re-
lated to women’s land rights. First, do women have the right to use,
control, own, sell, lease, bequeath or gift land within a marriage, a con-
sensual union, or her birth family? Second, do women who are di-
vorced, widowed, abandoned, or who are second wives have the right
to use, control, own, sell, lease, bequeath, or gift land? This section
looks at several barriers to women’s rights to land in relation to their fa-
mily relationships. Legal reform efforts to enhance women’s land rights
seldom focus on the intra-household distribution of land, yet such pro-
visions and practices can have a potentially great impact on women.
Control over land within the marriage
Beyond the legality of the title and the continued use of that property
to provide for and shelter their family, do women have effective rights
such as the ability to control the use of the property and the right to
benefit from the property? One study of agricultural land in Nicaragua
found that women who have either individual title or joint title admin-
ister over half (52%) of crop income while women who have no land
rights only control 14% of crop income.67 This would seem to suggest,
at least in this Nicaraguan case, that extending legal land rights to wo-
men, including joint ownership rights, increases their effective rights
over land.
However, use rights may be insecure, even within the marriage.
Many laws or customs allow husbands to sell land without the permis-
sion of their wives. Husbands may also choose what crops to grow, and
control any money generated from harvests.
The situation in Uganda provides a particularly pertinent illustration.
In Uganda, one family will usually possess several different fields,
separated geographically from each other and often separated from the
family home. At the time of marriage, the family often gives the wo-
man a specific field to cultivate. In times where the family or the hus-
band needs money, it is the fields designated to the women that are
frequently sold by the husband, without her knowledge or consent.
The Land Bill of 1998 originally included a provision, referred to as
the “consent clause,” for which women NGOs fought hard. It was in-
tended to stop the sale of any household land by one spouse unless the
other spouse gave written permission. However, the intent of the con-
sent clause was undermined. When it was eventually enacted, section
40 of the Land Act provided:
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No one can transfer land without the prior written consent of
the spouse if: (1) the spouse ordinarily resides on this land, and
(2) the spouse derives sustenance from this land.
Transfer includes: sale, exchange, transfer, pledge, mortgage,
lease or inter vivos gift – or enter [sic] into a contract for these
purposes.68
Thus, the consent clause, as enacted, can be read to apply only to land
that is both residential and used for sustenance, but not to apply to
land farther from the house. This interpretation does not in practice
provide equal rights for women as promised under the constitution. In
a land market survey in Uganda, respondents stated that the formal
written consent required under section 40 of the Land Act is rarely ob-
tained. Most respondents were not sure if the consent requirement cov-
ered all land plots of a household, just the plot on which the family ac-
tually lived, or plots that were used for family sustenance.69
By contrast, the legal obligation for consent in other countries is
much broader. For instance, in the Philippines, transactions in agricul-
tural land distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries during marriage
or cohabitation require the written consent of both spouses regardless
of whether the land is registered in the name of both spouses or just
one.70 Other property of the marriage or cohabitation can be sold only
with the consent of both parties.
However, formal rights to land by virtue of marriage may not guar-
antee that women have input into or control over land production. In
Zimbabwe, even with the legal right to land, women report that their
husbands control the use of the land; they do not allow women to plant
anything but maize, and though the women do all the work, they are
not permitted to be involved in any planning related to crop growing.71
Even when Pakistani women formally own land, custom may limit
their rights to use or dispose of this land. Although women have the le-
gal right to own land independently and jointly with their husbands,
according to lending institutions surveyed for a micro-finance study,
“women’s right to own property does not automatically translate into
the right to develop or dispose of it as they see fit.”72 There are no spe-
cific legal requirements as to women’s rights to control or dispose of
land.
Ultimately, it may be that the law can do little to safeguard women’s
control over land within the family, and laws that do attempt to safe-
guard women’s rights to land, like consent laws, may create other pro-
blems. For example, a law that requires written consent for any trans-
fer of household land can make the land market less efficient. Where
polygamy exists, and marriages and land are unregistered, keeping
track of whose consent is required can be difficult for banks or poten-
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tial buyers. Bankers in Uganda have complained about the consent re-
quirements imposed by section 40 of the Land Act: they report that it
is impossible for them to verify that all the required consents had been
obtained prior to granting a loan using land as collateral.73
However, there are potential solutions to the issue with consent laws
cited above. One possibility is to provide in law that a sale or mortgage
is valid even if later contested for lack of consent, provided that the pur-
chaser or mortgagee made a reasonable effort to obtain consent. Rea-
sonable effort could be defined as creating a balance between the needs
of the lender or seller for efficiency and clarity and a woman’s need to
protect her rights to land. If the purchaser or mortgagee cannot prove
that such care was taken, he or she could be required to give land or
equivalent compensation to the wife who did not provide consent. Of
course, while this may be an adequate legal solution, there may be so-
cial mores that restrict a women’s access to the court system, and the
rule may provide more protection to lenders and purchasers than to
women.
Divorce
Upon divorce, abandonment or termination of a consensual union,
there are three main factors that affect a woman’s right to land. First,
divorce may carry a stigma that impacts a woman’s right to use or own
land. In some countries divorce is not allowed, and in others, division
of property is based on the guilt of the parties.74 Second, in many in-
stances women move to their husband’s family household upon mar-
riage and are reluctant to claim their land upon divorce because it be-
longs to the husband’s family or it is located in the husband’s village.
Third, women often lack information about their right to receive land
from the marital household upon dissolution of the marriage or
union.75
Mandatory joint ownership is the legal solution most often promoted
to protect women’s property rights upon divorce or abandonment. As
discussed in various other contexts above, custom and practice play
into the effectiveness of a solely legal solution. As noted by gender and
land scholars, “where customary or traditional property rights and gen-
der relations are strong, they are likely to dominate the distribution of
rights within and around the landscape.”76
Laws, however, can provide room for change within a culture. A
good illustration of this is found in the Ethiopian state of Tigray. Dur-
ing the Tigrean land reform, the law mandated joint registration of
property in marriage or in the woman’s name alone in the case of non-
formalized unions. A woman has the right upon divorce to take the
property she brought to the marriage as dowry, as well as her half of
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the marital land. Other property obtained during the marriage is di-
vided equally. Women state that if they are able to own land and prop-
erty upon divorce, they cannot be forced to stay with men.77 In fact, a
recent study indicates that this change in the law has caused Tigrean
men to become conscious of women’s rights to their land, to be more
cautious about beating them, and to be more cautious about initiating
divorce. However, the rate of divorce has increased in recent years be-
cause women are leaving relationships that are violent or in which the
husband does not contribute to the family. Women state that the land
reform has made them independent.
The absence of laws can negatively impact divorced women’s rights
to land. In India, although Hindu, Muslim and Christian law all re-
quire the husband to provide maintenance to the wife upon divorce, in
the Indian state of Karnataka, separated or divorced Hindu women are
often socially stigmatized and rarely receive maintenance. Also, women
in Karnataka do not have the right to receive any of the husband’s
ancestral land or separate property. Nor does the civil law provide for
co-ownership of marital land.78 Divorced women in most cases must
support themselves, unless they have adult sons who can assist them.
Women nearly always lose access to land they previously cultivated and
typically do not receive the return of any dowry that was paid on their
behalf.
Even where general legislation regarding divorce exists and is posi-
tive for women, implementing regulations may thwart women’s access
to court. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, the person who applies for prop-
erty division (almost always the woman) must pay the state fee, a per-
centage of the value of the property.79 Article 102 of the Civil Code pro-
vides that the court can exempt payment, and poor women often do
pay less. However, they must pay something, and usually any amount
is too much. Moreover, the amount must be paid in advance and pro-
vides grounds for commencing the judicial procedure. The full burden
for payment falls on the person requesting the property division and is
not later reimbursed by the opposing party.80
Those working on land law reform in developing countries do not
generally analyze rules regarding division of property upon divorce.
However, the legal framework surrounding divorce and division of
property can have a major impact on women’s right to land and on wo-
men’s status within the family.
Bride price and dowry
The various customs of bride price and dowry, which involve the ex-
change of wealth upon marriage, are often linked to women’s ability to
own land.81 In some countries, like India and the Kyrgyz Republic,
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dowry is seen as the daughter’s pre-mortem inheritance, and she may
not have a customary right to inherit land from her birth family. In
some cases women may be allowed control over their dowry through-
out their married life, and it remains with them upon divorce or death
of the husband.82
Dowry is not returned upon divorce in the Indian state of Karnataka.
Similarly, women in Uganda are left with no marital property or wealth
from the bride price after divorce. A Ugandan husband’s family pays
the wife’s family for the bride. When women are asked why women do
not or should not own land, they cite bride price as the reason. Pay-
ment of bride price simultaneously indicates respect and love for the
bride and deems her the property of her husband. Thus, upon divorce,
the woman’s family is expected to return the bride price and the wo-
man is left with no marital property or wealth. In fact, in interviews,
men stated that women cannot own land because “property cannot
own property.”83
Legislating against the practices of dowry and bride price will prob-
ably not solve these problems; in fact they may cause them to increase.
Although India has outlawed dowry since the 1961 passage of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, dowry is still not only practiced, it is more com-
mon and more expensive today than in the past. Since dowry and bride
price continue to be practiced, legal solutions to the land issues asso-
ciated with these practices may need to be broader than outright prohi-
bition. For instance, where dowry and bride price are practiced, wo-
men’s leverage in the household may be improved if countries insti-
tuted a universal community property system in which all property
brought into and acquired after marriage belongs equally to both
spouses. This would be different from the community property laws
commonly in place in the West, where property brought to the mar-
riage separately by each spouse is usually excluded from the joint prop-
erty calculation, but it may be effective in containing some of the nega-
tive effects of these practices.
Polygamy
Many societies allow polygamy, and in settings where polygamy is cus-
tomary or traditional, attempts to prohibit it through legislation are
generally ineffective. However, polygamy seriously affects women’s
rights to property and is the source of much tension over land rights
in many countries, especially because it is not often acknowledged by
either men or women. Polygamy complicates legislation requiring writ-
ten consent of spouses for the disposition of property. It also compli-
cates provisions on inheritance and co-ownership of land. While legis-
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lating around polygamy is difficult, ignoring it would inadequately pro-
tect women’s property rights.
Polygamy, along with land shortages and rising populations, are the
predominant reasons for intra-familial land disputes in Uganda, ac-
cording to a 1993 study. Specifically, the problem with polygamy arises
because of the allocation of land to multiple children and multiple
wives.84 New wives often receive land at the expense of previous wives,
and the children’s inheritance may depend on their mother’s status at
the time of their father’s death. Also, because the eldest son of the
most senior wife is likely to receive the largest share of the property85
and is responsible for administration of the estate, children of other
wives may not fare well in the allocation.86
On August 24, 2004, the President of Benin signed into law the Per-
sons and Family Code, which states that only monogamous marriage
will be legally recognized. While polygamy is still allowed under the law,
subsequent wives will not have the same legal protections as the first
wife or the wife with whom the man is legally registered. Wives subse-
quent to the first wife in a polygamous marriage, do not have a legal
right to land under the Persons and Family Code 2004. It is unclear
from the law what will happen to all the polygamous marriages that
were in effect at the time of this law in 2004. Do those second and third
wives have any legal rights? How might this affect titling now since
most of the marriages that exist would have been made under the old
law that allowed for polygamy? If women are the second or third wife,
they will have no legal rights, making them more vulnerable.
It would be counterproductive for the law to make broad proclama-
tions about the relative worth of marriages (such as a rule that holds
that the first is the most important one, or that marriages with chil-
dren are superior, etc.); however, the law can make determinations
about property ownership. One possible rule that could alleviate some
of the problems associated with polygamy would be to require that
upon taking of a second wife, the husband and first wife must partition
all property belonging to the first marriage or consensual union so that
the husband has only his half-share to distribute to his new wife and
children. Of course, the law is a very cumbersome tool for dealing with
complicated family relationships.
VIII. Inheritance and inter vivos transfers
Inheritance of land by daughters or widows is often the main way that
women acquire ownership rights to land. Data from several countries
in Latin America indicate that inheritance is the most important med-
ium through which women become independent landowners: 54% of
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female-owned land in Brazil was inherited, 84% in Chile, 43% in Ecua-
dor, 76% in Mexico, 75% in Peru, 47% in Nicaragua, and 57% in Hon-
duras.87
Laws and customs governing inheritance are therefore key to the gen-
der distribution of land. Inheritance law may be ineffective at ensuring
land rights for women. For instance, laws often exclude large segments
of the female population such as unmarried women, women in cohabi-
tation relationships and women married under customary or religious
regimes but not married legally or, as seen above, polygamous wives.88
Transfers by inheritance happen either by will or by law. Succession
by will must satisfy the legal requirements of a will to be effective. A
will specifies how the deceased’s property is to be distributed. Usually
the testator (the writer of the will) may bequeath all or part of his or
her property to any person, but the law may also establish obligatory
minimum shares for children or spouses. If a person dies without a
will (intestate) or when the will covers only a part of the estate, laws of
intestate succession apply. This means the law will govern the division
of the estate among classes of heirs.89
Written wills are a rarity in rural communities of developing coun-
tries, and rules related to intestate succession are therefore important.
Intestacy rules usually provide that the spouse and each child receive a
certain share of the deceased’s property. Many pluralistic legal systems
provide that the religion of the spouses will determine which inheritance
regime applies. For example, if a person marries as a Muslim in India,
the inheritance rules are different than if a person marries as a Hindu.90
Many Latin American countries limit how much property an indivi-
dual can freely will to others and subject the remainder to certain rules
regarding the distribution to surviving spouses and children. In Nicara-
gua and Honduras, for example, property owners may cede up to 75%
of their estate – high by Latin American standards – to anyone, and the
remaining 25% (porcio´n conyugal) is set aside for widows.91
Where a person dies without a will, all Latin American countries des-
ignate the legitimate children of the deceased, regardless of sex, as the
first beneficiaries of equal shares of the property owned by the indivi-
dual. However, given widespread land scarcity, it is common for families
to consolidate inherited property through sales or informal arrange-
ments that allow one or several (usually male) children to retain control
of the land. In most of the region, only if there are no living children do
wives become the primary beneficiaries, eligible to share the estate with
the parents of the deceased, who are also secondary beneficiaries.92
In Latin America, inter-generational inheritance patterns demon-
strate greater gender equality over time. In one study, this is attributed
to four factors: (1) rising literacy, which raises the awareness of wives
and children regarding their rights of inheritance; (2) smaller family
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size associated with falling fertility, which leads parents to divide prop-
erty more equally among male and female siblings; (3) higher urban
migration rates of young people, further reducing the number of po-
tential heirs interested in remaining in the agricultural sector; and (4)
the declining importance of agriculture in the livelihood strategies of
rural households, reducing the income value of land and therefore
making it less critical to male family members.93
Customary law also plays a major role in inheritance practices. Cus-
tomary rules do not necessarily directly provide for the spouse or for
all children, and in some cases customary rules exclude women from
inheriting land even as daughters or widows. In other cases, daughters
can only inherit land, under certain circumstances, for example, if
there are no sons or if they are single, divorced, or widowed and have
returned home. In these cases, women may continue to have use rights
to land through their sons or brothers, but not ownership of the land.
By custom if a woman must move to her husband’s village upon mar-
riage, her ability to inherit as a widow may be impeded since the hus-
band’s relatives may have no interest in caring for an outsider to the
patrilineal line.
In some settings, courts may enforce customary law over civil law,
making it difficult for women to inherit land even if the civil law favors
such inheritance. In Zimbabwe, the civil legislation provides for equal-
ity between men and women; nevertheless, in Magaya v. Magaya,94 the
Zimbabwe Supreme Court ruled that under customary law women are
juveniles, and therefore a woman could not inherit her father’s prop-
erty even though she was named in his will.
Box 5.2. Crises and coping strategies
People who are forced to depend on their good relationships with
others for their most basic rights to shelter and the means to make a
living are vulnerable to appalling abuse and exploitation. Once crisis
strikes – whether in the form of economic crisis following the HIV/
AIDS pandemic, conflict as in Rwanda or Burundi in the 1990s, bat-
tles over eroding natural resources, or the undermining of tradi-
tional views of rights and obligations that occurs once people’s atti-
tudes and beliefs change in response to international media – people
must decide where their first loyalties lie. Social obligations to those
beyond one’s immediate loved ones feel less important, and if they
have property which will ensure one’s own survival, it is tempting to
grab it.
Source: C. Sweetman, How Title Deeds Make Sex Safer: Women’s Property
Rights in an Era of HIV (Oxfam: July 2006).
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Widows
In many countries, a woman’s access to her husband’s land upon his
death is determined by whether there are still living children. If there
are no children, a woman who has moved to her husband’s village is
often expected to return to her father. Even with children, a woman
may not inherit land from her husband because the land belongs to
her husband’s family and not to her. In most countries, ancestral land
is treated differently under customary law than purchased land.
In much of rural Africa, access to land is obtained through inheri-
tance of ancestral lands. Patrilineal inheritance patterns of ancestral
land (land passing to males) often correspond to patrilocal residence
patterns (women moving to their husband’s home upon marriage). In
many cases, widows do not inherit land from their husbands but may
obtain use rights to the land until the children are able to manage the
property. Evidence from a number of countries suggests that even if
women have a statutory right to land, they may lose their land to male
relatives. When women bring their cases to court, courts often favor
the rights of men over women, following customary law rather than
formal law.
The Succession Act in Uganda treats widows and widowers similarly,
although customary law favors widowers. Under the Succession Act, a
surviving spouse has the right to occupy, but not own, the house and
the land immediately adjoining the house plot, even if the woman
farmed land away from the house during the marriage.95 Moreover,
the Succession Act limits what can be done on this land; a widow or
widower must farm the land and cannot cut down trees, erect or
change buildings, nor use the land for other purposes.96 They have no
right to sell the land. Intestate surviving spouses inherit only a 15%
share in other property, including other plots of land, with lineal des-
cendents receiving the majority of the rest of the property. There may
be room for improvement to women’s land rights via inheritance in
Uganda through legislation; however, all the attention has been fo-
cused on Uganda’s land law, and thus the problematic inheritance
rules have remained unchanged.
Another issue related to widow’s inheritance is the practice of prop-
erty grabbing. This is where the in-laws of the deceased take over the
home and land of the widow by means of threats, humiliation or physi-
cal violence.97 This is an even greater problem in societies where it is
inappropriate for a woman to return to her family upon the death of
her spouse. In one study in Uganda, out of 204 widows, 29% said that
property was taken from them at the time of the husband’s death.98
The widow’s land is divided among her husband’s male relatives, many
of who may have assisted in gathering the bride price at the time of
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her marriage.99 This is a particularly important issue in Uganda where
widow-headed households are the most over-represented among the
poor, comprising 13% of the poorest quartile of the Ugandan popula-
tion.100
In countries where the impacts of HIV/AIDS on land tenure systems
have been studied (e.g., Lesotho, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Mala-
wi) one major impact of the epidemic was identified to be the increase
in the vulnerability of women, children and poor households to dispos-
session by patrilineal kin on the death of male household heads. HIV/
AIDS widows may suffer total or partial loss of assets to relatives of
their deceased spouses. Furthermore, women who do not have their
own rights to land will not have land to pass to their children, making
them much more vulnerable. Inheritance rights are especially critical
for women in post-conflict situations since many more women are
being widowed at a relatively young age, with dependent children to
care for and educate. The organization Widows’ Rights International
conducted a recent survey in Uganda and found that almost 30% of wi-
dows were under 40.101
Further potentially impoverishing effects of HIV/AIDS may come
from the stigma associated with the disease itself. What little research
has been done in this area suggests that there may be a stigma asso-
ciated with HIV/AIDS that especially impacts women’s land rights and
results in discriminatory practices that disproportionately affect wo-
men. Widowed women may be blamed for their husband’s death and
thus lose the right to use land, or they may lose jobs, be shunned by
customers, or forced to surrender property or assets to relatives.
Daughters
Inheritance of land by daughters in a given country is directly related
to marital residence and to the customary means of distributing
wealth. A woman who leaves her parental home and joins her hus-
band’s family often loses any right to inherit her parents’ land.102 As
discussed above, she also does not generally have the right to inherit
her husband’s land because it belongs to her husband’s ancestral fa-
mily. This in effect creates a double bind and ultimately eliminates in-
heritance as a means of acquiring land for many women.
Frequently, however, daughters in patrilocal societies are not con-
cerned about inheriting land from their birth family because they no
longer live in the family’s village. These customary practices manifest
themselves in different ways in different places. For example, almost
all women interviewed during field research in the Kyrgyz Republic
and India stated that they would not request land from their families
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even if they were legally entitled to family land because they moved
away from their birth family.
Also, in traditional African communal tenure systems, daughters did
not need to inherit the property of their parents to protect them except
when they were unmarried or had divorced and returned home, at
which time an arrangement was negotiated with their parents’ clan so
that they would have access to land.103 Even though in Uganda, the
Succession Act provides that children have the right to share seventy-
five percent of their parents’ land equally among themselves, few
daughters inherit land, and those who do usually only retain the use of
the land while they are living with their family and do not have the
right to sell the land.104
India provides a good example of how law and custom work in the
area of women’s right to land via inheritance as daughters. In India,
the Hindu Succession Act provides that daughters can inherit the prop-
erty of their parents. Hindu personal law, as followed in most of India
other than West Bengal, divides property into two classes: separate
property and joint family property. Separate property is usually self-
acquired and includes land the deceased purchased or received from
the government, devolves in the first instance in equal shares to the de-
ceased’s sons, daughters, surviving spouse and, if the deceased is a
man, to his mother.105 Joint family property is ancestral property. Tradi-
tionally, only males were eligible to become “co-parceners” and receive
a share of the joint family property at birth. But a 2005 amendment to
the Hindu Succession Act gives both sons and daughters independent
birth rights as co-parceners in joint family property.106
Despite the positive change for women brought with the Succession
Act, field research in Karnataka State (which had amended the Hindu
Succession Act to allow daughters to be co-parceners years before the
2005 amendment to the federal act) revealed that daughters generally
do not exercise their right to inherit land from their natal families, nor
do they exercise their present ownership right to the joint family land
as co-parceners. The only exception to these findings was when a
woman did not have brothers. Two common reasons were given for
why daughters were not asserting their rights under the Succession
Act: (1) their families had paid or would pay very high dowries and
other expenses to get them married; or (2) their families had limited
land and they felt uncomfortable asking to take a share of that small
parcel of land away from their brothers. From the perspective of these
women, they received their share of the family property through their
dowry and wedding expenses even though dowry was not given to
them but rather to the groom and his family.107
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IX. Women’s knowledge of land rights and ability to enforce
these rights
While countries and legislatures should enact or amend legislation –
family law, civil law and property registration laws – to provide women
with equal access to and security in land, it is equally important to edu-
cate women and men about these rights. Women need to know their
rights and be able to use their rights once they have them.
Women must be educated about the complexity of land issues, the
nature of rights and obligations, the relationship between different
laws and practices, the options available for enforcing land rights, and
the limitations of the legislation and the implementing bodies. Knowl-
edge of both formal systems and informal systems for exercising land
rights is critical in most parts of the world.
To ensure land rights for women, land rights literacy and notions of
gender equity must be mainstreamed into society. Women and men,
male local leaders, farmers, judges and land professionals must under-
stand the law and its implications. Property law will have greater value
if there are many people who understand it and are empowered to use
it to protect their rights, and if people respect the decisions that may
be obtained from a formal process.
Major legal changes will not be effective without a sustained effort to
implement them and to gain broad public support for them. While na-
tional workshops, training material and mass media campaigns are
able to alert the public to new laws, they do little toward effecting a
change in attitude or action unless they are augmented by efforts of lo-
cal people who both understand and support the changes. Combining
a mass media effort with a sustained presence of knowledgeable people
at the village level will have a much more lasting effect.
For real change to occur there must be several different levels of le-
gal literacy and education regarding women’s economic and legal
rights:
– Educating policy makers and local customary leaders on the eco-
nomic value of women having secure rights to land;
– Educating husbands regarding the economic benefits available
when their wives purchase land or have rights to land;
– Educating women regarding dispute resolution if rights to land are
impeded;
– Educating everyone on new laws and programs; and
– Educating women regarding their right to land from the marital
household.
Women’s NGOs and other groups can be especially helpful in educat-
ing and including women. One example is the role of the Laos
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Women’s Union (LWU) in educating women regarding their land
rights in relation to the Lao PDR titling and registration project, fi-
nanced with funds loaned by the World Bank. LWU is the official state
organization that advocates for gender equity and has been very active
and effective in working with legislators and state programs to extend
legal rights to women. LWU has also been a very active and integrated
member of the registration project’s systematic adjudication teams
since 1998, when it was perceived that women were being excluded
from the land adjudication process. This was an innovative action as
most land titling projects in any region have not attempted to work
with women’s organizations.
One major role of LWU in the land titling process is that of informa-
tion dissemination, particularly to women, regarding the process itself.
LWU produces and distributes communication materials such as calen-
dars, posters, TV and radio spots, and song tapes in villages. It is also
involved in educating citizens who receive land titles with regard to the
risks and benefits of such titles. LWU produced a booklet in 2002 on
the legal situation of women in Lao PDR, extracting sections and arti-
cles from several laws relating to land and women. This booklet was
being updated in late 2004 with recent legislation such as the new law,
Development and Protection of Women, recently approved by the Na-
tional Assembly.
At the first village meeting with the titling project’s systematic adju-
dication team, mostly village men are present. Several days or a week
later, LWU organizes a meeting with village women. The gender issue
is treated in depth at this meeting, particularly women’s property
rights. LWU staff interviewed in Vientiane feel that it is for this reason
that the number of titles issued to women and joint titles has in-
creased.108
X. Recommendations and lessons learned
Anyone concerned with promoting the capacity of the poor to improve
their well-being must also be concerned with the capacity of women to
improve their well-being and the well-being of their children. In most
of the developing world, women’s sphere of operation is the household,
and land programs must reach inside the household to be effective.
While women produce a large percentage of the world’s food, they
continue to be disadvantaged in terms of their ability to purchase land,
to receive land through inheritance or government programs, to have
secure rights to land and to dispose of land. Changing these facts will
require not only legal change but also societal change. It is critical,
therefore, that male and female leaders both within the country and
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within donor organizations make a commitment to change that in-
cludes speaking out publicly against gender bias and making the elimi-
nation of gender bias a priority issue.
Policy and legal change
Even though policy and legal change alone will not be sufficient to ef-
fectuate gender equity in land rights, many legal steps can be taken to
move toward this outcome. Donor projects and government efforts will
not only need to address property law and contract law, but also family
law. At a minimum, a review of the family code, the inheritance rules
and civil legislation related to co-ownership will be necessary to under-
stand fully women’s rights to land within the specific legal system. Le-
gal interventions should be reviewed periodically to gauge whether they
are having their desired effect and whether they are known and being
used by women.
The key issues for a woman’s rights to land all revolve around her
status in a family – whether she is a wife, mother or daughter, and
whether she is unmarried, married, divorced or widowed, and this sta-
tus may change over time. Each role entails different rights related to
property within the tribal, community or family system. Legislation
and regulations that affect women’s status in the family also affect her
ability and right to land.
The legal requirement that land that is acquired during a marriage
or consensual union belongs to both partners will probably have the
biggest impact on a woman’s rights to land because it will affect her
ability to keep land in case the marriage dissolves through death, di-
vorce, separation, or abandonment. Where dowry is given, one way to
eliminate the situation where men receive money or property when
marrying but women receive nothing would be to mandate universal
co-ownership by law; that is, provide in legislation that all property that
is accrued after or on behalf of the marriage be deemed to be jointly
owned by the married couple, with no exceptions for gifts or inheri-
tance. A different rule would be necessary for bride price, which is tra-
ditionally given to the bride’s family and not the bride. Depending on
the country context, the law might require that the bride price be held
by the bride’s family in trust for her or that she be given a portion of
the bride price at the time of marriage. The difficulty with dowry and
bride price is that legislation without community acceptance is ineffec-
tive. It may be an effective use of donor funds to help broker these
types of community agreements and could potentially have an impact
on the economic and physical security of women and children.
An additional safeguard for women would be to ensure that registra-
tion legislation and regulations specifically require that registration of-
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ficials register land and other immovable property in the names of wo-
men and men who are married or living in consensual unions. Even
without co-ownership, however, the law should require both husband
and wife to consent in writing to a transaction to dispose of land ac-
quired during the marriage or cohabitation, regardless in whose name
the land is registered. A further safeguard would be to require that a
wife appear before the notary to consent to the transaction. The right
to consent to disposal of land is certainly less than the right to co-own-
ership, but it is critical for women’s use rights to land within their
unions. This is especially true in customary land systems in Africa.
For countries where polygamy is practiced, with or without protec-
tion under the law, legislation is needed that would essentially protect
the first wife’s share of the marital property from the other wives. This
could be achieved if upon taking of a second wife, all property belong-
ing to the first marriage or consensual union would be partitioned and
divided. In this case the husband would only have his share to distri-
bute to his new wife and children. Then subsequent wives should have
the same legal protection as first wives (co-ownership) in relation to
the remaining property.
The privatization and land tenure reform processes offer an espe-
cially promising opportunity for ensuring women’s rights to land be-
cause the State has complete power to determine who will own the
land. State land that is privatized (or private land that is transferred to
the landless) should be titled at least in the name of husband and wife,
either through joint titling or distribution of individual titles to women
as well as men.
Finally, women must have effective mechanisms to enforce their
land rights. The closer the dispute resolution body is to the home, the
more likely women will be able to make use of it. A legislative review
of dispute resolution mechanisms should look at where disputes are
adjudicated, what is required for a dispute to be heard, and how the is-
sues of money, time and literacy influence the dispute resolution pro-
cess. In areas where customary or religious law is strong, involvement
of the recognized community elders or religious authorities can facili-
tate dispute resolution, but they may or may not be inclined to recog-
nize women’s land rights. Qualitative field research can evaluate which
are the best types of dispute resolution bodies for women.
Customary law
Although formal legal change is important, to reach women effectively
requires understanding customary law and traditions, and also under-
standing what is possible and what is not, what women do and do not
want to change. Field information must be gathered separately for
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men and women, and data must be disaggregated by gender. Rural
women understand where to focus change and what is possible within
their communities. In Uganda, for example, rural women are not call-
ing for co-ownership of land. They call instead for rights for widows,
an achievable goal within the social context, and one supported by both
men and women. In Kyrgyzstan, rural women did not want an inheri-
tance law that divided property equally between the spouse and all chil-
dren. Rather, they felt protected by their customary law, which provides
that the house and land go to the youngest son who is responsible for
the well-being of his parents until they die. Customary laws vary
greatly, even within one country, and it is critical to understand the
rules as they relate to families, family wealth and property ownership.
In many settings, customary law is much more powerful than statutory
law, especially in rural communities and with respect to family matters.
Where there is a difference between the two in such a setting, custom-
ary law and not statutory law will generally be followed.
Information and education
Educating women about their rights to land is key to any improvement
in gender equity. Project designers and implementers should have a
plan for communicating the importance of gender issues from the
early project design phase. They must also educate project managers
and implementers and include women in all aspects of project design.
Where possible, local experts (e.g., local NGOs, other ministries, uni-
versities) with local level resources and understanding of local cultures
and traditions should be used in project communication and commu-
nity training.
Information campaigns and education must include men as well as
women and must focus on issues that specifically affect women. In
many cases, separate informational meetings for women and men are
necessary as their schedules and customs are different. A variety of
media and messages may be necessary to ensure that all potential ben-
eficiaries are included, especially considering the constraints of literacy,
language and mass media access. It should be kept in mind that in
many rural settings women, especially poor women, are not literate.
XI. Conclusion
Women’s rights to ownership, use and control over land are generally
affected by their family status as daughter, wife, widow or mother.
Property should be viewed in the context of the whole family and the
distribution of wealth within the family. However, as land becomes
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more valuable relative to moveable property, a system that once may
have been equitable and functional under customary law may no long-
er be equitable. Property systems must be reviewed in the present con-
text for their impact on women and adjusted as necessary through for-
mal law, case law, education and training. It is too easy to dismiss
equality for men and women in a property rights system as either im-
possible to achieve or as a second, less important step. In fact, if gen-
der bias is to be overcome, it must be a priority from the beginning
and throughout the life of any project or reform.
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6 Land tenure reform in India
Tim Hanstad and Robin Nielsen
I. Introduction
India’s efforts to address the unequal distribution of rural land span al-
most a century, with their origins rooted in the colonial period and
stretching to the present day. Initiatives range from broad legislative
mandates imposed by state governments to a single man walking down
rural roads seeking donations of farmland for redistribution to the
landless poor. India’s extensive experience with land tenure reform pro-
vides critical insight into many of the concepts that are the focus of the
preceding chapters, including tenancy reforms, agricultural land own-
ership ceilings, and the allocation of micro-plots to landless house-
holds.
The results of the decades of reform efforts in India have been pre-
dictably varied, often reflecting not only the design and implementa-
tion of particular reforms, but also the economic, political, and social
environments in which they arose. Through a review of the history of
India’s land tenure reforms, this chapter provides an opportunity to
witness a country’s efforts to address the challenge of rural poverty and
inequality with specific policies, targeted legislation and directed pro-
grams. Examination of India’s experience provides a unique opportu-
nity to chronicle the effects of specific policies and legislative language
as they play out over time.
Moreover, India’s experience with land tenure reform is far from
over. Perhaps more than in any other country, policy makers in India
have demonstrated a willingness to examine past and existing reforms
with a critical eye and to consider new approaches that draw on those
experiences, to reflect on the lessons learned, and also to recognize
new rural realities. India’s highest policy-making body, the National
Development Council (consisting of the most senior central and state-
level policy makers) recently adopted India’s 11th Five-Year Plan.1 The
Plan recognizes the achievements (and failures) of past land tenure re-
forms and expressly notes the continued relevance of land rights, the
significant challenges remaining, and the need to consider new meth-
ods to bring the promised benefits of land tenure reform to the rural
poor. At the state level, some policy makers have already taken up the
challenge. Demonstrating significant initiative, officials in several
states have taken bold and creative steps to reconsider land policies.
The need for such efforts is acute, and the new policy directives and
programs show early promise.
India’s business, technology and manufacturing sectors have been
major sources of rapid economic growth in recent years. However,
much of India’s population has not shared in these economic gains.
Approximately 70% of India’s estimated 1.1 billion people live in rural
areas, and 60% of the total workforce works primarily in agriculture.2
Some 35% of India’s population still survives on less than one dollar
per day; 70% exists on two dollars a day or less, a higher proportion
than in Africa.3
India contains the largest concentration of rural poor people and the
largest number of landless households on the planet.4 The grim statis-
tics are connected: while India faces significant and entrenched pro-
blems stemming from an inadequate system of education and the per-
sistence of caste distinctions, landlessness is a better predictor of pov-
erty than either illiteracy or membership in the lower castes.5 In large
measure, land access determines a rural family’s status, their livelihood
options and their prospects for the future.
The link between landlessness and poverty in India has been long
recognized. Perhaps no country has matched the volume of land ten-
ure reform legislation produced by India since its independence in
1947, an amount amplified by the rare constitutional requirement that
each individual state must enact its own laws on this subject.6 India’s
experience demonstrates, however, that adopting well-intended laws
does not, by itself, guarantee intended results. From the perspective of
most rural poor, most Indian land tenure reform laws have not had the
desired effect, and some legislative provisions have had perverse and
unintended consequences. As a result, despite decades of well inten-
tioned effort, India’s poorest households still struggle for access to ru-
ral land and land tenure security.
This chapter describes India’s legislatively driven efforts to provide
the rural poor with access to agricultural land. Section II describes In-
dia’s post-Independence legislative initiatives to increase land access.
Most prominent among these first-generation initiatives are the aboli-
tion of intermediaries, reform of tenancy relations and imposition of
ceilings on landholdings. The chapter discusses these and other efforts
in some detail because India’s experience offers insight into the design,
implementation and impact of these more traditional land tenure re-
forms. India’s experience with these initiatives forms the foundation
for the country’s movement toward a second generation of land re-
forms.
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As described in Section III, India’s current efforts to rethink and re-
vise approaches to increasing land access and land tenure security are
yielding promising early results – in large measure because policy ma-
kers and planners are absorbing some of the lessons of the post-Inde-
pendence land reforms. This portion of the chapter discusses the les-
sons of the first generation of land reforms and describes several new
approaches designed to increase land access and improve land tenure
security for rural poor households. India’s recent experiences challen-
ging old assumptions with new initiatives point toward a promising
future in which land policies, laws and programs make it possible for
secure rights to land to improve the livelihoods of the single largest
concentration of the poorest and most disadvantaged people.
II. India’s first-generation land reforms
A. Abolition of intermediaries
At the time of independence in 1947, Indian agricultural land was ad-
ministered under three broad types of land tenure systems: the zamin-
dari system, the ryotwari system, and the mahalwari system. The za-
mindari system was the most widespread, covering 57% of cultivated
land in British India.7 Under this system, feudal lords and land tax col-
lectors were proprietors of the land with the authority to collect rent.
The tillers of the land became tenants whose fortunes were dependent
upon the wishes and whims of the zamindars. Over time, the larger za-
mindars freed themselves from the burden of managing their estates
and collecting rents from cultivators by contracting out the rent-collect-
ing rights. In some areas, multiple layers of intermediaries separated
the zamindar from the actual cultivator.8
The second type of land tenure system was the ryotwari system,
which covered about 38% of cultivated land in British India, mostly in
southern India.9 The ryotwari system recognized individual cultivators
as proprietors of their land with generally recognized rights to transfer
their land. The system did not legally recognize any kind of intermedi-
ary interest between the cultivator and the state; the proprietors paid
land revenue directly to the colonial administration. Nonetheless, infor-
mal intermediaries of the zamindari type emerged even in areas where
the ryotwari systems had strongholds, partly as the result of the infiltra-
tion of traders and moneylenders into agriculture. Over time, many
ryots took advantage of their power to transfer by renting out part or all
of their land to tenants, mostly sharecroppers.
Only approximately 5% of British India’s cultivated land was admi-
nistered under the third type of land tenure scheme, the mahalwari sys-
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tem. Under this system, village units paid land revenue. Peasant farm-
ers contributed shares of the total amount of land revenue owed by the
village in proportion to their holdings. The mahalwari system existed
in most of present-day Punjab and Haryana, as well as parts of Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh.
The existence of intermediary interests fostered inefficiency and in-
equity. British authorities had assumed that by giving zamindars and
other tax-collecting authorities proprietary rights and fixed tax
amounts, efficient collaboration between landlords and tenants would
follow. The authorities assumed that zamindars would provide manage-
rial expertise, technical knowledge and capital, while tenants would
supply their labor – a symbiotic relationship that would increase agri-
cultural production and productivity. Such symmetry of contribution
was never achieved on a large scale. Many zamindars mistreated
tenants through practices such as rack-renting and summary evic-
tions.10
The abuses of the intermediary systems attracted attention during
the struggle to end British rule, and in the period immediately follow-
ing Independence the country’s new leaders paid particular attention
to the abolition of intermediary interests in land. The Indian Constitu-
tion, which grants the states exclusive authority to enact land tenure
legislation, provided a starting point.11 By the end of the 1950s, almost
all states had enacted legislation abolishing intermediary interests
upon payment of compensation.
Results were mixed. On one hand, the legislation transformed
roughly 25 million “superior” tenants (not necessarily the tillers) into
landowners or tenants holding land directly under the government,12
intermediaries lost status and power, and the legislation reduced inci-
dents of forced labor and other forms of oppression.13 As zamindars
were forced to share power with their former “superior” tenants, these
beneficiaries of the reforming legislation gained in social status and
political power. The abolition of intermediaries also reduced the multi-
plicity of legal land tenures that previously existed, simplifying and
clarifying land tenure law in most Indian states, to the benefit of the
poorer members of society. Finally, legislation abolishing intermedi-
aries brought large areas of cultivable wasteland, forests and abadi land
(house plots and other land in villages) under state ownership. States
subsequently distributed a considerable amount of this land to poor
beneficiaries (as discussed in Section II D below).
For all the benefits realized, however, laws to abolish intermediary
interests still fell well short of their potential. First, the laws created
the impetus for zamindars to evict substantial numbers of tenants
through various methods, including taking advantage of loopholes in
the laws;14 the zamindars were particularly successful at evicting “non-
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superior” tenants (a classification that included the poorest farmers),
many of whom had directly farmed the land from which they were
evicted for generations.15
Second, the combination of these loopholes and other shortcomings
in the laws opened the door for intermediaries to gain ownership over
much or even all of the land for which they had previously held only
an intermediary interest.16 Meanwhile, the states generally compen-
sated the ex-intermediaries more than adequately for the rights they
did lose – as high as 15 to 30 times their annual net income derived
from the land.17 Frustratingly, most did not repay the favor: the ex-
intermediaries were generally disinclined to invest their windfalls in
industry or other activities beneficial to the economy.18
Third, while state laws often granted tenants the right to purchase
lands from willing landlords at set rates, the states set high purchase
prices, and the rules required tenants to make installment payments
within a relatively short period.19 Few could afford the purchase prices,
and an opportunity for tenants to become landowners slipped by.
In sum, the legislation reduced the feudal nature of agrarian rela-
tionships in much of India, and despite deficiencies in the legislation,
overall the states implemented this phase of India’s land reforms more
successfully than they implemented the land ceiling and tenancy re-
forms that followed. However, flawed legal provisions and less-than-
effective implementation led to large-scale evictions and missed oppor-
tunities to protect and empower many tenants. A stronger focus on
providing rights to those who actually tilled the land, as in the contem-
poraneous land tenure reforms in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan,
would almost certainly have achieved better results.20
B. Tenancy reforms
The weaknesses in legislation and implementation that limited the ef-
fectiveness of the abolition of intermediaries were more pronounced in
India’s efforts at tenancy reform. In the period immediately after Inde-
pendence, tenant farmers comprised an estimated 35% of India’s rural
population.21 The tenancy system favored powerful landlords at the ex-
pense of their tenants. Most tenancies were oral and terminable at will,
and most tenants had no other economic opportunities and therefore
were severely disadvantaged in their bargaining relationships with their
landlords.22 These exploitive tenancy relationships were ripe for legisla-
tive intervention.
In the 1960s and 1970s, every Indian state passed tenancy reform
legislation. As with the efforts to abolish intermediaries, equity and ef-
ficiency concerns supplied the fuel for the tenancy reform. Unlike leg-
islation to abolish intermediaries, central government policy guidelines
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directed state tenancy legislation. Unfortunately, central government
guidance on matters such as maximum rents and the ability of land-
owners to resume tenanted land brought little additional success dur-
ing the first-generation land reforms.23
In most states, tenants who remained on tenanted land became en-
titled to permanent rights, with a significant exception for “resumable”
land. While the legislative approaches varied by state, most tenancy
laws permitted landowners to resume tenanted land for personal culti-
vation, which was often broadly defined to include land farmed by la-
borers. Landowners took full advantage of the liberal definition to re-
tain ownership of tenanted land.24
Half-conceived, often lackluster implementation methods led to even
wider gaps between the declared objectives of the tenancy reform policy
and law and actual achievements in the field. For example, a village-
level examination of the implementation of the tenancy reforms in Ma-
harashtra found that local officials were unable to enforce the terms of
the legislation: tenants were dispossessed and previously tenanted land
vested in landlords because tenant names were removed from revenue
records, revenue officials could not establish tenancy relationships be-
cause of a lack of documentation, or tenants were coerced to surrender
their rights. Researchers concluded that in some villages half of the
tenants lost land rights as a result of the reforms.25
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the tenancy laws related to
the creation of new tenancies. The laws fall on a continuum. Some
states such as Karnataka prohibit tenancy altogether, with a few minor
exceptions. Karnataka’s tenancy law gives the state the power to seize
leased-out land without compensating the landowner and to distribute
the land to land-poor families.26 In contrast, while West Bengal gener-
ally does not allow fixed-rent tenancies, the state does permit share-
cropping (although, because the law thereby gives permanent rights to
such sharecroppers, the law discourages landowners from entering into
new sharecropping relationships).27 At the far end of the spectrum,
Maharashtra’s laws permit tenancy relationships but grant tenants
rights to purchase leased land, creating a disincentive for landowners
to enter into leasing relationships.28
Impact of tenancy reform
India’s tenancy reform legislation largely failed to achieve its goals of
protecting tenants and providing land ownership rights to the landless
rural poor. In the decades following enactment, the laws provided 12.4
million tenants with rights to 15.6 million acres of land.29 This com-
prises about 8% of rural households and 4% of India’s agricultural
land.30 While the achievement cannot be discounted for those who
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benefited, significant negative impacts experienced by a far larger
group offset the positive results. First, tenancy reform caused the large-
scale eviction of tenants. One study estimates that the legislation
caused landlords to evict tenant families from as much as 33% of In-
dia’s agricultural land.31
Second, the tenancy laws prevented poor farmers from accessing
land through tenancy. Rural households often believe that landowners
risk losing some rights to their land when they rent it out. As a result
some landowners let their land lie fallow rather than assume risks as-
sociated with leasing it out, and landowners who rent out land tend to
rent only to those whom they trust not to assert rights. For extra pro-
tection, the landowner may also rotate tenants to different parcels, of-
ten every year.32
Third, broad restrictions on tenancy also act to deny women and
other marginalized groups a reasonable means of safeguarding land ac-
cess. In many cases, village elites and male relatives may usurp land
owned by women. Where such practices exist, women’s land tenure se-
curity may be best served through long-term lease arrangements to her
male relatives. Restrictions against tenancy frequently prohibit such ar-
rangements, undermining a female landowner’s efforts to enter into
protective contractual arrangements on favorable market terms. And
while groups of women have often found leasing to be a useful tool for
accessing land, this approach is constrained because of the legislative
restrictions.33
Rethinking restrictions on tenancy to help the poor
Throughout much of the 20th century, tenancy in many parts of the
developing world – including India – was cast in the role of an exploita-
tive institution and charged with negatively impacting socially optimal
equity and productivity outcomes. This perception was understandable
in the period before and immediately after Indian independence. In an
agrarian setting characterized by strict social and economic hierarchy
where overwhelming numbers of rural poor lacked access to land other
than as insecure tenants and any other economic opportunity, tenants
had little bargaining power, and many landlords exploited their posi-
tions of economic and social privilege.
These characterizations are, overall, considerably less accurate today.
While still present, economic and social hierarchies have weakened. A
growing economy along with targeted social, political and economic in-
terventions have helped to reduce poverty, increase social empower-
ment, and provide other opportunities to an increasing number of poor
rural households. This progress is reflected, in part, by higher (albeit
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still low) agricultural labor wages and a shrinking proportion of the
working population in agriculture in many parts of the country.
Moreover, since the enactment of tenancy reform legislation in India
decades ago, a broader consensus in the economic literature has
emerged that concludes land rental markets in general – and share-
cropping relationships in particular – can play a substantial role in
increasing land access for the poor. Rental markets can supply a critical
rung on the “agricultural ladder” toward land ownership, particularly
as growing economic opportunity (especially non-agricultural opportu-
nity) and sociopolitical advancements erode feudal-like vestiges and im-
prove the bargaining position of poor tenants.34 Both land sales and
land rental markets are capable of enhancing transfers of land from
land-rich to land-poor households. Of the two, theory and empirical evi-
dence indicate that the rental market supplies the more commonly
practicable conduit.35 Land ownership conveys much greater benefits
(particularly concerning credit access, tenure security, social and politi-
cal empowerment, and wealth), but access to land via land rental is of-
ten a more feasible, albeit decidedly second-best alternative to land
ownership. While being a tenant farmer is rarely as beneficial as being
an owner-operator, tenants are generally better off than evicted ex-
tenants working as agricultural laborers.36
A systematic economic analysis of tenancy in India provides strong
empirical support that legislatively placed restrictions on tenancy in In-
dia result in decreased land access by both the landless and more effi-
cient producers.37 A 5,000-household survey conducted in India that
collected data over a 17-year period found that tenancy restrictions limit
the supply and demand for agricultural land and prevent access to land
by the landless and most efficient producers.38 These findings are sup-
ported by results of a smaller survey of 400 households that RDI con-
ducted in Karnataka in 2001. That survey interviewed members of
landless households, tenant households that had received occupancy
rights to tenanted land through land reform, households that received
house plots through some type of government program, and those that
received agricultural land through land reform initiatives.39 This mix-
ture of respondents expressed remarkably similar attitudes toward ten-
ancy restrictions. Of those respondents expressing an opinion, 91% sta-
ted that existing tenancy restrictions harm landowners, 94% stated that
existing tenancy restrictions harm the landless, 38% reported that at
least one farmer in their village keeps land fallow rather than renting it
out because renting may lead to the loss of such land, and 45% stated
that tenancy prohibitions should be lifted.40
Land tenancy markets can also reduce the vulnerability of poor
households by offering a more stable livelihood source than frequently
volatile labor markets.41 As opportunities in the non-farm economy in-
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crease, tenancy markets can facilitate a broader choice of livelihood op-
portunities such as migration, specialization and investment. Land ren-
tal markets have more potential to provide land access to poor farmers
in settings where agriculture is not capital-intensive,42 which is most
of the agriculture in a large majority of the settings that form our focus
in this book. In addition, small owner households in positions to pur-
sue non-farm livelihoods will benefit if they are able to rent out some
or all of their land for others to cultivate, and devote their personal en-
ergies to non-farm activities. Looking to other countries, China’s ex-
perience – a setting where leasing-out is essentially legal and safe –
indicates that in a growing economy, the role of land tenancy can be
significant.43
In the course of ongoing rapid rural appraisal research in various In-
dian states, RDI generally finds that: (1) knowledge of the specific ten-
ancy reform provisions in the law is low, but most rural households be-
lieve that landowners risk losing some (often substantial) rights to their
land when they rent it out; (2) consequently, when land is rented, it is
given to people who can be trusted not to assert rights and, for an extra
measure of protection, those tenants are typically rotated, often every
year; (3) although tenancy reform laws are rarely implemented, they of-
ten play a major role in landowner decisions about renting-out land
and lead to less active rental markets than would otherwise be expected
and to some sub-optimal utilization of land, thus creating a classic
lose-lose situation (i.e., the non-implemented law brings few benefits,
but its overhang distorts the rental market, with a considerable nega-
tive impact); and (4) land-poor households almost always wish that
more land was available for rental; they do not fear exploitive landlord
practices nearly as much as they fear not being able to access land to
improve their livelihoods.44 The conclusions are supported by the find-
ings of the 5,000-household survey noted above, which suggests that
lifting tenancy restrictions would lead to increased land access and in-
come for many poor and landless families and increase agricultural
productivity.45
India’s policy makers echo these conclusions in the 11th Five-Year
Plan, issued in December 2007. The Plan notes that although some
former tenants benefited from tenancy laws by receiving ownership
rights to land, the laws in some areas are now restricting access to land
by the landless and marginal farmers wishing to lease in land, redu-
cing productivity of the land and the supply of agricultural land due to
landowners’ fear of losing land rights under tenancy laws, and creating
an unregulated tenancy market that permits exploitative relationships.
The Plan recognizes the need to revisit tenancy legislation and revise
restrictions in a manner that recognizes the need to balance the inter-
ests of landowners, tenants and prospective tenants.46 Several states
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are considering such revisions to their tenancy laws (see discussion in
Section III E).
C. Agricultural landownership ceilings
As the third major legislative effort to equalize land ownership in the
years following Independence, all Indian states placed ceilings on the
amount of agricultural land a person or family can own, with the objec-
tive of equalizing landownership. The laws authorized states to take
land that exceeded the ceiling from larger landowners and redistribute
that land to poor, landless or marginal farmers.
The policy of imposing landownership ceilings evolved slowly after
Indian independence and generally enjoyed less consensus than land
tenancy reforms. The lengthy, somewhat troubled history of ceiling leg-
islation reflects an inherent dichotomy at the national level and in
some states: policy makers are philosophically committed to the impo-
sition of land ceilings, yet at local levels implementation poses an enor-
mous threat to the interests of landowners and leaders alike.
Indian states enacted and enforced ceiling laws in two phases: the
period from 1960 to 1972, when no specific policy guidelines yet ex-
isted, and the period since 1972, after adoption of national policy
guidelines. Laws adopted in the first round were ripe for constitutional
challenge and full of loopholes that large landowners used to circum-
vent the legislative objectives.47 The laws set high ceilings48 and did
not prohibit anticipatory transfers (which enabled large landowners, in
anticipation of the law, to conduct partitions and fictitious transfers).
Exemptions were numerous,49 and ceiling limits were set on the basis
of individual holders as the unit and not on a family basis, thus allow-
ing partitions among family members to evade the ceiling legally.50
The central government enacted national guidelines to give the effort
some teeth, and states responded by lowering ceilings, refining defini-
tions, and limiting some exemptions.51 The ceilings now range from
nine standard acres (3.6 hectares)52 in parts of Jammu and Kashmir to
54 standard acres (21.8 hectares) for certain circumstances in Gujarat,
Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and Tamil
Nadu.53 In nearly every law, however, the compensation paid is negligi-
ble when compared with the market value of the land. In all states, the
landowner with land in excess of the ceiling may choose which land
the government will take.54
The national guidelines stipulate that priority in ceiling-surplus land
distribution should be given to landless agricultural workers, particu-
larly those belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Most
states have generally followed this advice. In some states, first priority
is given in the distribution of ceiling land to tenants dispossessed in
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that area; other states provide no such priority. Some states provide for
distributing the ceiling-surplus land free-of-charge to beneficiaries (in-
cluding West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh). Other states re-
quire beneficiaries to pay a specified amount in suitable installments,
which in some cases is equal to the amount paid by the state govern-
ment to the dispossessed landowner. State laws also vary in the type of
rights received by the beneficiaries. Many states permanently prohibit
transfers by beneficiaries. Other states, such as Karnataka, prohibit the
beneficiaries from transferring their land for a period of years (ranging
from 10 to 20 years). Still other states allow such transfers only with
the permission of the local land revenue authority.55
Overall impact of ceiling laws
By the end of 2005, state governments across India had declared 7.3
million acres of above-ceiling land, which is approximately 1.8% of In-
dia’s agricultural land. Of that land, the governments had taken posses-
sion of 6.5 million acres and had distributed 5.4 million acres to a total
of 5.6 million households. The total of ceiling-surplus land distributed
amounts to approximately 1% of India’s agricultural land and 4% of ru-
ral households.56
The only states where more than 5% of the cultivated agricultural
land area has been redistributed as ceiling-surplus land are West Ben-
gal, Jammu and Kashmir, and (perhaps) Assam.57 West Bengal leads
India, accounting for 40% of the ceiling-surplus land beneficiaries and
about 20% of the distributed ceiling-surplus land in India. West Ben-
gal’s ceiling legislation set a relatively lower landownership ceiling than
the other states and redistributed the surplus land in smaller plots. In
addition, the law has fewer loopholes than most other land ceiling pro-
visions, and the state government’s emphasis on distributing the bene-
fits widely (but in smaller plots) led to more grassroots support for the
process.58
The impact of ceiling legislation in West Bengal has been substan-
tial: 34% of all agricultural households have received ceiling-surplus
land, in amounts averaging 0.4 acre per household, and studies have
documented the importance of the ceiling-surplus distribution in both
bettering the livelihoods of beneficiaries and promoting agricultural
growth and stability in the countryside.59
In other states, the impact of ceiling laws fell short of expectations
for several reasons: (1) the state governments paid inadequate compen-
sation for the land taken, which made the programs unpopular with
landowners; (2) landowners used gaps and loopholes in the laws to
their advantage; (3) states often distributed the relatively small amount
of land obtained in relatively large parcels, benefiting only a small per-
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centage of landless families; and (4) outdated and incomplete land re-
cords made implementation of the ceiling legislation more difficult.
The disappointing impact of ceiling laws is largely due to persistent
deficiencies in the legislation and a similarly persistent lack of political
will to implement the legislation effectively. In many cases, ceiling leg-
islation was incomplete and allowed large landowners to avoid the law.
Most significantly, however, the laws failed to provide fair compensa-
tion to landowners. Even after policy makers revised the laws to pro-
vide more favorable payments, government officials lacked the will to
make compulsory land purchases from the relatively powerful land-
owning class. The lack of adequate land records also made redistribu-
tion efforts more difficult.60
The lack of political will to confront and dismantle existing power
structures, to trace land rights through incomplete, outdated (or other-
wise poor or nonexistent) record-keeping systems, and to dedicate time
and resources to programs unpopular with politically influential land-
owners has continued to the present day. The 11th Five-Year Plan speci-
fically recognizes the small percentage of land distributed and the ex-
tent to which much of the area declared surplus but undistributed is
held up in litigation or from which the beneficiaries have been dispos-
sessed. The Plan calls for the speedy disposition of land cases pending
in courts, the identification of cases where beneficiaries have been dis-
possessed and land restored, and joint investigation by Revenue De-
partment officials and Gram Sabha members of fictitious transactions
and transfers made to avoid the law.61
D. Allocation of Bhoodan land, government wasteland and house sites
India’s land reform efforts are typically described as comprising only
the three categories of reforms discussed above: abolition of intermedi-
aries, tenancy reform and ceiling-surplus redistribution. The reforms,
however, also included other significant and sometimes overlapping
measures. These measures, which are briefly outlined below, include
the distribution of Bhoodan land, the allocation of government waste-
land, and the allocation or regularization of land for house sites (or
homesteads).
Distribution of Bhoodan land
Vinob Bhave, a disciple of Mahatma Ghandi, started the Bhoodan (land
gift) movement in 1951 in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh.
Bhave took up the cause at a time when armed land grabbing ostensi-
bly to aid the landless poor was gathering momentum. Bhave asked
landowners to donate a portion of their land for peaceful distribution
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to the landless. With a goal to obtain 50 million acres of donated land,
Bhave traveled on foot throughout India requesting donations.
Before he ceased his work in 1969, Bhave received 39 million acres
of land through the Bhoodan movement. However, of the land donated,
only 22 million acres has been formally distributed to the poor.62 The
remainder has not been distributed for a variety of reasons. In some
cases, the land was unfit for agriculture or had been encroached upon.
In other cases, heirs contested the land donation or land documents
were missing or contained irregularities. Some researchers also note
that the land that has been allocated is of poor quality.63
The actual distribution of Bhoodan land with legal documents has
continued in a sluggish manner through the present day.64 Dissatisfied
with the pace of progress, the Ministry of Rural Development tasked
the Committee on State Agrarian Relations and the Unfinished Task of
Land Reforms65 to review the progress of distribution of Bhoodan land
in all states and suggest measures for distribution of the remaining
land to the landless.66
Allocation of government wasteland
“Wastelands” are lands that are either entirely barren or are producing
significantly below their economic potential.67 An estimated 150 mil-
lion acres of India’s total land mass of 810 million acres are waste-
lands. This total acreage includes wastelands under the authority of the
Forest Department, controlled by state revenue departments, those
used for communal purposes and managed by villages or local govern-
ments, and privately owned wastelands.68
State laws provide for the allocation of government wasteland to poor
rural households under a variety of schemes, and as of 2004, state gov-
ernments reported allocating 14.7 million acres of government waste-
land to such households.69 Most of the allocation took place in the
1970s and 1980s, and six states have allocated 80% of the wasteland
granted, led by Andhra Pradesh (28% of the national total) and Uttar
Pradesh (17% of the national total). The national government does not,
however, maintain statistics on how many households have actually re-
ceived such land.70
In terms of total acreage, the amount of allocated government waste-
lands is nearly three times the amount of ceiling-surplus land redistrib-
uted. However, in contrast to the studies and literature devoted to ceil-
ing-surplus redistribution, the topic of government wasteland alloca-
tion is rarely mentioned, perhaps because the quality of such allocated
wastelands is often very poor. Our own fieldwork indicates that such
land is not only often (although not always) of poor quality, but would
require significant investment to bring it under cultivation – invest-
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ment that is frequently beyond the means of the beneficiary. In isolated
studies, researchers have typically found that a majority of the govern-
ment wastelands allocated are not utilized.71
The possibility of “soft” data may also be partially responsible for the
lack of attention to government wasteland allocation figures. In Andhra
Pradesh, for example, where more than one-quarter of such allocated
land exists, informed observers estimate that the reported grantees are
not in legal or physical possession of approximately 30% of the report-
edly allocated wastelands. In some cases, lands were distributed “on
paper” but not on the ground, or lands were distributed on the ground
but without formal legal documentation. In other cases, the grantees
were forced off the land by more powerful interests in the village.72
Section III B of this chapter discusses a project undertaken in Andhra
Pradesh to identify and correct irregularities in the distribution of such
land.
Allocation or regularization of house sites
Another feature of the first-generation land reform measures in some
Indian states is the provision of house sites or homestead plots to land-
less laborers and other land-poor households. States have provided the
land in various ways, including: (1) allocating state government land;
(2) allocating vested ceiling-surplus land; (3) allocating land under the
control of village panchayats; (4) allocating ownership of land held by
residential tenants; and (5) regularizing the possession of illegally occu-
pied land. Neither the national government nor most states maintain
systematically collected data on the numbers of households that have
received ownership of house sites by these various means, but esti-
mates place the number at about four million households nation-
wide.73 Nationwide, plots granted typically have ranged in size from
0.015 acre (about 700 square feet) to 0.10 acre (about 4,300 square
feet), with most closer to the lower end of the range.
Some states, such as West Bengal and Bihar, have enacted separate
laws allocating or regularizing house sites, but most states have incor-
porated provisions in their land reform laws, land revenue laws, or
both. A prominent example is the state of Kerala, which gave landless
agricultural laborers known as kudikidappukaran the right to obtain
permanent, heritable rights to their dwellings and the land surround-
ing the dwelling.74 Kudikidappukaran could obtain a maximum of 0.10
acre in rural areas and townships, and 0.03 to 0.05 acres in municipa-
lities. The law required kudikidappukaran to pay the landowner 25% of
the market value, half of which was to be subsidized by the Kudikidap-
pukar’s Benefit Fund. The remaining half of the purchase price was
payable by the kudikidappukar in twelve annual installments.75
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An estimated 421,000 kudikidappukaran received ownership rights
to their dwellings and surrounding land.76 Most received ownership in
the 1970s and many of the claims were settled outside of the official
channels.77 Statewide, 21,000 acres were transferred to agricultural la-
borers as homestead plots, or roughly 0.08 acres per family.78 The mi-
cro-plots gave the laborers security from eviction and, for those who
cultivated their plots, a source of food and additional income.79
In the years following Independence, the primary purpose of the
house site allocations was to provide land for a residence and (some-
times) to free agricultural laborers from the power of their employers
who are also their residential landlords. More recently, state programs
allocating micro-plots reflect recognition among policy makers that re-
latively small amounts of land can provide a household with valuable
non-residential benefits, including increased income, improved nutri-
tion, and greater status in the community, and micro-plot allocation
programs are a practical alternative to traditional land reforms (see dis-
cussion in Section III D and Chapter 4).80
III. Toward a second generation of land reform
A. Lessons learned from first-generation reforms
India’s’ first generation land reform efforts had some positive results,
particularly in a few states where they were well implemented. As of
2002, state governments had transferred 21 million acres under the
ceiling-surplus and tenancy reform legislation.81 Moreover, results of a
nationally representative survey of approximately 5,000 rural house-
holds interviewed in 1982 and again in 1999 reveal that where states
implemented land reforms, the measures had a positive impact on live-
lihoods. Households in states that implemented tenancy reforms and
land ceiling legislation experienced higher growth in income, asset ac-
cumulation and childhood education than those in states with lower
levels of land reform efforts.82
Overall, however, the first-generation land reforms fell far short of
accomplishing their objectives. Research indicates that the reform pro-
grams have not uniformly benefited the poorest and the landless and
the neediest households also lost some of the potentially beneficial im-
pacts because the state failed to provide essential supporting non-land
inputs. In addition, first-generation reforms missed a significant oppor-
tunity to provide rural women with rights to land. India’s central gov-
ernment directed states allocating government land (e.g., wasteland,
ceiling-surplus land) to title the land jointly in the name of husbands
and wives or individually in the name of the women. However, only a
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handful of states even included the directive in state allocation pro-
grams, and none were initially successful in implementing their direc-
tives.83 Only recently have the directives begun to take hold, most nota-
bly in the state of Karnataka.84
The neediest beneficiaries also lost some of the potentially beneficial
impacts of reform because the state failed to provide essential support-
ing non-land inputs. Finally, the positive impacts of the reforms that
beneficiaries realized have declined as implementation efforts have slo-
wed over time or were temporally limited, and fewer poor households
benefit from reforms. In some settings, the negative impacts of re-
forms, such as restrictions on tenancy limiting access to land by land-
less agricultural laborers, may now be outweighing the positive bene-
fits attributable to the reform effort.85
The first-generation land reforms offered India’s policy makers sev-
eral general lessons. First, in designing land reforms, governments
should respect the rights of those with existing land interests by provid-
ing adequate compensation when extinguishing or restricting their
rights. One reason why the states were able to implement abolition of
intermediary laws more fully than land ceiling laws is that they paid
substantially higher compensation under the former, and the higher le-
vels of compensation tended to result in less resistance from those
whose land rights were to be taken. In designing reforming laws, com-
pensation need not always be full market value, but should be mean-
ingful. At a minimum, it should supply a capital fund adequate to re-
produce, ad infinitum, the present net income received from the land
being taken, assuming a conservative constant return.
Second, policy makers and legislative drafters should strive for sim-
ple, comprehensible laws and legislative language. Complex legislation
creates a barrier for poor and marginalized people. Those who can af-
ford lawyers can exploit lengthy technical definitions, dense language
and complicated procedures to their advantage and to the disadvantage
of those with fewer resources, less education and less experience with
legal matters.86
Third, policy makers should reconsider outdated concepts regarding
appropriate land grants. States wishing to make allocations of land of a
size such that the income from the land is by itself sufficient to provide
the entire livelihood and raise the beneficiary households above the
poverty line have often found themselves paralyzed because sufficient
land of an appropriate quality cannot realistically be acquired to meet
that standard. The experience of the first-generation reforms has
taught that a more relevant standard exists. A sustainable livelihoods
approach recognizes that people draw on a range of capital assets to
further their livelihood objectives and acknowledges that in many cases
a diversity of assets – to which the land distributed will contribute sig-
250 TIM HANSTAD AND ROBIN NIELSEN
nificantly – will be an adequate response, including providing the best
buffer against the vulnerability factors that threaten the rural poor.87
Fourth, reform of land law and land policy can lead to beneficial so-
cial change that is at least as important as the direct economic benefits
intended for beneficiaries. The equalization of status between the za-
mindars and “superior” tenants increased the tenants’ bargaining power
and reduced opportunities for oppression. In considering land policy
reform alternatives and their possible impacts, policy makers should
give consideration to the potential non-material benefits in addition to
the material benefits.
Policy makers at the central and state levels have increasingly absorbed
the lessons of the first-generation land reforms, as evidenced by the 11th
Five-YearPlanandseveral innovativestateprograms.88SectionsIIIBandC
discuss programs that increase land access using land purchase. The 11th
Five-Year Plan recognizes that in some areas there may be insufficient
amountsofgood-qualitygovernment landtomeet theneedsof landlessand
near-landlesshouseholds. ThePlan identifies landpurchase programsas a
means bywhich states can obtain quality land.89 The state governments in
Karnataka,West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh recently initiated projects to
provide micro-plots and field plots of land to landless laborers and other
groups through landpurchaseprograms. In theseprograms, the land isob-
tained only through voluntary purchase. The voluntary nature of the pro-
gramsavoids theproblemsofpast land reformapproaches that reliedon in-
voluntarytakingsofland.All threeprogramspurchaselandinparcelsofsev-
eralacresormoreanddividethelandamongmultiplebeneficiaries.
Section III D highlights another program in Andhra Pradesh that,
with the land purchase program, is housed within the state’s Depart-
ment of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj. This program focuses
on providing rural poor households with the intended benefits of prior
land reforms by identifying gaps between promised land rights and
ground-level realities and using project-trained community surveyors
and paralegals to assist the state to provide secure land rights.
The final section discusses three areas of legislative reform: a recent
national law granting land rights to forest dwellers and two areas of po-
tential state-level legislative reform: relaxation of tenancy restrictions
and legislative support for turning West Bengal’s sharecroppers (barga-
dars) into landowners.
B. Micro-plot land purchase programs
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, large-scale micro-plot programs of-
fer a practical, cost-effective and politically palatable alternative to tradi-
tional land reforms. Micro-plot programs, which allocate plots that in-
clude or are located near the household’s house, require only a fraction
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of the amount of land considered necessary in traditional land reforms.
Land for micro-plots, which may range in size from a few square me-
ters to roughly one acre, may be acquired through market acquisition
as opposed to controversial land takings that can quickly erode political
support for a program.
Micro-plot programs recognize that small plots of land of a size suf-
ficient to allow for a house and enough room for vegetable gardening,
small animal husbandry, tree cultivation and home-based businesses
can diversify livelihood strategies and can provide protection against
environmental and economic shocks. If a household is able to make
productive use of the micro-plot, the plot can provide shelter for the
household, increase the household’s income, enhance household nutri-
tion, provide for the household’s social status within the community,
and serve as a vehicle for improving the household’s economic status
by providing access to credit.90
India’s 11th Five-Year Plan recognizes the enormous potential in mi-
cro-plot programs to meet the basic needs and provide for the futures
of the 13 to 18 million landless households, eight million of which also
have no home of their own. The Plan references micro-plot programs
in the states of Kerala (described in Section II), Karnataka and West
Bengal.91 The details of the Karnataka and West Bengal programs are
described below.
Karnataka’s micro-plot program
Based in large measure on RDI’s research findings and advocacy ef-
forts, in 2006 Karnataka’s Department of Rural Development and Pan-
chayat Raj initiated a five-year program, entitled Namma Bhoomi –
Namma Thota (Our Land – Our Garden), to provide landless agricultur-
al laborers with micro-plots with the objective of improving their social
and economic stability. Beneficiaries of the program come from fa-
milies that have not owned agricultural land for at least two genera-
tions and are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. The pro-
gram anticipates providing 500,000 landless rural households with
such plots, using either existing government land or purchasing private
land. Individual plots are between 2,250 and 4,500 square feet, de-
pending on whether the land is dry or irrigated and encourages the lo-
cal government officials implementing the programs to assist benefici-
aries by linking them with existing programs for plot development and
house construction. The program provides beneficiaries with title to
the plots, which must be registered in the name of both the wife and
husband.92
Karnataka’s micro-plot program is administered by the local govern-
ing body, the gram panchayat. The gram panchayats identify and pur-
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chase eligible land from willing sellers and create a list of eligible bene-
ficiaries to which subdivided plots from the purchased land is assigned.
As of May 2008, approximately 17,000 landless families had received
micro-plots.
West Bengal’s field and micro-plot program
In January 2006, the government of West Bengal’s Department of
Land and Land Reforms adopted Chash-O-Basobaser Bhumi-dan Prakal-
pa (Cultivation and Dwelling Plot Allocation Scheme) to provide land-
less and houseless households with micro-plots and field plots for use
as homesteads, for cultivation and to diversify their livelihood options.
The program’s objective is to provide (1) each rural family that has no
house with at least a 1,740 square feet (0.04 acre) micro-plot on which
to build a residence; and (2) each landless rural household that relies
on agricultural labor, food gathering from common property resources,
or menial labor for its livelihood and is below the poverty line with a
field plot of at least 7,000 square feet (0.16 acre) of cultivable land.93
The state Land and Land Reforms Department is charged with im-
plementing the project, primarily through sub-district level Land Pur-
chase and Land Distribution Committees, which include local officials
and members of India’s local democratically elected governing body,
the panchayat. The committees are responsible for obtaining land for
the project through purchase from willing private landowners who
wish to sell suitable land to the state for use in the project. The state of-
ficials evaluate each offer of sale from landowners for suitability and
negotiate for the purchase of selected parcels. The program guidelines
initially set ceilings on rates paid for various types of land. After early
experience suggested that the ceilings were too low, the state revised
the guidelines to allow the state to pay the market rate for land and to
exceed that rate with authorization. The program guidelines encourage
officials to purchase land in parcels large enough to create clustered
communities that share infrastructure and extension services.
The program requires the committee to select the poorest house-
holds from among landless and houseless agricultural laborer house-
holds. Of the benefits, 40% are targeted for members of scheduled
tribes and scheduled castes, 20% for tribals who are not members of
scheduled tribes, and 40% for other landless agricultural households.
Rural artisans are also eligible for homestead plots under the project.
Both the Karnataka and West Bengal programs are in their early
stages, but their designs appear to be well considered. The programs’
strengths include use of a decentralized management structure that de-
volves authority to local government officials. In addition, both pro-
grams require local officials to assist beneficiaries to obtain benefits
LAND TENURE REFORM IN INDIA 253
from existing programs providing assistance with house construction,
micro-irrigation plans, inputs such as seeds, membership in credit or-
ganizations and participation in economic development schemes. Em-
bedding these linkages within the program design helps ensure that
the beneficiaries are actually able to realize the potential benefits that
can flow from the ownership and development of micro-plots.
C. Land purchase by women’s self-help group members
In contrast to the micro-plot programs of West Bengal and Karnataka,
Andhra Pradesh’s land purchase program aims to provide field plots of
up to one acre of irrigated land per beneficiary.94 While Karnataka’s
program operates through village governments and West Bengal’s
through the state government line departments, Andhra Pradesh’s pro-
gram operates primarily through women’s self-help groups. The land
purchase activity is one component of the state government’s Indira
Kranthi Patham (IKP) program.95
The program uses institution-building and the creation and enhance-
ment of livelihood opportunities to empower rural poor people. At the
village level, women are organized into self-help groups of roughly 10-
15 women, which begin with capacity building and savings activities be-
fore graduating to income generation schemes. The self-help group lea-
ders form village organizations representing the interests of all self-
help groups in a village. Village organizations are further federated at
the mandal (sub-district) level and at the district level.
Targeting the poorest of the poor, the program initially attempted to
improve their livelihoods through institution-building and financing
for income-generating activities. However, for many within this popula-
tion, access and rights to land were primary, unaddressed issues; for
the landless, financing income generating activities (such as livestock
rearing) had proven largely ineffective because they lacked the land
base required for most such activities.
RDI worked with the state government and project staff to add a
land component that included two sets of activities: (1) land purchase
by women members of self-help groups, which is the subject of this
part; and (2) activities designed to increase land access and tenure se-
curity for the poor such as identifying government land available for as-
signment to poor households and facilitating resolution of pending
land cases, which are known as non-purchase or legal aid activities
(discussed in Section III D).
With the support and assistance of their village organizations, wo-
men agricultural laborers who are members of self-help groups search
for prospective land sellers, evaluate land available for purchase, and
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negotiate with the sellers to arrive at a purchase price for the land. The
Andhra Pradesh program has the following features:96
– Beneficiary-driven process. The self-help group members initiate the
land purchase activity, not government officials or landowners.
These self-selected beneficiaries who have shown the capacity for
land purchase identify the land, negotiate a price and develop a
business plan for farming the land.
– Purchase plus improvements; business plan requirement. The program
requires the self-help group members to consider what improve-
ments (such as adding a bore well) are necessary and to include
such improvements in their business plan. The requirement of a
business plan focuses the women on the economic feasibility of
their land purchase and requires consideration of options for land
development and cultivation.
– Cost recovery plan. The program includes a substantial grant compo-
nent and reasonable repayment terms so the self-help group mem-
bers do not end up with burdensome debt. The program allows up
to 75% of the total cost of the land purchase and any improvements
to be paid with grant funds. Each women is responsible for 25% of
the total costs, no less than 2/5 of which must be the woman’s per-
sonal contribution, either in cash or in kind. The women can pay
the balance with loans advanced from the self-help group or project.
Repayment of any loan can be spread over 15 years and carries a
market rate of interest.97 The debt repayment plan is included in
the business plan so beneficiaries can understand their financial ob-
ligation and how it affects the overall economics of the land pur-
chase option.
The program’s early experience is promising. One preliminary four-dis-
trict study of 223 households, of which 63 were beneficiary households,
found that beneficiary households experienced significantly higher le-
vels of food security, improvements in health and education, and less
migration. For example, 76% of beneficiary households reported hav-
ing two meals per day compared to 50-57% of non-beneficiary house-
holds. Beneficiary households also had a far lower rate of seasonal
migration (4%) than landless households (45%).98 However, the possi-
bility of providing a majority of the landless poor with one acre of land
through land purchase is questionable, because of the relatively high
costs per beneficiary (about US$1200) and the limited supply of appro-
priate land available for sale. State officials and project staff are evaluat-
ing designs that extend the project to include purchases of micro-plots
and support for land leasing activities.
LAND TENURE REFORM IN INDIA 255
D. Securing land rights through legal aid
In addition to providing rural poor women with access to land through
the land purchase activity described above, Andhra Pradesh’s World
Bank-funded Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Alleviation Project has a
series of activities designed to improve land access and tenure security
for poor households, which it collectively refers to as “legal aid.” These
legal aid activities are an innovative, collaborative, community-based
and highly adaptable approach to providing poor households with the
promised benefits of land reforms.99 In addition, the bottom-up, parti-
cipatory approach of the legal aid activities empowers the local commu-
nities served to develop relationships with local government officials
and experience the process of asserting and defending their legal rights
to land.
Like most Indian states, Andhra Pradesh enacted post-Independence
legislative reforms, and the state reports allocating 5.4 million acres of
land to almost three million rural poor households. However, field in-
vestigations funded by the state project found that many of the in-
tended beneficiaries had not received the intended benefits of secure
land rights. Gaps between the reported numbers and secure land rights
occur for a variety of reasons, including: (1) the assignment of land is
on paper only, and the physical possession has not been given; (2) ben-
eficiaries have been evicted from their lands; and (3) in numerous
cases, especially in areas where large compact blocks have been as-
signed to the poor (e.g., 150 acres are assigned to 100 poor families),
the survey subdivision work has not been done, so the beneficiaries
have not received their individual parcels of land. Similar circum-
stances concerning past government land allocation programs have
been reported in other states. In some cases, beneficiaries received land
but had no record of their rights. Other groups have been unable to
take possession of their land because of a lack of surveys.100
Andhra Pradesh’s efforts to address the shortcomings in earlier “allo-
cations” of government land provide a model for other states to consid-
er. The model begins with multi-faceted and decentralized efforts to
identify “gaps” of the type listed above (see Box 6.1) or other opportu-
nities to allocate unallocated government land. These gaps or opportu-
nities are then classified by project staff, after which they determine
the most appropriate approach, select a course of action, and see that
action to completion. As these activities have matured over several
years, they have become institutionalized within a framework of legal
aid activities.
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Box 6.1. Addressing “gaps” in past land allocations
Identifying “gaps” in past government land allocations and related
opportunities to provide secure land rights to the poor is a threshold
activity. The Indian state of Andhra Pradesh has used various meth-
ods for identifying and documenting this information:
Working in conjunction with community-based organizations. Rela-
tionships with community-based organizations have provided the
best source of information regarding opportunities to provide secure
rights to poor households. The project’s district-level officials keep
in touch with organizations familiar with and trusted by local people
and provide a conduit through which land information can be
passed and acted upon by appropriate officials.
Jamma bhoomi petitions. Jamma bhoomi is a people-centered devel-
opment process launched in Andhra Pradesh in 1997. The process
involves taking the state and district government administration “to
the door of the people.” Each year, more than 1,000 teams of state
and district officials hold local public meetings to listen to people’s
grievances and accept their written petitions. The project works with
local groups to facilitate applications pertaining to land issues in the
government’s Jamma bhoomi program. The information in such pe-
titions provided on land issues is computerized and may be acted
upon by various groups.
Survey and inventory of government land. In an effort to identify
problems relating to the assignment of government wasteland, the
state government initiated in January 2003 a massive, statewide,
physical inventory of existing and allocated government wasteland.
Although the survey was not completely finished, this information
has proven helpful in identifying problems with past allocation of
government land and identifying opportunities to address the short-
comings.
Official land records. Project paralegals and law students review
land records and cases maintained by the Revenue Department and
compare them to the results of field interviews to identify areas
where the land records do not reflect the ground-level reality.
In the early days of the project’s land-related work, project staff recog-
nized that the land rights of poor households were often the subject of
cases pending for years before the Revenue Department, the govern-
ment division responsible for land matters, in addition to numerous
other areas of responsibility. For example, numerous landowners con-
tested the state’s acquisition of their land under land ceiling laws and
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allocation to poor households. Procedural law requires maintenance of
the status quo until the claims are decided, preventing allocation of the
land to intended beneficiaries. The project engaged a lawyer and in co-
operation with Revenue Department officials, project staff reviewed the
backlog of cases in selected areas in two districts and identified those
involving the project’s target population of rural poor. Project staff, law
students and the Revenue Department worked together to determine
appropriate resolutions.
The initial Revenue Department case work revealed the potential for
legal aid to strengthen the land rights of poor households and identi-
fied two areas where the project could usefully expand: (1) through use
of the community-based organization structure to identify and resolve
land issues that never reach the Revenue Court system; and (2) by pro-
viding surveying assistance to overburdened government surveyors so
that cases requiring surveys can be resolved.
Elements of the land-related legal aid activities
The project developed a framework for legal aid activities based on the
following elements: employment and training of local youth as parale-
gals101 and community surveyors, management of legal aid staff by the
community-based organizations, and establishment of district land cen-
ters and community partnerships.
Paralegals. The project hires one educated youth from a disadvan-
taged family in each sub-district to train as a paralegal.102 The project
trains the paralegals on working with the members of self-help groups
and the community-based organization structure, on land laws and re-
cords, Revenue Department procedures and village inventories.103 The
paralegal also must complete coursework on land rights and poverty
law offered through the national law school.
The paralegals work directly with the self-help groups, building
awareness of land issues within self-help groups, identifying land is-
sues impacting the members, and helping the community-based orga-
nization to bring issues before the Revenue Department for resolution.
Paralegals also support the Revenue Department by providing assis-
tance with fact-finding, obtaining surveys through coordination with
the community surveyors, and arranging for legal opinions as neces-
sary.
Community surveyors. Like many states, Andhra Pradesh has a lim-
ited number of trained surveyors and a multitude of land issues that
require surveying as a precondition to resolution.104 Because the lack
of trained surveyors is delaying the ability of poor households to realize
the benefits of secure land rights, the project trains local youth as com-
munity surveyors as part of the legal aid activity. The community sur-
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veyors work in cooperation with local government surveyors and the
paralegals in an effort to increase the state’s ability to survey land, espe-
cially in cases where the resolution of land cases and receipt of title
has been pending because of a lack of surveys.
Community surveyors must successfully complete a surveying
course, receive training on land laws and records, village inventories
and working with the self-help group members. The community sur-
veyors must complete an apprenticeship with a government surveyor.
Once trained, the community surveyors conduct land surveys in coordi-
nation with the paralegals and the local government surveyors.
The legal aid activity also includes partnerships with law schools to
conduct clinical programs for law students and offer law students op-
portunities to work on land cases on a volunteer basis and has plans to
create district-level panels of lawyers to support legal aid activities. All
of the legal aid activities are centered in district-level Land Rights and
Legal Assistance Centers, which provide office space for staff, access to
land records and research materials, and assist the Revenue Depart-
ment with court procedures.
Early achievements
At the time of this writing, the legal aid activities are in their early
stages in Andhra Pradesh. However, the achievements of the method
of improving land rights are substantial. In the year in which the activ-
ities expanded statewide, legal aid staff identified land issues impacting
roughly 80,000 poor households and had resolved approximately 27%
of these problems. The issues addressed include matters relating to
issuance of pattadar passbooks (which prove land ownership, use and
encumbrances), boundaries and possession of land.
Just as significant are the less tangible benefits of the project. Legal
aid staff trained hundreds of self-help group members on land rights
and drafted handbooks on land issues for use by community members,
paralegals and Revenue Department officials. Legal aid staff helped the
Revenue Department identify areas where land may be available for
use by the poor and policy decisions that would benefit the poor. Self-
help group members report that they consider themselves capable of
discussing their legal rights and applying to government officials for
enforcement of those rights. Many Revenue Department officials have
begun to look to the legal aid staff to assist them in land matters. Final-
ly, training large numbers of local youth as paralegals and community
surveyors provides job skills to rural youth and grounds the knowledge
regarding land rights in the community.
The legal aid project in Andhra Pradesh has been assisted by several
factors, including project staff recruited from the ranks of former rev-
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enue department officers, which gives them an advantage in identify-
ing areas with significant land issues adversely affecting the poor and
local officials interested in resolving the issues, and a strong commu-
nity-based organization structure. However, the framework is highly
adaptable to other institutional and organizational settings. In some
environments, NGOs may undertake village inventories, raise aware-
ness of land rights among poor households, and develop action plans
for resolving land issues. In other areas, local governments may under-
take legal aid activities as a means of systematizing their efforts to as-
sist the poorest groups obtain access and secure rights to land.
In all settings, legal aid activities will be most successful where the
disadvantaged groups drive the process by helping to identify and
prioritize land issues and actively participating in the process of resol-
ving those issues. Participation in the process of identifying and assert-
ing legal rights to land not only provides the poor with improved land
rights but empowers them within their households and communities.
The legal aid approach to addressing the gaps between the promised
benefits of land reforms and rural realities not only can provide poor
households with intended land rights, but also the skills and experi-
ence that form the basis for social change through legal empower-
ment.
E. Increasing land rights with legislative change
In addition to the new programs for micro-plot allocation and legal aid
described in the earlier parts of this chapter, India’s policy makers also
have opportunities to improve the land rights of rural poor households
through legislative change. This section discusses the central govern-
ment’s effort to secure land rights for traditional forest dwellers and
two opportunities for future legislative change at the state level: relaxa-
tion of legislative restrictions on tenancy and assisting West Bengal’s
sharecroppers to become landowners.
Forest rights legislation
After years of debate, in December 2006 India’s parliament took a sub-
stantial and highly controversial step toward improving the livelihoods
of some of the country’s poorest and most vulnerable communities –
tribals living in or near India’s forests. A new national law grants forest
dwellers, most of whom are tribals, rights to forest land and forest pro-
ducts. The law, which is entitled the Scheduled Tribes105 and Other Tra-
ditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, is a
legislative effort to acknowledge the historical injustices suffered by the
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millions of tribals and other forest dwellers who rely on India’s forests
and forest products for their livelihoods.
India is home to approximately 68 million tribals, constituting
roughly 7% of India’s population.106 Historically, India’s tribals have
been distinguished from other rural communities in part by their de-
pendence on and communal use of land and its resources.107 Despite
the range of tribal habitations and an increasing volume of tribal mi-
gration into towns and cities for employment, the tribal economy of
the 21st century remains highly land-based.108 In particular, tribal live-
lihoods are closely linked to India’s forests, on which tribals rely for
shelter, food, fuel wood, spiritual and religious locales, and products
for sale or trade.109
As India began to formalize land rights in the 19th century, the tri-
bals’ occupation and customary use of the forest land and its resources
never translated into formal legal rights. From its initial announcement
of sovereignty over the forests, the government’s grip on forests and
forest resources has been almost absolute.110 Tribal land use resided at
the level of a discretionary privilege, which could be withdrawn at any
time and without recourse.111 Tribal rights to the land they occupy and
cultivate outside the reach of forest laws have been similarly insecure.
State and central governments have usurped large tracts of tribal land
for public projects and industrial activities, and the land has in many
areas been indiscriminately stripped of minerals and resources.112 In
addition, the precarious economic circumstances of many tribals have
resulted in the chronic and continuing alienation of tribal land to non-
tribals.113
In the last few decades, India’s central and state governments have
passed significant amounts of legislation specifically aimed at securing
tribal land rights. However, even where legislation is designed to pro-
tect tribal land interests, such as restricting alienation of tribal land or
ensuring tribals receive the benefit of land tenure reforms, the results
have been disappointing.114
The new Forest Rights Act is a departure from previous legislation
intended to protect tribal land rights in at least three important re-
spects. First, the law’s primary purpose is to secure existing (albeit in-
formally held) rights. Specifically, the law grants forest-dwelling sched-
uled tribes and other traditional forest dwellers the right to cultivate
forest land to the extent of their occupation, up to four hectares per in-
dividual, family or community. The law also grants ownership rights to
certain minor forest products, grazing areas and pastoralist corridors
that forest dwellers have traditionally used.115 As such, the law’s initial
effect is to enhance existing rights rather than constricting them or ex-
panding them, ensuring greater interest among intended beneficiaries
and reducing opposition.116
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Second, the law vests authority for determining forest rights with
the local community (gram sabha and community-established commit-
tees), trumps any conflicting law, provides enforcement powers, and
(in a lesson learned from first-generation land reforms) expressly pro-
hibits eviction of any forest dweller prior to the determination of his or
her rights under the law.117 With this combination of legislative provi-
sions, the law’s devolution of authority over forest land matters to local
communities may accomplish what prior legislation, the Panchayats
(Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), did not. The PESA
provides for tribal self-rule on matters affecting tribal society and econ-
omy at the village level and enlarged the authority of local government
to include various levels of control over local resources and pro-
grams.118 But implementation of the PESA and realization of its goals
have been spotty, in large measure because the PESA granted local
communities authority over resources in conflict with existing rights,
enforcement powers were not secured,119 and only a handful of states
adopted the PESA – with much diluted terms.120 The Forest Rights
Law’s supremacy clause and enforcement provisions give teeth to the
formalization of the rights of tribals.
Third, the rules require all three relevant authorities – the tribal wel-
fare office, Revenue Department and Forest Department – to sign off
on rights granted under the law. This requirement should help rein-
force the extent to which the drafters intended the Forest Rights Law to
govern rights previously subject to the Forest and Revenue Depart-
ments.
The rules implementing the Forest Rights Law were published on
January 1, 2008, and it remains to be seen whether the law will meet
expectations. Some success can already be claimed: the enactment of
the law reflects the central government’s continuing recognition of the
importance of land rights in addressing rural poverty; the law forma-
lizes long-standing informal rights of one of the poorest sections of In-
dia’s society; and the content of the law and the implementing rules re-
flect the ability of India’s policy makers to review the successes and
challenges of past efforts and respond with new approaches.
Removing restrictions on tenancy
The 11th Five-Year Plan recognizes that while the tenancy restrictions
enacted after Independence fulfilled a purpose and a percentage of the
poorer members of rural society benefited, as discussed in Section II
of this chapter, the benefits have now been realized, and the restric-
tions are now causing harm. Specifically, the Plan notes that existing
restrictions may restrict the ability of landless poor households to ac-
cess land through leasing it in, may cause some landowners to fear los-
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ing their rights to lessees and thus allow land to lie fallow, and may
result in concealed tenancies that exploit tenants.121 The Plan calls for
revisiting the issues of tenancy relationships and, in appropriate areas,
revising legislation to relax – if not extinguish – prohibitions against
tenancy:
Tenancy should be legalized in a “limited” manner. It should
provide security to the tenant for a contractual period, which
could be long enough to encourage long term investment by the
tenant. It should also protect the rights to the land of the land-
owner so that he has an incentive to lease his land rather than
keeping it fallow or underutilizing it. Long term tenure arrange-
ments should thus maximize agricultural production and in-
crease the returns to both the famer and landlord and tenant.122
The Plan expressly recognizes that conditions vary across the states,
and no single manner of addressing tenancy restrictions is advisable.
For example, in areas where landowners dominate and feudal relation-
ships prevail, special protections for tenants may need to be im-
posed.123 Once research is completed to determine states in which revi-
sions to tenancy laws are appropriate,124 the process should involve
two sequential, or in some settings, simultaneous steps.125
As an initial matter, legislation should consolidate the benefits of
past tenancy reform by converting “protected,” “registered,” or “occu-
pancy” tenants into owners.126 This would require legislative changes
that differ from state to state. For example, as discussed in the follow-
ing section in more detail, in West Bengal, the law could be improved
by giving sharecroppers (bargadars) a unilateral right to become owners
by “buying out” the landlord for a government-determined sum, by
providing for a streamlined voluntary transaction process, or by activat-
ing the financing mechanism for sharecropper purchases of barga land
that is already contemplated in West Bengal’s Land Reform Act.127
The second step (either taken simultaneously or following the pre-
servation and enhancement of existing rights of tenants) should focus
on liberalizing ongoing tenancy prohibitions and excessive tenant “pro-
tections.” The specific content of these amendments will differ from
state to state and will necessarily be dependent on the nature of the ex-
isting legislation. In general, however, policy and legislative changes
under consideration include the following provisions. First, where
tenancy is now prohibited, allow for tenancy but include provisions
that balance the interests of the tenants and landlords. Second, require
lease agreements to be in writing, using a standardized form that re-
quires the parties to state the rent amount, the lease length and other
important terms of the lease. Third, guarantee the tenant the right of
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exclusive possession for the duration of their agreement, but avoid un-
enforceable maximum rent payments or minimum length of terms.
Fourth, expressly provide that neither the law nor any practice will
grant new tenants any long-term rights to land or other rights beyond
what may be mutually agreed to by the parties, as evidenced in a writ-
ten agreement.
In settings where tenancy might become legally permissible or be
deregulated, our more general discussion in Chapter 2, Section IV,
must also be borne in mind. There we point out the dearth of practical
experience around the globe in designing and implementing measures
permitting or deregulating tenancy in settings where it had been un-
successfully prohibited or regulated, the principal exception being the
case of Mexico.128 In India, perhaps the prime initial candidates for de-
regulation would be the four states where government statistics indi-
cate that tenancy reforms did not confer ownership rights on, or pro-
tect the rights of, any tenants in the state: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Ra-
jasthan and Uttar Pradesh. If these results are verified, these states
have no existing beneficiaries with rights dependent on the mainte-
nance of protective laws nominally on the statute books. In such set-
tings, the states can immediately focus on options for eliminating
tenancy restrictions in a manner that balances the needs and interests
of landowners and prospective tenants.
Turning protected tenants into landowners
West Bengal provides another opportunity for improving land rights
through legislative change. In its initial legislative reforms, West Ben-
gal gave its sharecroppers (known as bargadars) substantial rights and
protections. Under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, sharecroppers
are entitled to permanent and non-transferable (except by inheritance)
rights to farm the sharecropped land and to keep a legally determined
share of the production. In addition, sharecroppers have a right of first
refusal to buy the sharecropped land. Thus, if a landowner wants to
sell his land, he must first offer it at the same price for sale to the
sharecropper. A sharecropper keeps his rights even if the owner sells
the land to a third party.129
For many years, sharecroppers were unable to enforce these rights.
In an effort to help sharecroppers realize the benefit of the law, in the
late 1970s the West Bengal government initiated Operation Barga – a
campaign to register and enforce sharecropper rights. The state has re-
gistered more than 1.4 million sharecroppers, and field studies confirm
that their rights under the law are now generally respected and en-
forced.
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However, while West Bengal’s sharecroppers have benefited from
stronger tenure security and lower crop share payments, virtually all of
them would prefer to have ownership of the land. In addition, as non-
agricultural opportunities have increased, many landowners would like
to sell their land in order to engage in other business activities. The
law has not kept pace with these changes. Instead, the law has frozen
sharecroppers in their position as tenants and effectively prevents land-
owners from selling the sharecropped land to third parties.
West Bengal can expand its already significant land reform achieve-
ments by allowing its protected sharecroppers to become landowners.
However, land sales between the many landowners and sharecroppers
who want to do business have often been prevented by legal restric-
tions on the transferability of sharecropped land and the sharecroppers’
lack of purchasing power.
The West Bengal government is now exploring legislative revisions
and other steps to support the sharecroppers who wish to become own-
ers (and helping those landlords who want to sell). These include fund-
ing a land corporation to help sharecroppers purchase the land they
farm, adopting a simpler and less costly process for the sale or ex-
change of sharecropped land to sharecroppers that includes safeguards
to prevent abuse by landowners, and setting a standard or minimum
price to be used when a sharecropper wishes to sell or purchase share-
cropped land.
At the time this went to press, neither legislative reforms relating to
tenancy generally nor to West Bengal’s sharecroppers, had been en-
acted. However, given the admirable willingness of India’s policy ma-
kers to evaluate past actions and change course as needed to meet the
needs of the poorest members of their populations, these legislative re-
visions seem likely.
IV. Conclusion
The legislative foundations of land tenure reform in India (abolition of
intermediaries, tenancy reform and land ceilings) were designed to in-
crease the poor’s access to rural land. The effectiveness of the legisla-
tion has been mixed, and in some cases decidedly negative. In recent
decades, progress under these first-generation efforts has substantially
slowed or stalled altogether.
India’s policy makers have distinguished themselves by their willing-
ness to review the impact of the first-generation reforms, identify suc-
cesses and recognize continuing challenges. At the central level, the
11th Five-Year Plan is a distinct departure from past plans, providing
unequivocal statements regarding the achievements of past reforms,
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continuing evidence of the need for further reforms, and specific guid-
ance for policy and legislative change in the areas of tenancy, land ceil-
ings and the allocation of micro-plots. At the state level, some policy
makers and program staff have taken bold and creative steps to address
rural poverty with innovative land programs. These programs are lead-
ing the way toward a second generation of land tenure reforms capable
of significantly improving the lives of the country’s rural poor. As these
efforts are developed and refined, that vast majority of other Indian
states that have yet to act must step forward to make land reforms new-
ly relevant to address the issues facing their populations of rural poor.
These state policy makers and planners can take advantage of the ex-
perience of the handful of pioneering states while creating programs of
their own that are tailored to the unique challenges of their locale.
Furthermore, the influence of India’s experience with land tenure re-
form – both in the years following Independence and in its recent new
approaches – should not be limited to its borders. India’s successes,
but equally significantly its recognition of the weaknesses in some of
its legislation and implementation efforts, offer valuable lessons to
other countries. In particular, countries such as Pakistan and Bangla-
desh, which have large numbers of tenant farmers without any real
prospect of land ownership and access to full-size farms, and those like
Indonesia with large numbers of agricultural laborers working on
small and medium holdings will benefit from India’s experience with
land allocations.
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7 From collective to household tenure:
China and elsewhere
Li Ping and Roy L. Prosterman
I. Introduction
This chapter looks at what is often thought of as a further, separate ca-
tegory of land tenure reforms: those involving movement away from
collectivized farming and towards the conferral of new, individualized
land rights upon the former collective farm workers. We have already
noted, at the beginning of Chapter 3, that there are some potentially
useful parallels between these experiences and the program-design-
and-benefit issues that arise in the redistribution of land held in large
private estates. (One major difference, of course, may be that the collec-
tivized land is almost always considered publicly owned, and hence
need not be paid for.)
There are also many more experiences of sweeping “decollectiviza-
tion” than there are of sweeping redistribution of estate land, and we
focus here especially on the case of China, where RDI has now worked
on the ground and advised policy makers for more than two decades.
The Chinese experience offers an opportunity to explore pro-poor land
tenure reform issues from three perspectives:
First, and most directly, how the world’s most populous country, still
containing roughly one-quarter of all those on the planet who depend
on farming for a livelihood, has pursued land tenure reform since its
revolution in 1949, and with what results.
Second, China was the first centrally planned economy to see the
break-up of its collective farms. The methods and consequences both
of individualizing tenure on arable land and of making such individual
tenure secure have been and remain central to China’s post-revolution
experience.
Third, China is presently facing the challenge of how to implement
a basically well-conceived set of laws that address the security of rural
land tenure. The Chinese implementation experience has potential re-
levance for pro-poor reforms of land tenure, and more generally for the
bringing of the rule of law to the countryside, for a wide range of set-
tings not limited to the formerly centrally planned or “transitional”
economies.
One key lesson of the Chinese experience has been a confirmation
of the importance of ensuring that the rural population enjoys broad-
based (indeed virtually universal) individual access to land. A second
key lesson has been that, beyond the benefits of broad individualiza-
tion, there are vitally important benefits from long-term security of
those individual rights. And a third key lesson is that any effort to
maintain an absolute per capita equality of individual landholdings by
governmental fiat (by “administrative means”), in conflict with the goal
of long-term security, carries far higher costs than benefits. Much of
this chapter’s discussion of legal issues thus concerns how to move
from bare individual tenure (very beneficial even though insecure) to
more adequate, beneficial and secure tenure.
All of the recent lessons from China, however, may be conditioned
by the fact that the land is already held in a form of public ownership
and that it need not be acquired from private landowners or involve
outlays for land costs. But as we shall see, there may be local cadres or
officials whose political response to the allocation of stronger land
rights to the cultivating farmers may not be too far different from that
of private landlords in other settings.
The land tenure reforms that China has undergone under the Chi-
nese Communist Party’s rule, beginning regionally as far back as the
1920s, have produced both dazzling successes and horrific failures. Be-
fore the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Commu-
nist Party was mostly one of poor peasants who had little or no land.
Possibly the most salient and successful measure that the Communist
Party championed and implemented was “land to the tiller." Such a
measure ensured that poor peasants received land in a highly egalitar-
ian manner and thus whole-heartedly supported the Communist Party.
In the first seven years of the new China under communist rule (1949-
1956), the central government adopted a landmark law that endowed
these peasants with full private ownership of land. As a result, China
achieved very large gains in agricultural production, and a rapid recov-
ery from the ruins of the decades-long civil war was facilitated. How-
ever, inspired by the Soviet Union’s model, ideology-oriented Chairman
Mao reversed course and started his collectivization campaign, under
which all agricultural land became the property of collective farms, and
individual peasants were banned from owning any substantial assets,
including land. China’s agriculture declined precipitously, and tens of
millions of people starved to death.
In the late 1970s and after Chairman Mao’s death, China finally
came to terms with the painful reality and gradually started a process
of decollectivization, called the “Household Responsibility System”
(HRS). While collective ownership of farmland was maintained, use
rights to such collectively owned land were given to individual farmer
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households for private farming. These broadly held individual land
rights gave rise to a notable achievement in poverty reduction during
the 1980s, with China’s arable land, merely 7% of the world’s total,
feeding adequately 22% of the world’s population. Learning from this
success, China has attempted to extend the 3-year use term initially gi-
ven to a (at least nominal) 15-year term and now to a 30-year renewable
term.
China represents a prime example of what a little individualized land
tenure can do to dramatically improve lives. But China has a long way
to go before the full benefits of secure, long-term land rights can be
realized. Importantly and urgently, the income and wealth brought by
China’s economic growth for the last two and a half decades has not
proportionally benefited the countryside. The urban-rural gap in per ca-
pita income continues to widen and has recently reached what the Chi-
nese government considers an alarming ratio of 3.33 to 1.1 The most
promising solution to these issues is to provide farmers with greater
land tenure security, permitting the farmers to make mid- to long-term
investment on the land, thereby increasing the volume, value and di-
versity of agricultural production. This requires significant legal and
policy reforms and their concrete implementation at the grassroots le-
vel.
RDI started its work in China in 1987, a few years after China’s de-
collectivization under HRS.2 Over the past 20 years, RDI has con-
ducted more than 1,000 direct farmer interviews in over 20 provinces
and four large-scale sample surveys in cooperation with Renmin Uni-
versity and Michigan State University in 1999, 2001, 2005 and 2008,
each covering between 1,700 and 2,000 farmer households in 17 pro-
vinces. The findings from such field research have greatly enhanced
and regularly updated RDI’s knowledge about farmers’ relationship to
the land which constitutes the primary means of livelihood for approxi-
mately 800 million Chinese. Beginning in 1988, this accumulating
body of rural observations has then been used as the basis for briefings
and recommendations to policy makers in Beijing.
This chapter begins with an historical overview in Section II, fol-
lowed by a discussion of tenure security benefits in Section III, and a
look at some current major issues surrounding land tenure in Section
IV. Section V then explores further tasks and reform needs, and Sec-
tion VI discusses possibilities of still more extensive tenure reform
measures.
Finally, Section VII introduces comparisons with the fate of collective
farming, and its legal surround, in the former Soviet Union, where
RDI began working in 1990.
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II. China’s changes in land tenure: An historical perspective
Land tenure was discussed in Chapter 1, where we noted that indivi-
dualized land tenures can be measured broadly in terms of three criter-
ia: breadth, duration and assurance. Breadth is a measurement of the
quantity and quality of the land rights held and may include the rights
to possess land, to grow or harvest crops of one’s own choice, to pass
the land on to heirs, to sell land or to lease it to others, to pledge land
rights as security for credit, to prevent trespass, to protect against state
expropriation, and many other rights.
Duration measures the length of time for which these rights are va-
lid. Typically, the same duration applies to all of the rights held, but
this is not necessarily so. In general, as the duration lengthens, tenure
security improves. However, duration need not be perpetual to create
an adequate incentive framework for land investments and improve-
ments.
Assurance, the third criterion, is a measurement of the certainty of
the breadth and duration of the rights that are held. If an individual is
said to possess land rights of a specific breadth and duration, but can-
not exert, enforce or protect those rights, they have no assurance. A
land “right” that cannot be exerted or enforced is not a right at all.
In China after the communes were broken up in the early 1980s –
thus individualizing agricultural landholdings and giving essentially
universal access – the central remaining issue of land tenure has been
the insecurity of farmers’ rights, stemming primarily from shortcom-
ings in duration and assurance, and secondarily from shortcomings in
breadth. At least five interrelated factors have contributed to land ten-
ure insecurity in rural China in recent years: (1) the short term or un-
certain duration of the rights; (2) the practice of land readjustments to
reflect demographic change; (3) the lack of written documentation and
certification of land rights; (4) the inability of farmers to enforce and
protect their rights; and (5) the ubiquitous and undercompensated tak-
ings of land. All are discussed in this chapter.
Pre-1949 land tenure reforms by the communists
It is worth reviewing the early history of Chinese Communist land ten-
ure reform measures because some of the issues faced and approaches
taken remain live and debated reform options in China today.
Ever since its founding, the Chinese Communist Party has been
keenly aware of the problem of landlessness that Chinese farmers were
facing and had constantly placed land tenure reform as one of its top
priorities in its fight with the Nationalists for control over China.3 Soon
after it established its first administrative region in northern Jiangxi
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Province in the early 1920s, the Chinese Communist Party promul-
gated its first land law, setting up the basic framework of communist
land tenure reforms: confiscation of land from landlords and distribu-
tion of the confiscated land among peasants with little or no land.4
There are five especially salient features in this law. First, the land con-
fiscated is owned by the Soviet government, and its use rights are allo-
cated to peasant households (Article 1). Second, while the land is
mainly allocated to peasants for individual farming, the law allows allo-
cation to peasants for joint farming and to Soviet government farms
(Article 1). Third, the term of peasants’ right to farm the Soviet owned
land is unspecified. Fourth, sale of the confiscated land is prohibited
(Article 2). Fifth, land is allocated on an egalitarian basis, and men and
women have equal right to allocated land (Article 4).
With the expansion of the communist-controlled area, the Land Law
of the Soviet Republic of China was adopted in 1931. Unlike the Jing-
gangshan Land Law, the new Land Law did not explicitly attest that
land is owned by the Soviet government; instead, it emphasized that
the confiscated land be “distributed to the poor and middle peasants”5
and “all temple land and other public land shall be granted to peasants
without condition.”6 Second, this Land Law was simply silent on the al-
location of confiscated land to peasants for joint farming or the alloca-
tion of such land to government farms. Third, it allowed the lease and
sale of land among peasants, but landlords were still prohibited from
repurchasing land, and rich peasants were prohibited from engaging
in land speculation (presumably, purchase with intent to resell).7
The most important communist land law before the founding of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949 was the Platform of Chinese Land
Law adopted at the CPC national land conference in September 1947.
This document was adopted at the height of civil conflict between the
Communists and the Nationalists and when the Communists were
seeking to win and consolidate peasant support: one may thus see the
Platform as the distillation, in effect, of what the Communists’ quarter-
century of experience in the Chinese countryside had taught them
would win that support. For the first time, the Chinese Communists
declared the explicit principle that China would adopt an “agrarian sys-
tem of ‘land to tillers.’”8 In order to fulfill this principle, the Platform
further provided that except for some described categories of non-ara-
ble land, all land confiscated from landlords and the land traditionally
owned by communities was to be distributed among all rural residents
and owned by individuals.9 All rural residents, regardless of age and
gender, were to be entitled to a (locally) equal share of land.10 It re-
quired that land ownership certificates be issued to all landowners.11 It
also provided that landowners “have right to freely manage and sell the
land, and lease the land under certain circumstances.”12
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Land tenure reforms in the 1950s
In June 1950, the Chinese communist government promulgated the
first land tenure reform law that was applicable to all parts of China
(except for Taiwan, which was then governed by the Nationalists, who
had fled the mainland after their defeat in the civil war). Except for the
important fact of explicit confiscation of landlords’ lands for distribu-
tion, the program was not much different in design from the success-
ful land-to-the-tiller programs carried out around that same period in
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (see Chapter 2). The Land Reform Law
of the PRC embodied the major provisions of the earlier platform on
land allocation and land ownership. The law provided that China was
adopting a “peasant land ownership system.”13 Land confiscated from
landlords, except for that owned by the state in accordance with this
law,14 was to be allocated to poor peasants “fairly, rationally and uni-
formly for them to own.”15 The law also provided that all landowners
were allowed to manage, sell and lease their land freely.16 To evidence
land ownership, the law required that a land ownership certificate be
issued by the people’s government to landowners.17
The Land Reform Law also authorized the regional people’s govern-
ment to promulgate implementing rules, taking into consideration lo-
cal circumstances.18 One set of regional implementing measures pro-
vided that land could be inherited by the owner’s spouse, children and
other direct relatives upon the owner’s death, and could be mortgaged,
sold and leased without restriction for most landowners.19 The imple-
menting measures also emphasized the need to respect women’s land
ownership rights, explicitly allowing women to have full rights to the
land they own free from others’ interference upon marriage, divorce
and remarriage.20
Although the Land Reform Law required the issuance of land owner-
ship certificates to all landowners, it did not spell out any formalities
concerning the certificates. However, under the Mid Southern Region’s
implementing measures, each landowner was given an option either to
have his or her own certificate or to have a single certificate covering
all land in the household, and required that all names of individual
owners in the household be listed on the certificate if a household cer-
tificate was to be issued.21
In a separate measure, land in suburban areas previously owned by
landlords was confiscated and placed under state ownership with the
intention of allocating such land to peasants who had little or no
land.22 To secure peasants’ use rights to such land, state-owned land
use rights certificates were to be issued to peasant land users.23 How-
ever, the land users could not lease, sell or leave idle such state-owned
land.24
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The land reform program distributed 46.7 million hectares of land
to about 300 million peasants, thus covering about one-half of the total
arable land and more than 60% of the total rural population.25 The
“land to the tiller” program proved a noteworthy success in increasing
agricultural productivity: annual grain production went up from 113.2
million tons in 1949 to 166.8 million tons in 1953, and further to
192.7 million tons in 1956. This 70% increase in grain production was
accompanied by an increase of 85% in total farm income during the
same period.26
Collectivization of Chinese agriculture
Despite the impressive economic gains, private ownership and indivi-
dual farming on rural land did not remain the policy for long. Soon
after the completion of these rural land tenure reforms, the Chinese
government introduced the concept of collective farming following the
example of the USSR (where all farming had been collectivized in the
early 1930s). In 1955, the Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party issued the Decision on Agricultural Cooperation, formally
launching the movement to collectivization.
Collectivization through legislative measures began in 1956 when
the National People’s Congress’ Standing Committee passed the Char-
ter of Agricultural Production Cooperatives.27 Although the charter did
not legally change private ownership, it established the creation of pub-
lic ownership of rural land as a goal for collectivization.28 According to
the charter, all land owned by members of the cooperative “must be
submitted to the cooperative for uniform use.”29 Each member was al-
lowed to keep no more than 5% of the village’s average landholdings
per capita as private plots.30 Contributors of land were entitled to some
compensation for their land contribution, but such compensation was
not to exceed compensation for labor contribution.31
The nominal private ownership of farmland under the cooperative
system was transformed into formal collective ownership only three
months later when the Third Plenary Session of the National People’s
Congress passed the Charter of Advanced Agricultural Production Co-
operatives in June 1956. This charter explicitly stated that collective
members “must transform privately owned land, draft animals, and
large farm equipment and other major production means into collec-
tive ownership.”32 Private plots were absorbed into collective owner-
ship; individual households, however, were allowed to keep ownership
of the residential land.33
Despite problems with farm management and production incentives,
the collectivization campaign proceeded rapidly. By the end of 1958,
the agricultural collectives had been abruptly merged into Rural Peo-
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ples’ Communes. Within half a year, approximately 90% of the rural
population became members of vast communes averaging 4,000 fa-
milies each.
From an ownership aspect, the fundamental characteristic of the
commune was the abolition of the last vestiges of private property. The
commune took sole ownership of all property, including the private
plots (which were absorbed into the commonly worked land), private
dwellings, livestock and certain consumer durables. Participating in
production activities governed by the collective authorities on the col-
lective’s land and with the collective’s inputs and equipment was the
only means of personal earnings for the commune members. Under
this system, none of the farmers had an individual stake in the land;
they worked together on the land, receiving pay for time spent in the
field. The communes effectively severed farmers from their land.
The collectivization campaign proved to be a disaster for China’s
agriculture and people. Grain production declined substantially for
three years in a row starting in 1959, leading to perhaps the planet’s
worst famine of the 20th century.34 After 1962, as an attempted re-
sponse, the effective unit of collective production was scaled back, gen-
erally to the production team level (around 40-50 households in a nat-
ural village or hamlet), and use of the private plots, although not their
ownership, was restored. But recovery was a slow process and further
complicated by the society-wide “Cultural Revolution” that began in the
mid-1960s.
Decollectivization under the Household Responsibility System
After ten years of the Cultural Revolution and more than 20 years of
collective farming, China’s rural economy came to the edge of collap-
sing prior to the tenure reform beginning in the late 1970s. Indeed,
1977 per capita grain production was lower than that of 1956.35 The
sluggish growth in the farm sector was accompanied by extremely slow
growth in peasant incomes. In 1978, the average annual rural income
was 133 yuan per capita, and more than 250 million rural people were
in semi-starvation status.36 When the new leadership began to clean
up the mess left by collective farming after Mao’s death in 1976, the
most imperative issue was to decide whether to abandon collective
ownership of land and, if not, what rural land system to adopt.
Although private ownership of land was deeply rooted in Chinese
history, and the Chinese communists had strenuously pushed forward
a “land to the tiller” program before and immediately after they took
power, more than 20 years of collective farming promoted and insisted
on by Mao between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s had left a political le-
gacy of public ownership. The new leadership was clearly aware that
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any tenure reform would be derailed if it crossed the threshold (one
might say the “third rail”) of public ownership.
With the death of Mao, the new reform-minded leadership headed
by Deng Xiaoping began to explore the way to bring rural China out of
poverty and persistent hunger in the late 1970s. At the same time, a
group of poor farmers in Anhui Province, driven by the need for survi-
val, invented a land contracting system in which collectively owned
land was contracted to participating farmers for private farming who,
in return, were committed to meeting collective demands for quota
grain, taxes and fees assessed based on the quantity of the land allo-
cated to each participating farm household.
This new form of private farming aroused a fierce debate among pol-
icy makers.37 The key issue in the debate was whether this new model
of farming represented a negation of Mao, designed to replace collec-
tive ownership of land with private ownership. The pragmatic faction
of the new leadership argued that the new model of farming was
merely an experimental way of organizing farm production aimed at
motivating farmers, instead of changing rural land ownership.
Although this argument for physical decollectivization downplayed its
potentially profound implications for the collective ownership of land,
individual farming itself had to be based on individual rights to land.
Thus, a mechanism was created that separated use rights to land from
ownership of land, and provided that the collective entity would con-
tinue to hold ownership but that use rights would be allocated to mem-
bers of the collective for individual farming. This approach of empha-
sizing decollectivization of farming practice prevailed, apparently be-
cause most decision makers realized the damage that had been done to
China’s agriculture by collective farming. A compromise was reached
among the leadership to introduce a new land system throughout the
country, later called the household responsibility system, or HRS.
Land contracting under the HRS immediately demonstrated its great
advantages over collective farming and received strong support from
central leaders. By 1983, virtually all arable land had been allocated to
individual households, usually on a per capita (though sometimes on a
per worker) basis, and more than 20 years of collective farming had fi-
nally come to an end.38
The initial results were striking, as grain production increased by
8.6% per year during the first years of HRS, in 1980-1984.39 These
productivity increases had a dramatic impact on farmer incomes and
consumption patterns, both in absolute and relative terms. Between
1979 and 1984, average net income for rural residents increased by
11% annually, compared to an average annual increase of 8.7% for ur-
ban residents, narrowing the income gap between urban and rural resi-
dents from 3.03:1 to 2.49:1.40 The gap in consumption between urban
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and rural residents also narrowed during this period, from a ratio of
2.8:1 to 2.3:1.41 It is estimated that, largely under this regime of broad-
based individual access to land, the proportion of people living below
the one-dollar-a-day poverty line in China declined during the years
1981-1987 (a period when 70% or more of the total population made
its livelihood from agriculture) from 64% to less than 30%.42 Note the
current revisions to earlier global poverty data discussed in Chapter 1,
with an extreme-poverty line now calculated at US$1.25 a day, and an
estimated 16% of China’s population now living below that level.43
Further improvements of the HRS
The next land tenure reform China adopted following the initial huge
success under HRS was to lengthen the duration of farmers’ individual
land rights and expand the breadth of such land rights. The land rights
that farmers received under HRS were uncertain, usually for a term of
one to three years, subject to local decisions.44 At the end of each term,
collective cadres conducted a land readjustment within the village in re-
sponse to demographic changes occurring during that term to ensure
absolutely egalitarian possession of land rights among all members of
the village.45 The breadth of farmers’ rights had been restricted in sev-
eral ways. A compulsory production plan was in force to the extent that
farmers were required to produce and sell a certain amount of grain to
the state, and to do so at a price much lower than market price. Nor
were farmers allowed to transfer their land rights.46
To address these tenure insecurity issues after the initial success of
HRS, the Chinese central government decided to standardize the allo-
cation of land rights for private farming. The first step took the form
of attempts to lengthen the duration of farmers’ land rights under
HRS. In 1984, the Central Committee addressed this issue in its im-
portant annual Rural Work pronouncement (Document No. 1). In or-
der to reverse local practices of contracting land to farmers for very
short periods, the Document required that farmers’ land rights be pro-
longed to 15 years nationwide. In addition, the Document formally
sanctioned an emerging rural land rights market by allowing transfers
of such rights.47 However, the Document did not make any rules on
how to assure implementation of the extended term or facilitate trans-
fer of land rights. Studies done by RDI and other organizations showed
that the new 15-year rights were still typically subject to a mechanism
of a “small readjustment” sometimes as frequently as every year, and a
“big readjustment,” sometimes every three to five years, which effec-
tively cut farmers’ land rights to a term ending at the next readjust-
ment.48 The uncertain duration of rights to a specific landholding
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greatly limited the scope for any rural land rights market, leaving room
only for short-term and at-will transfers.
Also, the grain quota remained in place, and farmers were required
to set aside at least part of their contracted land for growing grain,
which represented a limitation on farming autonomy. (Interestingly, re-
adjustment was never introduced in Vietnam, which broke up its col-
lective farms in the north and wherever they had been practiced in the
south in the 1980s, around the same time as China. One hypothesis
might be that the continuing success and indeed general entrench-
ment of the system of small family farms in the south helped forestall
the political pressure for ultra-egalitarianism that had led to periodic
readjustment of landholdings in rural China.49)
Capitalizing on the pervasive existence of unregulated land readjust-
ment practices, local governments and collective cadres in some rural
areas started to introduce mechanisms that presented even more ser-
ious threats to farmers’ tenure security in the late 1980s and through
the 1990s. Typical among them were the so-called “two-field system,”50
“scale farming”51 and “recontracting” farmers’ land to non-villager
bosses.52 Although these mechanisms took different forms, they shared
a similar feature: taking back farmers’ contracted land through compul-
sory administrative land readjustment, but now doing so in ways that
had little or no linkage with population change at the village or house-
hold level and that often selectively favored small groups of people. Be-
cause these schemes facilitated rent seeking by local officials and col-
lective cadres, they rapidly expanded throughout large areas of the
country. Central-government responses to these new threats to farmers’
land tenure security are discussed below.
The duration of farmers’ land use rights was addressed again nearly
ten years after the issuance of the 1984 Document No. 1, when the cen-
tral government decided in November 1993 to extend the term of use
rights to collectively owned arable land for another 30 years upon the
expiration of the 15-year rights nominally mandated in 1984.53
Although the 1993 Document No. 11 stated that “[i]n order to avoid fre-
quent changes in contracted land and prevent land from being further
fragmented, no readjustment in response to population changes
should be promoted within the contract period,”54 it did not provide
any guidelines on how to implement this policy. Nor had the policy
been stated in the clearest language: “shall be carried out,” for example,
would have been a much more definitive statement than “should be
promoted.” This almost certainly reflected a compromise between cen-
tral government factions, rather than inadequate drafting skills.
It was not until four years later – when the farmers’ 15-year land
rights (though still generally both undocumented and nonexistent in
practice) were nominally about to “expire” in most villages in China –
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that the Chinese government for the first time put forward a series of
specific policy measures to restrict the land readjustment practice that
had been conducted as a norm in most rural villages since the adop-
tion of HRS. The measures were contained in Document No. 16, is-
sued in mid-1997.55 These policy measures included explicit prohibi-
tion of village-wide big readjustments, serious restrictions on small re-
adjustment, prohibition of introducing the two-field system in villages
thus far unaffected by such practices, and banning the practice of tak-
ing back farmers’ contracted land for “scale farming.”
These new policy measures were widely interpreted as mandatory
policy guidelines for the implementation of a second round of contract-
ing. As compared with the new land system that was about to emerge
under Document No. 16 and successive measures, China’s rural land
tenure system during the first round of contracting (1983-1998) bore
the following characteristics:
First, virtually all rural households had access to some arable land.
Rural landlessness was essentially non-existent. This is a major accom-
plishment. Broad, virtually universal access to land in China has pro-
vided important household nutritional and income security throughout
rural China56 and creates a solid foundation for rapid and broad-based
rural growth.57
Second, landholdings were distributed among households in a sub-
stantially egalitarian fashion, usually based on one equal land “share”
per household member. While land-per-capita differences among re-
gions resulted in inter-regional discrepancies, differences within vil-
lages and localities were remarkably small.
Third, the land system rules and practices were not uniform
throughout the country. Collective ownership of land and allocation of
specific parcels to individual households had been essentially universal
throughout China since 1983. However, the duration of those rights,
the specificity with which the use rights were defined, the prevalence
and type of administrative land readjustments undertaken, and other
important qualitative aspects of the land use rights varied considerably
among regions and among localities within regions.
Finally, most villages attempted to balance two competing objectives
in establishing and implementing land system practices: continuing
equal per capita access to land for welfare or subsistence purposes and
stable, secure land use rights for productivity purposes. To this was
added the desire of many local cadres to assert influence and find
sources of financial return through continued meddling in land alloca-
tions. As discussed above, in most Chinese villages the vector resultant
of these various pressures was a practice of periodically readjusting
household land rights to reflect demographic changes in the village
and the individual household. The frequency and extent of those read-
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justments were, however, not uniform among different provinces nor
even among different villages within each province.
More recent major legislation on land rights
The first reform-era law – as distinct from the 1984, 1993 and 1997
policy documents – to contain provisions governing farmers’ land
rights is the revised Land Management Law (LML) adopted by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in August
1998.58 Article 14 of the law contained important provisions that at-
tempted to address three major shortcomings related to rural land ten-
ure security in China: the short or uncertain duration of the use term,
the lack of written land use contracts, and the practice of frequent land
readjustments. On the duration of use term, the law states that “collec-
tively owned land shall be contracted to the members of the collective
economic entity for . . . 30 years.” On documentation of land rights, Ar-
ticle 14 further required that “the contract issuing party and the con-
tracting party execute a contract stipulating the rights and obligations
of the two parties,” and that “farmers’ land contracting rights shall be
protected by law.” Equally important, Article 14 embodied into law the
land readjustment provisions of Document No. 16. It ruled out village-
wide big readjustment while allowing small readjustment only to be
conducted among “isolated households” upon “consent by two-thirds of
villagers or villager representatives and approval by township govern-
ment and county government agencies in charge of agriculture.”
However, the LML has only one article and part of another devoted
to rural household contracting59 and fails to deal with a vast range of
issues with respect to farmers’ 30-year rights. Thus, after more than
three years of further drafting and deliberation, in August 2002 the
Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress adopted
the Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL), the first modern Chinese law
to deal exclusively with the issue of rural land tenure.60 This law repre-
sented the most important legal breakthrough on almost every tenure
issue for securing the land rights of China’s estimated 187 million
farm households since the adoption of the HRS.
The RLCL sets forth a series of legal rules addressing a very broad
range of tenure issues. The legal framework governing land readjust-
ments under the RLCL is composed of three basic rules. First, Article
27 establishes the general principle of prohibiting all kinds of readjust-
ment during the 30-year term, with only a narrow exception for “a nat-
ural disaster that seriously damaged the contracted land and other spe-
cial circumstances” under which a small land readjustment may be
conducted. Second, to further restrict these narrowly permitted small
readjustments under special circumstances, the RLCL reiterates the im-
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portant procedural requirements that the consent of two-thirds of the
villager assembly or two-thirds of villager representatives as well as ap-
proval by the township government and the county agricultural admin-
istrative body must be obtained prior to the commencement of such a
readjustment. Third, the law validates previously issued contracts (is-
sued under the 1993 and 1997 policy documents or the 1998 LML)
that completely prohibit land readjustment. The RLCL also explicitly
invalidates any provisions of land contracts that violate the mandatory
legal rules with respect to land readjustment (Article 55).
On the breadth of farmers’ 30-year rights, the law states that farmers’
land rights include “rights to use, profit from, and transfer land con-
tracting and operation rights, and the right of autonomy over produc-
tion operations and disposition of products” and “the right to receive
the corresponding compensation” for any land taken by the state or col-
lective for non-agricultural purposes (Article 16).
On the right to carry out land transactions, the RLCL further states
that farmers’ land rights “may be transferred [to other village house-
holds], leased [to non-village households], exchanged, assigned, or
transacted by other means in accordance with law” (Article 32). To safe-
guard farmers’ interests in land from being violated by local officials
through various kinds of compulsory land transactions, the RLCL em-
phasizes the principle of “equal consultation, voluntariness and with
compensation” (Article 33), establishes farmers as “the party to any
transactions of” rural land use rights (Article 34) and explicitly prohi-
bits local officials to “intercept or reduce” the proceeds from such land
transactions (Article 35). It is important to note that prior legislation,
although permitting transactions of rural land use rights, had not pro-
vided any guidance with respect to the scope of this right and the pro-
cedures to exercise this right,61 and the RLCL has filled this legal va-
cuum.62
To evidence farmers’ land rights, the RLCL requires that written con-
tracts be issued to farmer households (Article 21). In addition, the
RLCL mirrors legal requirements for documenting urban land use
rights by requiring that county government or a higher level to issues
land rights certificates to farmers to affirm such rights (Article 23).
Such requirements are extremely important to protect farmers’ land
rights because these written land documents provide powerful evidence
in any dispute resolution63 process and offer deterrence against possi-
ble violations.
The RLCL also contains improved provisions on the “assurance” as-
pect of tenure security. Unlike the dispute resolution provisions in the
1998 LML and 1999 Administrative Review Law, which require ex-
haustion of administrative reviews before a complaint can be filed with
the People’s Court,64 the RLCL explicitly gives farmers a choice be-
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tween consultation, mediation, arbitration and suing in People’s Court
(Articles 51 and 52). Because collective cadres and local government of-
ficials are themselves often parties to land disputes, requiring adminis-
trative review makes little sense, especially when such officials have
much greater access to the mechanism than farmers. Enabling ag-
grieved farmers to seek immediate judicial redress at least opens signif-
icant possibilities for substantially improving farmers’ ability to resolve
such disputes satisfactorily (see further discussion below, as well as
Chapter 9 on legal aid).
Notably, the RLCL has a series of well-articulated remedial and pen-
alty provisions with respect to the protection of farmers’ land rights. It
establishes very clear and strong rules prohibiting violations of farmers’
land use rights by local officials, including illegal land readjustments,
taking back the farmer-contracted land and re-contracting it to others,
and forcing farmers to plant crops against their will. Civil penalties, in-
cluding monetary damages and restitution, and equitable remedies to
forestall or reverse the illegal action, now apply to any such violations
(Article 54). Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find more compre-
hensive remedial provisions in Chinese law on any subject.
The most recent legislative development may well be the most im-
portant of all. The Property Law adopted by the annual plenary session
of the National People’s Congress – not the smaller standing Commit-
tee, as was the case for both the LML and RLCL – in March 2007 reaf-
firms in the most authoritative manner farmers’ individual rights to
land in several important aspects. With respect to farmers’ land rights
for agricultural use, for the first time in China’s legislative history,
farmers’ land rights are defined as usufructuary property rights65 and
thus enjoy a much stronger protection under the law than obligatory
(contract) rights. Moreover, the law formally permits farmers to con-
tinue using their currently contracted land when the present 30-year
term expires,66 providing a possibility for creation of de facto perpetual
land rights for farmers, or at least implying a permission for repeated
renewals whenever the term expires. The law explicitly reaffirms the
principle of prohibition of land readjustments, and refers to the RLCL
for applying restrictive rules dealing with the small class of permissible
land readjustments.67
The Property Law also brings important clarity to the concept of “col-
lective ownership,” whose vagueness has helped cover up many actions
by local cadres that have undermined farmers’ use rights and security.
China’s Constitution states that rural land, except for that under state
ownership, is collectively owned.68 The 1998 LML reiterates this con-
stitutional principle and authorizes collective economic entities at var-
ious levels of the rural collective to “operate and manage” their collec-
tively owned land.69 However, neither the Constitution nor the LML
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answers the critical question regarding the relationship between village
members (farmers) and administrative bodies of the village (collective
entity) on questions of land ownership.
This longstanding uncertainty is seemingly resolved by the Property
Law. Article 59 provides that collectively owned real properties “are
owned by all members of the collective,” namely, by all farmers located
within the community on which the collective is formed. With respect
to the relationship between member owners and the collective entity
that “operates and manages” collectively owned land under the LML,
the Property Law further prescribes the role of the collective entity as
merely “exercising ownership rights on behalf of the collective.”70 That
is to say, such exercise of ownership rights must be carried out on be-
half of member owners. In order to prevent the collective entity from
circumventing member owners in dealing with collectively owned land,
the law further requires that members of the collective decide a series
of specified matters of importance including land contracting plans,
contracting collective land to non-villagers, readjustments in isolated
cases, and distribution of land compensation.71 However, if the deci-
sion made by the collective entity, villager committee or the person in
charge of such organizations violates the members’ lawful rights, the
aggrieved member or members may lodge a lawsuit to void the deci-
sion.72 Other important provisions in the Property Law are discussed
below.
III. Benefits of tenure security for Chinese farmers
Benefits under earlier tenure reforms
There have been two notable periods of high growth in farm productiv-
ity and incomes since China’s revolution, both linked to land tenure re-
form. Under the Land Reform Law of 1950 the government introduced
a system of peasant land ownership, redistributing secure, non-readjus-
table rights to nearly half of China’s arable land to over 60% of the ru-
ral population.73 Even in those very difficult times, under the private
ownership system China experienced a 70% jump in grain production
from 1949 to 1956 and an 85% increase in farmers’ income.74 This
period immediately preceded the collectivization of Chinese agriculture
in the mid-1950s.
The second period of accelerated growth was during and immedi-
ately following the decollectivization of agriculture under the HRS in
the 1980s, when farmers quickly made many short-term, annual im-
provements in their cropping practices (better timing, proper weeding,
more careful application of fertilizer, etc.) that had often been ignored
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on the collectives. This represented not a shift from one form of indivi-
dual tenure to a more secure form, as in the earlier period, but a shift
from collective tenure to individualized (though not secure) tenure.
Following the introduction of the HRS, China’s gross agricultural
output value increased, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, by 86% from
1980 to 1990.75 This increase occurred despite a sharp decrease in the
level of state investment in agriculture following 1978. One study con-
cludes that the total factor productivity of China’s agriculture increased
by 41% during the 1978-1984 period, and that 32% (32/41) could be at-
tributed to the incentives of decollectivization and individualization of
landholding under HRS, with the remaining 9% resulting from price
increases.76
Benefits of documented 30-year land rights
Specific evidence now appears to be emerging as to a third Chinese ex-
perience with improved tenure: the benefits of the enhanced tenure se-
curity provided by China’s rules regarding farmers’ 30-year land rights,
as adopted and implemented since 1997. This evidence relates espe-
cially to farmers’ possession of the confirmatory documents (contracts
and certificates) for their land rights required by the law and comes in-
ter alia from a 1,962-household, 17-province survey which RDI con-
ducted in cooperation with Renmin University and Michigan State
University during July and August 2005.77
Broadly, the findings indicate that there were important positive im-
pacts, including farmer investments in the land, associated with Chi-
nese farmers’ possession of documentation for their land rights. We
first summarize the chief tenure-related findings of the survey, both
positive and negative, and then discuss in more detail some behaviors
associated with the possession of documentation.
Positive findings include:
– Where farmers have received documentation of their land rights
(contract, certificate or both), they have substantially increased their
mid- to long-term investment in their land.
– Increases in investments were even greater where the land docu-
ments comply with law and are in proper form and were greater
still where farmers hold compliant documents and have received in-
formation on their land rights from two or more channels.
– Publicity has successfully conveyed to large majorities of Chinese
farmers certain basic facts about their land rights, such as that their
arable land should be contracted to them for 30 years without read-
justment.
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– In villages where farmers possess documents complying with the
law, farmers are much more likely to regard the compensation
package received in cases of land takings as satisfactory.
– The central government appears to have successfully brought about
a substantial degree of implementation of the laws and policies it
has promulgated in four land-related areas, as reflected in the de-
cline in prevalence of the two-field system, scale farming and re-
contracting, and the effective reduction of taxes and fees paid by
farmers. Thus, where the central government focuses and makes its
will clear, it appears that it can succeed in making pro-farmer laws and
policies effective, even on matters where the collective cadres have
largely contrary interests.
Negative findings include:
– 17% of villages have not yet begun the second round of contracting
in even the most nominal way.
– Only 63% of rural households have received any documentation
(contract, certificate or both) for their land rights, and only 38% of
households have received both documents, as required by law.
– Only one out of every 10 farmers possesses at least one of these
documents in the form most fully compliant with law (and it is for
this minority group that the rate of land investment has been great-
est).
– 30% of the villages that have purportedly given farmers 30-year
land rights have subsequently “readjusted” (almost all of them illeg-
ally) farmers’ contracted land.
– During the 10 years preceding 2005, the frequency of takings of
farmers’ land for non-agricultural purposes grew more than 15
times, and in only 22% of takings did the authorities actually con-
sult with farmers regarding the amount of compensation.
– Processes for redress available to farmers for their complaints about
compensation for takings have been highly inadequate, and have
rarely produced a result favorable to the farmers.
On the issue of investments made, the surveyed farmers were asked
whether they had made one or more of six specific mid- to long-term
investments on their land: fixed or removable greenhouses, trellises,
orchards, fish/eel ponds, or domesticated-animal farms.78 The survey
shows that there were only sporadic investments before 1998. After
the transitional year of 1998, when the LML was adopted, there was a
very large increase in investments that was sustained for a period of
four years (1999-2002). After that, investments appeared to revert back
to the pre-1998 level. Overall, the year of 1998 seems to be a defining
point when China adopted and seriously started publicizing and imple-
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menting the law. As shown in Figure 7.1, the peak years of investments
closely follow, with about a two-year time lag, the peak years of con-
tract/certificate issuance.
The reasons for the drop-off in investments after 2002 may include
some satisfaction of “pent-up” investment desires, the growing time-lag
since publicity or document issuance, and the increased negative publi-
city about poorly compensated land takings as well as the growth of il-
legal land readjustments.
The data analysis further reveals that there is a strong, positive corre-
lation between contract issuance and investments:
For the no-contract group, investments increased by 1.86 times (86%)
during or after 1998, while for the contract-issued group, investments
increased by 2.78 times (178%). The correlation between certificate
issuance and investments is similar, though less pronounced. Where
farmers possess both a contract and a certificate, there is an even stron-
ger correlation with investments, with 24.1% of the households who
have received both documents having made one or more of the six in-
vestments in or after 1998, versus only 12.5% who received neither.
Figure 7.1 Timing of contract issuance, certificate issuance and investments
 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Contract issuance Cerﬁcate issuance Investments 
Source: K. Zhu, R. Prosterman, J. Ye, P. Li, J. Riedinger & Y. Ouyang, The Rural
Land Question in China: Analysis and Recommendations Based on a Seventeen-Pro-
vince Survey, 38 NYU JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLITICS 761, 798, fig.
11 (2006).
Table 7.1. Contract issuance and investments, before and after 1998.
Investments made
before 1998
Investments made in or
after 1998
Contract not issued 6.6% 12.3%
Contract issued 8.0% 22.2%
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For those who received both documents, investments increased by 3.44
times (244%) as compared to their pre-1998 investments.79
Further, the evidence indicates causation, not just a “correlation” in
which both the issuance of documentation and the making of invest-
ment might be the twin results of some third factor. This appears to be
so for two reasons. First, as in medical tests of the effectiveness of new
drugs, we are seeing a desirable response (investment in the land)
which is “dose related.” Certificates are much more effective than noth-
ing; contracts are somewhat more effective than certificates; both to-
gether are more effective than either alone; compliant certificates are
much more effective than incompliant ones; and compliant contracts
are much more effective than incompliant ones (and somewhat more
effective than compliant certificates).
Second, a clear explanation offers itself for the causal mechanism in-
volved. Documented land rights – and the better-documented they are,
the better the result is – lead farmers to believe that they will retain
possession of their present parcels of land long enough to make a prof-
it from investments that take multiple years to recoup.80
This causal relationship is also consistent with what RDI has found
in extensive rapid rural appraisal interviewing of Chinese farmers over
a period of many years, in which the interviews have repeatedly given
insight into why farmers who invest do so, and why those who do not
invest refrain from doing so81 (see Box 7.1).
However, just over one of 10 households in the 17 survey provinces
presently possess a land rights document in what appears to be the
most efficacious, fully “compliant” form. This invites the question of
what would be the likely result in the Chinese context if all or nearly
all of the estimated 187 million rural households enjoyed secure, ade-
quately documented land rights.
Box 7.1. Anhui and Jiangxi – A tale of two provinces
In Anhui, RDI interviewed 32 farmers in four counties. The great
majority of Anhui farmers, 21 of 25 who expressed an opinion, were
highly confident that their land rights would remain free from the
process of readjustment for the entire 30-year term. Apparently as a
result of this confidence, ten farmers reported that they had made
long-term investments on their land to increase productivity or di-
versify into higher value-added crops. The specific investments in-
cluded planting fruit trees, shifting from chemical to organic fertili-
zer, building greenhouses for mushroom or vegetable cultivation,
and digging irrigation ponds. On average, farmers who had made
such investments reported that their net income per mu of land had
increased fivefold in the first year following the investment. To make
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these investments, farmers invested both labor and cash, ranging in
amounts from several hundred to as much as 20,000 RMB (at that
time, 8.2 RMB = US$1). Farmers paid for the investments using
their own savings or loans from friends and family; farmers reported
very little formal borrowing from banks or credit cooperatives, and
told us that such formal credit was largely unavailable. Access to
markets was a particularly important factor in the farmers’ decisions
to shift from grain to vegetable production. In Fanchang County in
Wuhu Municipality, a new highway means that both Shanghai and
Nanjing – a combined market of nearly 20 million consumers – are
now within a day’s drive. However, farmers uniformly stated that
without secure land rights, they would not have made investments
on their land.
Jiangxi presents a starkly contrasting picture. Only two of 26
farmers expressed high confidence that their land rights would re-
main secure during the 30-year term. In fact, 16 of the 26 villages
had already conducted a land readjustment since purportedly giving
farmers 30-year rights under the 1998 Land Management Law. As a
result, only four farmers reported making any long-term investment
on their land. Among these four, two believed that none of their
land would be subject to readjustment, and one had invested only
on his dry land because the village announced that dry land would
no longer be subject to land readjustments (while readjustments
would continue on paddy land). Only one farmer interviewed (the
only one reflecting such behavior in either of the two provinces)
risked making a long-term investment on land he still considered
subject to possible readjustments – and he made sure that the
greenhouses he built were movable, just in case.
Source: R. Prosterman & B. Schwarzwalder, From Death to Life: Giving Value
to China’s Rural Land, 8(1) CHINA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY 1 (2004).
Of added interest is the further survey finding that farmers with fully
compliant documentation of their land rights were twice as likely –
although still a minority – to be satisfied with compensation received
for land takings as those who had received no documentation of their
rights (39.3% versus 19.1%). Here, however, we may need to be more
cautious in attributing causation, since both contract issuance and bet-
ter compensation in the event of takings might sometimes be the com-
mon result of a third factor: local cadres who were better disposed to
follow the law and serve farmers’ interests.82
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IV. Some current major issues surrounding land tenure
Of the issues raised by the “negative findings” in the 17-province survey
summarized in the preceding section, two stand out as possibly requir-
ing adoption or clarification of the related legal rules if tenure security
is to be further improved: (1) 30% of the villages that have purportedly
given farmers 30-year land rights have subsequently “readjusted” farm-
ers’ contracted land, and (2) during the 10 years between 1995 and
2005 the frequency of takings of farmers’ land for non-agricultural pur-
poses had grown more than 15 times, generally without consultation
with or payment of adequate compensation to farmers.
This section discusses possible revisions or clarifications of the legal
rules that might forestall these two important tenure-undermining
practices. The issue of mortgageability of arable land (presently prohib-
ited) is also briefly explored.
Ending land readjustments
The single most important issue under the RLCL – and its greatest for-
mal achievement – is its general prohibition against readjustments, a
prohibition which has now been authoritatively reaffirmed in the Prop-
erty Law. The RLCL provides:
ARTICLE 27. During the contract term, the contract issuing
party shall not readjust contracted land.
During the contract term, in cases where a natural disaster
has seriously damaged contracted land and other special circum-
stances, and an appropriate readjustment of arable land or grass-
land between isolated households is necessary, the approval of
2/3 of the members of the Village Assembly or 2/3 of the Village
Representatives must be obtained, as well as approval by the
township government and the county government administra-
tive unit responsible for agriculture. If there is a land use right
contract stipulating that readjustments shall not be conducted,
such a contract shall be honored.
ARTICLE 28. The following types of land shall be used in re-
adjustments of contracted land or contracted to newly added po-
pulation within the village:
– Flexible land that has been reserved by the village collective
in accordance with law;
– Land that has been added through reclamation and other
methods in accordance with legal methods;
– Land that has been returned by contracting parties volunta-
rily and in accordance with law.
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Viewed against the legislative background and the express language of
the law, three points stand out:
First, Article 27 establishes a basic principle of no readjustment
within the 30-year contract period and allows limited readjustments
only under “special circumstances.” Article 28 continues to limit the
scope of readjustments by listing types of non-contracted land that
could be allocated for readjustments or for newly added population.
Second, by juxtaposing “readjustments” and “newly added popula-
tion” in Article 28, the legislature presumably has decided that “newly
added population” is not covered by Article 27 and cannot be consid-
ered one of the “special circumstances.”
Third, the law does not allow “big” readjustments. Even under “spe-
cial circumstances,” the readjustments allowed by Article 27 concern
only “isolated” households. The same term is used in Article 14 of the
1998 LML. Thus, a village-wide readjustment must be regarded as ille-
gal per se after the LML’s effective date of January 1, 1999, and empha-
tically so after March 1, 2003, the effective date of the carefully crafted
RLCL.
Nevertheless, the RLCL itself does not directly define what could
constitute “special circumstances.” This invites abusive interpretations
that run afoul of the fundamental non-readjustment principle. And, in-
deed, the 17-province survey found that population change is the lead-
ing reason for post-second-round readjustments, having been cited in
72.8% of those readjustments; natural disaster, the only clearly per-
mitted reason, was cited in only 1.4% of cases.83
Provinces and prefectures have adopted implementation rules for
the RLCL that offer possible guidance as to what the central govern-
ment could do to clarify the governing rules, either via national regula-
tions or via amendment to the law.
For example, the Shandong RLCL Implementation Method (article
14) provides the following clarification on “special circumstances”:
During the contract term, where farmer households lose their
land due to state expropriation or requisition, voluntarily give up
the compensation and wish to contract land again, or where
households lose their land due to special circumstances such as
their contracted land being seriously damaged by a natural dis-
aster, the contract issuing party may properly readjust contracted
land among isolated households . . . . [Emphasis added.]
Besides reiterating the procedural conditions set forth by the RLCL, the
Shandong rule requires that a household must actually “lose land” be-
fore a readjustment can be triggered. It logically follows that a house-
hold’s contracted land remains the same whether or not the household
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size grows or shrinks since, in either case, the household has not suf-
fered a “loss of land.” This is a significant clarification as it essentially
eliminates population change as a justification for readjustments, and
does so fully consistent with the language of the RLCL.
Certificates drafted by prefecture governments in Hunan Province
are even clearer:
During the contract term, the collective will not conduct readjustment
of the contracted land on the ground of population changes. The con-
tracted land is allowed for like-kind exchange, inheritance, and
compensated transfers in accordance with applicable laws. The
collective may take back and redistribute the contracted land if
the contracting farmer dies without any issue, or if the entire
household changes their agricultural residence registration to
non-agricultural registration, or the soil fertility is seriously da-
maged and contracted land has been idle for an excessive period
of time. [Emphasis added.]
Inclusion of such an explicit prohibition against readjustments for po-
pulation reasons in the certificate is an important step forward. Despite
falling short of the RLCL (there is, for example, no power in the collec-
tive under that law to take back contracted land due to its being left
idle), the clear restrictions of the village’s authority of withdrawing land
are significant in terms of irregular readjustments.84
Improving the land takings rules
Farmers’ land tenure security is threatened by rampant land takings
from four perspectives: First, although China’s Constitution and emi-
nent domain laws permit the state to expropriate farmland for the need
of public interests,85 such public interests are not defined in any way
under the law, giving the government virtually unlimited power in tak-
ing farmland for all non-agricultural purposes. Second, compensation
for taking farmland for either public purposes or commercial purposes
is subject to statutory limits86 (which are usually well below the fair
market value of the land to be taken),87 and in most cases are not suffi-
cient to maintain the living standard of the dispossessed farmers.
Third, even this insufficient amount of compensation for the expro-
priation does not go to the dispossessed farmers in full or in most part,
with other surveys suggesting that farmers get an average of only some
10-15% of the compensation paid.88 Finally, farmers’ right to notice,
participation and appeal in land expropriations is seriously lacking both
in the legal regime and in practice.
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RDI’s 2005 17-province survey provides the most recent data on the
issue of land takings.89 Farmers reported one or more land takings in
476 of the 1,773 survey villages (or 26.8%) subsequent to when they
were granted 30-year land rights (or since 1995 if the village has not
implemented the 30-year policy).90 Of these 476 cases of land takings,
almost one-third, 32.7%, were for typical commercial purposes such as
factories, urban housing and petrol stations.91
With respect to compensation for the farmers’ loss of land, the sur-
vey found that in only 320 of the 476 cases (67.2%) did farmers receive
some actual cash compensation, either in lump sum or installment, or
both.92 Furthermore, in about a third of cases where cash compensa-
tion was promised, the promise had not been fulfilled.
Making matters even worse, 26% of villages where takings occurred
conducted an apparently illegal land readjustment following the land
taking, “spreading the pain” of the taking among all villagers. Such
land readjustment essentially reduces the landholding sizes of other
village households not directly affected by the land taking, in effect
“compensating” land-losing farmers with other farmers’ land. Such a
scheme also facilitates collective cadres withholding or intercepting
cash compensation for their private use.93
In only 21.8% of cases were farmers consulted about the amount of
compensation. Although 65.5% of farmers were not satisfied with the
compensation, only 12.5% demanded a hearing or filed a grievance,
and fewer than 1% (only five farmers) went to court.94
Largely as a result of such takings processes, disputes and even con-
frontational protests have in recent years become routine in the coun-
tryside.95 Having realized the potential harm to social stability, the Chi-
nese government has taken some legal and policy measures to improve
the regulatory framework, notably the State Council’s Document No.
28 of 2004, the Ministry of Land and Resources’ Regulations on Public
Hearings, and legal measures adopted by some provincial governments
in response to the central government’s policy guidelines. Most re-
cently, the Property Law has made substantial improvements in the le-
gal regime for ensuring farmers’ interests in land when the land is
taken. These new developments include:
Compensation for land expropriation. Document No. 28 emphasizes
that the amount of compensation be determined based on the principle
of preventing the farmer’s living standard from being lowered as a re-
sult of the land expropriation. It specifically requires that local govern-
ments allocate to farmers part of the revenue from granting state-
owned land use rights if the maximum sum of land compensation and
resettlement subsidies allowed under the Land Management Law (30
times the average annual output value of the land to be expropriated)
is still insufficient to restore the affected farmers’ livelihoods. It also al-
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lows farmers to have an option of “stock-for-land” through which farm-
ers can elect to contribute their land rights directly to a project with
stable incomes in exchange for shares of stock in the project.96 The
Property Law, adopted in March 2007, now authoritatively reaffirms
the principle that compensation should be adequate to maintain the
farmers’ living standards.97 The law also requires that the government
make financial arrangements to meet the displaced farmers’ social se-
curity needs in addition to fully paying the compensation package for
the land it takes.98
Allocation of compensation. Document No. 28 states that compensa-
tion for loss of land must be primarily used for the farmer households
who have lost their contracted land through requisition. “Primarily
used for” leaves considerable scope for the cadres to exert actual control
over the compensation funds. More specific and satisfactory are the
Shanxi Provincial government regulations on the allocation of land
compensation between collective landowner and affected farmers, pro-
mulgated in October 2005. The regulations require 80% of land com-
pensation go directly to affected farmers whose contracted land is ex-
propriated and that 20% go to the collective landowner.99 The Property
Law is closer to – and of course far more authoritative than – the Shan-
xi regulations, explicitly providing that the holders of rural land con-
tracting and operation rights are entitled to compensation for loss of
land, the biggest component of the compensation package under exist-
ing Chinese takings law.100 This provision appears to supercede the
prior provisions of law authorizing the collective entity to take exclusive
possession of compensation for loss of land.
Procedures for land expropriation. In 2004 the Ministry of Land and
Resources promulgated new regulations that require the land expro-
priating agency to inform affected farmers of their right to a hearing
on compensation standards and the resettlement package, and provide
that such a hearing must be held if requested within five days after the
parties are informed.101 Document No. 28 takes this further and states
that before the expropriation is submitted for approval at the appropri-
ate level of government, its purposes, location, compensation standard,
and resettlement and rehabilitation measures should be made known
to farmers whose land is to be taken, and the results of the required
survey on the existing situation of the land proposed to be taken
should be confirmed by the rural collective and farmer households.
The Property Law, however, contains nothing on these important pro-
cedural issues.
How these new efforts will improve the local practice of land takings
– or restrain the frequency and amplitude of such takings – remains to
be seen. Widespread publicity for these requirements and putting in
place some of the other implementation measures discussed in Section
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V below is likely to be helpful. But it would be desirable if the central
government adopted an actual “Law on Takings” that would build upon
the protections provided in the Property Law, in Document No. 28, and
in the best of the local reform measures.
Mortgageability
One further needed reform in the prevailing legal rules in China in-
volves the issue of the mortgageability of farmers’ land rights. This is
closely linked to the breadth of farmers’ land rights and bears on their
practical ability both to make improvements on their existing land and
to engage in long-term transactions in land rights. The potential impor-
tance of measures that would allow farmers to obtain credit for major
land improvements is shown in the 17-province survey findings con-
cerning what resources farmers used to make the investments reflected
in the survey. Constituting the most prominent resources by far, three-
quarters used personal labor, and slightly over three-quarters used per-
sonal savings. Much less frequently, one out of six used money bor-
rowed from relatives, and only one out of seven used money borrowed
from a bank or credit union.102
Chinese law currently prohibits farmers from mortgaging their land
rights.103 This prevents them using land as collateral not only to obtain
necessary credit to finance land improvements, but also to finance the
acquisition of rights to additional land with a lump-sum payment to
the seller (the so-called “purchase money mortgage”).
Earlier drafts of the Property Law would have permitted the mort-
gage of arable land rights under certain conditions. This was omitted,
unfortunately, in the final version due to legislative concerns over the
farmers’ loss of land to foreclosure. Such concerns, while understand-
able, could be greatly allayed through appropriate provisions in a mort-
gage law. For example, China could introduce a homestead exemption
making part of the household contracted land exempt from foreclosure,
and therefore essentially non-mortgageable (enough land to produce
sufficient food to meet the household’s essential consumption needs).
Other options might facilitate credit: crop insurance could help assure
repayment; a portion of standing crops could be used as collateral; and
micro-credit to farmers, without collateral, could be encouraged and
meet important needs.
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V. Further tasks and reform needs: measures for
implementation
Much recent land tenure reform experience in China bears on the ever-
present issue of implementing the law. Some important tasks related
to implementation can be identified, various combinations of which
may also bear on implementation in other settings of land tenure re-
form; indeed one – legal aid, with which RDI has had extensive experi-
ence in various country settings – is the subject of Chapter 9.
Publicity, publicity, publicity104
The 17-province survey revealed that farmers have heard of the 30-year
no-readjustment policy but know few specifics. Virtually none of the
farmers knew any provisions of the RLCL, although it had gone into ef-
fect more than two years before the survey. Farmers’ broadly held
knowledge of the 30-year rights policy was traceable to a widespread
publicity campaign that coincided with adoption of the LML in mid-
1998.105 Television had been the most widely effective means of com-
munication (the great majority of Chinese farm households have a tele-
vision). Farmers had retained that broad knowledge, with over 90%
still aware of the 30-year rights in mid-2005. But no similar publicity
campaign has been conducted for the 2002 RLCL. It remains to be
seen if such a publicity campaign will accompany the aspects of the
new Property Law that concern farmers’ land tenure rights and that re-
affirm the RLCL. A repetitive informational and educational campaign
using multiple media channels will be necessary for that law and for
any additional land tenure protections (such as protections against tak-
ings) extended to farmers. The “assurance” aspect of tenure security re-
quires rightholders to be aware of a formally existing right; a right or
remedy that is unknown cannot be availed of. And if cadres know that
farmers are aware of their rights, this may itself help forestall many
rights violations that would otherwise occur.106
Issuance of compliant contracts and certificates
The practical importance of formal documentation of land rights, in ac-
cordance with Chinese law, is clear from the 2005 survey results. The
survey showed that possessing written contracts or certificates – and
even better, possessing both contracts and certificates – correlates
strongly with decisions to make mid- to long-term investments in the
land, and does so in a manner that strongly indicates a causal relation-
ship. This finding alone would amply justify a strong push by the cen-
tral government to ensure that contracts and certificates are issued to
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all farmers who have not yet received them. In addition to investment,
other important factors such as the farmers’ confidence in tenure se-
curity and their satisfaction with compensation in cases of land takings
are correlated with the presence of documentation – although evidence
of causation in the case of takings is less clear than in the case of in-
creased investment.
The survey further showed that issuance of contracts and certificates
has slowed in the past four years, leaving nearly two out of five farm
households without either document. The first task should be to make
sure that 85-90% of all farm households receive at least a contract or a
certificate. There seems to be no reason not to set a goal of ensuring
that 75-80% of households (versus 38% as found by the survey) receive
both documents. The central government should clearly signal now
that the achievement of such quantitative goals by an individual locality
within a pre-determined timetable will be a key issue on which the ade-
quacy of officials’ performance will be judged, and that it will widely
publicize success and failure in achieving this goal both within and be-
yond government circles.
Equally important is that the contracts or certificates to be issued
should comply substantially with the controlling laws and regulations.
Specifically, a contract or certificate should contain all the essential
information that constitutes “compliant” documentation. Existing but
inadequate contracts and certificates might be supplemented with a lo-
cally appropriate attachment where it is significantly easier to do this
than to issue a replacement. Unlike many other implementation needs,
this compliant-document goal would require fairly specific regulatory
guidelines, preferably from the central government.
Durable “fact sheets”
As part of the apparently successful nationwide campaign to end most
taxes and fees assessed against farmers, the government gave each
farmer a “fact sheet” in the form of a durable laminated card.107 The
cards contained an accurate but simplified description of the legal
rules, likely types of violations, and what to do if rights were violated.
RDI researchers found the cards prominently displayed in houses of
farmers.108 The government could cheaply produce and rapidly distri-
bute a similar laminated card containing major legal provisions on
farmers’ land rights, coordinating the distribution with the needed
publicity campaign, reaching farmers before most new contracts or cer-
tificates – and supplements to existing ones – were completed, signed
and issued.
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Legal aid
Besides publicity for laws, RDI experience in Russia, Ukraine and
other country settings indicates that one effective method of dissemi-
nating legal information to farmers as well as to local cadres is through
the establishment of rural land rights legal aid centers. These experi-
ences are discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
Independent rural legal aid services should be established to help
farmers and others understand and enforce their land rights. The legal
aid offices could be established initially as a pilot project, and later in-
troduced throughout the country if the model proves successful.109
The offices should be staffed by qualified lawyers and paralegals, be
based in places that farmers can visit conveniently – and also from
which the legal aid providers can conveniently visit rural villages – and
enjoy considerable independence even though they might receive gov-
ernmental funding. Independence is particularly important in cases
where farmers’ rights are infringed by government officials.
Experience elsewhere suggests that a large majority of disputes may
be resolved in the farmers’ interests by negotiation (and education)
when the other side perceives that the farmer has competent legal re-
presentation. The next recommendation also bears upon the relatively
less-common situation where a legal aid lawyer must bring a case to
court.
Deploying the Peoples’ Court
An entire chapter of the RLCL details farmers’ rights to go to court and
obtain a wide range of remedies when land rights have been violated.
These remedial provisions are reaffirmed in broad terms in the Prop-
erty Law. However, our impression from extensive rapid rural appraisal
interviewing – certainly reinforced by findings from the 17-province
survey – is that farmers find it very difficult to bring a land dispute to
court, and are often rebuffed in the rare cases where they do so.
China might consider the creation of a specialized court to resolve
land disputes, adopting appropriate elements from the models now
found in Hong Kong and the state of New South Wales in Australia.110
But it might be quicker and more effective to establish land panels
within the existing Peoples’ Courts, to provide farmers with improved
access to the legal system, give specialized skills to selected judges and
others through training in the resolution of land disputes (and a stea-
dily accumulating experience), and increase the efficiency of land dis-
pute resolution.
A specialized land panel within the Peoples’ Court should have ex-
clusive original jurisdiction over cases involving requests to adjudicate
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disputes such as those over distribution of land by collective units to
farm households, deprivation of such land by readjustments or other-
wise, land takings compensation and related issues, and disputes be-
tween farmers about leases or transfers.
To promote access, these specialized panels might operate in the
form of “circuit” courts, with judges traveling to townships (or perhaps
even administrative villages, where there had been indications of multi-
ple complaints) throughout each county to hear land disputes accord-
ing to a pre-announced hearing schedule.
Thus, as farmers learned more about their rights through publicity
and other means, they would also have a professionally equipped court
to which they could take land disputes. Again, like other measures, this
might serve as an important deterrent to would-be violators of farmers’
land rights.
Establish an information-collecting and monitoring toll-free hot line
A telephone hotline could be an effective way for the government to
link itself to the people and learn from their actual experience. It could
take advantage of the now-ubiquitous access to cell phones, including
in the countryside. Such a hotline should preferably be operated by a
national ministry (e.g., Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Land Re-
sources) and be open to the entire country. Certain provinces might be
encouraged to establish pilot projects as well. Farmers would call a uni-
form, publicized and toll-free number to report possible violations of
farmers’ land rights; hotline operators would receive specialized train-
ing on relevant laws and appropriate questions to ask. Anonymous
calls should be allowed in order to encourage farmers to expose sensi-
tive problems.
After receiving calls, the operators should record the information on
the calls promptly, the call records would then be sorted out and en-
tered into a centralized database. A frequent bulletin could be pub-
lished to analyze and summarize the calls based on number of calls,
geographical origins, nature and content of calls, and so on, with a sec-
tion describing “hot issues” and “hot areas.” The bulletin should be re-
ceived and reviewed by high levels of the central government and for-
warded to provincial-level agricultural and land resources agencies.
With respect to areas suffering repeated problems or saturated with
farmer complaints, the central government could consider conducting
additional independent fieldwork, circulating information about the
problems, and requiring the local governments which are responsible
to apply specific remedies without delay.
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Continue monitoring local implementation progress
To measure implementation in its various dimensions, the central gov-
ernment should conduct continuing assessments through farmer inter-
views and periodic surveys. Steps must be taken to ensure the objectiv-
ity and representativeness of the findings, through random selection of
counties, townships, villages and households, and through interviewing
farmers directly, outside the presence of local officials (particularly col-
lective cadres). Such assessment tools are essential to provide the gov-
ernment with an accurate and frequently updated picture of the extent
of implementation of the RLCL and Property Law, and other land-re-
lated issues at both national and local levels. This may also become the
basis to evaluate and revise the implementation efforts based on evol-
ving circumstances.
VI. Possibilities for still more far-reaching tenure reform
The road to more secure and marketable land rights for China’s 800
million rural residents will be long and hard, but one must bear in
mind how far China has come and how much progress has been made
during the last two and a half decades. China actually represents a
prime example of what broad and guaranteed individual access to land
– even when the rights are readjustable and not assured as to any parti-
cular piece of land – can do to bring dramatic improvement to the lives
of the rural population.
But the next major advances in farmers’ productivity and well being
will clearly require greater efforts to ensure their secure tenure on a
particular piece of land – a key generator of long-term investment and
land value, and a characteristic of all those agricultures that are more
productive than China’s. As China’s urban-rural divide continues to
worsen, land takings accelerate, and the competition from foreign agri-
cultural producers intensifies due to China’s WTO accession, the rural
land question will become ever more important. Powerful evidence
supports the view that any solution to these broader issues must also
include, as a central element, providing farmers with greater land ten-
ure security. This requires significant legal and policy reforms and
their concrete implementation at the grassroots.
Looking beyond the recommendations made in Sections IV and V,
including substantially completing implementation of the 30-year
rights for all farmers (or, perhaps, if further significant implementation
of 30-year rights proved daunting) China should consider one of two
next steps: either providing farmers with full private ownership rights
to land, or, a less drastic alternative, explicitly giving farmers perpetual
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use rights to such land. Either approach should remove the main
threat to tenure security, that is, those local officials or cadres who typi-
cally claim to be acting on behalf of the “collective” as the formal owner
of the land (a claim that should be undermined by Article 59 of the
new Property Law, as discussed above), but who often act primarily to
enrich themselves.111 The experience of the “land to the tiller” program
that made millions of poor Chinese peasants into small but real own-
ers of land in the late 1940s and early 1950s shows that private land
ownership not only can trigger enormous economic gain but also ac-
cords with the political ideology of a socialist state. As Premier Wen
Jiabao put it well in press conferences following annual sessions of the
National People’s Congress in 2005 and 2006, a reasonable policy
would seem to be that farmers’ land rights will “not be changed for-
ever.”112
A first step in that direction – although one going not nearly as far
as the two options suggested in the previous paragraph – is the provi-
sion in the Property Law that allows the farmer “to continue to contract
the land” after the 30-year term expires. Like several important Prop-
erty Law provisions, however, this would benefit from further clarifica-
tion in a related regulation: Is the continuation to be for another term
of 30 years? Must the farmer affirmatively request renewal of the term,
or is it automatic unless he declines to renew? Is the renewal power ex-
hausted by a single exercise, or does it continue – in effect creating the
potential for perpetual use rights?
Recently,113 articles have appeared in the Western media noting that
a small but significant movement is afoot – and is facing strong official
opposition – to give Chinese farmers full private ownership of the land
they till.114 In one of the same media accounts, a prominent Chinese
academic opposed to private ownership was quoted as saying that “if
[the Chinese government] want the same problems as India has then
they should go ahead and privatize the land,” and arguing to maintain
“the current system of state [sic] ownership.”115 But, as the detailed dis-
cussion in Chapter 6 makes clear, the comparison with India is far off
the mark. Except for two or three of its 28 states, India has had little
successful land tenure reform in the 60-plus years since independence
in 1947. At independence, a high proportion of rural families were
comprised of tenant farmers and agricultural laborers, and that propor-
tion has not shrunk appreciably over the past six decades – indeed, as
between these two non-landowning groups, there are probably fewer
tenant farmers and more agricultural laborers (generally the worse-off
of the two groups) today. China, by contrast, would begin any program
of full privatization with a farming system in which the great majority
of rural families now possess a parcel or (usually) several parcels of
land on a highly egalitarian basis, even though most of them remain
FROM COLLECTIVE TO HOUSEHOLD TENURE: CHINA AND ELSEWHERE 309
insecure as to which parcel or parcels – and with what relocations, re-
ductions or reconfigurations – they will possess from one year to the
next. There are, however, very few tenant farmers, very few agricultural
laborers, and virtually no landlords in today’s China. Thus, the starting
point for any full-ownership-to-the-tiller tenure reform in China would
be wholly different than it was, and remains, in India.
However, a persuasive argument can still be made that existing pro-
visions of law, if effectively implemented, create land rights for Chinese
farmers that are not significantly inferior to full private ownership. De-
pending on the percentage factor used to discount a future stream of
income, the usual formula would assign a 30-year land right, in the
first year, roughly 75% to 95% of the value of full private ownership.116
Moreover, full private ownership does not seem to be a prerequisite for
a market economy. Farmers in Hong Kong’s New Territories have (and
previously had under the British) 50-year rights to their land, while
Hong Kong’s urban skyscrapers are built on land that is usually held
with 75-year rights.117 Most land in Israel is held under 49- or 98-year
rights (the former with a biblical origin).118 Surely both Hong Kong
and Israel would generally be considered market economies. So is Aus-
tralia, where much privately used land (including extensive grazing
land in “stations” held by private parties) is acquired from the govern-
ment for a single lump sum payment for a “leasehold” period of 99
years.119 Further examples could be cited.
Moreover, as to the possible psychological significance of “owner-
ship,” any market-impeding psychological difficulties arising from
“only” having multi-decade rights seem to have been successfully over-
come in China’s urban sector, where private rights – although never re-
adjustable – now range from 50 to 70 years and are freely bought and
sold (and mortgaged).120 The key psychological need may not be to give
farmers formal “ownership,” but to help farmers understand and de-
fend the 30-year extendable and non-readjustable property rights that
they are supposed to possess under present law. This should also be ac-
companied by widespread publicity to clarify that the “collective” own-
ership, as authoritatively defined in Article 59 of the Property Law, is
joint ownership by all members of the village community.
The strongest argument in favor of rules giving farmers “private
ownership” is likely to be that this would be a more dramatic and more
decisive subject of a publicity campaign than the present “30-year
rights,” would further emphasize the non-existence of any competing
collective land rights, and would thus better lend itself to successful
implementation of the types of measures described in Section V.
If necessary to placate ideological and political opposition to full pri-
vate ownership (even though such ownership was successfully put in
place by the new communist government in 1949-1956), a series of
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mutually reinforcing limits and safeguards could be drawn from ex-
perience in other countries that would offer reassurance against possi-
ble abuses by the well-off or well-connected and would satisfy other
policy considerations that might arise as to equity and fairness. It
would need to be recognized, however, that by including many of these
limits in a new governing law on farmer ownership (such a law would
be needed, along with a parallel constitutional amendment) the govern-
ment would correspondingly limit the marketability of the farmers’
ownership rights, and hence the wealth-creating effect of such owner-
ship121:
– Do not allow the sale, or even lease, of land rights to anyone other
than a self-cultivating farmer. Such a partial moratorium on trans-
fers might be applied for an initial period, such as 15 years, while
farmers gained a better sense of land values and the land market
(note that the government has not seen any necessity to apply such
a restriction on the transfer of the present 30-year rights).122
– The foregoing restriction could be reinforced with a requirement
that any transferee who purchases the ownership right (even
though that transferee is a self-cultivating farmer) could not re-
transfer via sale or even lease, for some significant period, such as
five or ten years. This would restrain rapid turnover – what some
opponents of unrestricted private ownership might call “specula-
tion,” or what in the United States housing market has come to be
known as “flipping.”
– Regardless of the extent of restrictions on sale, or as an alternative
to moratorium periods, wherever sales were permitted, there could
be a sliding-scale tax on profits the size of which depends on the
length of time the land was owned, with a very high percentage tax
on sales made after a relatively brief period of ownership. This
should not, of course, apply to the present 30-year rightholders who
would be the initial beneficiaries of ownership, or their heirs, but
only beginning with those who buy from them and then quickly re-
sell.
– Farmers, as owners, should be allowed to capture the value of their
land in transfers for non-agricultural purposes, provided that they
have fully complied with zoning and land-use restrictions. Again,
taxation of the profits from such non-agricultural transfers (even
where permitted and lawful) could be at a high percentage rate –
but based on different, and complex, policy considerations. That tax
rate, even though it might be high, might well be flat and might ap-
ply to the initial beneficiaries as well. Major changes should, in any
case, be made in the legal regime for shifting land to non-agricul-
tural uses, as discussed above.
FROM COLLECTIVE TO HOUSEHOLD TENURE: CHINA AND ELSEWHERE 311
– There could also be restrictions – tailored to specific regions and
land types – as to the holding of agricultural land (either as owner
or lessee) above specified maximum ceilings. Note that there are no
such “ceilings” now, and their absence has sometimes helped pave
the way for abuses by the cadres, such as “outside boss contracting”
and “scale farming” (note too that large farms are not generally
more productive or efficient, and certainly not in a setting such as
China, which remains short on land and capital but long on la-
bor123).
– With a goal similar to that of imposing ceilings, the law might pro-
hibit any purchase or lease of agricultural land by foreign indivi-
duals or foreign legal entities, and perhaps also by domestic Chi-
nese legal entities. This, and many of the other restrictions de-
scribed, could be for a fixed initial period of time, or could later be
repealed after policy makers had gained assurance that this could
safely be done, in the more developed and less agricultural China
of ten or 20 years in the future.
VII. A brief comparison with land tenure reforms in the former
Soviet Union
RDI began working in Russia in 1990, when it was still part of the
USSR. After dissolution of the USSR in 1991, RDI worked for ex-
tended periods in a number of the republics of the former Soviet Un-
ion (FSU), including most prominently Russia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan
and Moldova.124
In comparing the post-collective-farming experience of those coun-
tries with that of China (and that of Vietnam), four salient points stand
out:
(1) The most fundamental and dramatic difference is that on most of
the territory of the FSU, collective farming has ended in name only.
Especially in Russia and Ukraine (and also all the Central Asian repub-
lics except Kyrgyzstan), the great bulk of farmland is still operated in
very large units – typically several thousand hectares with several hun-
dred workers – which generally perform just as poorly as the former
collectives. Indeed, those farms are often virtually identical in territory
to the old collectives and have simply been reregistered in new corpo-
rate forms such as “joint-stock companies” or “production coopera-
tives.” The organizational culture and decision making process appear
little changed from those of the previous entities, with the workers
(members) still lacking the kind of active input into management that
would, for example, characterize the ejidos (both collective and indivi-
dual) in Mexico or the kibbutzim or moshavim in Israel.
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(2) The laws of the various republics have in most cases (including
Russia and Ukraine) afforded the workers (members) a formal option
to leave the enterprise and start a private farm by claiming their pro-
portionate share of the land formerly used by the enterprise as the pri-
vate owners of such land. These legal provisions have been in place
since the early- to mid-1990s, but only a small fraction of farm families
have used them to start private farms in the case of Russia and
Ukraine (though used by a somewhat higher proportion of farm fa-
milies in Moldova and a substantially higher proportion in Kyrgyzstan).
The reasons for this sweeping failure to “head for the exits” on the col-
lectives when given the chance in Russia and Ukraine, in stark contract
with the experience in China (and in Vietnam), are further explored be-
low.
(3) One expansion of the scope of private farming that has generally
taken place, however, is the enlargement of the small plot sector, in-
cluding the “private plots” on the large farms and the “dacha plots”
held by urban residents. These small plots have long been disproportio-
nately productive: in 1990, just prior to the break-up of the USSR, this
small plot sector comprised about 2% of the agricultural land in Russia
(around 4 million hectares) and already accounted for a disproportion-
ate, roughly 27%, of the gross value of all agricultural output.125 Ac-
cording to Uzun, “The land in household plots doubled during the
1990s”126 to 8.6 million hectares, but he believes the figure should be
increased to take account of other categories of land allocated to small
plot owners for private use, notably land for hay cutting, ultimately
leading him to an estimate of 27.2 million hectares, or 14% of agricul-
tural land, from which the small plot owners obtain benefit. The pro-
ductivity of this sector remains highly disproportionate to the area un-
der utilization, now accounting for an estimated 56% of the gross value
of all agricultural output.127 Small plots, occupying about 5% of the
land in the collectives, also existed in China from the end of the giant
communes in 1962 until the broad introduction of family farming un-
der the Household Responsibility System after 1978 and were also dis-
proportionately productive in that setting.128
(4) As is still the case in China, in three of the four countries where
RDI has done most of its FSU work there had been until recently only
very limited development of markets for the full assignment or sale of
rights to agricultural land.129 A leasing market in agricultural land
rights did develop, however, one which is segmented into three cate-
gories: members leasing their land rights to the former collective enter-
prise; members leasing their land rights to private farmers (here paral-
leling the farmer-to-farmer lease market in China) when some med-
ium-size private farms were established nearby and wished to expand;
and members leasing (perhaps enterprise-wide) their land rights to
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large-scale, capital-intensive, sometimes foreign-controlled agribusiness
enterprises. Until very recently, the one country exception among the
four, where outright sale of agricultural land is increasingly taking
place, was Moldova. Now, however, the pattern of acquisitions by large-
scale agribusiness enterprises in Russia appears to have shifted decisi-
vely from leasing to buying land rights from collective-farm members.
There is further discussion of land-market issues below.
Regimes for withdrawal
In the USSR before its break-up, agricultural production had been car-
ried out through a system of 48,856 collective and state farms.130
These farms averaged 4,136 hectares (41 km2) in size,131 employed hun-
dreds of workers engaged in activities across that large area, and were
from roughly one to three orders of magnitude bigger than average
farm sizes found in the highly productive cropland sectors of the devel-
oped market economies.132 The collective system was very inefficient,
required huge subsidies, and did not reward entrepreneurship and
hard work. The system treated its workers like “modern-day serfs,” as
one commentator has put it.133 Some shortcomings of collective farm-
ing are discussed in Chapter 3, and earlier in the present chapter.
These shortcomings were recognized (or not) to widely varying de-
grees in the 15 republics that emerged from the break-up of the USSR,
and the new legal systems addressed the shortcomings with varying de-
grees of seriousness. The countries of the FSU which took reform rela-
tively seriously all made an effort to give land rights to the workers,
retirees and (in some cases) teachers and other “social sphere” workers
on the former collective farms, or to return the land to the pre-Soviet
owners.134 The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania re-
turned ownership of farm land to the heirs of its pre-Soviet owners,
that is, as of around the end of World War II, by way of restitution, a
process requiring an administratively fairly complex historical in-
quiry.135 In the Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia, land used by the collective farms was subdivided and transferred
directly to ownership of those on the enterprise. And other FSU coun-
tries, including the four on which we focus here – Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova and Kyrgyzstan – responded to the challenge with a unique
and interesting invention: the “land share.”136
Instead of providing each individual with a specific plot of land, the
land share provided the individual a right to claim a physical land par-
cel of a set size in ownership and leave the collective farm when that
person chose to do so. This resembles the right to partition joint prop-
erty in Anglo-American property law. Until the rightholder sought to
exercise the partition-like right, the land share remained an ownership
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right held in common with the other land share owners on the former
collective farm, to a specified quantity of land not yet separately demar-
cated or identified on the ground. The land share could be leased or
sold to a producer.137 A producer who leased in or purchased anything
less than all shares on the farm would have to negotiate with those
who had not leased out or sold their shares in order to identify the phy-
sical location of the leased or purchased land.
None of the land share systems was well designed. Each has raised
serious problems for actual withdrawal in practice, problems it will be
useful to bear in mind in case countries with still-collectivized agricul-
tures – such as Cuba, North Vietnam or Belarus – might be tempted to
adopt such a system in the future. The key to the full workability of
the land share system was whether the holder of the right could actu-
ally claim an individually identified land parcel in kind. For the most
part, the answer was no. An illustration of the “land-share” system and
withdrawal process is given in Box 7.2: clearly much depended on
being able to muster a fair decision and a favorable vote at the meeting
of all land share owners – something which would vary according to
country and local factors. In Russia and Ukraine, the two countries
with the largest number of land share owners, no more than 5%
claimed land in kind in the first decade of reform. In Moldova, roughly
15-20% of collective farm members left the farms with a corresponding
amount of the land. Kyrgyzstan established its land share system in
1992, and by the end of 1996 approximately 50% of this land had
moved from collective farms to farms operated by nuclear families or
extended families. This move was especially pronounced among the
Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups – all the members of an enter-
prise typically deciding to withdraw their land at once – while the eth-
nic Russians predominantly resisted withdrawals and remained on
large-scale farms.
In 1996-1997 Moldova began to acknowledge the fact that the land
share system was not delivering the anticipated results, and in 1999
Ukraine did the same. In response, each country began to execute a
vigorous state program to make every land share holder the owner of
an individual land parcel. This required platting the parcels, fixing par-
cel boundaries through boundary surveys, assigning parcels to each
land share holder, and registering these parcels in the ownership of
their assignees. Moldova’s program was implemented during 1998-
2000, and Ukraine’s during 2000-2006. RDI worked on both pro-
grams.
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Box 7.2. How the land-share system was supposed to work
A typical Russian collective farm might have employed 250 people
and cultivated 3,000 hectares of land. Another 25 people were tea-
chers, medical personnel or other social service providers serving
those living on the territory of the collective farm. In addition to
these active workers, another 225 pensioners had worked on the
farm or as social service providers. All three groups combined to-
taled 500 people. During the land reform process, 10% of the farm’s
3,000 cultivated hectares would have been put into a reserve, with
the remaining 2,700 hectares divided equally among those 500 peo-
ple in the form of land shares. Thus, each land share gave a person
the right, at least in theory, to claim 5.4 hectares in-kind out of the
2,700 hectares. Until the land share holder claimed the land, he or
she could lease the share to an agricultural producer or transfer the
share to relatives or third parties.
To withdraw the corresponding amount of land in kind, one or
more individuals (usually a household had two land-share owners,
husband and wife) typically needed to apply to the general meeting
of enterprise members (technically, the members would be voting as
joint owners of the land rather than as enterprise members since
the enterprise held no legal interest in the land). In the present ex-
ample, a husband and wife might be seeking to withdraw a specifi-
cally identified 10.8 (2 x 5.4) hectares. The general meeting was then
to decide the location of the land the applicants would get, taking a
vote on the matter. The allocated land would then be identified on
the ground, the parcel boundaries surveyed, and a certificate of
rights issued for the parcel.
National programs might also promote and facilitate a general
process of enterprise-wide parcel identification and certification. The
situation prevailing on that enterprise, and more broadly, might vary
from one of widespread support for the process, with mutual accom-
modation and a general withdrawal by the members, to deep hosti-
lity by farm members and farm managers, accompanied by failure
to act on an isolated application or by the offer of a remote and ill-
suited parcel.
Clearly, these systematic enterprise-wide titling programs obviated the
need for approval of individual applications to withdraw land in kind
that might otherwise be made by one or a few members at a time. Un-
fortunately, the country with the largest number of land share holders,
Russia, has not taken steps to enable land share owners to widely con-
vert their shares into actual land parcels.
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However, in Russia as also in Ukraine and Moldova, it was generally
permitted to use a small portion of the land represented by the land
share to physically enlarge the “private plots” that nearly all households
on the enterprise have. Usually, this was done by choosing a field close
to the residential areas where the existing private plots were already lo-
cated adjoining the house plots, and expanding each private plot by al-
lowing selection of a nearby, but not contiguous, small plot located on
the field. There was usually widespread support for such modest exten-
sions of the existing private plots with “field plots.” While it is one
thing to enlarge the family’s private plot, it is quite another to take
one’s entire proportionate amount of land out of the collective fields
and seek to gain the family’s livelihood as individual family farmers.
Why the greater resistance to actual break-up in Russia and Ukraine
Compared with China or Vietnam, only a small minority of farmers in
Russia or Ukraine have seized the opportunity, once it was given, to
leave the former collective and start family farms. In some ways this re-
luctance to create small farms is even more striking in Ukraine, where
nearly every member of a large enterprise now knows exactly where
his or her land is, and no longer needs to petition a general meeting to
work out and assent to the exact location of the land that is to be with-
drawn. Why this striking contrast in behavior between former collective
members in Russia and Ukraine, as compared to their counterparts in
China and Vietnam?
Several broad contrasts appear to exist between Russia-Ukraine on
the one hand, and China-Vietnam on the other that might have expla-
natory power:
– Collectivized farming had only existed in China and (northern) Viet-
nam since the mid-1950s, and both decided to permit countrywide
family farming roughly 25 years later. Most families, and certainly
all villagers in their forties or older, thus had a clear recollection of
what it meant to operate a family farm. By contrast, collective farm-
ing had existed in Russia and Ukraine since the early 1930s,138 and
the option of leaving the collectives only arose in the early 1990s, a
span of some 60 years. Very few were still alive who remembered
what it was like to depend on family farming for their whole liveli-
hood.
– A related matter was the need to market the large majority of the
farm products produced by agriculture in Russia and Ukraine, each
of which was more than four-fifths urban by the 1990s. This was
comparatively far more important than the need to market produc-
tion in China and Vietnam, which remained between three-fifths
and two-thirds rural and agrarian. Most farm production in China
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and Vietnam was needed and used for home consumption, not to
feed the cities, and average distances to urban markets were also far
lower in China and Vietnam.
– The agricultural population left behind in the Russian and Ukrai-
nian countrysides was also an ageing one. Indeed, half of all land
share holders in those settings were retirees, beyond their peak eco-
nomically active years, and less likely to welcome a major change in
lifestyle.
– Family farms in Russia and Ukraine (comprised of two to four land
shares) would typically be 10 to 20 hectares in size, or more. Thus
they clearly would require owning, or having assured access to, trac-
tors and other capital equipment, in contrast to the labor-intensive
family farms of one hectare (and often less) that families received
when exiting the collectives in China and northern Vietnam. But ca-
pital equipment or credit to buy it was not readily available in Rus-
sia and Ukraine, thus greatly limiting the extent to which families
could cultivate their land share.
– Further discouraging the idea of family farming and private land
rights was the initial experience of family farming in the USSR
after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. At first, such farming was en-
couraged, but later Stalin waged a harsh campaign against even
modestly successful small farmers (kulaks), murdering or deporting
to Siberia millions of them in the late 1920s and the 1930s.139
Many collective farm families retained memories of what had hap-
pened to grandparents who had relied on the Bolsheviks’ seeming
welcome to individual farming in the 1920s. (China had experi-
enced a post-collectivization famine in 1958-1962, but it was the re-
sult of disorganization and the destruction of individual motivation,
not part of a punishment deliberately visited by the state upon fa-
mily farmers.)
– Politically, China’s and Vietnam’s top leadership were clearly calling
the economic as well as political signals, and strongly supported the
break-up of collectives and a virtually complete reliance on family
farming, as well as broadly supporting the development of a market
economy. By contrast, Russia especially (despite, or perhaps partly
because of, its “big bang” rapid privatization of industry) was experi-
encing a tug-of-war between supposedly democratic legislative and
executive branches, and the pro-privatization, pro-family-farming
messages conveyed from Moscow down to the local level were de-
cidedly mixed, with the executive “for” privatization but the legisla-
ture “against” throughout most of the period.140 Neither Yeltsin nor
his successor, Vladimir Putin, was apparently willing to expend a
great deal of either political or financial capital on actually carrying
through reforms in the agricultural sector.
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Interestingly, in Moldova, where some of the above factors do not hold
(and others hold to a lesser degree), by 2000 an estimated 27% of agri-
cultural land was in individual production (small plots or family
farms), versus only 13% in Russia and 18% in Ukraine.141
Land market activity
The problems initially associated with creating a market for private
land rights in Russia – where, at the time the USSR dissolved in 1991,
such rights and such a market had not existed for almost 75 years
(since 1917) – are illustrated by the anecdote recounted in Box 7.3. This
anecdote underscores the problems of starting up a rural land market
“from scratch” where no legal framework or even customary practice
for such a market has existed for an extended period of time.
Some of those problems have persisted to the present day. Except for
the small plots – household plots on the successors to collectives, and
dacha plots around urban areas, usually including a house – it appears
that virtually no sales of rural land plots or of land shares had been oc-
curring in Russia as recently as 2005,142 and in Ukraine such sales
have languished due to a legislative moratorium. Considerable leasing
of rights to agricultural lands, however, has been occurring. The follow-
ing specific developments with respect to rural land markets in this
group of countries are worth noting:
Land sales in Moldova. Extending back at least to 2002 there has been
a developing market in sales of smallholder land plots, with family
farmers well represented among the buyers. Field research in 2008
found a price range of roughly US$500 to US$1600 per hectare.143
Reverse tenancy in Ukraine, with and without titling. As a prominent
form of “reverse tenancy” – with small owners leasing to large lessees
– land rights have for a number of years been leased out by the right-
holders chiefly to the successor organizations of the former collectives.
But there have been at least four positive changes with the introduction
of individually demarcated and titled land plots in Ukraine, changes re-
flected in an 800-household survey: (1) the same amount of land that
was formerly represented by an undivided and undemarcated land
share now commands a payment from the lessee that averages 32%
more per hectare; (2) the lessee of the demarcated parcel is substan-
tially more likely (85% versus 66%) to make the full rental payments
agreed to in the lease contract; (3) the lessee of the demarcated parcel
is also substantially more likely (84% versus 61%) to make the rental
payments on time; and (4) a much higher proportion of land thus indi-
vidually demarcated and titled (18% versus 2%) is self-cultivated by the
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owner – usually by adding some of it to the owner’s private plot – than
holds true for the land still formally held in common.144
Box 7.3. An anecdote from the early days of reform
Very early in the reform process, in 1991, two RDI lawyers met with
a group of generally progressive Russian officials and academics
convened by the All Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences with
the request that we discuss the experience of private ownership of
agricultural land in the United States, including the question of pur-
chase and sale. After an extensive presentation by RDI lawyers, a
round of questions began. One prominent Russian participant
raised his hand vigorously near the back of the room and was recog-
nized by the moderator. His question: “But who decides the price?”
Nearly three-quarters of a century of communism and central
planning had clearly taken its toll. To those from a developed market
economy, the question may seem absurd, but it is not as absurd as it
might seem: the parties to a land sale in a country such as the Uni-
ted States are drawing upon a long history of past transactions and
prices paid. What could parties participating in such a transaction in
the FSU countries draw upon if a land market were to be introduced
(as would be the case for Russia and most others) for the first time
since 1917?
Reverse tenancy in Ukraine and Russia – the appearance of large agri-busi-
ness. Beginning around 2000, in both Ukraine and Russia, a new kind
of large tenant has appeared, in the form of large private agri-business
concerns, sometimes funded with foreign capital. One recent account
projected large future investments in Ukraine’s agriculture, especially
if the existing moratorium on sale of agricultural land is allowed to ex-
pire in 2009; but even now, the same account reports that investors
have been leasing land in the hope that they can later buy and resell
the land, and that lease prices doubled in 2007 and were predicted to
double again in 2008.145
Growing land sales in Russia. In Russia, where sales of agricultural
land have been permitted since 2002, but especially developing since
2006, it appears that large agri-business investors had driven the aver-
age price of farmland up from US$570 per hectare in 2006 to US
$1000 as of mid-2008, often consolidating former collective farms into
very large “factory farms.” By one account, as much as 14% of Russia’s
agricultural land has now gone through such an acquisition-and-conso-
lidation process.146 But whether the individuals who hold land rights –
and whose land shares have not been individually demarcated and
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titled in Russia, as most such rights have been in Ukraine and Moldo-
va – have a sufficient perception of the reality and value of their private
ownership rights, or whether much or most of the land price is being
directed to the entity that had succeeded the collective or its individual
managers (compare the discussion of “takings” for non-agricultural
purposes in China, above) is a crucial question. So far as we are aware,
no field research has yet been done on this question – and, troublingly,
the same account noted above reports that each member (land share
owner) of an enterprise whose land was acquired three years ago was
offered about US$100 per hectare for land now worth US$1100 per
hectare.147
As the land markets described above grow – both for longer-term
leases and sales – there will be an urgent need to “level the playing
field” between the small transferor and the large transferee. Various as-
pects of how to overcome land-market inadequacies or “imperfections”
have been discussed earlier in this chapter and are discussed in the
two following chapters. They include publicity for farmers’ land rights
as they stand under the law, legal aid (certainly agri-business land
buyers or land lessees who are increasingly on the other side of the
transaction have legal representation), further formalization of rights
(perhaps by applying the Ukraine and Moldova demarcation and titling
approaches in Russia – but this will have to be done before the land is
transferred, not after), reduced transaction costs (thus enlarging the
pool of potential transferees), and monitoring of what is actually hap-
pening on the ground including publicity for transaction prices and
terms.
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9 Id. art. 6. The exceptions were large forests, irrigation projects, large mining sites,
large and contiguous tracts of grassland and wasteland, and lakes. Id. art. 9, sec. B.
10 Id. art. 6
11 Id. art. 11.
12 Id. Local communist governments promulgated specific rules for implementing the
Platform. For example, the Northeast Administrative Commission adopted an imple-
menting rule for the Northeast Liberated Region requiring that a region-wide uni-
form land ownership certificate be designed by the Commission and issued to all
landowners by governments at county level. Supplemental Measures for Implement-
ing the Land Law Platform in the Northeast Liberated Region, art. 11. In its im-
plementing rule, the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region Government
made distinction between arable land and the land used for fish farming, fruit pro-
duction, and bamboo growing and let peasants decide whether to distribute these ca-
tegories of non-arable land for private ownership. Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan
Border Government Supplemental Rules on Implementing the Land Law Platform,
art 7.
13 Land Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China (1950), sec. 1, art. 1.
14 Several categories of land are listed as state owned under the Land Reform Law,
which are: large tracts of forestland, the land on which large irrigation facilities are
erected, large tracts of wasteland, large tracts of salt-producing land, mines, rivers,
lakes and harbors. The large and contiguous tracts of land for growing bamboo,
fruits, tea and mulberries which were previously owned by landlords were also con-
verted to state-owned land. See id. sec. 4, arts. 18 & 19.
15 Id. sec. 3, art. 10.
16 Id. sec. 5, art. 30. Unlike the Platform, which allows land lease only under “certain
circumstances,” the Land Reform Law does not contain such a restriction.
17 Id.
18 Land Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China (1950), sec. 6, art. 39. A region
was composed of several provinces. Regional people’s government was abolished in
the mid-1960s when the Cultural Revolution began.
19 Measures of the Mid Southern Military and Administrative Committee on Imple-
menting the Land Reform Law, art. 9(vii) and 9(ix). The landowners who were pre-
viously landlords but currently did not engage in agricultural production were pro-
hibited from possessing such rights to transfer for “a certain period” after the land
allocation. Id. art. 9(ix).
20 Id. art. 9(viii).
21 Id. art. 9(xi).
22 Regulation of Suburban Land Reform (1950), art. 9.
23 Id. art. 17.
24 Land Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China (1950), sec. 4, art. 27.
25 China Institute of Reform & Development, HISTORY OF CHANGES AND INNOVATIONS
OF CHINA’S RURAL LAND SYSTEM 31-32 (Nanhai Publishing 1999). See J. Bruce & P.
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of adding to or taking from a household’s existing landholdings when that house-
hold’s size changes. Under small readjustments, households that neither add nor
lose members will continue to farm the same landholding. Such readjustment for po-
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76 Wu & Yang, supra note 25, at 37, citing J. McMillan, J. Whalley & L. Zhu, The Impact
of China’s Economic Reforms on Agricultural Productivity Growth, 97(4) JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 781-782 (1989).
77 See K. Zhu, R. Prosterman, J. Ye, P. Li, J. Riedinger & Y. Ouyang, The Rural Land
Question in China: Analysis and Recommendations Based on a Seventeen-Province Survey,
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Regulations of the 1998 Land Management Law, art. 26.
87 For example, in Fuyang Municipality of Anhui Province, the published market price
in 2003 was 160,000 yuan to 300,000 yuan per mu, but RDI’s findings in the same
area indicated that the highest compensation paid to farmers in the same area was
23,000 yuan per mu. See Introduction of Granting Use Rights to State Owned Land in
Anhui Province, ZHONGGUO GUOTU ZIYUAN BAO [CHINA LAND & RESOURCES NEWS]
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9 and art. 10. In Guangdong Province, the new rules on compensation for land ex-
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8 Formalization of rights to land
Robert Mitchell
I. Introduction
This chapter discusses general considerations bearing upon the regis-
tration of rights to land in the developing world. Given the great variety
of rights regimes applicable to land in the developing world, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that our analysis only touches on some of the
many issues that are likely to arise in any particular setting. In fact, dif-
ferent land regimes often exist side by side within the same country.
And across much of the world, most notably in Africa, customary
groups govern themselves according to customary law that also regu-
lates the land rights of members within the group. Where such groups
exist, complicated questions arise regarding each group’s relation to
the state, other customary groups, and its own members.
Developing and transitional country governments formalize rights to
land to pursue at least two distinct (but overlapping) goals: economic
development and poverty alleviation.1 Development banks and bilateral
donors are the usual sponsors of such projects. RDI has participated in
the design and implementation of a number of national programs to
formalize land rights, including multi-year programs in Moldova and
Ukraine, and has worked with policy makers on these issues in a num-
ber of other countries, including Albania, Russia, Indonesia, Rwanda,
China and the Kyrgyz Republic.
Two topics frame our discussion: First, under what circumstances
does the formalization of rights to land – defining, certifying and regis-
tering such rights in a public registry – benefit the poor and promote
broader economic development in less developed countries? Second,
how do legal, social and bureaucratic systems influence the creation
and effective operation of rights registration systems?
The first set of questions concerns whether the state should forma-
lize land rights, and what types of rights should be formalized. These
questions include: What types of rights do people claim? Do customary
groups claim rights to territory according to customary law? Do non-
traditional communities claim the right to use village commons? Are
local elites in a position to displace the poor during the implementa-
tion of state formalization programs? Is formalization likely to benefit
the poor directly – through increased tenure security, increased prop-
erty values, access to credit, etc.? Is formalization likely to benefit the
poor indirectly by promoting broader economic growth? Apart from
the potential benefits accruing to the poor through formalization, what
are the inherent risks for the poor? Is formalization likely to result in
elite capture and the poor losing control over land they currently pos-
sess or use?
The second set of questions relates to the nature of the system used
to formalize rights to land if policy makers have concluded that those
rights should be formalized. This discussion focuses primarily on the
registration of transactable rights to land, which are more likely to be
held by individuals or families than groups. The questions include:
When rights are first registered, how can the state ensure that the in-
terests of the poor – including interest in access to commons – are not
harmed? How can the interests of women be recognized and protected
during registration? How can citizens be encouraged to participate in
the system (and bureaucrats encouraged to make the system accessi-
ble)? How can the system be made trustworthy, sustainable and afford-
able?
Section II presents several examples that typify the broad range of
projects that attempt to formalize rights to land. Section III reviews the
theoretical benefits that formalization may bring to the poor, and Sec-
tion IV examines the evidence from various settings as to whether and
to what extent formalization has benefited the poor in practice. Section
V reviews elements and principles that underlie functioning land rights
registration systems, and Section VI reviews the types of rights that
might be registered in such systems. Section VII takes a closer look at
issues that arise when rights to a parcel of land are formalized for the
first time. And Section VIII presents conclusions.
II. Projects to formalize land rights
In this discussion we distinguish between titling (certification) of land
rights and registration of rights in a public registry. The land titling
process formalizes the landowner’s legal right in the land and results
in the creation and issuance of a land title or some similar document.
The land title may take the form of a stand-alone document, often in
the nature of a certificate, that defines and memorializes the legal land
right. Land rights registration is the process whereby land titles are en-
tered into a catalogue or compilation of legal land rights and related de-
scriptions of the land parcels upon which they are based. The resulting
land registry serves as a database of land parcel descriptions and of the
rights associated with each parcel.2 It is possible to title land rights
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without registering them, but the typical goal in most settings is to title
and register the land rights as part of the same process. In this chapter,
unless the context indicates otherwise, the terms “titling and registra-
tion” are generally treated as being integral parts of a connected pro-
cess.
Land titling and registration efforts take different forms in different
settings. Understanding how best to approach land titling and registra-
tion, or the potential impacts (positive and negative) of titling and re-
gistration presupposes a basic understanding of the differing settings,
contexts and objectives. For example, a titling and registration effort
aiming to title occupied but as yet undocumented land in the remote
regions of a particular country is certain to involve different objectives,
approaches and impacts than a titling effort focused on individual land
rights belonging to the members of a recently reorganized collective
farm. The following descriptions of several recent and notable titling
and registration efforts around the world illustrate the range of set-
tings.
Projects that seek to formalize land rights often end up defining
(and changing) the nature and scope of rights that people exercised
previously. It is usually not the case that each neighbor in a community
has exactly the same understanding regarding the location of parcel
boundaries or even the nature of each person’s rights to specific plots
of land.
Following the break-up of the USSR, governments of some of the
new states which emerged decided to move land formerly owned by
the state into private hands. Some projects to individualize state land
have involved land parcelization and titling on a massive scale. In Mol-
dova, for example, a national program created about 2.4 million land
parcels by sub-dividing land previously used by 901 collective and state
farms. The government issued a land title for each parcel, establishing
land rights for some 783,000 individual owners over six years. In this
case the process of formalizing rights occurred simultaneous with as-
signing parcels to individuals who previously had no claim to any parti-
cular parcel. In this way, each landowner’s rights were both created
and defined in the same process.3 Each owner’s rights were initially re-
gistered in the village land registry, and the great majority of titles were
thereafter registered in district offices of the national land registry. The
USAID-financed project also included extensive legal and regulatory,
public education and legal aid programs. An RDI attorney served as
chief legal advisor and later as project manager.4
The Latin American experience with land tenure reform and the ti-
tling and registration of land rights has a long history, reflecting un-
equal land distribution, large agricultural laborer populations, insecure
smallholder land rights, and interjections of conflicting indigenous
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rights. Seen as abundant in land but carrying large populations of land-
less poor, most Latin American countries have initiated land titling and
registration programs.5 In Honduras, for example, several land admin-
istration and titling and registration projects have been implemented
in recent years. From 1997 through 2003, a land management project
financed with World Bank loans registered 72,000 urban and 77,000
rural properties. The project included components addressing natural
resources management, assistance to uplands producers, and biodiver-
sity conservation.6
At the risk of gross oversimplification, African titling and registra-
tion efforts have generated paradoxical results that make for a difficult
puzzle. Different efforts have sought to advance individualization and
common use, informal tenure regimes and formalization of tenure,
commercial land uses and community land uses, as well as support for
traditional cattle grazers and traditional small-plot farmers.7 Some ex-
perts have condemned the formalization of individually controlled rural
parcels as inconsistent with and destructive of an otherwise functional
common property tradition,8 while other experts consider the formali-
zation of community-held, commonly used land to be an attractive op-
tion.9 Still others emphasize the need for the formalization of rights to
millions of residential parcels in informally settled urban areas.10
The results of formalization projects in Africa vary considerably. Ken-
ya probably stands as the most extensive and “Westernized” example of
land plot individualization, titling and registration in Africa. Beginning
in the 1960s, the Kenyan government individualized and formalized
ownership of large portions of several Kenyan districts.11 The results
were widely criticized as being inconsistent with local land tenure re-
gimes and thus, in part, resulting in a land grab by local elites.12 In
Uganda, since passage of the 1998 Land Act, the government has con-
sidered land demarcation and titling pilot projects as a means of stimu-
lating land markets, anticipating that local demand will drive any sub-
sequent titling of rights.13 The authors of a recent land assessment in
Rwanda recommended a two-tier land titling and registration system
consisting of a more informal system at the local level and a more for-
malized system at the national level that would title commercial con-
cessions.14
III. Formalization of land rights and the poor
There is growing interest in formalizing the land rights of impover-
ished individuals and families in a manner that helps the poor increase
the value of their capital, amass additional capital, mitigate economic
shocks, and broaden their civic and economic participation.15 This con-
336 ROBERT MITCHELL
cept of formalization usually involves documenting, certifying and re-
gistering ownership and other land rights claimed by individuals or fa-
milies. This undertaking is motivated in part by the notion that citi-
zens, including the poor, are more likely to invest in improving their
land if they hold secure rights to it. It is also motivated by the notion
that if land rights are made transactable, and if a larger potential mar-
ket for such rights develops, this will naturally lead to increases in
property values and ensure that properties move towards a higher and
better use. According to the theory, if the poor have secure land rights
and they can transfer their rights in the market, their assets will be-
come more valuable, and they will be able to take important steps to
escape poverty and otherwise improve their economic well-being.
However, the concept of formalization should not be limited to the
process of certifying, documenting and registering land rights held so-
lely by individual families. Where the poor claim land rights on a
group basis – whether according to customary law or in the form of
community commons exercised historically – it may be appropriate to
extend state protections to such rights as they are characterized by the
poor and their customary groups. This can be done without converting
the customary rights into an individualized land rights regime. In this
way, formalization is a much broader concept and includes state protec-
tion for many different types of land rights.
Documentation and registration of individual land rights are not a
panacea. In fact, if not handled correctly, it may not help the poor and
may actually hurt them. Thus, in any attempt to certify and register
land rights on an individual basis, it is important to identify the con-
texts in which an approach advances or hinders the interests of the
poor, as well as the inherent risks, both to the poor generally and to
women and minority groups specifically.
How might formalization of land rights benefit the poor?
Land rights typically play many important roles in the lives of the poor.
This point bears emphasis since observers who focus on only one ben-
efit often miss other very important benefits. Such oversights may re-
sult in reforms that promote one benefit, while undermining others.
Therefore, it is important to apply a critical lens to the potential bene-
fits of formalized land rights since they are often assumed, rather than
demonstrated or really understood. The relative importance of these
benefits is likely to vary from context to context. Moreover, some bene-
fits carry with them corresponding risks, which policy makers must
understand how to evaluate and mitigate.
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One potential benefit – security against eviction – deserves special
consideration since it has the potential to help not only individuals sub-
ject to state law, but also communities that claim group rights.
– Security against eviction. Many poor families who lack secure rights
to the land and housing where they reside face the threat of eviction
by the state or at the hands of more powerful individuals.16 This
threat not only creates psychological stress, it introduces constant
economic stress in the lives of the poor. Eviction looms especially in
many settings where there are significant market pressures to make
different, higher-value uses of land, which often characterizes urban
and transitional peri-urban areas, and rural areas endowed with nat-
ural resources coveted by state and private corporations.
Customary groups are subject to the same types of predations. In fact,
some groups are especially vulnerable because some state officials may
regard the claims of customary groups as unfounded and their use of
the land as inefficient, rendering the claims unworthy of protection.
A number of other potential benefits of formalization arise in the
case of transactable rights, which are more likely to be held by indivi-
duals or families than groups:
– New opportunities for investment and savings. Families who have se-
cure rights to land and housing can better invest on and improve
their property (see Box 8.1 and the discussion in Chapter 7). When
their rights are secure and long-term, holders can be more confi-
dent that they will realize the benefits of such improvements. If the
rights are transferable, the family has the option of selling the prop-
erty rights to cash out their investment and pursue other opportu-
nities. In this way, land rights become a vehicle for storing and ac-
cumulating capital. Such investments can take the form of agricul-
tural improvements (e.g., terracing, draining land, tree planting,
greenhouses, improved crop storage), construction of shelter for an-
imals, and construction or improvement of housing.
– Higher productivity and higher incomes. Increased investments in
farming can help farmers to intensify and diversify their produc-
tion, which should translate over time to increased production and
higher incomes.17 In addition, if formalization of rights allows the
family to reduce the amount of time it must spend on defending its
land rights, this can allow them to participate more fully in produc-
tive work not tied to the land.18
– Capturing increases in property value. If land is transactable, in-
creased tenure security should increase the market value of the
property by giving buyers confidence that their purchase is secure.19
Where demand for land is high (e.g., on the periphery of cities), the
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value of securely held land is likely to increase whether or not the
owner improves the land.20
– Access to services. Secure land rights that encompass a homestead al-
low families to have a stable address, which can be essential in es-
tablishing the personal identity necessary to access a range of public
and private services. Formalized land rights are often a requirement
in order to benefit from government agricultural or other land-
related programs. In addition, lenders and other businesses may
feel more comfortable doing business with a family which has an
address and may be more willing to offer unsecured credit or to of-
fer it at a lower interest rate.21
– Access to credit. Land is a preferred form of collateral for lenders be-
cause it is immovable. Lenders typically will not accept land as col-
lateral to secure loans unless rights to that land have been forma-
lized. Given the importance of access to credit for economic devel-
opment, this potential benefit flowing from the formalization of
land rights is frequently highlighted by development planners.
– Enhanced social status and stability. In addition to economic benefits,
a family that obtains secure land rights is likely to experience a
heightened sense of social status within the community. Families in
rural India report that after receiving formal title to land they had
purchased years earlier, they received their first invitation to attend
the village meeting. These families had attended the meetings in
the past, but had never been invited and were not expected to parti-
cipate.22 When families have a greater stake in the stability of their
community through secure land rights, they are less inclined to
support violent political action.23 Such families may also be less
likely to move precipitously to already crowded cities.24 These hard-
to-quantify social and political benefits may sometimes be even
more important to the poor than the economic ones.
– Peace of mind. Improved tenure security is also associated with re-
duced stress, improved peace of mind, and a greater hope for the
future for individuals, families or groups who receive it.25
– Reduced incidence of disputes. Although the process of defining rights
to land, including the location of boundaries, can expose latent con-
flict among neighbors, once the rights are defined and documented,
the scope for further conflict is likely to be diminished. Short-term
costs associated with the definition of rights should produce long-
term benefits.
– Improved stewardship of the land. Individuals who are assured of re-
taining a long-term relationship to a plot of land may feel more in-
clined to preserve the land by reducing soil erosion and other forms
of onsite environmental degradation. At the same time, more inten-
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sive cultivation of land can negatively impact the environment, in-
cluding offsite impacts not borne directly by the farmer.26
– Improved economic atmosphere. The case is sometimes made that re-
gistration of land rights for the general population – that is, not tar-
geted specifically on the poor – also benefits the poor by increasing
general economic activity, which leads to more jobs and opportu-
nities for all members of society, including the poor. According to
this concept, trade in land is presumed to benefit the larger society
by placing property in the hands of those who are most willing and
able to invest in improving the land. Trade in land naturally leads
to higher values for property, and ownership of property becomes a
secure place for families to invest savings and build capital that is
reinvested in the economy.
Of the foregoing benefits, proponents of formalization often single out
benefits associated with investments that owners are likely to make fol-
lowing formalization of their rights.27 According to the theory, as an
active market for land transactions develops, banks are able to deter-
mine the market value of land. They also become more willing to ac-
cept land as collateral for loans. In this way, the value of land is un-
locked and owners can mortgage their property to purchase materials
that will improve the property, thereby further increasing its value, or
to invest in other wealth-generating activities, such as the expansion of
a business. As market values become clearer and transactions more fre-
quent, a further big boost to transactability occurs if banks begin offer-
ing “purchase-money mortgages” to finance the sales transactions
themselves, thus offering new market entre´e to buyers who do not
have cash or savings in hand. Repeated thousands of times throughout
a community, over a period of years, mortgage lending can lead to a
general improvement of local living standards. This is less likely in the
absence of an active and secure land market, and such markets depend
upon a reliable and affordable system for registering rights in land.28
Settings in which formalization may not benefit the poor
Formalization of individual rights is unlikely to benefit the poor in set-
tings where the state, or strong private actors, have stripped the poor of
land rights in the recent past (paving the way for certification and re-
gistration of rights claimed by the dispossessors), or where they can
subvert the registration process itself to accomplish such dispossession,
or in settings where large segments of the poor do not possess land.
Formalization of individual land rights may be inadvisable in set-
tings where families base their claim of right upon customary law
administered by customary law institutions, especially where poor fa-
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milies exercise multiple subordinate rights to use land possessed by an-
other. State registration of individual rights in such a context might
have the effect of undermining customary institutions.29
However, formalization of rights is likely to benefit the poor in set-
tings where their land rights are under threat from the powerful, or
where the property could gain substantial value by becoming more
transactable. Even in such settings special care must be taken to ensure
that this process does not privatize community lands – “commons” –
from which the very poorest families gather products for their daily
needs.
In urban settings, the state’s fear that certifying and registering the
land rights of squatters on public land will encourage additional squat-
ting can be a serious obstacle to reform efforts.30 The high value of
land (and consequent high opportunity costs of allocating land to the
poor) may also dissuade states from working to certify and register
land rights for the urban poor. The state may also fear that the poor
will transfer formalized rights prematurely to non-poor transferees at
an inadequate price, and that the benefits of formalization will largely
bypass the poor.
In addition to the state, local elites may object to certification and re-
gistration efforts that benefit the poor. State and corporate interests
may have their own claims to natural resources used and claimed by
the poor, especially forests and unimproved rangelands. If there is a
serious likelihood that the state formalization program will result in
unleashing the energy of local elites and corporations to claim lands
used by vulnerable groups, formalization of such lands should gener-
ally not be attempted. These examples underscore the need to ensure
that local conditions will permit the formalization of land rights that
will benefit the poor.
Special considerations regarding rights of customary groups
Different cultural settings often involve different land regimes, and
many cultures and sub-cultures place a high value on group property
claims administered through customary law institutions. Often, a com-
pelling case can be made for the need to formalize such rights through
a process of formally recognizing the legitimacy of customary law insti-
tutions and territorial claims by the customary group. In settings where
groups claim group rights to land and natural resources, policy makers
should consider how state action can protect and advance the interests
of the poor by registering the land rights of customary groups. Identifi-
cation and registration of customary group land rights is one way in
which the state can insulate the group against encroachment by either
the state or private corporate interests.
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The state may protect group rights by mapping the territory claimed
by the group and adjudicating any conflicting claims with neighboring
groups. In this process, the state must define the membership of each
group, identify the structure that the group will use to administer land
use within its territory, and identify the process the group will use to
deal with outsiders. This process should be described in special legisla-
tion that ensures that group members are informed regarding the pro-
cess by which the group rights are being protected. (It cannot, for ex-
ample, be automatically assumed that chiefs, elders or other group lea-
ders will not act in self-seeking ways in cases such as approving, for
cash payments, the opening of parts of the group territory for private
corporate logging or mining, with corresponding displacement of
group members presently enjoying use of that area.)
States may be reticent to cede too much authority to customary law
institutions for fear of strengthening groups that may challenge the
state politically with respect to broader issues of local governance.
States may also fear that any recognition of customary land rights will
lead to demands that the state relinquish all claims over extraction of
minerals and timber resources on that territory.
In addition, recognition of customary group tenure can require the
state to adjudicate competing claims among rival groups, including
claims between neighboring forest communities and claims between
sedentary farming communities and migrating pastoralists. Such adju-
dication can exacerbate latent tensions if not handled carefully and in a
way that citizens accept as fair and transparent.31
If policy makers are not willing to protect customary group rights
and commons, and if it appears that titling and registration of indivi-
dual rights may encroach upon common property resources used by
the poor, it may be inadvisable to proceed with such titling and regis-
tration.
It is also important to note that the formalization of group rights is
very different from formalizing whatever individual rights to land are
held by members of the group. Group members often hold individual
or family rights to land ultimately controlled by the group. States
should work very closely with customary groups to determine whether
and under what circumstances the group would like to see registration
of the individual rights of group members. This type of registration
may or may not undermine the authority of the group to manage its
territory.
Women’s rights to land
The importance of formalizing women’s rights to land is only begin-
ning to receive serious attention from international development pro-
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fessionals.32 Development planners should not assume that programs
that are framed to stabilize the rights of whomever program adminis-
trators accept as the head of the household – who is almost always the
husband – benefit all members of the household adequately or equally.
There is often an imbalance of rights within the household that limits
the ability of women and children (especially girls) to benefit from the
formalization of rights extended to (or expressly naming only) the hus-
band individually. The implications of this imbalance are explored in
Chapter 5.
Formalizing women’s rights to land that is controlled by the house-
hold should lead to improvements in child welfare, including improved
nutrition and greater household spending on child education.33 In ad-
dition, women who have received formalized rights to land are better
able to withstand disruptions to the family caused by divorce, or the
husband’s death or abandonment. In the absence of formalized rights,
women and their children may be left with little or no access to land if
the family structure breaks down.
The issue of women’s rights to land should be addressed in every
discussion of rights formalization. This issue is complicated by local
customs and is likely to be a sensitive issue for state officials. It is im-
portant to involve state planners in research to shed light on the effects
that women’s lack of land rights has on families within the society.
Figure 8.1 summarizes a number of issues, arising out of the above
discussion, that planners should examine when analyzing individual
and group rights to land in a given setting.
Other state goals in formalizing rights to land
Historically, states have created inventories of land parcels and owners
to assess and collect land taxes.34 Such parcel inventories are often
called “cadastres.” The earliest cadastres were created to calculate land
taxes and to assign tax bills to the correct owner or user. The land ca-
dastre included measurements of the surface area of land and the pro-
ductive value of land as compared with other similar lands. When land
registries were later created to ensure the legal protection of landowner
rights, the registries were often built using data contained in the land
cadastre. Land cadastres exist in some developing countries, but these
tend to cover only part of the territory and are often out of date.
If the primary purpose of the land register is to protect private rights
to land and facilitate transactions, it is probably inadvisable for the reg-
ister to contain all information required by the land tax authority.35 In
fact, by allowing the land register to contain data that are not necessary
to protect private rights, there is a risk that such data will become man-
datory and that the (perceived) need to correct such data will interfere
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with land transactions. On the other hand, there are very good reasons
for designing the land register in a way that allows the tax authority to
use the land rights database as a foundation to create the tax database.
If the databases are linked early on, this will make it much easier for
lending institutions to make underwriting decisions involving land col-
lateral.
Cadastral offices may also aspire to provide data for use in regional
planning, such as roads and other public infrastructure, or, for exam-
ple, to provide the government with a basis for estimating crop yields.
Therefore, in addition to containing data on parcel boundaries, a “mul-
ti-purpose cadastre” might contain data on land tax rates and pay-
ments, land use restrictions, soil quality, environmental conditions,
crop performance, etc. A full-fledged, multi-purpose cadastre may not
be affordable even in many developed economies and is unlikely to be
affordable in less developed countries in the near term. Although it
may make sense to create a system framework that allows the registry
to develop into a multi-purpose cadastre,36 it is prudent to build in
safeguards to prevent the registry from being populated with data not
essential for registering rights to land.
Administrative capacity and commitment
Those living in poverty are not likely to obtain land rights if national
and local governments lack either the will or institutional capacity to
design and implement measures that identify and protect such rights.
At the national level – and at the state or province level where land is a
“state subject” as in India – capacity is important for designing laws
and regulations that take into account the interests of the poor.
Perhaps most important of all on the administrative point, state in-
stitutions at the national and local levels require clear direction regard-
ing institutional roles in establishing and protecting the land rights of
the poor. Successful implementation will require the state to prioritize
the land rights of the poor and to earmark sufficient funds for pro-
grams. It is important to consider the types of incentives that will moti-
vate public institutions to treat the poor as clients whose rights and in-
terests are worth protecting. Information is key: judicial and land
administration institutions cannot work effectively with the poor unless
they have clear information regarding both land rights law and the
needs and interests of the poor. If a state lacks the will or institutional
capacity to carry out reforms, any half-hearted attempt to formalize
land rights risks injuring the poor.
A good place for the state to begin is by conducting research on the
challenges facing poor families who might, at least in theory, benefit
from certification, documentation and registration of their rights to
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land. Some questions to consider include: Are the barriers to registra-
tion – both formal and informal – so high in the current system that
the poor simply have no real opportunity to register their rights? How
can the system be designed so that these barriers are removed? Are ci-
tizens interested in registering their land rights, and what changes in
the system would motivate citizens to participate in the system? This
research can help to demonstrate the state’s commitment to addressing
the needs of vulnerable populations in the design and implementation
of a new rights registration regime.
Planners should also consider carefully whether the state has the ca-
pacity and will to maintain the registry once it is created. If the system
is to sustain development of the land market, the capacity and will to
register transactions and other transfers must exist on the day that offi-
cials first begin registering rights to land.
IV. Evidence regarding benefits to the poor
The economic benefits of titling and registration can, but do not neces-
sarily, help alleviate poverty. For the poor to benefit, the economic bene-
fits of titling and registration must reach them, and some experts assert
that there is very little evidence that titling and registering rights to land
provide significant benefits to rightholders in the developing world.37
Lack of capital to fuel local land markets and general malaise of the lo-
cal economy may do more to dampen the development of the land mar-
ket than lack of titles and registration. And even if land markets are de-
veloping in some regions of the country, is it likely that titling and
registration of rights held by the poor will attract investment in their
neighborhoods and increase their property values? How can one predict
that conditions are such that lack of titles and registration is a signifi-
cant drag on development of the market? Surely governments and citi-
zens should not invest heavily in titling and registering rights to land if
there is no social or economic demand for these systems.
The benefits to the poor are likely to depend upon the specific con-
text in which titling and registration are conducted. And benefits in
one setting may not justify an assumption that these benefits will
translate to other settings.
The Thai titling and registration effort is one of the few to include
data collection and an econometric multivariate analysis. The analysis
generally indicates that capital-to-land ratios, land improvements, land
values, and outputs and inputs per unit of land were higher for the
titled land than the untitled land.38 Another study, using data from
land registration in Thailand during the period 1960-1996, projected
the effect of Thai land registration on broader financial and economic
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growth patterns. The study concluded that registration has had a signif-
icant effect on the longer-term economic growth, which occurred after
an initial negative impact over two years and after an extended period
of recovery from this initial impact.39
A 2005 survey conducted by RDI showed that where Chinese farm-
ers possess documentation (land rights contracts or certificates) issued
by the government according to the 2002 Rural Land Contracting Law,
they, such farmers invested in substantial improvements to their arable
land much more frequently than did farmers who lacked such docu-
mentation; for example, a farmer with a land contract which complies
with the law is 2.4 times as likely to make such an investment as a
farmer who has not received any land contracts. Yet according to the
law both farmers have the same land rights regardless of documenta-
tion.40 Other significant findings regarding the documentation of land
rights in China are shown in Box 8.1 and are discussed in Chapter 7.
Box 8.1. Formalization of agricultural land rights in China
A 17-province survey that RDI conducted in mid-2005 in coopera-
tion with Renmin University and Michigan State University found
several important positive impacts associated with Chinese farmers’
possession of documentation for their land rights, including the fol-
lowing:
– Farmers who received documentation of their land rights via con-
tracts or land certificates were much more likely to increase mid-
to long-term investment in their land.
– In villages where farmers have contracts or certificates that com-
ply with the law, farmers are much more likely to receive satisfac-
tory compensation in cases of land takings.
These findings are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
Few Latin American programs have been systematically evaluated to
confirm the existence of linkages between tenure security and econom-
ic development. However, recent studies of titling in Honduras and
Paraguay showed links between tenure security and increased invest-
ment as well as links between land titling and increased productivity
However, the studies also indicated that a small minority of farmers,
who were not the poorest or those with the least land, obtained most of
the benefits.41 Another recent study of tenure insecurity and invest-
ment and productivity in Nicaragua showed some positive connection
between tenure insecurity and lower production levels, although there
was no indication that insecurity reduced investment.42
FORMALIZATION OF RIGHTS TO LAND 347
In Buenos Aires, Argentina, however, a “natural experiment” in the
formalization of the land rights of urban squatters has found that for-
malization resulted in significant increases in investment. The squat-
ting began in the 1980s with about 1,800 families moving onto what
they thought was government-owned wasteland on the edge of Buenos
Aires. The land was in fact privately owned. After several attempts at
eviction, the government sought to expropriate the land from the pri-
vate owners and award titles to the squatters. A number of owners ac-
cepted the offered expropriation compensation, while others rejected
the offers and began legal challenges to demand higher compensation.
In 1989-1991, those occupying the land of owners who accepted the
government’s offer of compensation received formal land titles, while
those on land still subject to litigation did not. These events, by exogen-
ously creating an “untitled” control group and a “titled” group – with
no other difference between them – presented an opportunity to exam-
ine the effects of titling.
The study showed that those holding formal title invested substan-
tially more in housing construction features (total house footprint,
walls, roofs and sidewalks) as compared to the group lacking titles.
Overall housing quality was 37% higher (in terms of the quality of
housing features and components) for the titled homeowners.43 And
although the titled households had larger houses, the researchers
found that families without titles had an average of six household
members, while families with titles had an average of five members.44
In addition, the school-age children of the titled households attended
school for an average of 0.4 years more than the children of untitled
households and were less likely to be absent from school.45 There was
no difference between the two groups with respect to access to either
formal or informal credit.46
A 2003 study by RDI in Ukraine compared the experience of owners
who had received titles to specific parcels with that of individuals who
held only a “land share” document representing a right in large, undi-
vided fields. On average, the titled owners were able to rent out their
land for 32% more, were substantially more likely to receive the rent
payment in full and on time, and were much more likely to cultivate
some of the land themselves rather than rent it out.47 However, this
style of formalization really amounts to a special case since titling did
not involve land already possessed, but instead occurred simulta-
neously with the conversion of the undifferentiated land share right
into a right to a specific parcel.
In African settings, there is little or no evidence that land titling and
registration of individual parcels has spurred investment or conse-
quently led to increased agricultural production.48 In Kenya and Burki-
na Faso, there is evidence that titling has not increased investment.49
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In Uganda some argue that specific forms of tenure insecurity actually
spur investment, in the sense that improvements made or added to the
land can increase the possessor’s tenure security by denoting perma-
nency and owner-like status. Parcel occupiers may increase investment
in perennial crops and other improvements so as to make eviction
more costly by virtue of higher mandated compensation amounts
(where compensation requirements are enforced).50 One study of 36
Ugandan villages concluded that, through tree planting, land posses-
sors increased their security of land rights over inherited land.51 In any
event, the notion that investment might increase security must be ac-
counted for in any analysis of African titling and registration. Research
suggests that not accounting for this notion will yield results showing
that increased security has prompted the investment.52
Other findings tend to establish that some customary tenure systems
in Africa, and even those that provide for less than full transfer rights,
provide sufficient rights and security to prompt investments in the
land. Land tenure security under customary systems may be stronger
than it first appears to outsiders, and what seem at first inspection to
be precarious rights may in fact be stronger than suspected. Methods
of measuring land tenure security do not always make distinctions be-
tween levels of security as they actually exist.53 Assumptions of insecur-
ity are among the matters that should be explored and confirmed
before future titling and registration are undertaken in African settings
where customary land rights prevail.
Despite these African examples, it is probably useful to remember
that land titling and land rights registration – particularly in Africa –
is contextual. Most African examples described above illustrate the in-
dividualization and formalization of small parcels of agricultural land.
But what might not be useful in one situation might be useful in an-
other. For example, because of the intense urban and peri-urban infor-
mal settlements that make up and surround so many African cities, ti-
tling and registration of rights to urban residential plots may be a sen-
sible way to formalize the related investment, create assets for the
urban poor, and prevent displacement and landlessness. Moreover,
none of the examples have addressed the potential impact of docu-
menting customary group or community rights to protect them against
outside incursions.
Perhaps the lesson to be drawn is that although titling and registra-
tion may benefit the poor, the benefits cannot be assumed. Planners
should investigate the effects of titling and registration projects on the
poor in each context. With respect to each component of the project,
planners and implementers should ask whether the design is consis-
tent with the protection of the interests of the poor, and whether the
system, as implemented, protects such interests.
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V. Registration of individual rights to land
The system used to register rights to land, broadly speaking, defines
how rights to land are acquired, proven and protected, as well as what
recourse citizens have if state officials do not register the rights cor-
rectly. In addition to certification of rights during first registration, the
contents of a functioning registration system for transactable rights is
an important element to consider. Transactability is generally not an is-
sue for customary group rights, commons and certain types of custom-
ary subordinate rights, but is usually an important reason for register-
ing rights held by individuals, families and legal entities.
A principal justification for formalizing and registering individual
rights to land is to support the development of an efficient land mar-
ket. Registration of rights should promote two closely related objec-
tives: (1) continued protection of private rights to land such as rights of
ownership, mortgage and lease; and (2) facilitation of land rights trans-
fer by sale, lease and inheritance, as well as the creation of mortgage
rights.
Private land rights face tenure insecurity threats from both public
and private sources. In many countries a common threat to private
rights is that the state may expropriate the rights for some public pur-
pose without adequately compensating the private owner. Once the
state has registered the owner’s private rights, it is much more difficult
for the state to expropriate the land without compensating the rightful
owner.54 Private rights may also be under threat from more powerful
individuals within the community.55 States may take steps other than
titling and registration to enhance the security of those who physically
possess land.56
Another common threat to the holder’s rights to land relates to the
stability of parcel boundaries. Over time, neighboring parcel owners
may encroach upon the parcel, occupying and using small amounts of
land along the common boundary of the parcel. If parcel boundaries
are defined as part of the process of registering rights to each parcel,
each owner will have a basis for resolving disputes that may arise re-
garding the location of the common boundary.57
The second objective of the rights registration system – facilitating
transactions in land – is accomplished through instituting procedures
that make the transfer of rights to land simple and affordable. But it is
worth noting that the first objective – protection of private rights – also
serves to promote trade in land. Protection of rights to land encourages
a prospective buyer to have confidence that if he purchases the prop-
erty, he will receive legal and enforceable rights to it. That is, to the ex-
tent a prospective buyer has confidence that the seller owns the land,
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the buyer will be more willing to buy. Buyers are naturally willing to
pay more for more secure rights than for less secure rights.
In the same way, protection of ownership rights to land encourages
a lender to have confidence that when the lender accepts the mortgage
of an object of land as security for the loan, it will be able to enforce
the mortgage and dispose of the land to satisfy the loan in the event
that the owner defaults on repayment.
Prospective buyers will also be interested to know about all signifi-
cant rights that encumber the ownership right, such as multi-year lease
rights and mortgage rights. Thus, registration of such lease rights and
mortgage rights not only protects the lessee and the lender who holds
the mortgage right, but also protects the buyer, who might suffer losses
if she buys the property without knowing about the encumbering
rights. And whereas a prospective buyer’s visit to the land might reveal
rights claimed by an earlier, unregistered buyer, the prospective buyer
cannot easily learn about non-possessory rights such as mortgage
rights if they are not registered.58
Elements of the registration system
The registration system should contain information on the owner (or
equivalent rightholder), the owner’s rights and the land itself includ-
ing: (1) textual data on the owner’s name, address and other identifying
characteristics; (2) textual data regarding the owner’s specific rights to
the land parcel (as well as the rights of other persons created by lease
agreement, mortgage agreement, etc.); and (3) spatial data regarding
the parcel boundaries and its location relative to other parcels.59
Identification of the owner. Legal identity requirements must take into
account the ability of citizens, and especially the poor, to obtain what-
ever proof of identity is necessary to hold and use land rights. Registra-
tion programs should allow for practical means for enabling the poor
to establish their legal identity for purposes of registration (e.g., public
acknowledgment by neighbors or a community leader, if they lack doc-
umentation).
Identification of rights to be registered. Conceptually, it may be helpful
to understand that an owner’s rights to a parcel do not describe the
owner’s relationship to the parcel so much as they describe the owner’s
relationship with others as regards the possession and use of the parcel.
The owner’s rights typically include, for example, the right to exclude
others from the land, the right to sell the land to others, the right to
use the land without being disturbed, etc. The most common types of
rights registered include ownership (or long-term use rights in socie-
ties that do not allow private ownership) and subordinate rights, such
as lease and mortgage rights, which are registered as encumbrances
FORMALIZATION OF RIGHTS TO LAND 351
upon the ownership rights.60 All rights should be organized and re-
cords indexed according to the unique parcel number assigned to the
parcel.61
Identification of the parcel. The parcel must be differentiated from the
larger territory in some way. The process of determining boundaries
has both a legal and a technical aspect. Boundaries are essentially legal
constructions although they are described with reference to natural or
artificial monuments or with respect to GPS coordinates. Based on the
identification of boundaries, it is useful to construct an index map de-
scribing all parcels in a defined area, and then assign a unique number
to each parcel. The parcel number becomes an essential element for
registering rights to the parcel. Aerial photographs and satellite images
may be a cost-effective way of preparing base maps that can be used to
create parcel index maps, particularly where the scale allows identifica-
tion of parcel boundary features such as irrigation canals and hedges.
The basic process is illustrated in Figure 8.2.
In addition, the system for registering rights must be “dynamic” in
the sense that it allows for changes in owners, changes in rights and
changes in parcels. For example, owners and rights may be changed
either through court order, sale or inheritance. Such changes are likely
to begin occurring immediately after the first registration of rights be-
gins. Parcels may be changed (and created) through division or
through consolidation with other parcels.
Figure 8.2. Relation of rights registration and parcel cadastre functions
 
CREATE BASE MAP OF 
AREA 
DETERMINE PARCEL 
BOUNDARIES (LEGAL) 
AND SURVEY THEM 
(TECHNICAL)  
DESCRIBE PARCEL BOUNDARIES ON 
BASE MAP AND ASSIGN UNIQUE 
NUMBERS TO PARCELS, CREATING 
A PARCEL LIST AND AN  
INDEX  MAP , WHICH TOGETHER 
COMPRISE THE PARCEL CADASTRE 
DETERMINE OWNER OF 
PARCEL (AND DEFINE 
RIGHTS) 
LEGAL  TECHNICAL  
REGISTER OWNER AND RIGHTS IN 
REGISTER  OF LAND  RIGHTS ,  
AND ARCHIVE THE DOCUMENTS 
ESTABLISHING RIGHTS 
Source: R. Mitchell, Registration of Rights to Real Property in the Developing World 8, fig. 3
(2007) (paper commissioned by First American Corporation, on file with the Rural Develop-
ment Institute).
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Transfer of rights
When considering the benefits of formalization, it is useful at the out-
set to acknowledge that some citizens will transfer rights to land
whether or not the state recognizes the legality of the transfer. The par-
ties to such transactions may be willing to accept the risk that the trans-
fer might be challenged, especially if the cost of legalizing the transfer
is high. The challenge for planners is to design a system that can be
operated in such a way that citizens prefer to formalize their transfers.
Procedures established for registering rights in land should be de-
signed in a way that makes the process for transferring rights (or creat-
ing new land objects through subdivision or merger of objects) rela-
tively simple and affordable, rather than cumbersome and expensive. A
sound registration system should have the following characteristics:62
Simplicity. The system should be simple to operate and simple to ex-
plain to the public. It should not contain extraneous data. The public
must be able to understand precisely why the system exists and what
benefits it provides.
Accuracy. It is essential that the system contain accurate information
and that the information is protected against unauthorized manipula-
tion or loss. The system must be updated whenever transfers occur. An
inaccurate register is likely to create more problems than it solves.
Promptness. The system must be capable of processing transactions
without delay. If the system allows registration officials to delay proces-
sing transactions, this will tend to undermine its usefulness to the pub-
lic. Moreover, a system that allows delay for the great mass of transac-
tions, but which allows officials to expedite only some transactions,
provides opportunities for corrupt practices.
Affordability. The system must be affordable, based upon the local
population’s standard of living costs and the market value of the rights
being registered. If registration processes are unreasonably costly, the
public may find ways to avoid formally registering transfers of inter-
ests, opting for informal methods of dealing. Such informality exposes
the public to significant risks that they may not appreciate, and results
in a registry of rights that does not reflect the actual possession of
land.
Suitability to circumstances. The registration system must be suitable
to the national conditions. It is inappropriate to introduce an elaborate,
multi-functional database of land objects in settings where the national
budget and users of the system cannot pay for its creation or mainte-
nance. This is related to the question of simplicity, but also relates to
other questions, such as the degree of precision required in boundary
measurement (with more precise measurement generally costing
more).
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One important issue to consider is whether the system will be a
“conclusive” system (in which registration conclusively establishes the
legitimacy of rights) or a “declaratory” system (in which registration
provides only evidence of what rights are claimed), or perhaps some-
thing in between.
Conclusive systems are based upon a positive assertion from the
state that the registered owner is the legal owner of the land. State offi-
cials undertake to verify that submitted documents are legally sufficient
to transfer rights from the seller to the buyer, and registration is often
necessary to create and terminate rights to land. Some conclusive sys-
tems also provide compensation to innocent parties who suffer losses
as a result of reliance on the system. The law deems the register to be
legally conclusive, and third parties can rely upon it and need not in-
spect transfer deeds or other right-establishing documents. Such sys-
tems are often referred to as “title registration” systems.
A declaratory registration system provides only a public register of
documents that purport to effectuate the legal transfer of rights to land.
In a declaratory system, state officials do not attempt to verify the suffi-
ciency or accuracy of documents submitted for registration, and instead
place the burden upon private parties to determine whether the regis-
tered documents are legally effective. Such systems are often referred
to as “deed registration” systems.
Registration systems are most likely to fall somewhere along the con-
tinuum between a purely conclusive system and a purely declaratory
system. And it is possible to begin with a declaratory system and over
time introduce features of conclusive systems. In a developed market
economy the uncertainty associated with the declaratory system can be
greatly reduced through private “title insurance,” which is a contract by
which the insurer guarantees to compensate the registered owner for
losses suffered in case the owner’s property right is declared invalid.
Incentive for bureaucrats to process applications to register rights
State bureaucrats who operate the registry stand to benefit from any
government mandate requiring registration of rights since they will
have enhanced job security and may also have perverse opportunities
for demanding illicit payments from registry users. It is quite common
to see government ministries clashing over which one will be entrusted
with the creation and operation of the land rights registration system.
Opportunities for corrupt practices will be greater if the registration
process is non-transparent or inefficient. Backlogs create an especially
fertile ground for economic rent seeking (i.e., demands for payment of
bribes to officials) since owners may be willing to pay to move to the
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front of the queue. Well-enforced time limits for processing applica-
tions to register rights may reduce opportunities for corruption.
By the same token, to the extent that registration rules limit the dis-
cretion of state registry officials and require them to document their
decisions, opportunities for rent seeking diminish. In a conclusive re-
gistration system, for example, the law should require the clerk to re-
ceive into the system all applications, even if the clerk believes the
application is incorrect or the documents submitted do not comply
with the law. If registration is to be denied, a senior official should is-
sue a written decision explaining the basis for the refusal. Designed
correctly, it should be possible to limit or eliminate cases in which an
official can demand an illicit payment for accepting an application to
register rights.63
Finally, registration officials must receive an adequate salary to make
the job worth keeping. It may be useful to base compensation, job se-
curity and career advancement on meeting registration targets for time-
liness and accuracy.
Promoting use of the system
Citizens are unlikely to register rights to land unless they perceive that
the benefits outweigh the costs. Apart from cases in which the indivi-
dual is about to sell the property, benefits are more likely to outweigh
costs if two conditions are satisfied: (1) that citizens face threats to ten-
ure security; and (2) registration costs are predictable and relatively af-
fordable, given the value of land and citizen income. If either condition
is not met, citizens may rationally conclude that registration is not
worth the cost. Some may also be inclined to register only if they an-
ticipate that registration will enhance the market value of the property;
however, this is mainly a consideration for properties that are likely to
be developed in the foreseeable future, such as properties in and
around cities. Even in that case, the anticipated increase in the value of
the property may not offset the cost of registration and the time needed
to register. If the government can create trust among citizens that the
benefits of using the registration system outweigh the costs, more citi-
zens are likely to use the system, which, in turn, will likely help the
system to perform in a way that produces benefits. Public trust is an
essential element to a well performing registration system.
Public education relating to registration and its benefits will be im-
portant for creating understanding and trust of the system. In Moldo-
va, public education was an integral part of a four-year project to priva-
tize land formerly used by collective farms, issue titles to individual
parcels to former collective members, and register the ownership in a
new registry. The project created a monthly newspaper – “Farmers’
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Hour” – to help beneficiaries understand the privatization process and
their new land rights.64 A similar privatization and titling project in
Ukraine made extensive use of national radio and television program-
ming to reach the rural population.65
Financing operation and setting fees
Unless registration fees are affordable to citizens, they will not use the
system and it will become increasingly out of date and less trustworthy
over time. If the users cannot afford to pay the entire cost of operating
the system, then the state must subsidize its operation, whether
through taxes on land or from the general budget. Prior to launching
the system, planners should make a careful assessment of what fees ci-
tizens are able (and willing) to pay, and then determine what level of
state subsidy, if any, will be needed. If the business plan does not make
sense, it will not be prudent to launch the system.
There are important business reasons for eliminating opportunities
for officials to collect bribes during registration. Bribes dissuade citi-
zens from using the system and are not recorded as revenue for the
registry. This is doubly damaging to the registry since it reduces the de-
mand for services without producing an increase in system revenue. It
is much better to set a higher registration fee, which will support ade-
quate salaries, and eliminate corruption than allow low fees and toler-
ate corruption. Ultimately, corruption is a management issue that must
be resolved by leaders.
VI. Rights subject to registration
Individual rights
The legislation should define clearly what types of individual rights to
land are recognized by law, and which of these rights are subject to re-
gistration. With respect to individual rights, it is desirable to limit the
number of registered rights to only the most important, such as private
ownership, long-term lease and mortgage of privately owned land. In
addition, any valuable private right to publicly owned land, such as per-
manent use rights (and temporary rights, provided the term is suffi-
ciently long), should also be registered.
Protecting women’s rights to land
The laws of many developing countries do not require, or even provide
for, the registration of rights of married women and women living in
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consensual unions. Even where the law does require such registration,
it is almost always ignored in practice, either because the system is not
designed to facilitate the registration of the rights of both spouses, or
because registry officials are ignorant of the law. Failure to register a
wife’s rights to property can limit her control over resources within the
household, reducing the proportion of resources spent on the family’s
basic needs, particularly the needs of the children. Failure to register
spousal rights also exposes women to the risk of great hardship follow-
ing abandonment, divorce or the husband’s death.
To address this need, one approach is for the law to require the re-
gistration of spousal rights to land, but for the law also to presume that
when a married individual registers his or her rights to land, an unre-
gistered spouse is entitled to assert the same rights. In other words, it
is useful for the law to require all persons dealing with land to inquire
into the marital status of the registered owner, as well as whether the
owner’s spouse, or former spouse, has rights to the land.
This requirement could be enforced in various ways. The law might
provide, for example, that any person seeking to acquire a right to land
must obtain one of the following: (1) proof that the seller has never
been married; (2) proof that the owner’s spouse has no legal claim to
the property (i.e., proof that the property was inherited separately by
the husband or is not otherwise subject to the legislation governing
marital property); or (3) a notarized statement signed by the spouse
consenting to the transaction.
Of course, admitting the continued legal force of unregistered spou-
sal rights would tend to cloud the title and make it harder for people
who seek to deal with the property to determine whether the property
right is burdened with unregistered rights. In developing countries, it
may well be that such clouds on a title are appropriate since they serve
to protect the legitimate interests of women who are otherwise less
able to protect their interests. By recognizing the continued legal force
of unregistered spousal rights, the cost of resolving whether such
rights exist would be shifted to persons who seek to deal with the prop-
erty. Provided that the rule is well known, this approach is not incon-
sistent with the operation of a conclusive registration system. To en-
sure that the public receives adequate notice of this exception to the
conclusive effect of registration, rules could require that the registra-
tion records (including certificates or registry excerpts issued to those
dealing with the land) explicitly state that unregistered spousal rights
continue in force.
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Protecting subordinate rights to land
In many developing countries, it is common to find traditional perso-
nal subordinate rights, such as the personal right to gather fruits on
land owned by another. Such rights often play a substantial role in the
subsistence strategies of the most vulnerable members of rural socie-
ties. As with the spousal rights, it seems fair to require the law to pro-
tect unregistered personal subordinate rights. In creating a presump-
tion that these unregistered rights remain valid, the law should also es-
tablish a process by which people who seek to deal with the property
right can determine whether such rights exist in fact. Again, all per-
sons dealing with land should be required to inquire whether any per-
son asserts unregistered personal subordinate rights of this type.
Furthermore, it is probably appropriate for the law to make it difficult
to extinguish such rights and to require, for example, that any extin-
guishment of the right must require the owner to buy out the unregis-
tered subordinate rights according to the same legally prescribed pro-
cess required for transfer of other land rights.66
Group rights and rights to commons
In countries where traditional groups claim group territory managed
by customary law institutions, the law should provide some process by
which the state works with the group to define the territory and regis-
ter the group’s rights. In order to protect the group against loss of the
rights, the law should provide for registration of caveats (specific re-
strictions) prohibiting the sale, mortgage, license or other transfer of
the land rights, perhaps subject to some process whereby the group as
a whole can decide to transfer rights to a delimited portion of their
land. The territory should be mapped and should appear in the index
mapping system to prevent encroachment by other owners.
It is also very useful to register the commons (taken to mean lands
held within the formal property system, but reserved for common use),
though it will require legal research to determine the nature of the
right and the holder of the right. For example, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the law allows villages to incorporate, or whether the vil-
lage can hold, for example, a permanent use right to state land. If the
law allows the village to dispose of commons, the law should provide a
transparent public process for making such decisions based on public
meetings and documented public testimony by members of groups
using the commons, including the poor.
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VII. First registration
Process of adjudication, demarcation, land survey, posting, certification
“First registration” of rights is the series of initial steps concerning a gi-
ven area or parcel to determine for the first time who holds rights to
that land, document those rights, and enter them into the public re-
cord. First registration is more typically associated with the initial
establishment of a land title registry to support a conclusive registra-
tion system; however, it could also be undertaken to support the crea-
tion of a declaratory system, especially if the existing record of rights is
generally out of date or otherwise untrustworthy, or if the society is
creating the registry for the first time.
At least in a system that is intended to be, if not strictly conclusive,
at least tending significantly in that direction, first registration consists
of five main steps: (1) adjudication to determine who has the legitimate
claim to own which parcels of land; (2) demarcation, in which land
claimants physically mark the limits of each parcel on the ground (not
needed for boundaries already marked with a fence, soil berm or other
installation); (3) land survey, which involves the measurement and
mapping of the physically marked parcel boundaries; (4) public posting
of the parcel maps and ownership claims to allow others to challenge
the claims asserted; and (5) preparation of land certificates and entry of
relevant information on land rights and land parcels into the land
rights register.67 Of the foregoing, steps (1) and (4) are less likely to ap-
ply, at least in full-fledged form, the more the system tends toward the
declaratory model.
In the adjudication process, officials and citizens jointly determine
existing rights in particular land parcels. The main questions to be an-
swered concern who holds what rights to which land parcels and struc-
tures. Simultaneously, claimants of parcels that adjoin each other must
visit the parcels to agree on the location of mutual boundaries, which
are then demarcated (if not already demarcated) on the ground. Once
neighbors agree, it is usual to set temporary pegs in the ground to
mark the location of boundaries, except in areas where fences or berms
or equivalent clear delineations already exist. The land survey official
may also prepare a rough sketch of the parcels and may ask the neigh-
bors to sign the sketch. This process can be greatly facilitated with the
use of aerial photographs and satellite images, especially where many
boundaries are physically marked with fences, berms, etc. that are visi-
ble from the air.
After the neighbors have agreed on the location of parcel boundaries,
the land surveyor measures the location of the boundary markers with
respect to local fixed monuments, or perhaps by using global position-
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ing system technology (GPS). The main purpose of land surveying is
to record the location of parcel boundaries so they can be re-established
in the future in case of dispute. The surveys also provide a basis for
producing parcel index maps that assist in land administration.
Survey methods range from simple and inexpensive to complex, de-
tailed and costly. In many settings, especially in agricultural areas
where land values are lower and there is minimal risk of constructing
buildings across parcel boundaries, owners require much less precise
definition of boundary location. In urban areas, relatively higher land
values and the need to avoid construction across boundaries help justi-
fy the higher cost of more precise measurement of boundaries. The
choice of surveying and mapping methods should balance cost with ac-
curacy, taking into account local needs, local land values and the local
availability of various survey technologies. Planners should never base
their decisions upon the mere fact that certain standards are used by
more developed economies or based upon a desire for technical perfec-
tion. And donor agencies seeking to fund registration systems should
be conscious of such potential biases in making recommendations,
especially when they may coincide with the donor’s own interest in
making a larger loan or grant (or a preference to purchase equipment
rather than fund salaries). Planners must be careful to pay special at-
tention to per-parcel costs, with the overarching goal of identifying a
usable system of least cost (in China, for example, a nationwide regis-
tration system for farmers’ land rights, when it is established, will need
to encompass over one billion separate parcels).
As an example of suitable practices, in the Moldova land titling pro-
ject, land survey costs averaged US$2.25 per parcel, including the mea-
surement of existing parcel boundaries and the creation of new parcel
boundaries through a subdivision process.68 Although simplified, the
land survey techniques produced a very small number of errors.69 In
addition, land survey costs were controlled through strict pricing proce-
dures that established fixed price ceilings for bids by survey contrac-
tors. In Indonesia, the per-parcel costs of using satellite images was es-
timated in 2003 to be about US$3 per hectare, including correction
with GPS technology, as compared to approximately US$12 per hectare
for corrected aerial photography. The cost for ground surveys was
much greater.70
After the parcel index map is prepared, registration officials may ask
land claimants to sign a copy of the map to signify their concurrence
with the parcel descriptions. At the very least, registration officials
should post the registration map publicly for some specified minimum
period to allow local residents an opportunity to raise questions and
challenge ownership claims or claims regarding the location of bound-
aries. After challenges are resolved, the index map and associated infor-
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mation on land claimants should become the legal basis for preparing
the land ownership registry and the preparation of title certificates for
distribution to the owners.
Proving rights to land during first registration
In many developing countries, large segments of the population claim
rights to land based upon occupation or upon the fact that they have
purchased the right to occupy the property from someone whose claim
was based on occupation. These transactions may or may not be docu-
mented, and there may not be documentary evidence of occupation. In
some countries, occupants may have tax receipts showing that they
have paid land taxes over a period of years, even though they do not
have a formal title to the property.
The law should specify the grounds upon which ownership can be
proven, either according to customary law or according to legislation
that provides for rights to arise through prescriptive possession, includ-
ing with respect to rights acquired on land designated as state land. In
most developing country settings, the law should probably provide that
the adjudication process shall allow claimants to present oral testimony
to prove their ownership or other long-term rights, and should not pre-
sume that documentary proof is superior to oral testimony that contra-
dicts the documents. Neighbors usually know very well who has occu-
pied each piece of property and for what term. Immediate neighbors
are likely to have very clear ideas about the location of parcel bound-
aries that have been respected in practice. If the law is not clear regard-
ing the basis for proving undocumented ownership, planners must en-
sure that the law is changed to clarify this process.
It is also important that the adjudication process be public. Prelimin-
ary results of each local adjudication should be posted publicly in the
neighborhood to allow community members to raise objections before
the rights are registered. Again, the law should set forth this process.
Costs and benefits of systematic vs. sporadic first registration
Adjudication, certification and registration of rights can be performed
either sporadically or systematically. In a sporadic process, officials per-
form the necessary tasks at the request of the rightholder, parcel by
parcel according to demand, often facilitated by a legal requirement
that land parcels must go through the process before they can be trans-
ferred or subdivided. In the systematic process, officials set out to per-
form the necessary tasks with respect to all parcels (or at least all pri-
vately claimed parcels) within a given area.
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The sporadic approach is piecemeal and haphazard, but low-income
countries with significant resource and personnel constraints are often
forced to proceed in this way. The sporadic approach allows the govern-
ment to defer costs and makes it easier to pass costs on to benefici-
aries.71 Using a sporadic approach typically means, however, that the
land register will remain incomplete for many years or decades and
will be less beneficial both to the state and to landowners as long as
unregistered titles also exist in the same locality.72
Sporadic approaches can exclude poor rights holders because the
poor often lack the resources (time, money, information and education)
needed to take advantage of opportunities to register their own land or
purchase and register the land of others. For example, expensive land
surveys can deter poor rightholders from formalizing their rights and,
because owners usually fund sporadic titling and registration services
(at least in part), high costs can become onerous and create accessibil-
ity problems.73
The exclusionary nature of sporadic approaches is manifested by the
great length of time needed to conduct sporadic registration of most
properties. One estimate, made in 1998, of the time to complete spora-
dic titling in Indonesia and to bring all eligible properties within the
system at the then-current rate was set at 90 years.74 Until well into
that 90-year period, most land rights holders – the overwhelming ma-
jority of them poor – would be excluded from the intended benefits of
titling and registration.75
In the long term, a systematic approach is preferable to a sporadic ap-
proach for several reasons. First, economies of scale make it less expen-
sive.76 Second, it is less likely to lead to encroachment upon the rights
of the poor because it gives maximum publicity to the determination of
land rights within a given area, enhancing transparency and grassroots
participation. Third, women may also be more likely to have their rights
registered through a systematic process since this allows greater scope
for public education and may allow local women to focus community at-
tention on the importance of registering women’s rights. Finally, it is
more certain because adjoining land parcels are investigated simulta-
neously, helping to ensure that boundaries of adjacent parcels are
mapped without gaps or overlaps.77 However, if a systematic approach
is used, it is likely that the state will need to subsidize the cost, or at
least a substantial portion of the cost, since many landowners, espe-
cially in rural areas, cannot afford registration fees and land survey
costs outside the context of an individual market transaction.
USAID has demonstrated a preference for systematic titling of land
ownership in some settings despite the absence of a fully functioning
state system for registering rights to land. The large-scale privatization
and titling efforts in Moldova and Ukraine are prime examples of this
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approach. The argument in favor of these approaches is very much
centered on providing immediate and tangible benefits to the poor.
The primary benefit conferred in these projects was a valuable land
right in place of a less valuable and much more tenuous land share
right.78 An important emphasis in such projects is to keep the price
per beneficiary as low as reasonably possible, allowing the project to
benefit a large universe of owners and provide a model that would al-
low the government to finance titling without foreign assistance.79
However, systematic titling and registration can also exclude certain
rights holders. During systematic efforts, holders of uncertain or irreg-
ular rights – including parcels subject to dispute, for which the owner
lacks documentary evidence, or on which the owner has erected con-
structions without the necessary permissions – can be excluded from
obtaining title.80 Because of the costs related to resolving the status of
these “problem parcels,” they are often left unregistered and their titles
left subject to later resolution, or officials simply register the problem
parcels in the name of the state. In the Republic of Georgia, at one
point systematic registration had failed to register up to 50% of resi-
dential plots in some places because of encroachments and irregulari-
ties.81 In Albania, as many as 30% of parcels were registered in the
name of the state in some places because of unresolved issues.82 In
such cases, the very people who have a clouded title, and whose rights
are consequently most in need of resolution and formalization, are ex-
cluded from the process. Inevitably, it is the poorest rightholders who
lack sufficient resources to clear those rights.
Provisional titles
Provisional titles are one legal tool that can be used to prevent exclu-
sion of the poor. The English title registration system, set forth in large
part by the Land Registration Act (1925), allows for the registration of
possessory titles.83 Possessory title is provisional in the sense that the
rights are registered “as is” and the act of registration does not cure
any existing defect, although the act of registration combined with the
passage of a period of time without any challenges could turn the pro-
visional title into an absolute title. Registration of possessory titles
could reduce the costs of cleaning up title for registration and still pre-
serve latent rights, allowing a rightful claimant to appear and reassert
rights to the land. According to the English legislation, a registered
possessory title remains subject to all latent rights existing at the time
of registration, but the possessory title automatically converts to abso-
lute title after the “as is” registered rights have existed for 15 years with-
out challenge. The Singapore land title registration system also recog-
FORMALIZATION OF RIGHTS TO LAND 363
nizes provisional titles, similar to the English system, but provides for
conversion of title from provisional to absolute in only five years.84
This type of legal tool might be particularly suitable in an environ-
ment where it is suspected that there are many conflicting (and diffi-
cult to resolve) claims to the same land parcels. Where poor popula-
tions do not have the resources to make and support a claim, these
tools can provide a legal safety net that preserves the rights until such
time as the claimant is able to pursue the claim. Of course, a disadvan-
tage of possessory titles is that – until they become absolute – they pro-
vide more limited protections and less certainty for the titleholders,
and may impair marketability.85 Legislators must strike the proper bal-
ance between facilitating efficient registration of rights and protecting
the rights of those who are not able to participate fully in the process.
The use of provisional titles is most likely to protect the interests of the
poor when used in conjunction with a systematic registration process
that maximizes participation of the poor.
Financing first registration
If the state cannot afford to finance the costs of first registration it is
reasonable to ask whether the population is in a position to finance
these costs. Even if citizens might be able to scrape together the money
necessary to pay registration fees and survey costs, it is often unlikely
that they would prioritize such purchases over other purchases, except
in the specific instance of sporadic registration in the context of a
transaction. Where a system is in place to collect land taxes, including
for agricultural land, one solution might be to add the fees for first re-
gistration to the annual land tax, and allow them to be paid over a
short period of time (say, five years), which would reduce the immedi-
ate impact upon property owners. A variant on this approach would be
to collect the fees for a systematic first registration at the time of the
first sale or mortgage of the property (but not upon inheritance), fol-
lowing first registration. This would require the state to finance most
of the costs of first registration up front and collect reimbursement gra-
dually as the land market develops.
If the state does not finance first registration, it may also be unable
to finance the day-to-day operation of the system. Although the state
may design a registration system with the intention of making it self-
financing, paid for through registration fees charged to applicants and
fees charged for providing information to market participants, the state
should be prepared to subsidize the system in the event that fees do
not generate enough income to sustain the system.
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VIII. Conclusion
Systems that formalize land rights offer opportunities to improve the
lives of the poor in many developing countries. Potential benefits in-
clude security against eviction, opportunities for investment and sav-
ings, capture of increased property values, access to credit, and en-
hanced social status and stability. However, the needs and opportu-
nities are likely to differ from setting to setting, and planners must
clearly understand both their goals in formalizing rights, as well as the
particular features of the specific setting in which they will work. Im-
portantly, planners should test – through field research – hypotheses
about the benefits and risks of formalizing rights before embarking on
an expensive program to do so.
Evidence as to the benefits of formalization appears to be highly
situation specific, and it appears, moreover, that there will be settings
in which the general principle of “do no harm” is likely to be signifi-
cantly violated. The challenge is to determine whether in a given situa-
tion formalization is likely to benefit the poor, or at least likely to bene-
fit the general population without harming the poor.
The following are settings in which formalization may be more likely
to benefit the poor:
– Settings in which the poor have received land rights under govern-
ment programs, including under redistributive land tenure reform
programs.
– Settings in which squatters have occupied public lands (and private
lands) for long periods of time.
– Settings in which rightholders do not have formalized rights, but
face a serious external threat such as, for example, owners (or
equivalent rightholders) of peri-urban lands that might be a target
for takings via eminent domain for commercial or “development”
purposes. (Reasonable care would need to be taken, however, that
the legal rules and administrative arrangements for such titling did
not open the way for a reverse phenomenon: government or private
interests successfully claiming to already be the priority right-
holders.)
– Settings in which customary group rights are not yet formally pro-
tected against the threat of outside incursions. Formalization should
consist of documenting and registering the external boundaries of
the group’s lands within which they will carry on their chosen cus-
tomary arrangements.
– In almost all settings it is desirable to give greater weight to wo-
men’s land rights via formalization. This may take several forms,
ranging from adding the wife’s name to existing titling documents
and registry entries, to adding the wife’s name in supplements or
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reissues for existing documents, to creating a presumptive rule of
law that deems wives to have rights in common to all land docu-
mented in a husband’s name, unless the contrary is shown.
Formalization is unlikely to benefit the poor – and may positively harm
the poor – in other settings, some of which may overlap (and thus may
negate) settings described above. These include:
– Settings in which the legal and administrative arrangements cannot
offer adequate protection against the interception of benefits by lo-
cal officials or local elites, as via their successful assertion of false
claims, or their simply using the occasion to undertake an illegal
“squatter clearing” operation, especially for valuable lands.
– Situations of premature insistence upon “Westernization” and indi-
vidualization of land rights, as in customary rights within the
boundaries of traditional communities. To similar effect, lands such
as unimproved pasturelands or rangelands used by traditional her-
ders (although documenting the external boundaries of such lands
is likely to be beneficial).
– Situations – often also found on lands of customary or indigenous
groups – where there are likely to be many subordinate rights, often
held by women or by other weaker members of the community,
which it would be difficult to memorialize and preserve in the for-
malization process, and which are therefore likely to be lost
(although it may be possible to formulate rules that preserve such
subordinate rights, at the cost of some derogation from any desired
“conclusive” aspect of the registration system).
– Situations where there are lobbies or groups, such as surveyors or
notaries, who insist upon a titling and registration process that
would involve financial or other transaction costs far higher than is
reasonably necessary. This might take the form, for example, of
ground-survey costs per parcel far higher than what international
best practice shows is possible.
In determining when and whether and to what extent to move ahead
with titling and registration, planners should bear in mind at least four
general observations.
First, there should be no general presumption that individualized ti-
tling and registration are always to be done. This chapter has at-
tempted to lay out some of the considerations that should be the sub-
ject of empirical investigation before decisions are made. Yet failure to
act is also a decision, and one must take care that an extended research
agenda does not simply become an excuse for inaction: the potential
benefits, for the poor, from this most important of productive assets,
366 ROBERT MITCHELL
land, are too significant to put off decision making for an extended per-
iod. Thus, conduct research, but also decide.
Second, where research does not point a clearer way or where there
are major variables still to be determined as to a possible titling and re-
gistration system, planners should consider implementing pilot pro-
jects to test whether formalization is likely to provide benefits, if the
nation’s legal system permits such a legal regime to be adopted for
application in only one or a few areas. As with all pilot projects, it will
be necessary to keep replicability in mind, not lavishing financial or ad-
ministrative resources that are too generous to be extended on a na-
tional scale.
Third, wherever possible, use the comparative international experi-
ence as a guide to lower the per-parcel costs of titling and registration.
Consider, for example, whether newer technologies such as satellite
surveying and GPS can be used to reduce the costs of surveying and
mapping drastically, used in conjunction with practically minded legal
rules about the accuracy of boundaries, especially for rural lands. Or, if
traditional ground surveying is to be used, keep in mind that there
have been large differences in costs-per-parcel in different country set-
tings, depending on such factors as whether competition among pri-
vate surveyors is demanded and bidding processes are used.
Finally, planners would do well to keep in mind that fundamental as-
pects of system design may make a system more or less affordable
and, especially when corruption is a basic concern, more or less open
to rent seeking by officials involved in the registration process. Cer-
tainly, a declaratory system is likely to be much less expensive for the
state to operate than a conclusive system and involves much less offi-
cial discretion and hence less room for rent seeking (where that is per-
ceived to be a major threat). On the other hand, what the register pro-
vides in a declaratory system is essentially notice of claims and no
strong assurance of rights. Other important legal variables in design
that may put less pressure on perfection of the information in the reg-
istry are the recognition of rights by prescription (including prescrip-
tion effective against the state, at least for smallholders), and clear rules
as to inquiry notice, holding prospective transferees liable to have the
knowledge they should gain as a consequence of inspecting the prop-
erty. A highly promising intermediate approach, without going to a de-
claratory system, but offering potentially large cost savings, is the use
of provisional titles that will be perfected if they are not challenged
within a prescribed period.
Land rights registration systems are fundamentally human systems
that operate within a complex environment of existing power relations,
including relations between citizens and public officials, and among ci-
tizens who may possess differing amounts of power. Successful intro-
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duction and operation of a system will depend in part upon creating a
workable legal framework, and creating appropriate knowledge and
technical capacity among registry officials. But the greater challenges
may arise with regard to matching the capacity of the system to the
needs of the public, ensuring that the system provides services that are
useful and affordable to citizens. Mere legislative fiat – making regis-
tration of land rights mandatory – is unlikely, by itself, to ensure that
the system is used in practice. An unused registration system is un-
likely to serve the needs of either the state or citizens, and may create
many more problems than it solves.
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9 Land rights legal aid
Robert Mitchell
I. Introduction
Of all possible pro-poor interventions relating to reform of land tenure,
legal aid for poor families who use, own or seek access to land may be
the most generally applicable and least risky. It is less risky because it
is more flexible than other interventions: client demands can daily help
shape the nature and focus of the intervention. Legal aid is important
for implementing other land tenure interventions discussed in this
book, and it can help project implementers maintain their focus
squarely on the poor. Land rights legal aid to the poor also provides a
feedback loop for project implementers, which can provide an early
warning of project missteps. And legal aid provides ample “real life”
material to support advocacy and public information campaigns direc-
ted at the public and government officials. Finally, legal aid tests the
government’s commitment to assisting the poor; a government that
cannot accept and support a program of legal aid for the poor may be a
weak candidate as a partner for other pro-poor land-related interven-
tions.
Legal aid seeks to assist the poor to take control over their own lives.
Designed and delivered properly, provision of legal aid services to the
poor represents a “bottom-up” strategy that focuses on the needs of the
poor and approaches the legal system from the standpoint of the poor.
This is very different from the much more common approach that in-
ternational development agencies take, of reforming judicial systems in
the hope of benefiting the poor.
[T]he basic needs of the rural poor are more than merely physi-
cal. The rural poor hunger besides for justice, for respect for
their dignity, and for control over their lives. . . . To the extent le-
gal aid can help the rural poor gain justice and greater control
over their lives, it does meet a basic need.1
This point is illustrated by the comment of a Chinese farmer who told
RDI that he was not primarily concerned with winning his case over a
land dispute; rather, he was most concerned that his position should
be heard and considered.2 Thus, there is reason to believe that the poor
derive important benefits from participating in the process of under-
standing and pressing their rights, even if they do not immediately
succeed.3 At the same time, to be truly successful, a legal aid program
should materially improve the lives of clients.
Designed and delivered with appropriate sensitivity and focus, legal
aid can help to protect the poor’s access to land and use of land. This
chapter discusses lessons learned regarding how to provide legal aid
services in a manner that promotes and protects the access to and use
of land by the poor. Section II presents an overview of two broad styles
of legal aid: traditional and structural. Section III discusses the rela-
tionship between traditional legal aid and rural land rights. Section IV
explores further the representation of clients. Section V looks at land
rights education and use of mass media, and Section VI discusses fi-
nancing, organization and staffing.
Lessons described here are based primarily on RDI’s experience in
organizing and supervising legal aid services in Russia, Moldova and
Ukraine, and are informed by our involvement with legal aid in the
Kyrgyz Republic and India. In 1996 RDI established the first land
rights legal center in the former Soviet Union, the Center for Land
Reform Support of Vladimir Oblast, which celebrated its tenth anniver-
sary in August 2006. In 1998 RDI established a second center in Sa-
mara, Russia, which operated until 2005. As part of a USAID land pri-
vatization program in Moldova, RDI helped create a national system of
rural legal aid centers that operated until the project ended in Decem-
ber 2000. RDI also helped design a national system of legal aid centers
in Ukraine. The first centers opened in February 2003 and the twenty-
fifth center opened in 2005; these operated until March 2007.4 Since
2002 RDI has provided technical assistance to a statewide paralegal
program working with the rural poor in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh (See Chapter 6).
II. Styles of legal aid
Legal aid services may be divided into two broad types: traditional and
structural. In general terms, “traditional” legal aid undertakes to pro-
vide clients with legal protections on the basis of existing legislation.
Traditional legal aid does not seek to change the letter of the law, but
to enforce the law as written. In the process of enforcing the written
law, a well-designed traditional legal aid program should also seek to
generate public discussion of government policies, laws and legal pro-
cesses in terms of the real experience of legal aid clients.
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The traditional approach may be contrasted with structural legal aid,
also called “developmental” legal aid, which uses a political approach to
challenge legal and political structures that generate and perpetuate in-
justice to the poor.5 Proponents of structural legal aid advocate this
approach in settings where the legal system is believed to be funda-
mentally biased against the poor. Structural legal aid seeks to assist the
poor as a class rather than specific individuals.6
Advocates of structural legal aid charge that traditional legal aid, at
best, is a way of giving alms to the poor, providing temporary relief
without addressing the structural problems that generate poverty.7 An-
other charge is that traditional legal aid may even provide cover to
those in a position of power who maintain unfair policies. In making
the case for structural legal aid, Nasution argues that the legal aid must
have a political motivation in addition to a humanitarian motivation,
and must both inform people of their rights and encourage them to de-
velop the moral courage to demand such rights.8
Diokno argues that structural legal aid lawyers must confront the
government with the detrimental human effects of government poli-
cies and programs, demonstrating the inconsistencies between the va-
lues that the government professes (and values that accord with inter-
national standards) on the one hand, and the government’s actual poli-
cies, as implemented, on the other. This strategy is premised on the
belief that appeals to conscience are not doomed to fail, and on the be-
lief that governments seek respect from other governments.9 Diokno
further argues that legal aid should help the poor understand the
causes of their situation and help them to organize and mobilize them-
selves to overcome the causes.10
Structural legal aid can surely serve a very valuable role in challen-
ging government policies and the fundamental structure of legal pro-
tections available to the poor. Such aid may be the only type of assis-
tance relevant to the poor in settings where the law, as written, ex-
cludes protection for the poor, and where the justice system, either
through design or practice, routinely deprives the poor of access.
But traditional legal aid may also perform a valuable role in many
settings. If designed and implemented correctly, traditional legal aid
can inform people of their rights as embodied in existing law and moti-
vate them to find the moral courage to demand their rights, and can
expose inconsistencies between the values the government professes in
the law as written and the values evident in the government’s policies.
Providers of traditional legal aid may also advocate changes in law,
though this is unlikely to be a primary focus. Perhaps the only structur-
al legal aid activity that is outside the purview of traditional legal aid is
protest (and advocacy of public protest) against the government.
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Box 9.1. Classifying legal aid tactics
By way of example, one might consider the possibility of various al-
ternative approaches by which lawyers might help landless rural
people to gain ownership of an unused large estate or portion of a
large estate.
(1) Identify a group of such people as client and ask the country’s
land administration authorities to take over control of that land un-
der existing legal rules applicable to unused or abandoned land, and
to allocate the land to the clients as defined beneficiaries under the
law; or
(2) Perhaps after a rebuff under (1), file suit in court to force the
land administration authority to act; or
(3) Urge the legislature or the land administration authority to
adopt rules under which the clients can acquire control of such land;
or
(4) Represent a group of clients who already occupy the land, under
circumstances in which the law may recognize in principle their en-
titlement to control that land (e.g., they were previous owners or
had customary rights and were wrongfully displaced); or
(5) Represent the occupying clients in arguing to the government
for the need to change the law to accommodate the needs of these
clients, or the need for conferral of control rights to the clients on
an ad hoc basis.
Options (1), (2) and (4) might appropriately be categorized as exam-
ples of traditional legal aid, while options (3) and (5) might appropri-
ately be categorized as structural legal aid.
Even in fundamentally unjust societies, there may be space to enforce
the existing law for the benefit of the poor, to expose deficiencies in the
law, to sensitize the courts and the press regarding injustices, and to
compel the law actually to deliver to the poor that which it promises on
the books. Traditional legal aid programs address this gap: to expose
the hypocrisy in law by helping the powerless to enforce the law as
written.11 The defense of the interests of those who lack access to se-
cure land may contribute to erosion of the sense that powerlessness is
an immutable condition. Box 9.1 offers some specific examples of tac-
tics that might be classified as traditional and others that might be clas-
sified as structural legal aid.
Some governments may not allow structural legal aid tactics that
question the government’s legitimacy. In settings where structural legal
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aid is not an option, traditional legal aid may be an appropriate means
for assisting the poor. For example, Chinese legal aid providers “are
able to challenge local authorities, or persons with powerful connec-
tions, precisely because the goals they are pursuing are consistent with
those of the State.”12
An argument can also be made that traditional legal aid may some-
times better serve the interests of the poor, even in settings where the
government tolerates structural legal aid. Sometimes, structural legal
aid providers may have strong ideological viewpoints, occasionally even
to the point of superseding the needs or best interests of their clients.
Moreover, the poor may prefer to use existing law to make incremental
and immediate improvements in their lives rather than expend energy
on improvements that are more fundamental, but more distant and
perhaps less certain.13 Finally, the rational motivations of poor indivi-
duals may well differ from the rational motivations of groups of the
poor.14 If this is correct, poor families may be more willing to partici-
pate in legal tactics that improve their life now rather than participate
in legal (or political) tactics that provide no immediate benefit to the
family, but which may benefit the larger group in the future.
Nothing just said, of course, precludes the possibility that in some
circumstances both traditional and structural legal aid activities may be
proceeding in parallel towards a common goal. Nor should it be in-
ferred that traditional legal aid operates in settings and in a manner
free of controversy: to the contrary, local landlords or officials on the
other side of a legal dispute may be quite unhappy to see the poor re-
ceiving legal assistance.
III. Legal aid and rural land rights
Although legal aid programs typically address all types of problems for
a given population, legal aid programs can also be effective when they
develop individual specialization or model approaches to common is-
sues.15 This specialized approach acknowledges that the poor are a het-
erogeneous body, and that while the poor have a number of features in
common, such as a lack of control over goods and services, the dissimi-
larities among groups of the poor require different approaches for ad-
dressing and reducing poverty.16
We focus here on the provision of traditional legal aid relating to a
narrow set of issues – land rights and access to land – affecting the ru-
ral poor.17 This focus implies both a means test and an issue test. This
narrow focus is justified to the extent that secure control of land is fun-
damental to the livelihoods of the poor, the case for which is made else-
where in this book.
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Land rights legal aid may be initiated as a stand-alone program or in
support of larger land tenure interventions. Where land rights legal aid
complements other land tenure interventions (such as redistributive
land tenure reform, or systematic land titling, to name but two), the le-
gal aid services allow project implementers to ensure that the principal
intervention remains focused on delivering benefits to the poor. It is
possible to implement land rights legal aid on any scale, from one attor-
ney to many hundreds, depending upon resources and circumstances.
International experience with land rights legal aid is limited. In the
Philippines, local NGOs do occasionally help resolve land disputes, but
local NGOs are reluctant to provide such aid since this type of dispute
tends to create direct conflicts with powerful local landowners.18 Na-
tional NGOs may be more willing to provide assistance in land dis-
putes, but they are not based in rural areas where the needs arise most
often. In Bangladesh, legal aid providers focus only a small percentage
of their time on land disputes.19 What legal aid exists in China is
mostly limited to major cities; few functional legal aid programs oper-
ate in rural areas, where lawyers are few, and it is difficult for lawyers
to earn a living.20
Several African legal aid initiatives focus a portion of their activities
on land rights issues, including the Land Reform Project operated by
the Legal Resources Centre in South Africa. The project focuses on liti-
gating in order to establish precedent, to secure settlements for clients
outside of court, and to facilitate access to land for clients through the
government’s Department of Land Affairs.21 It is also actively involved
in state deliberations on land reform legislation and has advocated spe-
cific law and policy reform, such as the passage of the Communal Land
Rights Act of 2004. Another example is the Legal Assistance Centre
(LAC) in Namibia, which in 1997 launched the Land, Environment and
Development (LEAD) project to provide legal advice on land rights to
rural communities. The four main activities of the project are: (1) lobby-
ing for legal reform; 2) legal training on land laws for farmers, small-
scale enterprises and NGOs; (3) providing educational materials on
land rights; and (4) providing advice, mediation and litigation services
on land and environmental issues to rural communities.22 The center
has often met resistance from regional officials; it was forced to request
a court order from the High Court to meet with the community leaders
without harassment from local police and government officials.23
Legal aid is especially needed in less developed areas of any country
since people there lack the money to pay for lawyers, have a lower level
of legal consciousness, have less access to lawyers generally, and have
much less access to lawyers who can afford to provide pro bono ser-
vices.24 The same can surely be said for rural populations throughout
the developing world.
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It is important for legal aid providers and those designing and fund-
ing legal aid to conduct research regarding the legal needs of the poor.
In order to understand whether and how one can devise programs to
provide legal assistance to have-nots, it is also crucially important to ex-
amine the structures of power in the society. Study must not be a substi-
tute for action, however, and the needs of the poor will be understood
more clearly once legal aid services begin to be provided. It is necessary
to monitor service provision intensively at the beginning of the program
to ensure that clients both desire and benefit from the services provided.
Legal aid services may include a wide range of activities. The time
and resources of service providers are not unlimited, so it is important
to decide what time and other resources the providers will devote to
each activity. Here we examine four activities: land rights education;
advice to clients regarding specific matters; representation of clients
engaged in a dispute; and changing the climate of expectations.
Land rights education
In many (though not all) settings where RDI has worked to provide in-
formation to the poor regarding land rights, rural citizens do not have
frequent access to newspapers, television or even radio. Print and
broadcast media rarely devote much coverage to land rights issues, and
whatever coverage exists is often incomplete or inaccurate. Literacy var-
ies widely in countries where legal aid for land rights is needed, and
this influences the mode of delivering information. It is self-evident
that if a person is unaware of her land rights, she is not in a position to
know whether – or to what extent – her rights are being violated. The
question of considering remedies is never reached. Rural elites may rely
upon such ignorance to their advantage in dealings with the rural poor.
Of course, it is dangerous to generalize regarding the extent to which
the rural poor understand their rights. In their study of the legal needs
of the poor in an Indian village, Gordon and Lindsay found that the
poor did in fact know something about the law. They dismiss outright
the assertion that the poor are mystified by the law and courts and
found, to the contrary, that however deficient the understanding of out-
siders might be regarding the legal needs of the poor, the rural poor
they met with clearly understood their needs and aspirations.25
In settings where the law is undergoing rapid change, as in coun-
tries that emerged in the 1990s from the former Soviet Union, it is
especially difficult for rural citizens to obtain sound information on
land rights. In the half-dozen countries of the region in which RDI has
worked with rural populations in the last decade, it is still quite com-
mon to find extremely low levels of legal fluency regarding land rights.
Although people are not completely ignorant of the law, there is often
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no reliable institution from which they can receive accurate informa-
tion. In many rural areas, citizens do not have regular access even to
local newspapers. Even where newspapers and other mass media are
available, these rarely present a thorough discussion of land rights.
The present limitations of knowledge of the changing (improving) for-
mal land rights in rural China are discussed in Chapter 7.
Nor can people regularly rely upon local officials to provide accurate
information. Officials may not know the law themselves or may be
unaware of more recent changes in law. Even where local officials have
information regarding land rights, they are often more likely to view
land questions from the perspective of the non-poor, either because the
officials come from non-poor families or because they perceive their
political futures to be aligned with the interests of the non-poor.
Even among the poor, some constituencies may require additional,
special outreach in land rights education. These may include socially dis-
advantaged populations and also, in many settings, women (see Box 9.2).
Box 9.2. Legal aid and the protection of rural women’s land rights in
Guangxi, China
Women are often at a distinct disadvantage in obtaining information
regarding land rights. It is important to ensure that public education
campaigns targeted to reach the poor are designed in ways that ad-
dress the needs and interests of women, which feature women in
roles of understanding and enjoying their land rights, and which are
delivered at times and places where women are likely to feel comfor-
table receiving the information.
In cooperation with Guangxi University Law School, in January
2007 RDI prepared a training manual and provided training to legal
aid lawyers and staff of Guangxi Province (China) on the protection
of rural women’s land rights. A majority of attendees had encoun-
tered inquiries or cases concerning rural women’s land rights, but
knew little about specific laws and regulations controlling rural wo-
men’s land rights, especially recent regulations and notices from the
Ministry of Land and Resources and the Supreme Court.
The training focused on several questions that are common in the
countryside regarding securing women’s land rights, including, for
example, protecting a daughter’s land rights when she marries and
moves to a different village, ensuring a woman’s land rights are pre-
served after divorce or abandonment, ensuring that women receive
compensation equal to that provided to men in the case of land tak-
ings by government, and procedures for initiating a formal lawsuit
related to rural land.
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Advice in specific matters
While important, public education does not usually provide sufficient
protection to the poor. There are at least two reasons. First, a poor citi-
zen may reasonably conclude that land rights that appear to be granted
in laws are not truly available since he or she cannot afford to chal-
lenge the interests of officials or the non-poor who benefit from lack of
enforcement of such rights. Second, a poor citizen may not even be in-
terested in learning about land rights in the absence of some demon-
stration that the society – through such institutions as the courts and
legal aid – is prepared to ensure that the rights are enforced.
People may use knowledge of rights in a number of ways short of
going to court. They may, for example, negotiate with a neighbor about
repairing a fence based on knowledge of the relevant law. Although ci-
tizens have not taken the matter to court, this does not mean that they
have not mobilized the law.26 Legal aid providers in some settings have
long provided services to help the poor resolve legal issues without en-
tering the formal legal system. In the Ukraine and Vladimir, Russia,
legal aid centers, non-litigation assistance complements litigation ser-
vices. Legal aid attorneys receive letters from clients and meet with cli-
ents who request advice in specific matters. The attorneys are often
able to advise clients regarding how the client can resolve the issue per-
sonally by, for example, preparing a particular application, or present-
ing the claim to a particular government office.
Representation of clients engaged in a dispute
The provision of advice to clients – that is, explaining the client’s op-
tions, but not offering to assist the client in pursuing any option – may
fail to protect the client’s interests adequately. Advice alone may be in-
sufficient in cases where the client’s rights are obstructed by a citizen
or official who has much more power than the client. In such cases
the legal aid service provider can best serve the client by actively repre-
senting the client in the dispute. This principle is stated explicitly in
the guidelines of the land rights legal aid network that operated for sev-
eral years throughout rural Ukraine:
The legal aid centers will focus upon identifying and solving dis-
putes and other problems related to land rights of land parcel
owners. The centers will not merely provide information to land
parcel owners, but will accompany the land parcel owner to
meetings with other parties to the dispute or problem, and then
advocate a solution on behalf of the land owner.27
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Other observers have noted that filing court cases should not be mea-
sured only in terms of winning or enforcing a court victory, and that
the poor often use the legal system as a way to increase their leverage
in settling disputes outside of court.28
Even if one believes the courts to be corrupt, or at least biased
against the interests of the poor, filing cases in court may place pres-
sure on judges and increase the costs to those who obstruct the rights
of the poor. Elites often find that illegal manipulation of the court sys-
tem carries certain costs, and that if one is “clearly wrong and expects
to lose a case, bribing judges or the police becomes an expensive pro-
position.”29
Although it is sometimes necessary for the legal aid service provider
to represent the client’s interests in court, it is often the threat of filing
the claim in court, rather than the actual prosecution of the claim in
court, that is most important in advancing the client’s interests. The
lawyers of the Ukraine Land Titling Initiative (ULTI) legal aid network
took only about 2% of client disputes to court, while solving the vast
majority of disputes outside of court.30 But the lawyers were able to set-
tle so many cases outside court precisely because they had the where-
withal and the confidence to take cases to court if the violation of rights
was clear.31
Changing the climate of expectations
One fundamental objective of legal aid should be to make the delivery
of justice and respect for the rights of the poor “routine” in the sense
that these outcomes and practices are expected in the normal course.
Legal aid should seek to change expectations which regard injustice as
the norm.32 Such a change in expectations should be regarded as an in-
tegral part of the establishment of the rule of law in a society.
Perhaps the best place to begin reversing low expectations is with
routine cases that involve clear, but nevertheless frequently occurring,
violations of rights. It is true that the routine cases may be easier to
prosecute in the sense that they have a lower profile and are therefore
less likely to attract strong resistance from groups that have no interest
in seeing the poor succeed in defending their rights. But an important
reason for preferring routine cases is that the resolution of such cases,
whether they are resolved in court or outside court, can more effec-
tively serve to establish the basic principle that the rights of the poor –
rights provided in national law – must be respected. Resolution of rou-
tine matters may thus have a more dramatic impact on the lives of the
poor than victories in so-called “impact” litigation that is undertaken
for its dramatic appeal, and “small victories . . . not only make the cru-
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cial difference for the immediate clients, but also make it possible for
wider change.”33
If legal aid services provide concrete victories in routine cases over
time, and as news of the victories travels throughout the community –
and, where possible, is broadly publicized though the media – these
successes should gradually increase the confidence of the poor as a
class and motivate more individuals to demand that their rights be re-
spected. Researchers who studied the impact of legal aid services pro-
vided to poor women in Ecuador concluded that the program may have
a positive influence even on those not directly involved in the program.
The researchers surmised that recipients of legal aid may serve as dis-
seminators of information, and the successful prosecution of claims
should create precedents that induce non-litigants to change their be-
havior. They conclude that the indirect benefit on non-litigants may be
the major potential impact of effective legal and judicial reform.34 The
ultimate objective is to promote a respect for equal application of the
law to the poor:
The sum total [of the work of legal advocacy NGOs] is far greater
than the number of evictions they stop or the amount of mainte-
nance payments they obtain for poor women. They help to cre-
ate a culture of rights in which community standards are raised,
so that it is no longer acceptable for a man to unilaterally declare
an oral divorce and leave his wife and children with nothing,
where a municipal government cannot bulldoze a shanty town
with impunity, where factory owners cannot assume govern-
ment safety officials will simply ignore hazardous workplace
conditions, and where poor people begin to believe that rights
are not just something that exist for others.35
Some routine problems may not be easy to solve and may require
much of the legal aid service provider’s time to resolve. But if the pro-
blem recurs with frequency, it may be worth spending a large amount
of time to pursue several “test cases.” The pursuit of such cases may
help to expose problems in how courts and local government handle
them, and even expose problems in the law.
IV. Representation of clients in practice
Representation of clients vs. mediation
Although there may be a place for mediation in cases involving dispu-
tants who are of more or less equal status, mediation is less likely to be
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effective in cases where one party has much greater power than the
other party. Mediation and other “neutral” processes are often decidedly
not neutral in cases involving disputes between the poor and the non-
poor (or between the poor and government officials) since such pro-
cesses inevitably reinforce unequal relations that precede the dispute.
When a dispute is passed from the formal system of justice to the in-
formal system, there is evidence that pre-existing inequalities between
the parties will carry over into the informal system. If a landlord or
large company is the party against which the poor tenant is proceeding,
the powerless person remains at a substantial disadvantage in the new
context.36
Legal aid services that provide representation to poor clients consti-
tute a very different approach to dispute resolution, an approach that
acknowledges the importance of the power imbalance between the
poor and the non-poor. This imbalance of power usually contributes to
the dispute in the first place and makes it difficult to resolve. In RDI’s
experience working with legal aid providers in Russia, Ukraine and
Moldova, disputes between the poor and local elites (or local officials)
rarely come down to a question over confusion of the legal norm;
rather, the dispute almost always amounts to a case of the more power-
ful party taking advantage of the less powerful.
Resolution of cases prior to court
Almost all disputes presented to the ULTI legal aid centers in Ukraine
relate either to the denial of client land rights by village or district offi-
cials, or the refusal of agricultural enterprises to honor the terms of
lease contracts signed with client landowners. After the legal aid attor-
ney gathers sufficient background information, the attorney meets with
the local official or land lessee to learn his or her side of the dispute
and to attempt to find a solution that protects the interests of the cli-
ent. The ULTI legal aid attorneys report that they resolve 98% of cases
prior to filing a claim in court. In the usual case, once the attorney
meets with the official or leasing-in enterprise on the other side of the
dispute to explain the law and offer a solution, the official or enterprise
accepts the solution proposed. This occurs not only because the law
usually supports the client’s claim, but because the party who is con-
fronted with an explanation of the law is better able to save face by
feigning ignorance of the law and accepting the attorney’s explanation
as an assistance rather than as an affront. If the official or leasing en-
terprise decides to resist the solution offered by the attorney, the official
or enterprise risks losing face in the event the attorney successfully
uses administrative and court process to compel a solution.37 And in
the great majority of cases taken to court by the ULTI legal aid centers
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or the Vladimir legal aid center in Vladimir, Russia, the legal aid attor-
neys prevailed.
It is usually much preferable for legal aid service providers to help
their clients to resolve disputes without resorting to court. Resolution
of disputes outside of court takes much less time and is therefore a
much more efficient use of the legal aid staff’s time. Resolution out-
side of court is also likely to provide much quicker relief to clients.
Where court administration is not efficient – a condition in no way
limited to, but especially prevalent in, developing countries – resort to
court may doom the client to protracted and time-consuming litigation.
In Andhra Pradesh state in India, for example, long backlogs of land
cases in the Revenue Court serve to preserve the status quo, delaying
justice for poor litigants who cannot afford to pay attorneys to press
their cases.
Resolution of disputes outside of court is also likely to create much
less friction between the client and the opposing party, with whom the
client will continue to live and work in the same community. Minimi-
zation of social discord is often in the best interests of the poor, and
this concern may reduce their interest in pursuing claims in court. Le-
gal aid service providers in Vladimir, Russia, report that the over-
whelming majority of rural citizens are still reluctant to file claims in
court and attribute this unwillingness to their distrust of the judicial
system and their opposition to conflict with the agricultural organiza-
tions and state management bodies on which they depend.38 In other
cultural settings, resort to litigation in the courts may carry with it so-
cial stigma, resulting in a "reluctance, particularly among the poor, to
become entangled with the courts.”39 Of course, there is likely to be a
natural limit to people’s propensity to endure injustice: for example, a
family that faces losing their land rights as the result of official action
may have very little to lose in challenging the officials as publicly and
strongly as possible. Two examples from Ukraine, one resolved in court
and the other prior to court action, are given in Box 9.3.
Resolution outside court saves the client court fees, which are often
a considerable barrier to the poor. And resolution outside court may
give clients a greater sense of control over the situation and lay the
groundwork for informal resolution of disputes that arise in the future
between the same parties, reducing the need for the legal aid provider
to become involved.
Finally, resolution outside court may allow all parties to save face.
The importance of this factor should not be underestimated. A local
elite whose actions are challenged often has a strong interest in resol-
ving the dispute in a way that allows the elite to excuse the dispute as
a misunderstanding of the law or difference of opinion regarding the
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facts. This is much easier to do during an informal negotiation be-
tween the legal aid service provider and the opposing party.
Box 9.3. Two cases in Ukraine
The following are examples of typical cases reported by ULTI rural
legal aid centers during November 2005.
The right to receive land. Ukraine law provides that members and
pensioners of collective and state farms are entitled to receive an
equal share of land previously used by the farm. A pensioner of the
Shevchenko state farm was passed over when the farm distributed
land shares in 1995. Early in 2005 the pensioner, then 93 years old,
and her daughter heard about the Mykolaiv oblast legal aid center
while listening to the Agronovyny radio program and applied to the
legal aid center for help. After confirming the pensioner’s right to
receive a land share, the center prepared a court claim for the
daughter to present. The claim was uncontested, and in August
2005 the court ordered the village to provide the pensioner with a
land share for 5.3 hectares.
Collecting past rents. In March 2005 a poor pensioner wrote to the
enterprise leasing his land and requested payment for rents due for
2003-2005, to which he received no reply. He heard about the Za-
porizhzha oblast legal aid center from the provincial radio program
“Land, hopes and expectations,” and applied to the center in Sep-
tember. The center wrote to the enterprise in October asking for doc-
umentation related to the overdue rents in preparation for filing a
court claim. The center received a letter from the enterprise later the
same month stating that the rent had been paid in full in sunflower
seed, grain and cash, for a total value of UAH 3,143 (then approxi-
mately US$628), which the pensioner confirmed.
Source: Ukraine Land Titling Initiative (July 2006).
Moral suasion
In cases in which it is obvious that the rights of the poor have been vio-
lated, moral suasion becomes a valuable tool for resolving the case short
of litigation in court. Moral suasion – the act of convincing the rights
violator that it is manifestly unjust to proceed with the violation – can
be an effective and efficient method of resolving disputes.
Although this is not universally true, in many cultures it is impor-
tant for the non-poor and poor alike to save face and not to be per-
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ceived as flaunting the law. To the extent that elites depend on the sta-
bility of social institutions, including laws, to protect their interests,
they may be reluctant to challenge laws and social norms directly. For
example, in India, “perhaps one of the more important allies of the
lower jatis [that is, the lower caste groups] is the legitimacy, albeit
strained, of the legal system in the minds of the upper jatis.”40 Legal
aid providers in Ukraine have found that once a legal aid attorney ex-
plains the law to the adversary in the presence of the poor clients, the
adversary often concedes in order to save face, explaining that he or
she had misunderstood the law.
Explanation of the law by an outsider – especially an outsider who
has the credential of being law-trained – can carry great moral force,
making threat of court litigation unnecessary in many types of cases.
Thus, in a range of cases, merely making known to an adversary that
the poor claimant or defendant has legal representation can greatly im-
prove the bargaining position of the poor.
Representation in court
Where an official or local elite has a significant personal financial stake
in maintaining a particular position, embarrassment or moral condem-
nation by the community may not be enough to compel compromise.
In such cases, the willingness of the client and the legal aid service
provider to take the case to court is the only method left for forcing
resolution of the claim.
After a legal aid service provider has pressed several cases in court,
the advocate’s reputation for being willing and able to prosecute cases
in court will also give the advocate greater credibility in the region the
advocate serves.
Legal aid service providers must carefully choose which cases to take
to court. One important consideration should be the chances of win-
ning the case and obtaining some practical relief for the client. This
may seem obvious, but there may be situations in which both the cli-
ent and the legal aid staff undertake to prosecute cases in which the
likelihood of success is small. One reason for prosecuting such a case
may be to call attention to an unjust situation. It is extremely impor-
tant for the legal aid service provider to discuss with the client the pro-
spects for success in court so that the client can make an informed de-
cision about whether to participate. Some clients may very reasonably
decline to undergo the stress and other costs of litigation (even where
there will be no direct financial cost) where the litigation is not likely
to improve the client’s situation in the near term.
The legal aid service provider must decide whether to accept all types
of cases, or to accept only those cases in which the rights of the poor
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are violated by an adversary who is wealthy or otherwise powerful
enough to influence the outcome of the dispute through formal and in-
formal means. Participation in cases between unequally situated par-
ties can help to even the playing field, providing relief in cases that
would otherwise be unwinnable or whose pursuit would otherwise be
unthinkable.
Although there is no shortage of cases in which one poor citizen dis-
putes with another poor citizen over access to land or other land issues,
the legal aid service providers may reasonably decline to become in-
volved, concluding that the disputants have relatively the same access
(and the same limits to access) to courts and other decision makers. If
the service provider does wish to become involved in disputes among
the poor, the service provider may be most effective acting as a media-
tor of the dispute, provided that all parties agree that the service provi-
der may play this role.
These observations are not intended to minimize the needs of the
poor for resolution of disputes among themselves, but only to suggest
that the use of the limited time and resources of the legal aid service pro-
vider must be prioritized, and that those poor who have a dispute with
more powerful interests may have fewer avenues of relief to pursue, and
may therefore legitimately claim a higher priority for legal aid services.
Legal aid service providers must also take pains not to prosecute
cases in which the client does not advance a meritorious claim.
Although ordinarily an attorney hired by a private client might have an
ethical obligation to prosecute the client’s claims without regard to
whether the client “deserves” to win, the legal aid attorney who serves
the poor owes an obligation to other prospective clients not to squander
time on less than meritorious claims since this reduces the amount of
time that the attorney has to devote to meritorious claims. Thus, the at-
torney will often be justified in refusing to prosecute a case that, even
while having a basis in law, does not rise to the status of a meritorious
claim or an efficient use of resources.
V. Land rights education and use of mass media
Village seminars
The ULTI legal aid centers in rural Ukraine found village seminars to
be an efficient and effective way of transmitting basic legal information
to villagers regarding rights to receive ownership of land and the exer-
cise of ownership rights through cultivating land, leasing land to
others, exchanging land, bequeathing land to heirs, etc. Legal aid cen-
ter staff typically travelled to a number of villages in a day to meet with
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mayors and other citizens to make arrangements to hold a village-wide
seminar during a subsequent visit. On seminar days, villagers gath-
ered at the village hall to hear a presentation on land rights by the legal
aid staff, who then invited villagers to pose questions and present con-
cerns related to land relations in the village. Although the focus was on
agricultural land, the attorneys were able to respond to general ques-
tions regarding other types of land, as well as questions related to pen-
sions, labor contracts, and other matters of concern to the villagers.41
As part of their seminar presentations, ULTI legal aid staff stated
their availability to represent villagers in matters related to the exercise
and protection of land rights. In this way, seminars were an essential
source of clients during the first months of center operations. The Vla-
dimir legal aid center in Russia has long used village seminars to in-
form villagers of their land rights and to publicize the center’s availabil-
ity for consultation.
Educating officials
Provision of legal information to local officials, judges and administra-
tors can be as important as providing it to rightholders, especially
where the law is changing or judicial training has not adequately fo-
cused on the rights of the poor. Regional officials can be an important
ally in resolving local disputes. Judges and public prosecutors are often
not well versed in land law, particularly where the law has recently
changed. Even land administration officials may not fully understand
the law, especially as it regards the land rights of the poor.42
It can be effective for legal aid attorneys to meet with such officials
to present training on land rights, including review of cases handled by
legal aid attorneys in other districts. In addition to representing clients,
the Qianxi legal aid center in China holds seminars with judges and
other court officials to raise awareness of laws relating to the protection
of women’s rights.43
Seminars with officials can also help to establish the legal aid attor-
ney as an expert on land law in the eyes of local officials. In Ukraine,
upon establishing a new provincial legal aid center, one of the first acts
of attorneys of the ULTI legal aid network was to meet with provincial
justice officials and land administration officials to explain the pur-
poses and working guidelines of the center, and to offer the center’s
services to officials who receive appeals for help from rural landowners.
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Box 9.4. The importance of rural presence
Land rights legal aid attorneys cannot provide appropriate service to
poor rural landowners and the landless unless they travel frequently
to rural areas. This is important so that attorneys may see firsthand
evidence related to specific disputes, and to understand the context
of land tenure issues. And travel to villages is important to facilitate
meetings with groups of clients who cannot easily travel to the legal
aid office. But another, often overlooked benefit of frequent travel to
rural areas is that this allows the legal aid attorney to gain a sense of
the daily life of the rural poor and to appreciate the importance of
land tenure issues in their lives. The presence of legal aid attorneys
in the village also helps to establish the reputation of the legal aid at-
torneys in the eyes of clients and to serve notice to third parties that
the attorney takes the work seriously. For these reasons, effective le-
gal aid programs must ensure that legal aid staff have adequate
transportation to rural areas to accomplish their work.
Mass media
The mass media – including print, radio and television – can help to
advance the aims of legal aid in several important ways, including pub-
lic education on legal rights (including publicizing the results of litiga-
tion), raising expectations with regard to enforcement of rights, and
even influencing the outcome of particular disputes.
Public education is perhaps the most obvious way in which the mass
media can support legal aid work. Journalists who develop a specialized
focus on laws and legal disputes can translate these issues “into every-
day language in order to implant the feel for justice in society.”44 It is
important in such cases for the reporter to explain not only the legal
outcome of cases, but the legal basis and important considerations that
produced the outcome.
One effective and low-cost means of promoting public education is
for the legal aid service provider to submit articles for publication in
local and regional newspapers, which rural citizens are more likely to
read. For example, during the final quarter of 2006, the Center for
Land Reform Support of Vladimir Oblast published three articles in
some twenty district newspapers in Vladimir oblast (province) and four
neighboring oblasts. The articles explained the rights of citizens to en-
gage with administrative agencies as established under a new law, ex-
plained recent changes to a federal law that establishes local commis-
sions to decide, in the event of a dispute, which land parcel a person
who wishes to leave the former collective farm will receive in individual
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ownership, and explained recent changes reducing land tax rates for
agricultural land.45
One very popular device is the question and answer column in
which a legal aid service provider (or other qualified attorney) responds
to readers’ questions regarding various matters. In Ukraine the ULTI
legal aid attorneys participated in a weekly national radio program in
which they answered general questions mailed in by program listen-
ers.46 In Moldova, a question and answer column was used with great
success in “Ora fermierului” (“Farmer’s Hour”), a national monthly
magazine published during 1998-2000 to support private farming and
the privatization and subdivision of formerly collectivized agricultural
land.
Many Chinese public interest lawyers pursue their goals through ap-
peals to the press, which has been increasingly active in reporting legal
injustices.47 Although it is important to publish news of legal disputes
in which the outcome appears to be less than just, it is also helpful to
find and report news of cases in which the poor succeed.
The objective of legal advocacy for the poor should be not only to
protect the interests of individual clients of the legal aid service, but to
use the victories as lessons to other similarly situated individuals who
might otherwise be unaware of their rights or too intimidated to de-
mand that their rights be respected. “The most important method of
disseminating information about legal strategies is through their suc-
cessful pursuit. Nothing spreads like a success story. The active pro-
moting of such uses of courts will, by itself, result in others following
similar strategies.”48
Publication of victories serves several purposes. First, it may encou-
rage similarly situated poor disputants to press their case. Second, it
serves to educate public officials, including court officials, as to the ex-
istence of the law and the fact that the rights of the poor are being
enforced, at least in some quarters. Third, publication of victories by
the poor may influence the degree to which local elites and others feel
they have a free hand in violating the rights of the poor, in effect influ-
encing the climate of expectations generally. Finally, where the legal
aid service provider has been instrumental in obtaining the victory,
publication of the victory helps raise the profile of the provider, perhaps
enhancing the provider’s effectiveness in other cases and attracting
new clients to the legal aid service. The Wuhan University Center for
the Protection of the Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens states that its
support from the municipal government is due in part to the center’s
favorable treatment in the national press.49
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VI. Financing, organization and staffing
Financing
Financing is the single most important factor in the ability of legal aid
organizations to plan and meet program objectives. A source of multi-
year, stable funding gives the legal aid program a much better chance
of retaining trained staff and allows service providers to focus on deli-
vering services without being overly concerned about job security.
The primary sources of financing for legal aid organizations in the
developing world are international and national foundations, religious
organizations, foreign government donors, contributions from lawyers
and other individuals, member dues and court-ordered fees, and most
receive financing from multiple sources.50 Funding often includes “soft
money” grants that support a particular program aim and which expire
after a given period. These can be very useful, but can complicate the
work of the legal aid organization by requiring the organization to
track specific types of clients and cases separately.
Personnel costs should be the largest budget category. For legal aid
organizations that focus on solving specific disputes, investigation costs
are likely to be a substantial portion of operating expenses. The Center
for Land Reform Support of Vladimir Oblast in Russia currently oper-
ates on a budget of roughly US$2,000 per month, with which it main-
tains a staff of three full-time attorneys. In Moldova, each legal aid cen-
ter operated on a budget of approximately US$1,800 per month, which
paid the salaries of three specialists (either three attorneys or two attor-
neys and an agronomist), a clerical staff person, office rent, fuel for lo-
cal travel, an internet connection and other office expenses.51
The higher costs for the ULTI legal aid centers was attributable to
higher salaries and the fact that each center was responsible for mak-
ing visits to villages across a territory whose average size was approxi-
mately 24,000 square kilometers (just over 9,000 square miles), an
area larger than either El Salvador or Israel. Attorneys traveled to vil-
lages to provide land rights legal education through village seminars,
to gather information related to client claims, and to negotiate with op-
posing parties on behalf of clients. See Box 9.4 on the importance of
travel outreach.
Travel to rural areas is important to African legal aid programs as
well. Despite the fact that the majority of the South African LRC’s cli-
ents are from rural communities, its seven offices are all in predomi-
nantly urban areas. The LRC services its rural clients through regular
travel and by maintaining relationships with over 50 “advice offices” in
rural towns across the country.52 Lawyers and paralegals frequently tra-
vel to some of the most remote regions in the country, including
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Northern Cape Province and the interior of KwaZulu Natal.53 In Nami-
bia, LAC attorneys are often forced to limit expensive and lengthy travel
to remote areas when the organization is experiencing financial in-
stability. The center compensates by working with locally based NGOs
and community organizations to provide legal assistance to rural cli-
ents and has also helped establish advice offices in rural regions, which
are managed by volunteer paralegals.54
The national government is a potentially stable source of financing
for legal aid. And government provision of legal aid to protect the
rights of particular groups – such as women, the elderly and children –
helps send a message that the government places particular value on
these protections55 and serves to legitimize the work of legal aid provi-
ders. Although potentially a stable source of financing for legal aid,
government financing may bring with it unwanted influence on legal
aid activities. Such influence is likely to be particularly unwelcome with
respect to structural legal aid, more so than with respect to traditional
legal aid.56 In the case of the latter, while government officials might
intercede in the work of legal aid providers to protect particular impor-
tant persons, they are less likely to intervene in a general class of cases
since the legal aid providers are, presumably, working to uphold cur-
rent law. Nevertheless, public financing of legal aid can create an inap-
propriate dynamic of state-supported attorneys litigating against state
interests and the interests of elites, and this dynamic can lead to re-
strictions on activities or the threat of loss of financing.57
Where the focus of traditional legal aid is the enforcement of land
rights of the poor, national government financing may be especially
problematic because a fair number of land disputes are likely to involve
state action. One common source of dispute involving the poor, for ex-
ample, is the taking of land for public (or ostensibly public) purposes.
Other common types of disputes involve state regulation of the land-
owner’s use of land, and complications arising from the registration of
rights to land. In China, for example, the Ministry of Justice and other
Chinese government institutions such as the National Labor Union,
consumer organizations and local governments have begun providing
legal aid, including legal aid services for disabled persons.58 However,
some local governments in China object to financing legal aid because
they believe lawyers have become exceedingly wealthy, while other local
governments object to the idea of paying lawyers to litigate against the
local government.59
Just as national government funding of legal aid for the poor sends a
message that the government supports the protection of the poor, inter-
national financial support for land rights legal aid sends a similar mes-
sage with respect to the values of the outside world. International re-
cognition can give the legal aid program some political insulation from
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government interference.60 And legal aid programs financed by
sources other than the national government may be more likely to take
on cases that government-supported programs might feel obliged to
avoid.61
The land rights legal aid programs in Moldova and Ukraine are ex-
amples of legal aid programs funded by a foreign government, in this
case USAID, and established independent of existing NGOs. These
programs, which were part of larger programs primarily devoted to pri-
vatizing and titling agricultural land, greatly benefited from secure
funding. In the case of the ULTI centers in Ukraine, funding contin-
ued from 2003 until the spring of 2007. Both programs had the sup-
port of the respective national government, and because the land priva-
tization was very popular in rural areas, the legal aid programs enjoyed
strong support in the villages.
It can be difficult for legal aid programs to survive in the absence of
outside funding. The legal aid program in Moldova ended almost im-
mediately after the close of the USAID-financed program of which it
was a part. In Ukraine, the ULTI legal aid network survived the close
of the USAID-financed project in September 2006 and registered as
an independent legal entity. The centers continued operating with
USAID support but closed in the summer of 2007 when USAID sup-
port ceased.
Another potential source of funding is client fees. The question of
charging fees for services relates not only to sustainability, but also to
the value clients place on services. Are clients likely to value services re-
ceived free of charge? Should legal aid centers charge nominal fees for
services, both as a way of dissuading prospective clients from present-
ing less serious claims, or as a way of encouraging clients to participate
in the prosecution of the claim? Although the ULTI legal aid centers in
Ukraine and the Vladimir center in Russia have not charged fees, this
did not lead to the presentation of frivolous claims and did not cause
clients to behave passively. The legal aid center in Guangzhou, China,
uses a unique approach. The center charges clients a small fee when
they apply for legal assistance from the center. If the center accepts the
case, it returns the fee to the client at the conclusion of the case. If the
center does not accept the case, it keeps the fee. This practice is in-
tended to discourage people from presenting non-meritorious applica-
tions for assistance.62
It is not appropriate to require that legal aid programs have the po-
tential to become wholly self-supporting in order to justify funding
them over the medium term. As Golub observes, “NGOs engaged in
challenging the status quo may always depend on foreign sources of
funding in many parts of the developing world, just as equivalent
groups depend on foundations and other outside sources in many far
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more affluent industrialized societies."63 If legal aid services in devel-
oped nations are not wholly self-supporting, it is unrealistic to suppose
that legal aid services in developing nations can support themselves.
If a legal aid program is eventually forced to close due to lack of
funding, this is no reason to regard the resources invested in the pro-
gram as having been wasted. In particular, legal aid services that are
targeted at resolving actual disputes are worth providing even if only
for a limited time since such services make an immediate difference to
the lives of clients receiving assistance, and because resolution in favor
of one poor client is bound to raise expectations among others simi-
larly situated.64
Organization
Some suggest that legal aid services are best provided by grassroots so-
cial action organizations, in part because such organizations may have
the local political clout necessary to help successful litigants withstand
pressures (in some other area of village life) brought by local elites
who have lost a case in court.65 This is a fair point, and highlights the
need for the legal aid service provider to be sensitive to local power re-
lations and to make sure that it is the client who ultimately determines
whether and how to proceed in prosecuting the case. The goal of legal
aid is not to “win cases,” but to improve the client’s situation. It is for
the client to decide whether a particular victory is worth achieving, tak-
ing into account the types of pressures local elites may bring to bear.
University programs provide another means of delivering legal aid to
rural populations. In China, for example, legal aid services have in
large part been developed by local justice bureaus and university law
departments.66 Non-government legal aid programs established by
Chinese universities receive no government support, though some are
supported by foreign foundations, such as the Ford Foundation.67
University programs may be preferable in certain settings. The fact
that the Beijing University Center for Women’s Law Studies and Legal
Services is part of the university’s law department reportedly provides
the center with more credibility than it would have if it were comple-
tely independent of an established institution. The Wuhan University
Center for the Protection of the Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens re-
ports that because it is affiliated with a university rather than the gov-
ernment, its status is attractive to clients who have grievances against
government departments or entities and who are therefore reluctant to
seek assistance from a government legal aid program. In addition, the
position of legal aid programs within Chinese universities may help
insulate them from scrutiny by the state.68
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University-based legal aid clinics have recently developed throughout
much of Africa, including in Kenya (Moi University), Zimbabwe (Uni-
versity of Zimbabwe), and Lesotho (University of Lesotho). In no Afri-
can country, however, have university-based law clinics become as
widespread as in South Africa. Since 1972 each of South Africa’s 21
law schools has created its own legal aid clinic. These clinics have been
lauded as both practical academic tools for law students and beneficial
resources for poor and marginalized communities in the school’s sur-
rounding area.
While many of these clinics differ in size and resources, most are
staffed by a small number of practicing attorneys, current law students
and administrators. Often, working at the clinic is voluntary for stu-
dents, but in some cases can be required in the final year of law school.
A number of these university-based clinics have teamed up with the Le-
gal Aid Board (LAB) and been subsumed into the local “justice centre.”
Others remain mostly independent, funded partly by the LAB and
partly by the university. Most clinics rarely ask clients to pay fees. Many
South African university law clinics specialize in a particular legal is-
sue, such as children’s rights, refugees or domestic violence. The
clinics tend to be located near the university, forcing rural dwellers to
travel to the city to seek legal aid.
Another potential method for providing legal services to the poor is
“judicare,” which is a general term given to programs that enlist pri-
vate attorneys to take on individual cases, usually on a reduced fee ba-
sis, with fees paid by the state. This approach is an alternative to pro-
viding legal aid through full-time attorneys whose only work is with
legal aid clients.
One criticism of judicare services is that private attorneys do not
understand the needs of the poor and have no experience in working
on issues important to the poor. A 1989 study contains the following
assessment:
Few solicitors’ offices are located in deprived areas where the
poor have most need of them, and solicitors receive little train-
ing in social welfare law. The problem is circular – the poor do
not think of using a lawyer for advice with their problems,
hence lawyers do not develop skill and expertise in these areas,
and the service is not available to those who wish to use it.69
In the UK, dissatisfaction with the ability of judicare to address the le-
gal needs of the poor led to a movement to create legal aid centers.70
Another important issue is the possible conflict of interest of the pri-
vate attorney, who may very reasonably conclude that it is risky to re-
present poor clients who have disputes with either local elites (who
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may be prospective clients) or local officials (upon whom the attorney
may need to rely in other matters). In other words, “private lawyers will
be constrained in their legal work for the poor by established interests
in the local community whom they rely on for resources.”71 This is
likely to be especially true in rural areas where there are few attorneys
and fewer paying clients.
For thirty years the LAB in South Africa operated a judicare system,
but reorganized its activities in 1998 to move towards a “justice centre”
system that employs salaried legal practitioners solely to provide ser-
vices to the poor. The 1998 National Legal Aid Forum cited the follow-
ing as its main reasons for the transition away from judicare services:
(1) a new constitutional requirement for legal representation; (2) wide-
scale fraud by legal practitioners; (3) cost concerns; and (4) the success
of public defender pilot programs.72 Since the transition to justice cen-
ters, the LAB has created better access to legal aid in South Africa but
disproportionately in favor of criminal cases in urban areas.73 The LAB
currently has 44 justice centers throughout the country in chiefly ur-
ban areas, but a major goal of the organization is to establish centers
gradually in rural areas.74
On the other hand, the establishment of legal aid centers may some-
times be perceived as a threat to private attorneys. Private attorneys in
the UK objected to the “political and quasi-political” law reform activ-
ities of publicly financed legal aid centers and also objected that the
centers competed unfairly with private attorneys by providing services
free of charge. A compromise was reached whereby the centers agreed
not to compete with private attorneys with respect to issues such as
personal injury litigation, marital disputes and probate. It soon became
apparent that referrals of these matters from legal aid centers actually
generated clients for private attorneys.75 In Ontario, Canada, lawyers
and social activists concluded that poor people often have very different
legal needs than fee-paying clients, leading them to call for the intro-
duction of community legal aid clinics to complement judicare services
being providing by private attorneys.76
Use of attorneys
If a primary function of the legal aid service is to represent clients in
resolving disputes (as opposed to advising clients how they can solve
their problems themselves), attorneys are likely to be far more qualified
to provide this service than paralegals. In most countries, only attor-
neys are authorized to prosecute claims in court. Even if the goal of the
legal aid service is to avoid taking the clients’ claims to court, the legal
aid service provider may find that the threat of going to court can pro-
vide highly useful leverage in negotiating the resolution of disputes.
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Attorneys are also likely to command more respect in negotiations
with adversaries. The attorney’s explanation of the law applying to the
merits of the client’s case may be more readily received by adversaries.
And a powerful adversary may be more willing to negotiate with a li-
censed professional, perceiving that this helps the adversary to preserve
his dignity.
Of course, attorneys are likely to command a much higher salary
than paralegals, which reduces the number of legal aid service provi-
ders who can be hired within a given budget. But if the legal aid ser-
vice aims to negotiate favorable outcomes for clients involved in dis-
putes with more powerful adversaries, attorneys may be necessary.77
Ideally, legal aid service providers will be committed to social reform.
Lev notes that the founders of the LBH in Indonesia determined that
because the work “extended beyond legal representation to legal and
social reform, law graduates were screened for commitment and social
awareness as well as social skills.”78 On the other hand, attorneys and
other legal aid providers must be paid a living wage. Workers who are
not fairly compensated for their time will not perform at the highest
standard.79 Salaries for professional staff are likely to be the most sig-
nificant expense of the legal aid operation, greatly exceeding rent,
transportation and other expenses.
Land rights legal aid service providers should be carefully and com-
petitively interviewed and selected for energy, commitment and cap-
ability rather than supposed existing knowledge of land law; the latter
can be learned but not the former. If a significant part of the legal aid
service will involve negotiating settlements on behalf of clients, it is
helpful if the attorneys have some experience in court, either as prose-
cutors or private litigators. This type of experience gives the attorney
the confidence to press cases in court, which greatly strengthens the at-
torney’s hand in negotiating the resolution of disputes.
For legal aid service providers to be effective, they must respect and
listen to clients. “There is often a social, economic, educational or iden-
tity gap between lawyers and their clientele that must be bridged.”80 In
India, poor families may be reluctant to seek lawyers from a higher
ranking jati (caste), thus limiting their access to legal aid.81
It may not always be possible for organizers of legal aid services to
hire attorneys from the same social background as the program’s cli-
ents. But where possible, legal aid service providers should be drawn
from the local region rather than transplanted from the national capi-
tal. Regional attorneys are more likely to understand the local condi-
tions. In the Moldova and Ukraine legal aid programs, care was taken
to hire regional attorneys, agronomists and economists.82
Some social scientists postulate that individuals who provide needed
services establish power over the person receiving the services, and that
402 ROBERT MITCHELL
unilateral dependence occurs when the receiver is unable to reciprocate
by bestowing benefits upon the provider.83 One way to counter this
supposed tendency might be for the provider of legal aid services to
emphasize that the legal aid program has an interest in ensuring that
the law is respected and that the resolution of personal problems also
benefits the larger society, including others who may be situated simi-
larly, but who do not have immediate access to assistance. In this way,
the client’s acceptance of aid actually redounds to the benefit of others,
especially if the legal aid provider is able to publicize any good out-
come the provider helps the client achieve.
Use of paralegals
Paralegals play an important role in many legal aid programs. In places
where the ratio of lawyers to the rural population is very low, it may be
very difficult to staff legal aid centers only with lawyers. The Legal Re-
sources Center in South Africa trains paralegals and others to monitor
law violations, take statements, provide information and give legal ad-
vice to communities in times of emergency.84
The primary argument against using paralegals is that they lack the
necessary training and are not qualified to provide legal services. How-
ever, with proper training and guidance, paralegals can significantly en-
hance the delivery of legal aid services, especially where a significant
part of the services consists of advising clients on how to solve their
problems themselves. An interesting example is provided by the client
advice bureaus established throughout the UK in 1939 to help citizens
cope with the disruptions of war; by 1940 the bureaus had dealt with 4
million applications for advice. Although the legal profession was not
involved in setting these up, much of the advice the bureaus gave re-
lated to legal matters.85
Staff of the UK client advice bureaus relied upon a 150-page set of
“Citizens Advice Notes” prepared by the central organization. These
notes gave the bureaus a clear advantage over attorneys who had earlier
undertaken to assist the poor through “Poor Man’s Lawyer” schemes
active in the 1920s and 1930s. Whereas attorneys of the earlier pro-
gram had little knowledge of the areas of law important to the poor,
the lay volunteers staffing the advice bureaus had access to quality in-
formation that addressed the right issues.
In the case of land rights legal aid, it is useful for paralegals to be
knowledgeable regarding rural society and agronomy. The staff of a le-
gal aid project providing advice and assistance to rural landowners in
Moldova contained a number of agronomists and agricultural econo-
mists working alongside the attorneys. Legal aid clients consisted of
poor rural citizens who had recently received agricultural land in own-
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ership and were either farming it themselves or leasing it to large agri-
cultural enterprises. Attorneys supervising the work provided these
specialists with basic instruction in the national laws applicable to agri-
cultural land relations. For their part, the agronomists and agricultural
economists were highly motivated to work with rural landowners and
had particular insight into problems relating to agricultural production.
Since many land disputes related to the lease of agricultural land under
production, the agronomists and economists were often able to fashion
solutions that made economic sense to both the landowners and the
agricultural enterprises which leased in their land.86
In any event, legal aid services should be overseen by attorneys, as-
sisted where appropriate by paralegals trained in the appropriate area
of law. The supervision by attorneys is necessary to ensure that parale-
gals have a sound understanding of the relevant law and that advice to
clients keeps up with changes in the law. The attorneys will also be
able to take over particularly difficult cases and represent clients in
court or other official proceedings if necessary.
Since 2003 the Society for Eradication of Rural Poverty SERP has op-
erated an innovative paralegal program in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh as part of the Indira Kranthi Patham (IKP) program estab-
lished by the state Department of Rural Development (DRD). The pro-
gram trains village youths to serve as paralegals and community land
surveyors dedicated to identifying and resolving land issues on behalf
of impoverished rural families.87 In each sub-district, a federation of
village-level women’s self-help groups (established earlier by the DRD)
hires the paralegals. The fact that the paralegals report to the women’s
groups is significant since it helps to ensure that they will focus on the
priorities of the women they serve.
Each paralegal concentrates on three villages per year, focusing pri-
marily on land claims related to: (1) land the government previously al-
located to landless families (though often not completing the allocation
process), (2) government lands occupied by the poor, and (3) private
lands that poor families have purchased but for which they have not
formalized their rights in the state registration system. The paralegal
identifies land issues confronting particular poor families, gathers facts
and documents, prepares reports for land administration officials and
files petitions in the administrative courts, assists the claimants and
the court officials to address the issues, and tracks the cases until they
are resolved. With the assistance of the paralegals and other project
staff, the land administration officials hold village courts, resolving as
many claims as possible on the spot.
In response to the chronic shortage of trained surveyors in rural
areas, the program has also hired village youths in each district to train
as apprentices with government surveyors to help settle the survey-
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related issues of the poor. The community surveyors are trained at the
state survey training academy and then apprentice for one year before
being eligible to receive a license as a surveyor.
In each district the government has established a Land Rights and
Legal Assistance Center to support the paralegals and community sur-
veyors. The district-wide federation of women’s self-help groups hires a
retired government land administrator to manage the community sur-
veyors and support the work of the paralegals. Each district federation
also hires a legal coordinator to provide functional support to the para-
legals. The centers also provide training to land administration officials
to expose them to the methods and pro-poor approach of the program’s
activities.
These activities have helped to place the issue of land rights and
claims of the poor back onto the agenda of state land administrators
and have helped ensure that the issues are viewed within a develop-
ment perspective. Importantly, the paralegals, who are typically from
the most exploited and vulnerable families, are able to identify the is-
sues affecting the poor and bring them onto the agenda of government
administrators. In what is a two-way bridge, the paralegals can also
help the poor to understand the requirements of the state land admin-
istration system. As of October 2007, paralegals and community sur-
veyors had resolved land disputes and other land issues on behalf of
21,716 poor people, which represents 27.5% of the issues presented to
the program to date.
Ultimately, legal aid staffing in any given setting will largely depend
upon the program budget and the decisions of the organizers regard-
ing the nature of the aid to be provided. RDI’s experience in Russia,
Moldova and Ukraine leads us to value the work of committed attor-
neys who place a high priority on resolving land disputes on behalf of
poor rural clients, including the very small percentage of disputes that
the attorney and client decide to pursue in court. At the same time,
our experience with the paralegal program in Andhra Pradesh, India,
persuades us that well designed and well managed paralegal programs
can be an efficient means of reaching large segments of the rural poor,
particularly where paralegals are drawn from the rural sector.
VII. Conclusions
Of all possible interventions designed to improve the ability of the poor
to obtain and exercise rights to land, traditional legal aid may be the
most generally applicable and least risky. Legal aid is more flexible in
that it can be adjusted to fit particular circumstances to respond to the
specific demands of a given segment of the poor. It can be an impor-
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tant tool for implementing other land tenure interventions, helping im-
plementers maintain a focus on the poor and correct flaws in project
design. And legal aid may be implemented on any scale, from one at-
torney to many hundreds, depending upon resources and circum-
stances. Although some successful models rely exclusively on attorneys
to provide services, well trained and well supervised paralegals can also
provide specific legal services to the rural poor and can do so at a lower
cost per client.
Designed and delivered with appropriate sensitivity and focus, tradi-
tional legal aid – the form of aid that seeks, in principal part, to imple-
ment current law – can inform people of their rights, motivate them to
demand that their rights be respected, and expose inconsistencies be-
tween the values expressed in the law as written and values evident in
the way public policies actually affect the poor. This exercise may serve
to sensitize the courts and the press regarding the plight of the poor
and compel the legal system to deliver the rights promised in the law.
One key component of land rights legal aid is education of the pub-
lic. This can be especially important in countries where the land rights
regime is changing rapidly. Legal aid can sometimes represent the only
reliable source of information on land rights that is available to the
poor. But information is often not enough; in many settings the poor
are likely to require some form of direct assistance in enforcing their
rights. The legal aid service provider can best serve by actively repre-
senting the poor client seeking to enforce land rights and helping the
client deal with officials and private parties whose actions interfere
with the client’s exercise of rights. A fundamental objective of legal aid
should be to make respect for the rights of the poor “routine” in the
sense that the poor begin to expect that their rights will be respected.
To be most effective, legal aid providers should actively take the side
of the poor in disputes between the poor and the non-poor, rather than
act as neutral mediators or arbitrators. This approach acknowledges
the importance of the power imbalance between the poor and the non-
poor. At the same time, legal aid providers should seek to resolve dis-
putes efficiently and minimize confrontation. The goal is not to avoid
confrontation, but to avoid unnecessary confrontation and escalation of
disputes to the point that they risk damaging the long-term interests of
the client. Where disputes can be resolved prior to court, this is often
not only more efficient, but also minimizes damage to social relations.
Where it is obvious that the rights of the poor have been violated, mor-
al suasion can be a valuable tool for resolving the case short of litiga-
tion in court, especially in settings where elites depend on the stability
of laws and other social institutions to protect their interests.
Land rights legal aid should strive not only to protect the interests of
individual clients of the legal aid service, but to use the victories as les-
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sons to other similarly situated individuals who might otherwise be
unaware of their rights, or too intimidated to demand that their rights
be respected.
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10 Concluding reflections
Roy L. Prosterman
As this book was being completed, we learned of the new research (see
Chapter 1) that has greatly increased the estimate of the numbers pre-
sently living in extreme poverty – now calculated as less than US$1.25
a day in purchasing power parity terms – from just under 1.0 billion to
1.4 billion people. This new estimate does not yet take into account the
sharp increase in food and energy prices since 2005. Roughly three-
quarters of these very poor are rural, and a majority of them lack se-
cure rights – several hundred million of them lack any access – to a
piece of land.
Providing secure land property rights, especially to the poor and
marginalized, is a challenge that remains at the root of many develop-
ment problems today. Feasible tools and solutions do exist. These tools
– which fall under our definition of “pro-poor land tenure reforms” re-
flected in Box 1.2 in Chapter 1 – vary widely in their specific objectives
and design. Globally, while there have been some significant reduc-
tions in the prospects and occasions for carrying out pro-poor land ten-
ure reforms over the past four decades, there have been, on balance,
even more important expansions in the possibilities for such programs
and the recognition of their importance. The global and comparative
experience over the past 40 years has much to teach about what works
and what does not work.
The present volume is an effort to capture and distill many of those
lessons, based largely on the work and learning of the Rural Develop-
ment Institute (RDI). RDI’s work, and its precursor labors under the
umbrella of the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, be-
gan in 1966. Those efforts have now covered more than 40 countries,
and they provide the core perspectives for the present volume.
When RDI’s work on behalf of land access and secure land rights
for the rural poor began, Lyndon Johnson was the U.S. President, the
Cold War was near its nadir, and the first moon landing was still three
years in the future. In the intervening four decades, much has chan-
ged, even our preferred terminology: this book has avoided the term
“land reform” but refers throughout to “land tenure reform.” This has
been done in part because the land reform sobriquet has been identi-
fied, in some parts of the world – notably in much of Latin America –
with narrow, confiscatory and punitive approaches, and in some other
settings has been used as a political leader’s Orwellian terminology –
as in the case of President Mugabe in Zimbabwe – for measures that
have harmed the poor while enriching well-connected cronies.
Terminology aside, there has been major evolution over those 40
years in what the cumulative experience suggests should be done to
improve the land access and security of the hundreds of millions of
people in poor rural families who still lack such property rights. Draw-
ing upon what the previous chapters have reflected of RDI’s experience
and that of governments, civil society, practitioners and scholars, the
following broad changes in the perception, prospects and practice of
land tenure reform seem the most fundamental:
– Little scope remains for traditional land-to-the-tiller programs that
use expropriatory methods to obtain private land for the allocation
of full-sized farms to tenant farmers.
– Somewhat more, albeit only modest, scope remains for programs
that distribute estate lands to agricultural laborers.
– The greatest scope for land redistribution to the completely landless
poor in developing countries now appears to reside with the distri-
bution of micro-plots – fractions of an acre on which they can build
houses, plant gardens or crops, grow trees, keep livestock and main-
tain micro-enterprises.
– In many settings where agricultural tenancy has been the subject of
intrusive regulation or has been prohibited, much could probably
be gained on behalf of the poor by legalizing and encouraging such
tenancy.
– The “household” should not be treated as a mysterious black box
whose interior workings are unknown or irrelevant, and the intra-
household allocation of land rights to women – at least equally with
men, and even preferentially where possible – must be viewed as a
critical goal of land tenure reform.
– Hundreds of millions of families of non-tenant possessors would
benefit from having their insecure land rights made more secure.
While programs to formalize individual land rights through titling
and registration may provide one possible solution, formalization is
not a uniform solution and also involves numerous risks that can
undermine the land rights of the poor. Where it is not yet appropri-
ate to define or document individualized rights, a repertoire of good
practices has evolved that can give recognition to group or commu-
nity rights. The devil is in the details.
– Where it is otherwise appropriate to recognize and document indivi-
dualized land rights, the law should generally provide that they are
held in ownership or some other long-term tenure, that a system is
instituted for protecting the rightholder’s interests against the state
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as well as other private actors, and that the rights are, or are at least
on track to become, transferable and mortgageable.
– That collective farms were nearly always a bad idea already ap-
peared evident when we began this work four decades ago. More re-
cent experience confirms this and provides a basis for distinguish-
ing the cases where collective farm members will quickly exit with
their pro rata portion of enterprise land if given the opportunity,
and those where they will not, and identifying how to preserve prac-
ticable opportunities for the latter to exit later or otherwise translate
their land rights into economic benefit.
– Land tenure reform involving the redistribution of private lands
should, wherever possible, be done at market prices through volun-
tary market transactions and not through involuntary takings. In the
exceptional cases of involuntary takings, the land losers should re-
ceive a fair and adequate price and not be targeted for punitive mea-
sures any more than the owner of land being taken for a highway.
– Land tenure reform policies and legislation must be developed
against the background of a thorough comprehension of the grass-
roots realities and the social, historical, economic and political sur-
round. It is now much better understood that this requires input
from a broad range of stakeholders. At the same time, one must be
cognizant of the possible existence of windows of opportunity and
the consequences of lengthy delay in the lives of the desperately poor.
– More universally recognized during the course of the four decades
– though still a struggle to put into practice – is that developing
and adopting appropriate policies, laws and programs forms only
the first part of the challenge. Implementation is key and is fully as
important and typically more challenging than the adoption of laws
and policies. Concomitantly, increasing attention is now paid to the
need to track implementation through systematic and independent
monitoring and evaluation.
– Legal aid for poor families who use, own or seek access to land can
be an important tool for implementing land tenure programs that
target the poor. It is a flexible tool in that the demands of legal aid
clients – the poor – can help implementers of the principal program
ensure that the program remains focused squarely on the poor. Land
rights legal aid also provides a very useful feedback loop for project
implementers, providing an early warning of project missteps.
This final chapter adds a brief gloss to these leading developments in
perception, prospects and practice that have emerged during the past
four decades and that seem likely to be largely determinative of
whether we may indeed see “one billion rising” out of rural poverty
through the land tenure reform of coming decades.
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I. Leading changes in prospects and practice
Declining relevance of “old” land-to-the-tiller approaches in combating
landlessness
The cumulative experience, discussed in Chapter 2, teaches much
about what legal and administrative parameters must be met to sup-
port a mandatory land-to-the-tiller program giving ownership to tenant
farmers. Even where those design lessons can be absorbed and applied,
a combination of political and financial constraints now make the pro-
spects for such reforms in the future rare. Countries where substantial
tenancy exists today generally have governments that are less authori-
tarian than they were decades ago, are much less likely to face threat-
ening rural rebellions centered on the land issue, and are likely to have
much higher land prices than in the past (after adjusting for inflation).
Thus, thinking in terms of the landlords whose lands would need to be
mandatorily acquired under such a program, there would today usually
be no government that could credibly impel them, no insurgency
whose existence might persuade them of the need to cooperate, and lit-
tle likelihood of adequate compensation for their land.
Limited relevance of estate-land distribution
The prospects for acquiring agricultural estates to provide laborers own-
ership rights – either individually or as a pro rata share – to land
equivalent to a full-sized or close to full-sized farm are discussed in
Chapter 3. Such prospects may be modestly greater than the prospects
for providing tenants with ownership of their present holdings. Even
where the government is now non-authoritarian and no impelling land-
related insurgency exists, some significant part of a country’s estate
lands may still have a low enough value to be affordable in a mandatory
taking at a market or near-market price. This will not be true of planta-
tion land producing high-value crops but may well be true of unused or
underused estate lands, including private unimproved pasture that
could be used for growing food crops. Even in such cases, important de-
sign parameters would need to be observed – for example, acquiring
and allocating modest enough landholdings per beneficiary family to al-
low replication over most or all of the needy beneficiary universe.
Prospects for using micro-plots to address landlessness
Although micro-plots have existed in many settings from time imme-
morial, their connection to the needs of the landless in traditional devel-
oping countries is only now being recognized and applied in practice,
as discussed in Chapter 4. Even where some developing countries have
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had small-plot allocation programs, they have often failed to recognize
the full potential benefits, either considering such plots solely in terms
of housing benefits and thus failing to provide the small additional area
beyond the footprint of the house itself that would permit significant
agronomic and other non-housing benefits, or actually providing some
area beyond the house footprint (largely by accident, rather than as a de-
liberate policy) and then failing to discover how such households are
using the unbuilt portion of the land to improve their livelihoods. Un-
like hypothetically projected land-to-the-tiller programs and many hy-
pothetically projected estate-lands programs, programs distributing
micro-plots are much more likely to be affordable to developing country
governments, with or without donor assistance. Indeed, with appropri-
ate design safeguards to prevent inflating land prices, the needed land
can often be acquired on the market from willing sellers. Thus, govern-
ments now have a generally affordable micro-plot option that is hard to
ignore in settings where distribution of full-sized farms to the landless
is impracticable. India appears now to be moving towards replication of
such programs countrywide, as discussed in Chapter 6.
Deregulation of tenancy
Once policy makers in a particular country setting determine that it is
not feasible in today’s circumstances to provide multi-acre or “full-
sized” farms in ownership to wage laborers working in the small-and-
medium-holding sector, legalization and deregulation of tenancy may
become another attractive option. Especially for landless agricultural la-
borers, becoming a tenant farmer may represent the first rung up on
the ladder out of poverty. Laborers who become tenants are likely to
achieve increased income, increased absorption of underused family la-
bor power, increased scope for decision making, and increased agro-
nomic knowledge.
Legalization and deregulation may also produce benefits where
tenants already hold land, but under formally illegal arrangements.
Public acknowledgement of lease terms that have been concluded in
secret may afford tenants a measure of protection against serious viola-
tions of such terms by the landlord, and tenants may gain useful bar-
gaining power from more freely circulating information on rental rates
and other lease terms. And if landlords are free to rent out land with-
out fear that tenants may claim ownership (or may assert other not-bar-
gained-for rights, such as a cap on rent), this may greatly enlarge the
pool of people to whom landlords are willing to rent. Thus, an ener-
getic and motivated young laborer family may replace an indifferent
(but previously “safe”) relative of the landlord as a tenant when a true
market for rentals begins to operate. Ending a purported right to be-
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come owner for tenants who are allowed to stay on the land more than
a short time may also permit longer-term leasing, with prospects for
better stewardship and multi-year improvements by tenants such as
use of organic fertilizer.
The land rights of women
Until very recently – an omission only beginning to be recognized and
remedied even now – the land rights of impoverished women have re-
ceived little attention. Chapter 5 examines in depth the challenges asso-
ciated with the land rights of women.
Land rights, including those conferred in reform programs, have al-
most always been considered as though they are solely those of or sole-
ly under the control of the “head of household,” who is almost always
a man.
“Family law,” moreover, often embodies customs that are extremely
difficult to influence by means of changes in formal law. In rural cul-
tures in developing country settings, customs related to land typically
give wives far less voice and control over the family’s land and its at-
tachments than is given to husbands. In decisions regarding land
transactions, inheritance of land, and rights to land in cases of divorce,
separation or abandonment, wives often have far lesser or even no ac-
knowledged rights to household land.
These customary arrangements are extremely difficult to change
with respect to land for which rights are already held. But where the
government is conferring rights to additional parcels of land or forma-
lizing rights already held (especially where existing rights are perceived
to be uncertain), it is often possible to confer and document those new
rights either in the joint names of wife and husband or even exclu-
sively in the name of the wife. The recognition that women’s rights
must be treated explicitly and at least equally, in programs that allocate
new land (or stronger rights) to beneficiaries represents a further
extremely important evolution in the concept of land tenure reform.
But wherever the wife’s rights are to be documented, it is not
enough just to make the proper notations or entries. It will also be im-
portant – and the more widespread and deeply rooted the contrary cus-
toms are, the more necessary this will be – to carry out a campaign of
education that underscores the land rights that women now have. In
some circumstances, special legal aid programs or initiatives under
broader legal aid programs may be needed to offer protection and edu-
cation focused on women’s enhanced land rights and all that they
entail.
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Whether and how to document land rights
Forty years ago, when confronted with the question of whether to for-
malize and document land rights, the general answer would have been,
“If the land is being used in fact on an individual household basis, and
there are no other private actors claiming a better right, then yes.” To-
day, as discussed in Chapter 8, the answer is more nuanced.
Among other considerations, it is important to recognize that com-
plex mosaics or layers of customary land rights are very difficult to cap-
ture and represent in the types of land titles commonly found in more
developed market economies. Women and others on the margins may
hold secondary or subsidiary rights – perhaps unperceived or see-
mingly “minor” to outsiders, but of great moment to such customary
rightholders – that may be overlooked, weakened or entirely lost during
a formal individualization and documentation process. Even if the for-
malization process succeeds in securing the rights of women (or chil-
dren, as in the case of orphans) who hold primary rights, the cost may
be the diminishment of important secondary rights previously exer-
cised by other women (or others in weaker positions). It is clearly diffi-
cult to assess the degree to which the potential gains of some may jus-
tify the potential losses of others in such cases. Some types of subsidi-
ary rights (gathering fallen branches for firewood, grazing animals in
the off-season, foraging mushrooms, etc.) may also be difficult or ad-
ministratively impossible to capture in a formalization process. How-
ever, to the extent that it is natural to suppose that the existing holders
of undocumented secondary or subsidiary rights are generally likely to
be less powerful than existing holders of undocumented primary
rights, then the burden of any process that favors the latter is likely to
fall on those least equipped to bear it.
Still another risk is that the well connected will make exaggerated or
even entirely false assertions of land rights in the course of a rights for-
malization process. And where the process of formalizing rights must
be financed by the rights claimants, the poor may not be able to afford
to participate, and thus may find that their rights are less protected
(relatively speaking) than they were before the formalization occurred.
This is a sound argument in favor of public financing of land formali-
zation programs. Design issues, including standards applied to land
description requirements, should be resolved in favor of modern, effec-
tive, lowest-cost technologies.
Many cultures place a high value on group property claims adminis-
tered by customary law institutions. In certain cases, these group rights
can be protected through formal recognition of the customary law insti-
tutions and the territorial claims by the group. Formalization of group
rights is very different from formalizing whatever individual rights are
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held by members of the group. The state must work closely with the
customary group to determine whether and under what circumstances
the group would like to see registration of the individual rights of its
members.
If these fundamental issues can be addressed successfully in pro-
gram design, the formalization of land rights may benefit the poor. But
the design challenges are complex, and the decision of whether to em-
bark upon formalization should be taken only after a thoughtful con-
sideration of the risks, costs and benefits of the program, in particular
with relation to the poorest and most marginalized segments of society.
There is much greater scope for conducting an analysis that is aware
and nuanced on those issues than would have been the case 40 years
ago. The devil is in the details.
The sticks in the property rights bundle
In cases where formal individualization of land rights is deemed desir-
able, it now appears much more clearly than it did four decades ago
that the “bundle” of rights confirmed should generally include all of
the characteristics usually associated with full private ownership and
marketability. Much like the issue of women’s land rights, issues relat-
ing to transferability and the importance of wealth creation through
land ownership or its equivalent were largely ignored and relegated to
the background three and four decades ago.
Ideally, the bundle of rights confirmed during formalization should
consist of a set of documented and perpetual (or at least very long-
term) rights that include the powers to sell, lease, mortgage and pass
such rights by inheritance. Under special circumstances it may be ap-
propriate, at least initially, for the government to impose some restric-
tions. For example, the government may decide to impose a brief mor-
atorium on sales where land markets are newly developing and unfa-
miliar, or a moratorium on sales to foreigners (who may come from
wealthier countries). Even if such measures do not respond to any real
threat, the government may find that such measures respond to popu-
lar fears and reduce public resistance to the individualization of rights.
Similarly, mortgage rules might include a limited homestead exemp-
tion, and debtor protections like crop insurance could be simulta-
neously introduced.
But the longer the duration and greater the scope of the restrictions
on sale and lease, the more likely it is that owners will be motivated to
transfer their rights through extra-legal means, driving the land market
underground. And if such transactions cannot be acknowledged, they
cannot be placed upon the public records, nor can they receive bank fi-
nancing via a mortgage. The resulting uncertainty and lack of finance
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are likely to reduce the market value of the land rights and simulta-
neously act as a drag on land market development. Moreover, restric-
tions on sale and lease that do achieve compliance will, so long as they
remain in place, correspondingly restrict the land market and its gener-
ally desirable “wealth creating” effect.
Once land rights are individually formalized, all rights that extend
beyond the lifetimes of the present holders will pass by law or by will,
at least to the extent the holders have not previously transferred such
rights in lawful transactions. Here, a further important application of
the women’s land rights principles suggested above should be to en-
sure that the wife inherits upon the death of the husband. Preferably,
such inheritance should not be merely a severable one-half interest,
but ownership of the entirety of the property such as would follow
from adopting “community property” type rules. (Of course, pari passu,
the husband would then inherit the whole if the wife died first.) To
protect the interests of the wife more fully, the law should stipulate
that one spouse’s attempted testamentary disposition through will
could not alter the other spouse’s entitlement, and should specify strict
procedural requirements for the wife’s formal consent to any transfer
attempted by the husband during his lifetime.
Successfully winding up decollectivization
After China and Vietnam allowed near-universal exit from their collec-
tive farms in the 1980s, and farm members departed rapidly to estab-
lish small family farms, it was assumed by many in the development
community that the same permission, if given in what was then the
USSR, would have the same results. In the years since communism
and central planning began to lose their grip in 1989 – and the former
Soviet republics went their separate ways in 1991 – the experience in
this region has been much more variable.
Excluding those settings where there has been no real permission gi-
ven by the government to break up the collectives, such as in Belarus,
it is now possible to look at more than a decade-and-a-half of post-com-
munist experience in prominent settings such as Russia and Ukraine,
and identify key factors that seem to have kept their collective farms
from following the radical break-up path seen in China and Vietnam.
Important variables, discussed in Chapter 7, seem to include the
length of time the farmers were collectivized, the likely need for and
scarcity of capital equipment for a resulting family farm (such farms
being much larger in settings like Russia than in settings like China),
the difficulty of accessing markets distant from the farm, and the farm-
ers’ lack of confidence that the reforms will not be reversed. The possi-
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ble role of such differences was not even the subject of serious specula-
tion prior to 1990.
But even where the collectives have not been broken up by a general
exodus of members, it is clear that some degree of land reallocation
and some benefits of privatization can be conferred upon such mem-
bers. For example, rules can allow and encourage the expansion of ex-
isting “private plots” held by the farm members – compare the discus-
sion of micro-plots above – which have historically been used for high-
er-value crops and more intensive animal husbandry. Also, the law
might at least be changed to remove barriers that make it difficult for
individuals to own or lease in enough land to create small and mid-size
farms. Governments or NGOs could also provide rural legal aid to en-
hance the likelihood that small landowners or land share owners – in-
cluding those who lease or sell land rights to the former collectives and
to new private enterprises in “reverse tenancy” or “corporate factory
farm” arrangements – receive basic protections. The law could thus
play a useful role in leveling the playing field between small transferors
and large transferees.
Analysis of the decollectivization experience (as explored in Chapter
7) remains highly relevant, of course, to facilitating future transitions
in the two most prominent holdouts still mandating a collectivist orga-
nization of agriculture – North Korea and Cuba – as well as for others
like Belarus and Kazakhstan. And some combination of further enlar-
gement of the private plots and policies to address constraints in start-
ing full-sized private farms may yet have an impact on the future shape
of farming in Russia and Ukraine.
Paying an adequate price for land to be acquired
The issue of how the government should obtain private land for public
purposes – including for reallocation to the poor – has been the subject
of dramatic new thinking over the past four decades. Indeed, this issue
was the entry point in 1966 for the first land tenure work that pre-
ceded RDI’s formation. For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, it is gener-
ally best to pay the market price for any private land that is to be used
in a land tenure reform program.
This, in turn, means that the needed land should usually be acquir-
able – wherever a rural land market has developed – on the basis of
market transactions involving a willing buyer and willing seller. Excep-
tions may arise in the case of acquisition of estate land where the exist-
ing market price is excessive relative to the land’s present income flow,
whether due to its role as a source of political power or for other rea-
sons that are not directly economic. In such cases, the government
might reasonably invoke its eminent domain power to acquire the land
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at a price reflecting a reasonable capitalization of its projected net in-
come flow.
But even this non-confiscatory and non-punitive “eminent domain”
model should be rarely involved. Wherever possible, the program
should be entirely without compulsion and based on the payment of
market prices. And to the extent that micro-plot allocation programs
come to “occupy the field” in lieu of older approaches focused on full-
sized farms, the amounts of land needed will be correspondingly much
smaller, and the prospects for land acquisition through market pur-
chase correspondingly much better. Such market-based approaches, of
course, as discussed in Chapter 3, do not preclude the use of measures
to ensure that the program of government or government-financed
purchases does not inflate the price of land, such as the protective mea-
sure of a Dutch auction in which would-be sellers compete to offer a
buyer the best deal.
Creating new norms
The development of land tenure reform policies and legislation is a la-
bor-intensive and demanding task. A full comprehension of the on-the-
ground realities and the social, historical, economic and political con-
text is needed. Those designing such policies and legislation must seek
input from a broad range of interested parties: the rural poor and land-
less themselves, landowners, government officials, knowledgeable
NGOs and other civil society participants, academics, and others with
relevant knowledge and perspectives. Focused desk research must be
followed by extensive field interviewing (sometimes called “rapid rural
appraisal”) and, often, by full-scale sample surveys.
There are no cookie-cutter solutions that obviate the need for this de-
manding labor. And while the comparative experience can be instruc-
tive, cautionary, even enlightening, good policies and laws cannot be
simply imported across national boundaries.
At the same time, “windows of opportunity” do in fact open and
close. Bad advice may also rush in to fill a vacuum, especially where a
new government or leader – perhaps urban in experience and outlook,
but well-disposed toward the rural poor and their needs – has come to
power. And there must be a constant awareness that long delays in for-
mulating programs, if they are allowed to occur in an otherwise recep-
tive environment, will come in a setting in which the rural poor and
landless continue each day to suffer and have needs – with chronic
malnutrition, for example, the most important contributing factor in
child deaths globally.
Ultimately, one reason why we write this book is the hope that it
may help to make such delays in program formulation shorter, in so
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far as the accumulated experience may bear on the introduction of
practicable solutions in a specific setting.
From norm creation to norm fulfillment
A recurring theme in this book has been that it is essential not just to
adopt or already possess “good laws” on the books, but to have those
laws widely and effectively implemented in the countryside. As com-
pared to 40 years ago, there is a much greater awareness today both of
key litmus tests that an adequate implementation process must meet,
and of the need to assess actual accomplishments systematically.
Key elements for the adequate implementation of laws must always
involve reiterated publicity, delivered by means that are highly accessi-
ble to the intended beneficiaries of the tenure reform. In some settings
(such as rural China), television may be a highly suitable medium, but
will be of little use in rural settings that lack electrification. Planners
must clearly consider literacy levels when crafting and using printed
materials, including the literacy rates of women who should be in-
cluded as at least equal beneficiaries. In-person education about new
land rights programs is also often critical, and typically must be deliv-
ered to groups of beneficiaries by effectively trained local officials and
civil-society actors desiring to help support the program. Legal aid pro-
grams are an especially promising method of providing local educa-
tional outreach both to local officials and program beneficiaries, and
RDI’s experience with them has been discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
The need for systematic monitoring and evaluation of actual accom-
plishment through well-designed sample surveys is much more widely
recognized today. Such surveys can also be supplemented by more fre-
quent and less formal “rapid rural appraisal” interviews. This monitor-
ing can yield crucial information for refinements and “mid-course cor-
rections” as land tenure reform programs are being implemented. New
and supplemental approaches for gathering information from benefici-
aries, such as via telephone hotline or text messaging to a central in-
spectorate, could now be in prospect in many countries with the rapid
spread of cell phone technologies. And information gathered by NGOs
and reports by local media should be carefully monitored as affording
early warnings of possible problems.
Disputes over land rights will arise, of course, and some local offi-
cials or the well-connected may seek to intercept benefits or deprive
the poor of what is rightfully theirs. Intended beneficiaries together
with administrators and implementing agencies must, wherever possi-
ble, be backed up by adequate judicial or quasi-judicial institutions that
administer some form of dispute resolution.
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And just as it is important to budget adequately for such central ele-
ments of a land tenure reform as, for example, the purchase of private
land for allocation to the poor, policy makers must also identify and
make available the human and financial resources necessary to sustain
the various measures of implementation.
Legal aid
Legal aid programs may help land tenure reform beneficiaries access
judicial or quasi-judicial institutions that can offer protection in case of
disputes with local officials or the well-connected. But the past decade
or so has yielded experience showing that land rights legal aid can have
impacts on program implementation that go well beyond litigation.
Legal aid providers – pro-actively traveling to the places where both
beneficiaries and local implementers are – can serve a vital educational
function, educating beneficiaries as to what their rights are, and in-
forming those charged with front-line implementation as to the speci-
fics of relevant laws and regulations. Information gathered by the legal
aid providers about what is happening in the countryside and what
kinds of disputes may be arising or on the horizon can, in turn, be car-
ried back to the makers of policy and the crafters of implementation
strategies in national or provincial capitals to give early warning of pro-
blems and also mid-course corrections in implementation approaches
(also, in effect, another source of program monitoring).
And, when disputes arise, litigation – though it may be highly suc-
cessful when pursued, even in seemingly unpromising institutional en-
vironments – is usually a measure of last resort that is, in practice,
rarely necessary. A motivated, energetic and informed legal profes-
sional on the side of a disputant poor family is able in a wide range of
settings to gain a satisfactory outcome in the great majority of disputes,
even against the powerful, with a trip to court comprising a tacit threat
that rarely needs to be invoked.
II. The continuing relevance of land tenure reform today
On balance, the needs for land tenure reform around the globe are al-
most certainly greater than they were four decades ago, when the pre-
cursor work that led to the creation of RDI began.
In some respects, of course, those needs have diminished. Most no-
tably, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that the
proportion of the world’s population dependent on agriculture, exclud-
ing the long-time developed economies, has fallen from about 66% in
1970 to around 51% currently. However, the number of people counted
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in the agricultural sector in those countries has actually increased, by
some three-fifths, as a result of the large overall increases in population
and is today more than 3 billion people.
Certainly there are some countries, such as Brazil, where the propor-
tion of those engaged in agriculture has fallen so far over the past four
decades that one might argue the land issue has now greatly declined
in relative importance and that formulation of responses to urban pov-
erty must now receive much higher priority. Shortly after RDI first did
fieldwork in Brazil in 1968, looking at the land tenure issue and con-
ceivable solutions (theoretically feasible, but not then politically possi-
ble), the FAO estimated 45% of the population was economically active
in agriculture. Today it is 16%, and even the absolute number of those
counted in the agricultural sector has declined, from 37 million to 31
million. Is addressing the rural land tenure issue in contemporary Bra-
zil, or in other countries with seemingly similar demographics of
urbanization just “locking the barn door after the horse is stolen”? The
question will be considered further below.
Another seeming source of decline for the importance of the land
tenure reform issue is the end of the Cold War. Even well before the
Cold War ended around 1989-1990, there had been a sputtering de-
cline in major civil conflicts in which largely rural-based Marxist move-
ments used the land issue to organize threats to existing regimes. With
the exception of Nepal (where a political settlement had seemingly
been reached shortly before this was written), the last national insur-
gencies that embodied serious threats of that kind were the interimly
successful one in Nicaragua, the failed one in El Salvador, and the non-
Marxist one still in power after nearly three decades in Zimbabwe, each
of which had led to major and highly disparate programs to address
the land issue. Other current violent movements that seem to threaten
governments with some degree of seriousness – among them, Afghani-
stan, Iraq, Somalia, Algeria and Kashmir – have much less or nothing
to do with the land tenure issue. But to say that violent Marxist move-
ments that seek to mobilize the rural poor around land-based grie-
vances are no longer as widespread as they were in the 1960s, or even
as salient as they were in the 1980s, may not necessarily be to say that
dangerous instability is not a threat traceable to the poverty of the rural
landless, in at least some critical settings. Again, this will be considered
further below.
Both urbanization and Marxism’s decline may thus have diminished
the relevance of rural land tenure reform, at least upon first glance. On
the other side of the ledger, the possibility and need for pro-poor land
tenure reform initiatives have clearly increased over the past four dec-
ades in four important ways.
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First, rural land tenure reform has become a live topic and ongoing
process in most of the former centrally planned economies. Coinciding
with the diminution of serious Marxist insurgencies in non-communist
developing countries that grew out of the end of the global confronta-
tion between communism and capitalism, there has also been a broad
resurgence of the importance of the rural land issue within the former
centrally planned economies themselves. Many have now embraced
“capitalist” and market-based approaches that have led to the signifi-
cant reorganization of their agricultural sectors including their rural
land systems. The transformations in these countries would not have
been predicted, or even imagined, four decades ago. However, the
transformation of the rural land tenure systems is not yet complete in
these transition economies. Whereas land tenure reform was not a live
topic in these former centrally planned economies 40 years ago, it
remains an important topic of unfinished business today. Of these,
China alone contains about one-fourth of the agricultural population of
the planet. Other countries, notably North Korea and Cuba, have yet to
transition away from unsuccessful collective farming but presumably
will at some future time; and in the former Soviet republics there is a
wide spectrum of experience, from persisting collectivization (Belarus,
Kazakhstan) to “land shares” and formal privatization side-by-side with
variations on continuing collective or other large-scale operation (Rus-
sia, Ukraine) to near-complete exit into family farms (Baltic states,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan).
Second, new approaches to land tenure reform, through the distribu-
tion of micro-plots and through liberalizing tenancy, mean that land
tenure reforms could now reach additional tens of millions of house-
holds of the rural landless – especially agricultural laborer households
– and could provide major benefits in settings in which governments
had given up on the land tenure issue over previous decades. The need
for new measures to aid rural laborer households that must presently
use a cash wage to acquire their entire daily sustenance is especially
critical in light of the startling, and likely to persist, crisis in the price
of basic foodstuffs. Furthermore, the new focus on intra-family alloca-
tion of benefits offers promise of bringing land rights to a large new
segment of the neediest and most marginalized: women and, through
them, young children. The additional number of poor rural persons in
traditional developing countries for whom the land issue can thus once
again be revitalized – by intelligently re-imagining the forms that ten-
ure reform can take – is probably at least as great as the numbers for
whom the possibility of tenure reform has been newly created by the
withering of central planning.
Third, giving the poorest a stake in the rural economy can slow the
process of excessively rapid urbanization. This matter takes on ever-
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greater urgency as governments see the anomie, suffering and violence
that can arise out of “desperation urbanization” in which large num-
bers of the landless poor are impelled to the cities by the push of pov-
erty, with no real prospect for steady employment or for educating their
children, and with no assets other than the clothes on their back. Such
desperation urbanization may create new potentials for instability. For
example, some of the teenage sons of the migrating families – instead
of becoming rural Marxist guerrillas – may now join or support radical
political groups (e.g., Pakistan, Egypt) or secular criminal gangs (e.g.,
Brazil, South Africa) in the new urban setting. Here, the wealth-creat-
ing aspect of the conferral of rural land rights in forestalling premature
and unprepared urban migration may be especially relevant, and in-
volves the increasing recognition of the importance of the marketability
of such rights. There may also be settings in which recent premature
urbanization might be partially reversed if, for example, ownership of
micro-plots is made available in peri-urban areas.
Fourth, some of the most vexing and difficult land tenure reform is-
sues now arise in post-conflict or post-disaster settings, in which some
great trauma has set the stage for widespread local contentions as to
which household or group has the more legitimate claim to possess
and use particular lands. Many such conflicts over land arise in African
settings, of which the post-apartheid land restitution program in South
Africa is perhaps the most widely known example. It is hard to judge
whether the need for post-conflict resolution of land disputes is greater
today than it was 40 years ago; certainly the international awareness of
the problem is greater. And one huge and continuing disaster that has
multiplied the number of such land disputes greatly is the global HIV/
AIDS pandemic, with its death toll now at 25 million, much of this
concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, the hardest hit region. The effects
of the pandemic raise many issues related to women’s access to land,
in particular: what are a wife’s land rights when her husband has died
of HIV/AIDS? What are the land rights of an aunt or other female
care-giver when parents of the children she cares for are dead? What
are the land rights of orphans, female or male? By what affordable and
replicable processes are humane and acceptable resolutions of these is-
sues to be reached?
In sum, there will be no dearth of land tenure reform issues to de-
mand the attention of specialists, governments, funders, NGOs, aca-
demics, members of the media, concerned citizens and vast numbers
of direct stakeholders for many years to come. As long as poverty, hun-
ger, distress and instability prevail among large numbers of the world’s
rural population, and many of them still lack a secure relationship,
often even access, to the chief source of rural livelihoods, hope and sta-
tus, these land issues will have to be addressed.
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— of sharecropped land in India 265
transfers
— inter vivos 217
— anticipatory 75
— of land rights by the poor
prematurely 341
— prohibition on in India 245
— restrictions on 77
tree planting 155, 162-163, 182, 338, 349
tribals 261
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U
U.S. Agency for International
Development See USAID
Uganda
— bride price and dowry 216
— consent requirements 214
— joint titling in 204
— opposition to women in 210
— polygamy in 217
— tenure security in 349
— titling in 336
— widows in 220, 227
— women in 212
— women’s formal title to land in 204
— women’s inheritance in 220
Ukraine
— agri-business leasing land in 320
— few private farms in 313
— formalization in 348
— land shares in 314
— legal aid in 378, 385, 389-393, 395,
398
— readiness to leave collective farms
compared to China, Vietnam 317
Ukraine Land Titling Initiative
(ULTI) 386, 390, 392-393, 396, 398
United Fruit Company 127
United States support of land-to-the-tiller
programs 67
University of Washington School of Law,
RDI and 20, 413
urbanization 36, 86, 426
urbanization 125 See also migration
USAID 65, 81, 335, 362, 378, 398
V
Venezuela 122, 128
Vietnam War 64 See also conflict,
political
Vietnam, South See South Vietnam 63
Village Land Committee 60-61
village seminars 392-393, 396
W
wastelands 238, 247
water
— for drinking 172
— for micro-plots 178
— irrigation in Papua New Guinea 163
— micro-catchments for rainwater 163
— micro-plot colonies and 180
— micro-plots and 161, 163, 166, 177
water 27 See also irrigation
West Bengal
— ceilings on ownership in 245
— micro-plots in 253
— sharecroppers in 263, 265
— tenancy reforms in 86
— tenancy regulation in 82
— tenancy rules in 240
— turning protected tenants into
landowners 264
widows
— as heads of household 170
— customary law and 219
— HIV/AIDS widows 221
— in Nicaragua and Honduras 218
— in Tanzania 203
— in Uganda 220, 227
— inheritance by 217, 220
— right to purchase land 210
— working the land indirectly 196
widows 220 See also women
Widows’ Rights International 221
wills 218
women
— 30-year land rights and 200
— as at-will tenants 32
— challenges in changing customary
arrangements to land rights 414
— customary law and 198, 226
— discrimination against 197-198
— divorce and 214
— economically vulnerable 176
— effect of gender training on land
rights 205
— elderly 196
— formalization and 342, 204
— heads of household rights 199
— Hindu Succession Act and 222
— in Bolivia 204
— in Honduras 206
— in Karnaka 215
— in Karnataka 210
— in Kyrgyz Republic 201
— in Laos 206, 224
— in Pakistan 213
— in the Philippines 213
— in Uganda 210, 212
— in Zimbabwe 213
— individualization of communal land
and 203
— inheritance by 220
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— joint titling and 205
— juveniles under customary law 219
— knowledge of land rights 223
— lack of access to resources 211
— land access and 48
— land markets and 210
— land redistribution and 199
— land rights and limitations of formal
law 38
— land rights and tenure security
efforts 38
— land rights of 195
— land tenure reform and 224
— leases and 211
— legal aid in China 384
— marriage and 205
— Muslim law and 211
— paralegals and 404
— protecting rights of 40
— registration of land rights 356
— restrictions on tenancy and 241
— Rural Land Contracting Law
and 200
— self-help groups in Andhra
Pradesh 254
— status as beneficiaries in land-to-the-
tiller 73
— systematic registration and 362
— widowed 203 See also divorce;
education; widows
World Bank
— in Egypt, role in reversing tenant
protection 85
— in Honduras, finance of registration
program 336
— in Laos, Laos Women’s Union
and 224
— lack of economies of scale and 113
— market-assisted land reform 70
— research on distribution of land 19
— support programs to acquire estate
lands 129
Z
zamindari system (India) 237
Zimbabwe
— Magaya v. Magaya 219
— design flaws in land reform 44
— land invasions in 126
— misuse of term land reform in 414
— reform not pro-poor 20
— taking of estate land not a
reform 120
— university-based legal aid in 400
— women in 213
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